January saw some interesting developments in Iraq, both good and bad. On the security front, there was a large spike in violence by both insurgents and Shiites. On the political side the government is still deadlocked as parties reposition themselves in the drive for power. On the economic front oil is holding up the economy, while basic services are faltering. All together it was a month characterized by one step forward, two steps back.
Security: A Spike In Violence[/b]
In long wars like the one in Iraq increases in violence are to be expected. Gen. Petraeus has continued to warn people that the security situation in Iraq is fragile and the U.S. is far from winning the war. That was proved in January with a major military operation in central Iraq, new attacks on the Sunni Awakening groups, and the re-emergence of a Shiite cult. The ups and downs in security is a major reason why the Bush administration wants a deal with Iraq for a long term U.S. military presence there before it leaves office.
While Baghdad has settled into a rough cease-fire between Sunnis and Shiites, violence went up in provinces surrounding capital where insurgents fled during the surge. For example, in December the governor of Ninawa province quit because of attacks, while in January the police chief of that province was killed in a massive bombing, 120 Kurdish families were forced out of the city, and there was an assassination attempt on the governor of Diyala province.
Crater left from bomb that killed Mosul???s police chief
All of these were reasons why the U.S. launched Operation Phantom Phoenix aimed at rooting out insurgents from the four provinces surrounding Baghdad. While many fighters left before the U.S. arrived, the plan is to build up Sunni awakening groups to try to keep insurgents from returning. This tactic has had mixed results so far. One area the U.S. is currently carrying out operations in, Arab Jabour for example, was touted as a new safe zone in the winter of 2007 in a speech by Bush and in several news pieces, only to have 40,000 lbs of bombs dropped on it at the beginning of Phantom Phoenix. This led the U.S. military to admit that they had only taken reporters to the safe part of the town, while the other side was still an insurgent stronghold.
U.S. operations in Diyala province, part of Operation Phantom Phoenix
The Sunni awakening councils have also become a favorite target of their former insurgent brethren. At the end of December bin Laden released a new tape where he called the awakening groups traitors. There has been a steady increase on attacks on them since then. More and more Shiite militias have also come into conflict with them. As a result, several awakening leaders have been assassinated throughout the country including ones in Adhamiya in Baghdad, Baquba in Diyala, Shaab north of the capitol, and in Anbar province.
U.S. soldiers with an Awakening member
In the Shiite south the Soldiers of Heaven cult re-emerged for the second year running, attacking Iraqi security forces in three cities. The uprising was put down, but not before hundreds were killed, wounded and arrested.
More troubling for the future security of the country were three other developments. First American officers told Time magazine that the U.S. was beginning to cut back on payments to Sunni groups. America has promised to fund the awaking groups until 2008, but the long-term plan is to have the vast majority of them get government construction jobs. The problem is that money for this program hasn???t appeared yet and many Sunnis do not want that type of work. 20% of the Sunnis are also supposed to be integrated into the security forces, but this has only happened in Anbar and Abu Ghraib just outside of Baghdad. Prime Minister Maliki continues to be cold on both these programs and has had ordered thousands of Shiite militiamen to be taken into the services to counter any new Sunni recruits. What the Awakening fighters will do if they no longer get paid is an open question.
The U.S. is also planning on releasing almost 20,000 Iraqis, mostly Sunni prisoners this year. There are extensive programs to rehabilitate them before release, but the major problem is that there are no jobs for them once they???re out. Unemployment has been a major factor in the growth of militias and the insurgency. There is also no way to monitor the prisoners after they???re released.
Last, the Sadrists are making noises about ending the stand down of the Mahdi Army, which has been a major factor in the decrease in violence in the country. Spokesmen have claimed the government, and especially their main Shiite rival the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) are persecuting them. The Sadrists say they are fed up and might strike back. Their discontent was shown when Iraq???s national security advisor was trapped in a mosque in Baghdad by Sadrists and had to call on the police to rescue him. While some Sadrist leaders want to compete in the political field, others think violence is a way to rally the Shiite masses to their cause.
Any of these could derail the security gains that have been achieved in recent months. That???s why the Bush administration is pushing for a new agreement that would ensure a long term U.S. troop presence in Iraq. The U.S. and Iraq disagree on the details however. Iraqis want some kind of deadline for when U.S. forces will leave. That led Iraq???s foreign and defense ministers to say that the U.S. will be out by 2018 when Iraqis are capable of protecting their borders and taking over internal security. The U.S. wants more of an open ended agreement, probably with de facto permanent bases. The declaration of principles that was released in November 2007 for example, said that the U.S. would protect Iraq from both internal and external threats, something the U.S. has not promised any other country. That would give the U.S. the authority to prop up the Iraqi government for as long as they wanted.
Politics: Gridlock and Maneuverings Behind The Scenes[/b]
Violence might have spiked in January, but the real problem with Iraq continues to be its government. The Maliki prime ministership is incompetent, sectarian and still divided. It hasn???t come through with any of the political benchmarks that it has been promising since it took office in 2006. A new deBaathiication law was voted on by Parliament but Sunni Vice President Hashemi says he will hold up its passage into law until its amended. The constitutional review committee missed its deadline once again and has asked for another extension of its work. Provincial elections have also been postponed, mostly because the ruling parties see them as a threat to their power. Bush and Maliki promised that Iraq would spend $10 billion on reconstruction as part of the surge, but has only spent about $3 billion or less. Most of this money continues to go to Shiite areas more than Sunni ones. The only thing that keeps Iraq running is the U.S. military which is the real government in the country. They deliver services, build infrastructure, shuttle politicians to and fro, cut political deals, etc. This kind of intensive nation building can???t last and builds dependence amongst the Iraqis. Why should they do anything if they know the U.S. will do it for them?
Vice President Hashemi wants the government to release Sunni prisoners and give other concessions in order for the Sunni parties to return to the government
This gridlock has led the political parties to a
ttempt to remake the government. Maliki???s ruling coalition fell apart in 2007 and he only finds support from his own Dawa Party and the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC). The SIIC has been working feverishly to create a new bloc to support Maliki, calling on the boycotting cabinet members to return. At the same time, the Kurds, that use to be one of Maliki???s main backers have grown disillusioned with the prime minister because he failed to stop Turkish attacks on Kurdistan and failed to follow through with a promise to have elections over the future of Kirkuk. The Kurds have been working independently to bring in as many political parties as possible to resolve the Kirkuk issue so that it is annexed by them, while threatening a no confidence vote unless Maliki consults with more people when making decisions. The Sunni parties have been meeting with Maliki, the SIIC and the Kurds to try to negotiate their return to government as well. They are ready to come back because they feel threatened by the Sunni Anbar Awakening Council that wants a voice in government. The Sunni parties want to get back their positions in government before the Awakening Council can become an actual political party and displace them.
Opposed to these machinations is a nationalist bloc made up of Sadrists, former prime minister Ilyad Allawi???s Iraqi National List and the Sunni National Dialogue Front. They want to depose Maliki, are against the Kurds??? expansionist aspirations and want national control over Iraq???s oil. 138 members of parliament are needed for a no confidence vote in Maliki, but so far, the various coalitions either for or against him have only around 100.
All of these moves are symbolic of how Iraqi politics have changed over the last year. Two of the major blocs, the Sunis and Shites, have fallen apart. Political parties act more out of their own interests rather than larger sectarian concerns. This allows for more flexibility and alliances. Whether this will lead to a functioning government is yet to be seen. The political parties have used the government???s ministries as a way to enrich themselves and their followers rather than to actually run the country. Maliki has also shown no signs of change, especially because President Bush always says he stands behind him. Given this background, the impending announcement that boycotting parties will return to Maliki???s cabinet may be just a new coalition that maintains the status quo.
Maliki???s ruling coalition disintegrated in 2007, but a new one seems to be forming. No matter who is part of it, Maliki is assured of staying in office.
Iraq???s oil wealth obscures problems with the rest of Iraq???s economy
Macroeconomic reports on Iraq were good in the opening of 2008, but they hid problems with how the economy was actually affecting the public. The IMF reported that Iraq???s economy would grow by 7% in 2008 because of high oil prices. They also hoped that exports would increase even though they were below previous years and didn???t meet the government???s production goals. At the same time two major oil refineries were shut down because they couldn???t get electricity, while a third was attacked and closed for repairs. There is still no new oil law either, and one is probably dead for now because of disagreements with the Kurds over who has the power to make contracts.
The larger economic indicators also hide what???s actually going on within the country. The Pentagon???s December 2007 report gave an optimistic report on Iraq???s electricity output, but the Electricity Minister said there had been no improvement in power for the last year. 2 hours of electricity during the day is the norm across the country. Much of northern Iraq has simply run out of electricity. Iraqi papers report that it is the worst energy crisis since the start of the war. There is also a water shortage that has cut farm production, the second largest business in the country after oil.
This all points to how oil wealth is a chimera. It provides large profits, good numbers, but few jobs. The government uses the profits for massive social programs for a public that is bereft of opportunities. The situation is made worse by the fact that Iraq is in the middle of a war that has created massive unemployment and disrupted all services.
Conclusion[/b]
Overall, the U.S. is attempting to consolidate its gains before the surge ends in the summer of 2008, but there are still long term threats to security. These come from armed factions, the inability of the government to carry out its duties, and the faltering economy. If Baghdad doesn???t start to deliver, the insurgents will continue their struggle, the Awakening groups will get fed up and disrupt things, the Shiites will continue to fracture and fight amongst each other, the Kurds will increasingly go their own way, services will continue to deteriorate, and Iraq will maintain its position as one of the worst failed states in the world. These are all problems that the U.S. won???t be able to walk away from for decades.
Sources[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Biddle, Stephen, ???Iraq after the Surge,??? Committee on Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, 1/23/08
Government Accountability Office, ???Iraq Reconstruction: Better Data Needed to Assess Iraq???s Budget Execution,??? January 2008
Think Tank And U.N. Reports[/b]
Cordesman, Anthony, ???The Evolving Security Situation in Iraq: The Continuing Need for Strategic Patience,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/21/08
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Cordesman: Despite Gains, Future in Iraq, Afghanistan Remains ???Uncertain,?????? Council on Foreign Relations, 1/14/08
Hamre, John, ???Alternative Strategies or Iraq in the Post-Surge Environment, Testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/16/08
Mardini, Ramzy, ???Implications o the New Kurdish-Sunni Alliance for Security in Iraq???s Ninawa Governorate,??? Jamestown Foundation, 1/14/08
Serwer, Daniel and al-Rahim, Rend, ???Iraq: Politics Unfrozen, Direction Still Unclear,??? United States Institute of Peace, January 2008
United Nations Security Council, ???Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1770 (2007),??? 1/14/08
Articles[/b]
Alsumaria, ???Accordance Front return to Cabinet imminent,??? 1/25/08 - ???Agriculture production decreases in Iraq,??? 1/22/08 - ???Iraq tribes request role in decision making,??? 1/18/08 - ???Iraq VP decries Justice & Accountability law,??? 1/22/08
Aswat Aliraq, ???272 gunmen killed, wounded or captured in Basra, Nassiriya clashes ??? ministry,??? 1/20/08 - ???Casualties from Basra clashes reach 314,??? 1/19/08 - ???Gunmen kill Sadrist Sheikh in Najaf,??? 1/26/08 - ???IAF to ponder return to government ??? source,??? 1/17/08 - ???IED kills 3 governor bodyguards, wounds 2 in Diala,??? 1/19/08 - ???Iraqi Alliances: Shifting Sands,??? 1/28/08 - ???Messianic cults in Iraq, an increase in numbers and expansion,??? 1/26/08 - ???New alliances not new intentions in Iraq,??? 1/29/08 - ???PM receives IAF delegation, stresses reconciliation,??? 1/26/08 - ???Sadr may extend freeze if govt. stops measures against loyalists ??? spokesman,??? 1/21/08 - ???Sunni party about to join 4-way alliance ??? SIIC,??? 1/25/08 - ???VP intends to hinder approvi
ng accountability bill ??? MP,??? 1/23/08
Battat, Abed, ???Security worsens in three southern provinces,??? Azzaman, 1/21/08
BBC News, ???Agencies see good year for Iraq,??? 1/17/08
Becatoros, Elena, ???U.S. hopes jobs dim allure of Iraq???s militant groups,??? Associated Press, 1/3/08
Boot, Max, ???We Are Winning. We Haven???t Won,??? Weekly Standard, 1/28/08
Boot, Max and West, Bing, ???Iraq???s Number 1 Problem,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/28/08
Bowman, Tom, ???A Year Later, Surge???s Impact Seen in Some Areas,??? Morning Edition ??? NPR, 1/7/08
Christian Science Monitor, ???As violence ebbs, the next hurdle for Iraq is political progress,??? 1/8/08
Cockburn, Patrick, ??????If there is no change in three months, there will be war again,?????? Independent, 1/28/08 - ???US troops will be gone within 10 years, says Iraqi minister,??? Independent, 1/25/08
Farrell, Stephen, ???U.S. Attack in Iraq Is No Surprise to Many Insurgents,??? New York Times, 1/9/08
Gamel, Kim, ???Iraqi Troops Clash With Shiite Cult,??? Washington Post, 1/18/08
al-Mawsawi, Abdulati, ???Production halted at two major Iraqi refineries,??? Azzaman, 1/18/08
Moore, Solomon and Oppel, Richard, ???Attacks Imperil U.S.-Backed Militias in Iraq,??? New York Times, 1/24/08
Moubayed, Sami, ???Iraq???s Sunnis reclaim lost ground,??? Asia Times, 1/15/08
Oppel, Richard and Al-Ansary, Khalid, ???Shiite Priases Anti-Insurgent Militias,??? New York Times, 1/4/08
Oppel, Richard and Al-Husaini, ???Suicide Bomber Kills Key Sunni Leader,??? New York times, 1/8/08
Oppel, Richard and Mizher, Qais, ???Bomber Kills Sunni Allies of the U.S.,??? New York Times, 1/21/08
Pepper, Daniel, ???The U.S. Financial Crisis ??? in Iraq,??? Time, 1/23/08
Peterson, Scott, ???How fear turns to resolve in one Iraqi village,??? Christian Science Monitor, 1/23/08
Raz, Guy, ???Long-Term Pact with Iraq Raises Questions,??? National Public Radio, 1/24/08 - ???Some Say U.S. May Shift to Peacekeeping in Iraq,??? All Things Considered ??? NPR, 1/10/08
Hey motown. If you haven't spent all your bilefilled-evil-torturing-illegal-abusive-opressive rhetoric on George Bush and the soldiers out there protecting your fat ass, maybe you could spare some on some real evil - like people who blow up retarded women and use 10 year old children to kidnap and murder innocents. Or is that outside the scope of your article?
BAGHDAD - Videotapes seized during U.S. raids on suspected al-Qaida in Iraq hide-outs show the terror group training young boys to kidnap and assassinate civilians, U.S. and Iraqi officials said Wednesday.
Footage aired for reporters showed an apparent training operation with black-masked boys ??? some of whom appeared to be about 10 years old ??? storming a house and holding guns to the heads of mock residents. Another tape showed a young boy wearing a suicide vest and posing with automatic weapons.
Hey motown. If you haven't spent all your bilefilled-evil-torturing-illegal-abusive-opressive rhetoric on George Bush and the soldiers out there protecting your fat ass, maybe you could spare some on some real evil - like people who blow up retarded women and use 10 year old children to kidnap and murder innocents. Or is that outside the scope of your article?
BAGHDAD - Videotapes seized during U.S. raids on suspected al-Qaida in Iraq hide-outs show the terror group training young boys to kidnap and assassinate civilians, U.S. and Iraqi officials said Wednesday.
Footage aired for reporters showed an apparent training operation with black-masked boys ??? some of whom appeared to be about 10 years old ??? storming a house and holding guns to the heads of mock residents. Another tape showed a young boy wearing a suicide vest and posing with automatic weapons.
News flash! In February 2008 Saba declares that Al Qaeda in Iraq is evil!
Wow Sab, how many people know about this? You need to spread the word. This is a Frickin' revelation! YOu have a true news scoop here.
They must not have heard that the insurgents have been using kids as look outs and to plant bombs since the insurgency started in 2003.
They must not have read about how insurgents used two handicapped women for those market bombings last week.
They must not have read about how in Diyala insurgents left bodies with their heads cut off to try to deter people from joining Concerned Local Citizens groups the U.S. was trying to organize.
They must not have read how torture houses have been uncovered in Anbar and Diyala recently as the U.S. has been sweeping through those areas.
And I'm sure you didn't read how I wrote that one of the main reasons why Sunnis turned against Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamists was because they imposed a strict form of Islamic law and killed people that didn't follow it.
And I'm sure you didn't read about how I wrote that one of the causes for the Anbar tribes to turn against AL Qaeda in Iraq was because the insurgents tried to force marriages upon the tribes and ended up killing entire families when they refused.
And they must not have read that the insurgents continue to do this in Diyala.
And you must not know that some of the CLCs that the U.S. has set up in Baghdad like the Ghazilya Guardians are in fact former Islamists that went around imposing Islamic law and killing people.
I guess it was just the monthly time for Sab to wave the flag and claim victory.
When you catch up and know what the hell is going on in Iraq, please let us all know.
When you catch up and know what the hell is going on in Iraq, please let us all know.
Dude wouldn't know what homework was if it hit him in the head. He is the worst kind of political commentator; he's a true believer, just like Rummy and Perle. Reality is not part of his equation.
When you catch up and know what the hell is going on in Iraq, please let us all know.
Dude wouldn't know what homework was if it hit him in the head. He is the worst kind of political commentator; he's a true believer, just like Rummy and Perle. Reality is not part of his equation.
I wanted to post these speeches from Dr. Dahlia Wasfi here as they seem fitting to this great summarizing thread about the U.S. occupation of Iraq. This speech is from an "Out of Iraq" Forum which took place on April 26, 2006:
When you catch up and know what the hell is going on in Iraq, please let us all know.
Dude wouldn't know what homework was if it hit him in the head. He is the worst kind of political commentator; he's a true believer, just like Rummy and Perle. Reality is not part of his equation.
When you catch up and know what the hell is going on in Iraq, please let us all know.
Dude wouldn't know what homework was if it hit him in the head. He is the worst kind of political commentator; he's a true believer, just like Rummy and Perle. Reality is not part of his equation.
Of course it comes with the mandatory disclaimer, to protect people like you from head explosion..
Editorial Making (Some) Progress in Iraq[/b] Published: February 14, 2008
Good news is rare in Iraq. But after months of bitter feuding, Iraq???s Parliament has finally approved a budget, outlined the scope of provincial powers, set an Oct. 1 date for provincial elections and voted a general amnesty for detainees.
All these steps are essential for national conciliation. As always in Iraq, it is best to read the fine print. Final details of the legislation aren???t known. The country???s three-member presidency council must still sign off. And then the laws have to be implemented.
One month after Parliament approved a law intended to open government jobs to former members of Saddam Hussein???s Baath Party, American officials insist it will ensure that more former Baathists will be hired than barred. That will take a lot more good will and follow-through than Iraq???s central government has so far shown.
The Bush administration ??? which has displayed only intermittent interest in Iraq???s political stalemates ??? will have to press a lot harder to make sure that all these new laws are translated into action.
We are, of course, cheered by the news that representatives from Iraq???s three main ethnic groups ??? Shiite, Sunni and Kurd ??? finally saw some benefit in compromise.
The Kurds??? largely autonomous regional government got what it wanted ??? a 17 percent share of the 2008 budget. The Sunnis will be the main beneficiaries of the amnesty law since 80 percent of the detainees in Iraqi jails are Sunnis.
The third law will transfer more power to Iraq???s ethnically dominated provincial governments ??? something all groups say they want. There are already questions about whether the provincial governments will be ready to hold elections in October. The United States and its allies will have to move quickly to provide both funding and technical help.
And there is a lot more work to be done. Iraq???s Parliament has yet to approve a law to ensure an equitable sharing of oil revenues.
Unfortunately, Iraq???s leaders still appear to feel no real sense of urgency. And the Bush administration ??? which is now talking about a ???pause??? in the drawdown of American troops ??? certainly isn???t doing anything to change their minds. Right after Wednesday???s vote, Parliament members began a five-week holiday.
They forogt to note that, if any two of the four get made into law, they'll be outperforming the Democratic Congress.
Towards the end of 2007 one of the hottest news stories of the time were reports on Iraqi refugees. Egged on by a propaganda campaign led by the Iraqi government to prove that things were getting better in the country, newspapers reported on thousands of Iraqis returning to their country from Syria because of the improved security conditions. The optimistic stories soon faded from the headlines, while follow up and analysis of the possible consequences were left to the wayside. Since then, trends have reversed with more Iraqis fleeing the country than returning, and conflicts over the ones that have come back.
Ebb and Flow In Reporting On Iraqi Refugees[/b]
Beginning in November 2007, Baghdad orchestrated a story of tens of thousands refugees coming home, topped by a government sponsored bus convoy that brought back 800 refugees. Prime Minister Maliki???s office claimed that people were coming back because of the new found security provided by the government and the surge. A U.N. survey of returnees however, found that the main reasons were Iraqis running out of money, lack of opportunities in other countries, and visa restrictions. The Iraqi numbers were also proven to be inflated as they were counting every single Iraqi crossing the border from Syria whether they were a refugee or not. By December the story had changed as Baghdad and the United Nations called on Iraqis not to return because the government and aid agencies could not take care of them. After that, the story largely disappeared from the headlines.
The Current Situation[/b]
What has happened to Iraqi refugees since then has not been pretty. When reporters took the time to actually interview Iraqi refugees they found that most were very pessimistic about the situation in Iraq. Those misgivings turned into hard reality quickly. While there were some reports of local councils assisting people, many found their homes occupied by new residents that refused to leave. In Baghdad especially, the refugees seemed to have increased tensions. In the capital???s Adil neighborhood for example, the U.S. military claims 70% of the violence there is due to returnees trying to regain their former residences. Shiite security forces and the Mahdi Army are trying to force out Sunnis for Shiite refugees, while the local Concerned Local Citizen group is using threats and violence to push out Shiites for Sunnis. In other areas, returning Shiites found their homes controlled by local Mahdi Army factions who had rented out their places. Many refugees have been forced to find alternate housing, thus joining the ranks of Iraq???s internally displaced. To add to the difficulties, the U.S. military has been ordered not to intervene when it comes to housing disputes fearing that they will have to do another job that Iraqis should be doing. At the same time, aid agencies reported that they were overburdened by the existing refugee problem and couldn???t handle the new arrivals. The Iraqi government hasn???t helped the situation either. It continues to run ads in Syria calling on refugees to return, while it has no real program to deal with them if they do. Many refugees, being Sunni, are afraid to register for any help anyways because they fear the Shiite controlled government. Together, this convergence of events probably accounted for the latest report by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees in February 2008 that found that more Iraqis were fleeing to Syria than returning to Iraq.
Conclusion[/b]
Today, the United Nations does not feel that it is the right time for Iraqis to return. They are asking for more aid, and a study to be conducted to try to determine when it is safe for the refugees to come home. In the meantime they are calling on neighboring countries to help settle the Iraqis, something the governments are diametrically opposed to. They fear that the Iraqis are the new Palestinians, a permanent refugee population that will never leave and pose a drain on resources. The irony is that thousands of Iraqis have tried to go home in recent months, but their plight has been largely ignored. Because only 1-2% live in refugee camps, there are no eye catching pictures for the news to use. Instead, most live in homes, just not their original ones, which means they are basically out of sight, and out of mind.
Overview of Iraq???s External and Internal Refugees[/b]
Iraq has 2 million external refugees and 2.4 million internally displaced. The majority are Sunni, and 80% come from Baghdad. Neighboring Syria has received the biggest brunt of this exodus being home to 1.5 million Iraqis, and having to spend $1.2 billion a year to support them. The majority of internal refugees live with relatives or rent in the capital, rather than camps. During 2007 the number of displaced increased because of continued sectarian cleansing by Shiite militias, especially in the capital, and increased military action due to the U.S. surge.
In December 2007 the United Nations conducted a survey of Iraqis living in Syria. Here are some of their major findings:
78% came from Baghdad 35% fled from July-October 2007 during the height of the surge 30% fled in 2006 because of sectarian violence More than 50% had been threatened or been bombed 54% had dead or missing relatives, up from 22% in the previous survey 20% said they had been victims of torture or violence 40% had been living in Syria for more than a year Most are highly educated and represent the brain drain from Iraq since the 2003 invasion Most are nearly broke with 33% saying they???d run out of money in 3 months Many had their children dropping out of schools in Syria Many rely on U.N. assistance, especially for health care
A February 2008 U.N. High Commission for Refugees report found that while 700 Iraqis were returning to Iraq from Syria, 1,200 were fleeing to Syria.
The Iraqi Red Crescent has counted 67,000 Iraqis returning to the country from September 2007 to January 2008. Up to 100,000 internal refugees have attempted to regain their homes as well.
The Internal Organization for Migration said only 20-30% of returnees were able to get their homes back, while 50% said they wouldn???t even try to. 50% were also unable to find jobs.
Sources[/b]
Government, Think Tank, and United Nations Reports[/b]
Bruno, Greg, ???Refugees Return but Concerns Linger,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 11/20/07
Ferris, Elizabeth, ???The Real Challenge of Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Future,??? Brookings Institution, 12/6/07
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report To The United States Congress,??? 10/30/07
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ???UNHCR Syria Update on Iraqi Refugees,??? February 2003
News Reports[/b]
Al Jazeera, ???Returning Iraqis pose new challenge,??? 12/6/07
Allam, Hannah, ???Baghdad may be safer, but few Iraqis in Syria risk returning,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 12/5/07 - ???Survey: Many Iraqis in Syria fled during U.S. troop buildup,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 12/14/07
Azzaman, ???Surge reported in number of internally displaced Iraqis,??? 11/6/07
Barnes-Dacey, Julien and Dagher, Sam, ???Returning from Syria, Iraqis question safety,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/28/07
Buckley, Cara, ???Refugees Risk Coming Home to an Unready Iraq,??? New York Times, 12/20/07
Cave, Damien, ???Pressure for Results: The Politics of Tallying the Number of Iraqis Who Return Home,??? New York Times, 11/26/07
Cave, Damien and Rubin, Alissa, ???Baghdad???s Weary Start to Exhale as Security Improves,??? New York Times, 11/20/07
Dagher, Sam, ???Aid shrinks as Iraq???s internal refugee tally grows,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/30/07
DeYoung, Karen, ???Balkanized Homecoming
,??? Washington Post, 12/16/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???More Iraqis Said to Flee Since Troop Increase,??? New York Times, 8/24/07
Gumbrecht, Jamie, ???Returning Iraqis face lack of services, property disputes,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 1/1/08
Jordans, Frank, ???UNHCR: Many Iraq Areas Unsafe for Return,??? Associated Press, 12/7/07
Kaplow, Larry, Nordland, Rod, and Spring, Silvia, ???There???s No Place Like ??? Iraq???? Newsweek, 11/24/07
Lannen, Steve, ???Militia in 2nd province ends cooperation with U.S.,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 2/16/08
Mattar, Shafika, ???Jordan Restricts Visas for Iraqis,??? Associated Press, 2/14/08
Paley, Amit, ???Iraq Urges Refugees To Stay Put,??? Washington Post, 12/5/07
Rasheed, Ahmed and Mohammed, Wisam, ???Iraq???s returnees crave a future free of bloodshed,??? Reuters, 2/7/08
Schoof, Renee and Strobel, Warren, ???Report: Surge hasn???t cut attacks on Iraqi civilians,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/4/07
Susman, Tina, ???Some Iraqis returnees face uncertain lives,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/13/07 - ???Troop buildup fails to reconcile Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/4/07
Therolf, Garrett, "Dispute over vacant homes in Iraq often turn violent," Los Angeles, 2/17/08
Yoshino, Kimi and Ahmed, Caesar, ???Baghdad???s housing boom,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/29/08
Youssef, Nancy, ???Baghdad refugees happy to be home again,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/20/07
If Sab was just a little bit brighter he would've noticed that ALL news on Iraq whether good or bad has declined over the last year or so.
Of the major newspapers, NY Times, Wash. Post, USA Today, LA Times, Christian Science Monitor, McClatchy that have bureaus in Iraq reporting has dropped from 2-4 news stories a day down to about 1. The Christian Science Monitor only reports on Iraq about once a week. In fact, unless there is a major event like the Turkish incursion into Kurdistan there have been days when half the major newspapers don't have any stories about Iraq. TV News reportage, given the time restraint and interest, tends to report even less than the print media.
The Attempted Transformation Of The Sadrist Movement[/b]
Moqtada al-Sadr
One of the most important events of the last year was the decision by Moqtada al-Sadr to call off his Mahdi Army in August 2007. After the Sadrists clashed with Iraqi security forces in the holy city of Karbala, Sadr ordered his forces to stand down. The effects were felt immediately throughout Iraq as the Mahdi Army had been responsible for thousands of deaths of Sunnis, especially in Baghdad, and attacks on Coalition forces throughout the country. There are differing opinions about the motivations behind the order, was it because Sadr was losing control over his movement or was it because of military pressure by the U.S., but since then the Sadrists have attempted to change their stripes. The movement has gone through an extensive, and sometime bloody, housecleaning, become more involved in politics, while Sadr has gone to Iran for religious training to become an Ayatollah. Overall, the Sadrists hope to transform themselves into an Iraqi version of Hezbollah, a combined religious, political, social and military organization.
Theories On The Freeze[/b]
In August 2007 Sadrists were attempting to enter the holy city of Karbala when they came into conflict with Iraqi security forces controlled by their rivals the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). A firefight ensued that spread across neighboring cities in the region as dozens were killed and hundreds of militia members were arrested. Afterwards Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army to stand down and that has been renewed every six months since then. There are two different version of why Sadr made this move.
Some believe that the Sadrists were in a position of weakness politically and militarily. This line of thought believes that increasing raids, arrests and killings of Sadrists by U.S. and Iraqi forces, as well organizing Shiites into Concerned Local Citizens groups that could splinter his movement during the surge made Sadr call the stand down or be destroyed. The withdrawal of Sadrists from the cabinet in Prime Minister Maliki???s government also gave the Mahdi Army no friends in government to stop the attacks. U.S., Iraqi and SIIC forces have continued this pressure, which might be why Sadr continues with the cease-fire.
Sadrists
Another argument believes that Sadr was losing control of his movement. From 2006-2007 the Mahdi Army had gained hundreds of new recruits and expanded its base throughout Baghdad and its suburbs through vicious ethnic cleansing. With its success and new real estate it also began turning on fellow Shiites, extorting money, confiscating property, threatening civilians, etc. The fact that the Mahdi Army contains a large criminal element made the situation worse. It was also coming into increasing conflict with the SIIC in southern Iraq with a spate of clashes and assassinations of officials. Together, these forces might have made Sadr call the cease-fire so that he might regain control of his group.
Following the Hezbollah Model[/b]
Since the freeze, the Sadrists have concentrated on purging its ranks, forging a nationalist coalition in parliament against Maliki and the Kurds, and attempted to increase its religious standing and independence.
One of the most common news stories after the cease-fire has been of the Mahdi Army weaning unwanted elements. Like the reasons behind the stand down, there are differing opinions on this phenomenon. Some believe that Sadr is getting rid of the riff raff that joined his movement during the last two years. Some are told to leave, while special teams within the Mahdi Army assassinate others. Others believe this is a public relations ploy to make it seem like Sadr is reforming his group when he isn???t. They point to the fact that when the surge first started in early 2007, Sadr ordered his forces off the streets to avoid the new Americans forces, and there was an immediate drop in sectarian violence. This means there are fewer ???rogue??? elements of the militia than is often reported.
Either way, the majority of the Mahdi Army has followed the cease-fire, and that is one of the major reasons behind the drop in violence throughout the country. There are still occasional clashes with the SIIC in the south, and more importantly the U.S. has increasingly claimed Special Groups of the Mahdi that work with Iranian agents continue to attack U.S. forces, but the large scale ethnic cleansing and Shiite death squads that ravaged Baghdad and other areas appear to be over.
On the political front, the Sadrists have tried to increase their influence in parliament by opposing Prime Minister Maliki???s government and the Kurds. They have joined ranks with nationalist groups in parliament and formed a coalition that is against the Kurds??? desires to annex the city of Kirkuk and sign independent oil deals, as well as try to topple Maliki. They have also attempted to gain more power over the important port city of Basra.
Sadr has also left Iraq for religious training in Iran. Sadr has always been treated like a stepchild by the Shiite religious establishment in Iraq for his lack of religious education. He is attempting to remedy this problem by becoming a full-fledged ayatollah. This would allow him to stand as an equal to Shiite clerics as well as issue fatwa???s for his followers. At the same time, the Sadrists have announced their desire to transform themselves into more of a social movement that provides services to Shiites, especially the poor, who are the base of Sadr???s support.
This all follows the model of Hezbollah that not only has its own militia, but is a powerful member in Lebanon???s parliament and provides social services. Sadrists have had first hand experience with this model having had extensive contacts and training with the Lebanese group.
In the short term, Sadr???s goals appear to be to reorganize his organization, create a new governing coalition in Iraq, declare his independence from the Shiite establishment, take over the religious centers of Karbala and Najaf, and defeat the SIIC. They are also hoping for a new round of local elections by the end of 2008 that they hope will allow them to sweep into power over many local and provincial governments. Although violence is still on the table, most of these goals are being worked on peacefully.
Conclusion[/b]
Whether Sadr is successful in transforming his movement is still to be seen. What is more important for the time being is that his cease-fire and following actions show that the Mahdi Army is moving away from violence and the bloody purging of Sunnis from central Iraq that was engulfing the country previously. There are still reports of elements of the Mahdi Army working with Iranian special forces to attack the U.S., and low level fighting between Shiites in the South, but these are nothing like previous levels. Instead, the movement is moving towards the political and social realms as it continues to change its public face while continuing to oppose its rivals.
Sources[/b]
Government Reports
Biddle, Stephen, ???Iraq after the Surge,??? Committee on Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, 1/23/08
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? December 2007
Think Tank Reports
Borden, Anthony, ???Iraqi Governance Report,??? Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Institute For War & Peace Reporting, ???Battling for Power in Basra,??? 8/7/07
International Crisis Group, ???Iraq???s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,??? 2/7/08
Rahimi,
Babak, ???Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Politics of Moqtada al-Sadr,??? Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 2/8/08 - ???The Hakim-Sadr Pact: A New Era in Shiite Politics???? Jamestown Foundation, 10/25/07
News Reports
Agence France Presse, ???Iraq cracks down on Sadr militants,??? 11/19/07
Al-Laithi, Nidhal, ???Iraq to ???swim in lack of blood??? if Sadr killed,??? Azzaman, 2/27/08 - ???U.S. accused of taking sides in Shiite factional fighting,??? Azzaman, 11/17/07
Alsumaria, ???Iraq Cabinet to work out disputes with Kurds,??? 1/31/08 - ???Sadr to extend activities half decision,??? 2/11/08
Aswat Aliraq, ???MP unleashes details of agreement to pass key laws,??? 2/13/08 - ???Reports on govt. reshuffle media hype ??? Sadrist MP,??? 2/15/08
Azzaman, ???Assassination Hizbollah leader had links with Iraq???s Mahdi Army,??? 2/22/08 - ???Sadr movement says government cracking down on members,??? 11/5/07
Bennett, Brian, ???Underestimating al-Sadr ??? Again,??? Time, 2/12/08
Cockburn, Patrick, ???Shia call on Mehdi Army to take up arms again in Iraq,??? Independent, 2/7/08
Cole, Juan, ???Turkish-Kurd Military Confrontation,??? Informed Comment, JuanCole.com, 2/22/08
Crain, Charles, ???Sadr???s Freeze Greeted With Skepticism,??? Time, 9/19/07
Dagher, Sam, ???As British leave Basra, militias dig in,??? Christian Science Monitor 8/28/07 - ???As British troops exit Basra, Shiites vie to fill power vacuum,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/17/07 - ???Iraq???s Sadr uses lull to rebuild Army,??? Christian Science Monitor, 12/11/07 - ???U.S., Iran dial down tensions in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/7/07
Dehghanpisheh, Babak, ???The Great Moqtada Makeover,??? Newsweek, 1/19/08
DeYoung, Karen and Ricks, Thomas, ???As British Leave, Basra Deteriorates,??? Washington Post, 8/7/07
Dreyfuss, Robert, ???Is Iran Winning the War in Iraq,??? The Nation, 2/26/08
Economist, ???The enigma of Muqtada al-Sadr,??? 2/14/08
Farrell, Stephen, ???50 Die in Fight Between Shiite Groups in Karbala,??? New York Times, 8/29/07 - ???Governor of Iraqi Province Assassinated,??? New York Times, 8/21/07
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, ???Al-Sadr overhauling his Shiite militia,??? Seattle Times, 9/10/07
Moubayed, Sami, ???Iraq???s Sunnis reclaim lost ground,??? Asia Times, 1/15/08 - ???Muqtada moves to stop a Sunni ???surge,?????? Asia Times, 11/15/07
Paley, Amit, ???Maliki Intends to Lift Curfew in Baghdad,??? Washington Post, 11/13/07 - ???Sadr???s Militia Enforces Cease-Fire With a Deadly Purge,??? Washington Post, 2/21/08
Parker, Ned, ???Sadr militia moves to clean house,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/7/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Iraq Police Tied to Attack on U.S. Base,??? Washington Post, 10/21/07
Partlow, Joshua and Sarhan, Saad, ???Sadr Orders ???Freeze??? on Militia Actions,??? Washington Post, 8/30/07
Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???Disaffected Iraqis Spurn Dominant Shiite Clerics,??? Washington Post, 12/21/07 - ???Iraq???s Youthful Militiamen Build Power Through Fear,??? Washington Post, 12/13/07 - ???Moqtada Al-Sadr Extends Cease-Fire,??? Washington Post, 2/22/08 - ???Shiite Contest Sharpens In Iraq,??? Washington Post, 12/26/07
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Paley, Amit, ???Sadr Extends Truce In Iraq,??? Washington Post, 2/23/08
Reid, Robert, ???U.S. Blames Shiites in New Iraq Violence,??? Associated Press, 11/24/07
Ricks, Thomas, ???In Iraq, Three Wars Engage U.S.,??? Washington Post, 2/3/08
Roggio, Bill, ???Captured Iranian agent identified, 15 Special Groups operatives captured in Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 9/30/07 - ???Dividing the Mahdi Army,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/27/07 - ???Iraqi Security Forces take on the Mahdi Army in Diwaniyah,??? Long War Journal.org, 11/19/07 - ???Mahdi Army trains with Hezbollah,??? Long War Journal.org, 8/20/07 - ???Pressure on Sadr and the Iranian-backed Special Groups continues,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/18/08 - ???Sadr to extend cease-fire,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/21/08
Rubin, Alissa, ???Despite Deadly Clashes in Iraq, Shiite Pilgrims Spared,??? New York Times, 1/19/08
Smith, David, ???Hopes of UK troop cuts in Basra dashed,??? Observer, 2/24/08
Tavernise, Sabrina, ???Relations Sour Between Shiites and Iraq Militia,??? New York Times, 10/12/07
Dr.Wu is mad that he blew 2g's on chalk supplies and the murderous butchers are refusing to make the transition to brave victims of bush's illegal war for him.
Motown, is just a human rss reader. No-one gives a fuck about you son.
Dr.Wu is mad that he blew 2g's on chalk supplies and the murderous butchers are refusing to make the transition to brave victims of bush's illegal war for him.
Motown, is just a human rss reader. No-one gives a fuck about you son.
Don't you have something better to do like collect mp3s and create more fantasies in that little head of yours?
Much of Iraq???s government started from scratch after the 2003 U.S. invasion. Despite millions of dollars in aid and advice, many of Iraq???s ministries are deeply troubled. The fact that various political parties that care more about themselves rather than the country as a whole control them creates more problems. The Iraqi Health and Justice Ministries are two examples. In February 2008 the Iraqi justice system was unable to prosecute the former Deputy Health Minister and the head of the ministry???s security forces. The two ex-officials were members of Moqtada al-Sadr???s movement, and were charged with running death squads out of the ministry and corruption. Their release was a sign of the problems with Iraq???s justice system and the power of sectarian forces.
Iraq???s Health Ministry: A Haven For Sectarian Murders[/b]
After the December 2005 elections the Sadrists were one of several new parties that came to power. As part of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, they were given control of several ministries in the new government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. One of these was the Ministry of Health. Up to 80% of the staff left and were replaced with Sadrists, while the security forces were filled with members of the Mahdi Army. Together they began a systematic program of murder, abduction and corruption throughout the ministry. Sunni patients at hospitals and visitors to Baghdad???s morgue were routinely kidnapped and killed. Ambulances were used to ferry militiamen, weapons and abductees, while some hospitals were used as prisons and torture centers by Sadrists. The ministry???s officials also funneled money to the Mahdi Army, and stole drugs to be sold on the black market. Together the actions helped lead to the destruction of Iraq???s health care system, and played a role in the bloody sectarian war that took place from 2006-2007.
In 2006, U.S. forces began collecting intelligence on the Sadrists??? operations and conducted at least one raid on the Health Ministry in Baghdad. This culminated in the arrest of the deputy health minister and the head of the ministry???s security forces in February 2007 on charges of murder, kidnapping, and corruption. The ministry???s police were also disbanded. A year later they were to go on trial, but charges were dismissed because of a lack of evidence in March 2008. The Iraqi justice system relies upon confessions and there were none in the case. Witnesses also refused to appear in court due to threats. One judge on the three-judge panel that was to try the case was said to have promised to find the defendants innocent and another was removed.
Former Deputy Health Minister Hakem Abbas al-Zamili after the charges against him were dropped and he was released
How The Case Reflects On Iraq???s Justice System[/b]
Despite five years of American and foreign assistance, Iraq still does not have a functioning justice system. Iraqi courts are overloaded with cases, judges are routinely assassinated and threatened, and the police are often corrupt, sectarian, and loyal to local forces. The arrest of the Health Ministry officials was the most prominent case since the 2003 U.S. invasion, yet nothing happened. The trial was seen as a test case to see whether the Shiite dominated government of Prime Minister Maliki was capable of trying fellow Shiites from a powerful political party, and it failed. The decision to release the two officials was widely condemned by Sunni political parties as evidence that the government was sectarian. The case highlights the fact that the Iraqis right now are simply not capable of handling many of their most pressing affairs.
Sources[/b]
BBC News, ???Sunni anger at Iraq trial failure,??? 3/5/08
CBS, ???CBS: Death Squads In Iraqi Hospitals,??? 10/4/06
CNN, ???Deputy health minister arrested in U.S.-Iraqi raid,??? 2/8/07
Cole, Juan, ???Sadrists Demand Release of al-Zamili,??? Informed Comment.com, 3/5/08
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07
Drezen, Yochi and Jaffe, Greg, ???Maliki Faces Fresh Doubts, Tests,??? Wall Street Journal, 8/21/07
Glantz, Aaron, ???Iraqi Health Ministry Severs Ties With US Over Raid,??? AntiWar.com, 8/15/06
Gordon, Michael and Rubin, Alissa, ???Trial Near for Shiite Ex-Officials in Sunni Killings,??? New York Times, 11/5/07
Jones, General James, ???The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,??? Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 9/6/07
McCaffrey, Gen. Barry, ???Ater Action Report ??? Visit Iraq And Kuwait 5-11 December 2007,??? United States Military Academy, 12/18/07
Moore, Solomon, ???Thousands of New Prisoners Overwhelm Iraqi System,??? New York Times, 2/14/08
Pfaff, Tony, ???Development And Reform Of The Iraqi Police Forces,??? Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, January 2008
Rathmell, Andrew, ???Fixing Iraq???s Internal Security Forces: Why is Reform of the Ministry Interior so hard???? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11/13/07
Roggio, Bill, ???Pressure on Sadr and the Iranian-backed Special Groups continues,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/18/08
Rubin, Alissa, ???Charges Are Dropped Against 2 Shiite Ex-Officials Accused in Sectarian Killings,??? New York Times, 3/4/08 - ???Trial of 2 Ex-Officials in Iraq Is Delayed as Witnesses Fail to Show,??? New York Times, 2/20/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,??? 7/30/07 - ???Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,??? 10/31/07
Apparently, listing someone as a source means you don't need to use quotation marks anymore.
Motown:
The trial was seen as a test case to see whether the Shiite dominated government of Prime Minister Maliki was capable of trying fellow Shiites from a powerful political party, and it failed. The decision to release the two officials was widely condemned by Sunni political parties as evidence that the government was sectarian. The case highlights the fact that the Iraqis right now are simply not capable of handling many of their most pressing affairs.
Juan Cole
The trial was seen by many observers as a test of whether the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki could act in a non-sectarian, fair manner. In fact, it appears that favoritism toward Shiites is a policy.
whne you have an original thought, go ahead and post it.
Yeah, Saba is constantly coming up with new and creative ways to rationalize all kinds of bullshit, without ever having to cite anything factual at all. You act like you came up with the phrase "100,000 civilians dead" all on your own.
whne you have an original thought, go ahead and post it.
You mean like this?
Hey motown. If you haven't spent all your bilefilled-evil-torturing-illegal-abusive-opressive rhetoric on George Bush and the soldiers out there protecting your fat ass, maybe you could spare some on some real evil - like people who blow up retarded women and use 10 year old children to kidnap and murder innocents. Or is that outside the scope of your article?
BAGHDAD - Videotapes seized during U.S. raids on suspected al-Qaida in Iraq hide-outs show the terror group training young boys to kidnap and assassinate civilians, U.S. and Iraqi officials said Wednesday.
Footage aired for reporters showed an apparent training operation with black-masked boys ??? some of whom appeared to be about 10 years old ??? storming a house and holding guns to the heads of mock residents. Another tape showed a young boy wearing a suicide vest and posing with automatic weapons.
Wow, February 2008 sab declares that Al Qaeda in Iraq does bad shit. That's some really original cutting and pasting there.
And Sab, didn't you start this thread: "Spitzer Is Linked to Prostitution Ring"
Was that an original idea or did you hear or read that somewhere. I didn't see any footnotes or sources on there so I can only assume that by your own standards that you are a plagiarst.
In fact, besides shit talking, all you do in this thread is cut and paste which means you haven't had one original idea besides thinking of how you can be an asshole.
So now that we've established that you are a hypocrite, why don't you shut the fuck up and talk about something you know about rather than continue to post about a topic, Iraq, that you have proven again and again you know nothing about.
P.S. - I think it says a lot about you that on one of the most pressing issues that America has faced over the last couple years, and will probably face for the next decade, the only thing you can really do is have hissy fits where you make homoerotic offers to suck your dick and talk shit.
The Demise, But Not Death of Al Qaeda In Iraq[/b] In 2007 Al Qaeda in Iraq was soundly defeated in its former strongholds of Anbar province and the Baghdad area. Today its forces are trying to regroup in northern Iraq around the city of Mosul. Over the last three years, its indiscriminate use of violence especially against Iraqis, and its insistence that it lead the insurgency have turned most of the population against it. That is usually the turning point in a guerrilla war, and thus Al Qaeda in Iraq finds itself on the run in many provinces today. The fact that the surge is coming to a close however, means that there will always be safe havens for the group to hide in, and they will still be able to carry out attacks for the foreseeable future. 2007 thus saw the demise, but not death of Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Background[/b] Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded Al Qaeda in Iraq. Originally it was called Attawhid wal Jihad (Unity and Holy War) and carried out a number of high profile bombings soon after the U.S. invasion ended in 2003 such as the destruction of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad. Zarqawi was a dogmatic and ruthless Islamist who saw the U.S. occupation of Iraq as a way to turn himself into a terrorist celebrity. It wasn???t until 2004 that Zarqawi pledged allegiance to bin Laden and his group became known as Al Qaeda in Iraq. Zarqawi wanted the brand name recognition Al Qaeda offered, and like a fast food restaurant started his own franchise in Iraq. Despite the new name, Zarqawi was always highly independent and didn???t listen to advice and admonitions from Al Qaeda central. In several letters that were later published by the U.S. Al Qaeda leaders such as #2 man Ayman al-Zawhiri remonstrated Zarqawi for his attacks on Shiites, his refusal to work with fellow insurgents that didn???t follow his leadership, and his general dismissal of the Sunni population???s concerns in Iraq. Zarqawi never changed his policies and was killed in June 2006.
Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in life and death
The Initial Split With Al Qaeda in Iraq[/b] Just as Al Qaeda central warned, Zarqawi???s harsh tactics turned many people against his organization. That was a change because during the first few years of the insurgency, many Sunnis looking to fight the Americans turned towards Zarqawi and his followers for money, weapons and organization. By 2005 however many Iraqis had enough. The first reports of a split occurred in mid-2005 in Anbar province. In May and June 2005 two tribes in Anbar and several insurgent groups began turning their guns on their former allies. The causes were many. For the tribes, Al Qaeda in Iraq had attempted to take over their smuggling and robbery trade in Anbar to finance their insurgency, angering sheikhs. The tribes also didn???t like Al Qaeda imposing its form of Islamic law upon their people, especially because the militants often killed those that didn???t follow their interpretation of the religion. Zarqawi???s followers also assassinated sheikhs that attempted to work with the government. For the insurgents, their complaints were three fold. First, they were tired of Al Qaeda trying to boss them around and killing their leaders and fighters if they didn???t obey. Second, Al Qaeda???s increasing use of car bombs that killed Sunnis and their sectarian attacks on Shiites that were aimed at provoking a sectarian civil war divided the insurgency over tactics and costs. Finally, the vast majority of Sunnis had boycotted the first round of elections in 2005 and felt left out of the political process. Many were determined to vote on the Constitution in December, even if many were against its passage. Zarqawi stated that his group would kill anyone that took part in the election. Instead, many insurgent groups cut a deal with the U.S. in October 2005 to work together to ensure there would be no major violence during the polling.
The Tribal Awakening Movement[/b] Sunni tribes in western Iraq were the first ones to really organize against Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the spring and summer of 2005 tribes began fighting with Al Qaeda in Iraq and reached out to the U.S. for help. At first the U.S. Marines were standoffish, but eventually agreed to help. By March 2006 the tribes had formed at least two different military organizations to fight the militants, leading to the deaths of six Al Qaeda in Iraq commanders. In the fall of 2006 the sheikhs founded the Anbar Salvation Council that included 26 tribes in the province and 30,000 fighters, led by sheikh Sattar Rishawi. The newly organized tribesmen were able to put the pressure on Al Qaeda in Iraq in the province during 2007. With their new alliance with the Americans, the tribes began providing recruits for the provincial police in cities like Ramadi where the number of police went from 35 in June 2006 to 1,300 by November. In turn, attacks in the city dropped by as much as 50% by the end of the year. The tribes also formed eight Provincial Security Forces of 10,000 fighters, eight Emergency Response Units, plus a small group of special forces that operated outside of Anbar tracking down and killing Al Qaeda in Iraq leaders. Together, these tribal units were able to force Al Qaeda in Iraq into northern and eastern Anbar, and killed Zarqawi???s successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri in Salahaddin province in May 2007. The Council grew confident enough that they began sending out emissaries to other Iraqi tribes in Diyala, Ninewa, Salahaddin, Babil, and Baghdad to form their own Awakening movements. Even after Al Qaeda in Iraq was able to kill the Salvation Council???s head, Sheikh Sattar Rishawi, the group was able to expand their influence. By late 2007-early 2008 attacks in Anbar had dropped to the lowest point since the war, 23,000 tribesmen had joined the Anbar police force, and the Council was trying to transform itself into a political party to take part in the government.
Sheikh Sattar Rishawi who lead the Anbar Salvation Council until his assassination by Al Qaeda in Iraq in September 2007
The Insurgency Turns On Al Qaeda In Iraq And the Birth Of the Concerned Local Citizens Movement[/b] Many nationalist insurgent groups also began turning on Al Qaeda in 2005-2006. Two of the main ones were the Islamic Army of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigades. Both were mostly former soldiers and Baathists that had become more Islamist as the insurgency wore on, but grew tired of Al Qaeda in Iraq. In 2005 there were repeated clashes between the insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar over participation in the December 2005 elections and Zarqawi???s murdering of commanders of the Islamic Army and the 1920 Revolution Brigade that didn???t follow his leadership. In January 2006 Al Qaeda in Iraq also killed 70 Sunni police recruits in Ramadi, which led to a shoot out with the Islamic Army. The U.S. began to realize and exploit these divisions by opening negotiations with insurgents that were opposed to Zarqawi. They were helped by the death of the terrorist leader in June 2006. Zarqawi???s successor Masri attempted to patch up relations with Iraqis. He formed a number of umbrella organizations to try to unite the insurgency, such as the Mutayibeen Coalition, the Islamic Emirate of Iraq, the Mujahadeen Shura Council, and finally the Islamic State of Iraq. The problem was that Al Qaeda in Iraq always insisted that they be in the lead and continued on with Zarqawi???s tradition of killing anyone that didn???t get into line behind them. By early 2007 many elements of the insurgency were in open revolt against Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Islamic Army and 1920 Revolution Brigade had several clashes including the assassination of the latter???s leader by Al Qaeda in Iraq in March 2007. In May 2007 the Islamic Army a
nd two other insurgent group formed their own coalition, the Reformation and Jihad Front to oppose Al Qaeda in Iraq. More importantly, some members of the 1920 Revolution Brigade formed the Adhamiya Awakening in Baghdad to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq. This was the first of many Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) groups that would pop up around Baghdad???s Sunni enclaves, and then to other regions in central and northern Iraq to fight the militants.
Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri took over command of Al Qaeda in Iraq after Zarqawi???s death in June 2006 and attempted to reach out to tribes and other insurgents unsuccessfully in 2007 until his death at the hands of the Anbar Salvation Council in May 2007
The Effects of the Surge[/b] The main focus of the surge was in Baghdad and Anbar province, just where Sunnis were beginning to revolt against Al Qaeda in Iraq. When the extra troops began to arrive in early 2007 they were able to take advantage of this turn in events. In May 2007, 2nd in command Gen. Odierno outlined the new U.S. policy towards Sunnis. He said there were reconcilable and irreconcilable members of the insurgency. The reconcilable ones were open to negotiations and involvement in the nation???s future like the Sunni tribes in Anbar and the nationalist groups such as the Islamic Army and 1920 Revolution Brigade. The irreconcilable was Al Qaeda in Iraq that would never talk with the U.S. and only believed in their victory. The next month Gen. Petraeus and his advisor held a conference and decided that the Sunnis were ripe for negotiations and cooperation with the U.S. military against Al Qaeda in Iraq. They began negotiating with tribes and insurgent groups throughout central and northern Iraq.
CLC fighters in Salman Pak outside of Baghdad
The Sunni policy spread like wildfire. By February 2008 there were 71,000 CLC/Awakening fighters. 43,000 in Baghdad, 10,000 in Ninewah, Salahaddin, and Tamin, 6,000 in Babil, 4,000 in Diyala and 8,000 in Anbar provinces, plus another 54,000 members of the Anbar Salvation Council and Anbar provincial police that mostly came from the Council. The CLCs and tribal Awakening movements were able to clear and hold cities with the cooperation of U.S. forces, and deny Al Qaeda in Iraq new recruits. The Americans also launched repeated military operations in other regions where Al Qaeda in Iraq was fleeing to, to keep them off balance. By early 2008 Al Qaeda in Iraq was on the run. Their headquarters had been pushed from Anbar to Diyala province to Mosul in Ninawa province. They were also still operating west of Kirkuk, in Tikrit and Samarra in Salahaddin, Baquba in Diyala, south Baghdad, north of Karbala and around Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar. This was a far cry from 2006 when Al Qaeda in Iraq announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq, had a parade through Ramadi in Anbar to celebrate it, and was able to fly its flags in a Sunni neighborhood in the center of Baghdad.
A U.S. military map showing in red the areas where Al Qaeda in Iraq is still active in December 2007. The insert map on the left hand corner is of Baghdad
Not The End of Al Qaeda In Iraq[/b] Despite the shrinking area within which Al Qaeda in Iraq is able to operate in, the group is not defeated. U.S. officers are quick to point out that the situation in Iraq is still tenuous, and militants are still able to carry out deadly attacks. Al Qaeda in Iraq also appears to have finally learned from their mistakes and changed their tactics. In Mosul, they have started warning civilians before attacks, they haven???t impose Islamic law, and haven???t attacked civilians. They have also changed their targets to blowing up pipelines and power stations, and attacking CLCs and Awakening movements with several leaders having been assassinated in 2008.
Conclusion[/b] In 2006 the U.S. released a letter from Al Qaeda central leader Attyia al-Jaza???ri to Zarqawi. Al-Jaza???ri was a veteran of the Islamist insurgency in Algeria that was crushed by the government. Al-Jaza???ri, like the early letter by Al Qaeda leader Zawahiri, warned that Zarqawi???s policies would lead his organization down the road of ruin. Al-Jaza???ri wrote:
???[The] al mujadhidin are our brothers, the Sunni are our brothers and our friends, as long as they are Muslims, even if they are disobedient, or insolent; whether they come into the organization with us or not, for they are our brothers, our friends, and our loved ones. We should cooperate with them, help and support them, and work together. Besides, how do you know you won???t be humbled tomorrow, while they are strengthened? You may diminish while they increase! ??? Their [the Algerian Islamists] enemy did not defeat them, but rather they defeated themselves, were consumed and fell.???
His words proved prophetic in Iraq. Al Qaeda had always been at their best when they went into a troubled area and worked alongside the locals providing assistance. In Iraq, Zarqawi and his successors demanded that they be in the lead even though none of them were Iraqis, they did not have the same religious beliefs as Iraqis, and turned to killing and intimidation against anyone that stood in their way. The price for their stance was to lose the sympathies of most Iraqis, turn the country towards civil war with attacks on Shiites, and eventually lose their bases throughout the country. Unfortunately, just as the organization is on the ropes, the surge is ending. The pressure is still on Al Qaeda in Iraq, but with fewer U.S. troops there???s little hope they can actually be defeated anytime soon. As the series of attacks and increase in violence in February and March 2008 prove, the group is still alive and able to dish out death in Iraq.
SOURCES:[/b]
Government Reports
Biddle, Stephen, ???Iraq after the Surge,??? Committee on Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, 1/23/08
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? December 2007
McCaffrey, Gen. Barry, ???Ater Action Report ??? Visit Iraq And Kuwait 5-11 December 2007,??? United States Military Academy, 12/18/07
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq???s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007
White House, ???Benchmark Assessment Report,??? 9/14/07
Think Tank Reports:
Bakier, Abdul Hameed, ???Al-Qaeda Adapts its Methods in Iraq as Part of a Global Strategy,??? Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 12/20/07
Beehner, Lionel, ???Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Resurging or Splintering???? Council on Foreign Relations, 7/16/07
Cordesman, Anthony, ???The Evolving Security Situation in Iraq: The Continuing Need for Strategic Patience,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/21/08 - ???Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07 - ???The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/6/07
Fishman, Brian, ???The Imaginary Emir: Al-Qa???ida in Iraq???s Strategic Mistake,??? Combating Terrorism Center, 7/18/07
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Cordesman: Despite Gains, Future in Iraq, Afghanistan Remains ???Uncertain,?????? Council on Foreign Relations, 1/14/08
Kagan, Kimberly, ???The Anbar Awakening: Displacing al Qaeda from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq,??? Institute For The Sstudy of War and WeeklyStandard.com, 8/21/06-3/30/07
Katulis, Brian, Juul, Peter, and Moss, Ian, ???Awakening to New Dangers in Iraq,??? Center for American Progress, Febru
ary 2008
Khalil, Lydia, ???Anbar Revenge Brigade Makes Progress in the Fight Against al-Qaeda,??? Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/28/06 - ???Divisions Within the Iraqi Insurgency,??? Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 4/12/07
Kohlmann, Evan, ???State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: August 2007,??? NEFA Foundation, August 2007
Scheuer, Michael, ???Al-Qaeda and Iraq: Too Soon to Declare Victory,??? Jamestown Foundation, 10/24/07
Simon, Steven, ???Prepared testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 7/17/07
Steinberg, Guido, ???The Iraqi Insurgency,??? German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2006
Articles:
Agence France Presse, ???Fewer foreign attackers entering Iraq: US general Petraeus,??? 9/14/07 - ???Sunni tribes of Iraq???s rebel bastion declare war on Zarqawi,??? 3/5/06 - ???US commander gives part credit to Syria for military gains in Iraq,??? 11/21/07
Al-Ansary, Khalid and Adeeb, Ali, ???Most Tribes in Anbar Agree to Unite Against Insurgents,??? New York Times, 9/18/06
Al Jazeera, ???Al-Qaeda denies death of Iraq chief,??? 5/1/07 - ???Iraqi group ???splits??? from al-Qaeda,??? 4/12/07
Al-Khalidi, Suleiman, ???Iraqi Sunnis set up fatwa body to combat al Qaeda,??? Reuters,
Allam, Hannah and al Dulaimy, Mohammed, ???Marine-led Campaign Killed Friends and Foes, Iraqi Leaders Say,??? Knight Ridder, 5/17/05
Alsumaria, ???Iraq Qaeda tactic relies on suicide bombers,??? 1/22/08
Anderson, John Ward, ???Iraqi Tribes Strike Back at Insurgents,??? Washington Post, 3/7/06
Associated Press, ???Al-Qaida linked group moves to patch up rift among insurgent factions,??? 4/17/07 - ???Al-Qaeda targets Sunni tribal groups,??? 1/2/08 - ???Purported spokesman for an Iraqi insurgent group offers negotiations with the United States,??? 10/5/06
BBC News, ???Iraq chiefs vow to fight al-Qaeda,??? 9/18/06
Beaumont, Peter, ???Iraqi tribes launch battle to drive al-Qaida out of troubled province,??? Guardian, 10/3/06
Bergen, Peter & Cruickshank, Paul, ???Al Qaeda in Iraq: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,??? Mother Jones, 10/18/07
Bing, West, ???Will the Petraeus Strategy Be the Last???? Atlantic.com, 9/17/07
Boot, Max, ???We Are Winning. We Haven???t Won,??? Weekly Standard, 1/28/08
Burns, John and Rubin, Alissa, ???U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies,??? New York Times, 6/11/07
Carroll, Rory, ???Al-Qaida in Iraq seizes border town as it mobilizes against poll,??? Guardian, 9/7/05
Cave, Damien, ???Remains of 40 Found in Mass Grave,??? New York Times, 11/22/07
Cave, Damien, and Farrell, Stephen, ???At Street Level, Unmet Goals of Troop Buildup,??? New York Times, 9/9/07
Chon, Gina, ???Under U.S. Pressure, AL Qaeda in Iraq Shifts Tactics,??? Baghdad Life, Wall Street Journal.com, 1/20/08
CNN, ???Admiral: Al Qaeda in Iraq ???killing off??? former allies,??? 2/18/08
Crain, Charles, ???Iraq???s New Job Insecurity,??? Time, 12/24/07
Curtis, Kim, ???Ramadi War Zone Now Rare Bright Spot,??? Washington Post, 10/28/07
Dagher, Sam, ???Rift threatens U.S. antidote to Al Qaeda in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 2/13/08 - ???Risky US alliances in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 7/17/07 - ???Sunni Muslim sheikhs join US in fighting Al Qaeda,??? Christian Science Monitor, 5/3/07 - ???Will ???armloads??? of US cash buy tribal loyalty???? Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/07
Evans, Dominic, ???Sunni recruits to police volatile Abu Ghraib,??? Reuters, 9/25/07
Farrell, Stephen, ???U.S. Attack in Iraq Is No Surprise to Many Insurgents,??? New York Times, 1/9/08
Fletcher, Martin, ???Fighting back: the city determined not to become al-Qaeda???s capital,??? Times, 11/20/06
Foreign Policy, ???Seven Questions: Phebe Marr on the End Game in Iraq,??? November 2007
Fumento, Michael, ???Return to Ramadi,??? Weekly Standard, 11/27/06
Gamel, Kim, ???US Commanders Welcome Fallujah Revival,??? Associated Press, 2/9/08
Ghoash, Bobby, ???A Truce Between U.S. Enemies in Iraq,??? Time, 6/6/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Gordon, Michael, ???The Former-Insurgent-Counterinsurgency,??? New York times, 9/2/07 - ???Pushed Out of Baghdad, Insurgents Move North,??? New York Times, 12/6/07
Gordon, Michael and Farrell, Stephen, ???Iraq Lacks Plan on the Retrn of Refugees, Military Says,??? New York Times, 11/30/07
Greenwall, Megan, ???Blast Injures U.S.-Allied Sunni Cleric,??? Washington Post, 8/12/07 - ???Villagers Battle Insurgents After Attack on Sheik Near Baqubah,??? Washington Post, 8/24/07
Gumbrecht, Jamie and Yousse, Nancy, ???In Iraq, U.S. airstrikes target insurgents near supposedly safe zone,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 1/10/08
Guardian, ??????We don???t need al-Qaida,?????? 10/27/05
Hurst, Steven, ???al-Qaida Regaining Some Footing,??? 2/11/08
Irish Times, ???Iraq???s Sunni offer to join Shia-majority police,??? 10/2/06
Kelly, Mary Louise, ???Rift Appears Among Iraq Insurgent Groups,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/14/07
Kilcullen, Dave, ???Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,??? Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07
Kimmage, Daniel, and Ridolfo, Kathleen, ???Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images And Ideas,??? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 2007
Klein, Joe, ???Is al-Qaeda on the Run in Iraq???? Time, 5/23/07
Kraul, Chris, ???Sunni chiefs in Anbar join mainstream,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 4/20/07
Kukis, Mark, ???Turning Iraq???s Tribes Against Al-Qaeda,??? Time, 12/26/06
Lannen, Steve, ???Mosul, the next major test for the U.S. military in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 1/31/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Al-Qaeda tries to salvage image,??? USA Today, 2/6/08
Lubold, Gordon, ???A quieter Anbar Province rebuilds,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/5/07 - ???Anbar streets illustrate Petraeus???s testimony,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/12/07 - ???U.S. takes Anbar model to Iraq Shiites,??? Christian Science Monitor, 10/2/07
Malkasian, Carter, ???Did the Coalition Need More Forces in Iraq???? Joint Forces Quarterly, July 2007
Martin, Paul, ???Washington seeks partial truce with Iraqi insurgents,??? Washington Times, 12/21/05
Michaels, Jim, ???U.S. gamble on sheiks is paying off ??? so far,??? USA Today, 12/26/07
Moore, Solomon and Oppel, Richard, ???Attacks Imperil U.S.-Backed Militias in Iraq,??? New York Times, 1/24/08
Murphy, Dan, ???How Al Qaeda views a long Iraq war,??? Christian Science Monitor, 10/9/06
Oppel, Richard, ???Magnet for Iraq Insurgents Is a Crucial Test of New U.S. Strategy,??? New York Times, 6/16/05 - ???Quieter Fallujah fears U.S. exit,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/19/07
Oppel, Richard and Al-Husaini, ???Suicide Bomber Kills Key Sunni Leader,??? New York Times, 1/8/08
Oppel, Richard and Mizher, Qais, ???Bomber Kills Sunni Allies of the U.S.,??? New York Times, 1/21/08
Paley, Amit, ???Iraqis Joining Insurgency Less for Cause Than Cash,??? Washington Post, 11/20/07 - ???Shift in Tacti
cs Aims to Revive Struggling Insurgency,??? Washington Post, 2/8/08
Parker, Ned, ???Hard-line Iraqi clerics group shut down,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/15/07 - ???Insurgents report a split with Al Qaeda in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 3/27/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Rival Sunnis in Deadly Gunfight,??? Washington Post, 11/11/07 - ???Sheiks Help Curb Violence in Iraq???s West, U.S. Says,??? Washington Post, 1/27/07 - ???Singing Up Sunnis With ???Insurgent??? on Their Resumes,??? Washington Post, 9/4/07 - ???Sunni Insurgent Leader Paints Iran as ???Real Enemy,?????? Washington Post, 7/14/07
Partlow, Joshua and Paley, Amit, ???Sunni Violence in Baghdad Called Disrupted,??? Washington Post, 10/28/07
Peterson, Scott, ???How fear turns to resolve in one Iraqi village,??? Christian Science Monitor, 1/23/08
Price, Jay and Basri, Ali Omar al, ???In Basra, vigilantes wage deadly campaign against women,??? McClatchy Newspaper, 10/4/07
Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???20 Die as Gunmen Descend on Village,??? Washington Post, 12/2/07 - ???Diary of an Insurgent In Retreat,??? Washington Post, 2/10/08 - ???In Iraq, a Perilous Alliance With Former Enemies,??? Washington Post, 8/4/07
Reuters, ???Iraqi insurgents??? clash with Qaeda kills 16,??? 10/27/07 - ???Rebels call on Al Qaeda to ???review??? behaviour,??? 4/7/07 - ???Two suicide car bombs kill 11 in Iraq???s Ramadi,??? 2/19/07
Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, ???Al-Qaeda In Iraq Reported Crippled,??? Washington Post, 10/15/07
Ridolfo, Kathleen, ???Iraq: Al-Qaeda Tactics Lead To Splits Among Insurgents,??? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4/17/07
Roggio, Bill, ???1920s Revolution Brigades turns on al Qaeda in Diyala,??? Long War Journal.org, 6/12/07 - ???Al Douri forms nationalist Sunni coalition; 1920s Revolution Brigades denounces al Qaeda,??? Long War Journal.org, 10/4/07 - ???Al Qaeda establishes ???a haven in Diyala,?????? Long War Journal.org, 12/30/07 - ???al Qaeda on Sunni violence in Anbar,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/25/07 - ???al Qaeda???s Grand Coalition in Anbar,??? Long War Journal.org, 10/12/06 - ???Amariyah, the Anbar Salvation Council and Reconciliation,??? Long War Journal.org, 6/1/07 - ???Anbar Rising,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/11/07 - ???The Anbar Salvation Council goes expeditionary,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/2/07 - ???Anbar Tribes vs. al Qaeda,??? Long War Journal.org, 9/29/06 - ???The Anbar Tribes vs. al Qaeda, Continued,??? Long War Journal.org, 11/22/06 - ???The Awakening, al Qaeda clash in Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 12/17/07 - ???Choosing Sides in the Sunni Insurgency,??? Long War Journal.org, 10/6/06 - ???Divisions in al Qaeda in Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 10/13/06 - ???The Diyala Salvation Front,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/10/07 - ???Harmony: The Attyia ??? Zarqawi Letter,??? Long War Journal.org, 9/27/06 - ???Islamic Army of Iraq splits from Al Qaeda,??? Long War Journal.org, 4/12/07 - ???Securing Eastern Anbar Province,??? Long War Journal.org, 6/15/07 - ???The Sunni Awakening,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/3/07 - ???The Sunni Civil War,??? Long War Journal.org, 3/27/07 - ???Why the violence has declined in Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 11/8/07
Rosen, Nir, ???The Many Faces of Abu Musab al Zarqawi,??? Truthdig.com, 6/9/06
Roug, Louise and Boudreaux, Richard, ???Deadly Rift Grows Among Insurgents,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/29/06
Rubin, Alissa and Cave, Damien, ???In a Force or Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict,??? New York Times, 12/23/07
Sabah, Zaid and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Security Pact on Iraq Would Set U.S. Exit,??? Washington Post, 12/11/07
Schwartz, Michael, ???Car bombings: Iraq???s time bomb,??? Asia Times, 6/8/05
Shahine, Alaa, ???Qaeda changing tactics in Iraq???s Diyala: U.S. general,??? Reuters, 12/8/07
Susman, Tina, ???Attacks on Iraq volunteers rise,??? Los Angeles Times, 2/8/08
Tarabay, Jamie, ???Anbar Alliance May Not Translate to Other Provinces,??? All Things Considered ??? National Public Radio, 9/25/07
Tavernise, Sabrina, ???In Air Attack, U.S. Soldiers Kill 18 Gunmen,??? New York Times, 8/25/07 - ???Marines See Signs Iraq Rebels Are Battling Foreign Fighters,??? New York Times, 6/21/05
Tavernise, Sabrina and Filkins, Dexter, ???Local Insurgents Tell of Clashes With Al Qaeda???s Forces in Iraq,??? New York Times, 1/12/06
Tilghman, Andrew, ???The Myth of AQI,??? Washington Monthly, October 2007
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???A Deadly Clash at Donkey Island,??? Washington Post, 8/19/07 - ???Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,??? Washington Post, 8/9/07 - ???Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,??? Washington Post, 9/30/07
Another example of how sab is full of shit because when discussing tbe previous pole by the same news companies he said the BBC hates America and only cares about American's killing babies, but now is all too happy to cut and paste the results of their latest findings.
Another example of how sab is full of shit because when discussing tbe previous pole by the same news companies he said the BBC hates America and only cares about American's killing babies, but now is all too happy to cut and paste the results of their latest findings.
Another example of how sab is full of shit because when discussing tbe previous pole by the same news companies he said the BBC hates America and only cares about American's killing babies, but now is all too happy to cut and paste the results of their latest findings.
There is a new status quo in Iraq. Violence is down from the civil war days of late 06-early 07. Political parties are beginning to think like parties that want to help themselves and their followers rather than just their sectarian group. That being said I think Iraq's public has been traumatized by post-invasion Iraq and are very cautious. In Baghdad there are lots of shops open, people are out and about a lot more, but they tend to stick to their own neighborhoods. Violence has also spiked since Jan. as well which makes people weary. Overall, I think for the first time since the invasion there is a ray of hope for Iraq, which is reflected in that new poll.
Iraq's future for the next ten years is probably the following: The economy will be booming but only because of high oil prices. That hides the high unemployment and lack of basic services in the country. Violence will hopefully stay low, but with peaks and valleys. The government will slowly but surely pass laws, but only some of them will be implemented fairly and effectively. Baghdad will continue to be incompetent while the provinces start working, but only because the U.S. military is facilitating and funding them. Corruption will continue to be a major problem.
The two big impending issues are the Sunni vs. Sunni and Shiite vs. Shiite disputes, not the insurgency or Al Qaeda in Iraq. The tribes in Anbar behind the Awakening movement want power in both their province and in Baghdad, but are opposed by the Sunni political parties. The Shiites are split between the Sadrists and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, plus in Basra, the 2nd most important city in Iraq, you have the Fadhila Party. That will come to a head by the end of 2008 if they hold local elections as planned. That will shape the future of the country because they all have different ideas about Iraq, but none of them can agree or make compromises right now. That could also lead to more violence.
2007 12 April - A bomb blast rocks parliament, killing an MP.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
18 April - Bombings in Baghdad kill nearly 200 people in the worst day of violence since a US-led security drive began in the capital in February.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
2007 May - The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, is reported killed.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
2007 July - President Bush says there's been only limited military and political progress in Iraq following his decision to reinforce US troops levels there.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
2007 August - The main Sunni Arab political bloc in Iraq, the Iraqi Accordance Front, withdraws from the cabinet, plunging the government into crisis.
Truck and car bombs hit two villages of Yezidi Kurds, killing at least 250 people - the deadliest attack since 2003.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
Sun Aug 26, 6:27 PM ET
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Iraq's top Shi'ite, Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders announced on Sunday they had reached consensus on some key measures seen as vital to fostering national reconciliation.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
March 20th 2008 5 long years, Sunni US alliance falling apart and...
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
Comments
January saw some interesting developments in Iraq, both good and bad. On the security front, there was a large spike in violence by both insurgents and Shiites. On the political side the government is still deadlocked as parties reposition themselves in the drive for power. On the economic front oil is holding up the economy, while basic services are faltering. All together it was a month characterized by one step forward, two steps back.
Security: A Spike In Violence[/b]
In long wars like the one in Iraq increases in violence are to be expected. Gen. Petraeus has continued to warn people that the security situation in Iraq is fragile and the U.S. is far from winning the war. That was proved in January with a major military operation in central Iraq, new attacks on the Sunni Awakening groups, and the re-emergence of a Shiite cult. The ups and downs in security is a major reason why the Bush administration wants a deal with Iraq for a long term U.S. military presence there before it leaves office.
While Baghdad has settled into a rough cease-fire between Sunnis and Shiites, violence went up in provinces surrounding capital where insurgents fled during the surge. For example, in December the governor of Ninawa province quit because of attacks, while in January the police chief of that province was killed in a massive bombing, 120 Kurdish families were forced out of the city, and there was an assassination attempt on the governor of Diyala province.
Crater left from bomb that killed Mosul???s police chief
All of these were reasons why the U.S. launched Operation Phantom Phoenix aimed at rooting out insurgents from the four provinces surrounding Baghdad. While many fighters left before the U.S. arrived, the plan is to build up Sunni awakening groups to try to keep insurgents from returning. This tactic has had mixed results so far. One area the U.S. is currently carrying out operations in, Arab Jabour for example, was touted as a new safe zone in the winter of 2007 in a speech by Bush and in several news pieces, only to have 40,000 lbs of bombs dropped on it at the beginning of Phantom Phoenix. This led the U.S. military to admit that they had only taken reporters to the safe part of the town, while the other side was still an insurgent stronghold.
U.S. operations in Diyala province, part of Operation Phantom Phoenix
The Sunni awakening councils have also become a favorite target of their former insurgent brethren. At the end of December bin Laden released a new tape where he called the awakening groups traitors. There has been a steady increase on attacks on them since then. More and more Shiite militias have also come into conflict with them. As a result, several awakening leaders have been assassinated throughout the country including ones in Adhamiya in Baghdad, Baquba in Diyala, Shaab north of the capitol, and in Anbar province.
U.S. soldiers with an Awakening member
In the Shiite south the Soldiers of Heaven cult re-emerged for the second year running, attacking Iraqi security forces in three cities. The uprising was put down, but not before hundreds were killed, wounded and arrested.
More troubling for the future security of the country were three other developments. First American officers told Time magazine that the U.S. was beginning to cut back on payments to Sunni groups. America has promised to fund the awaking groups until 2008, but the long-term plan is to have the vast majority of them get government construction jobs. The problem is that money for this program hasn???t appeared yet and many Sunnis do not want that type of work. 20% of the Sunnis are also supposed to be integrated into the security forces, but this has only happened in Anbar and Abu Ghraib just outside of Baghdad. Prime Minister Maliki continues to be cold on both these programs and has had ordered thousands of Shiite militiamen to be taken into the services to counter any new Sunni recruits. What the Awakening fighters will do if they no longer get paid is an open question.
The U.S. is also planning on releasing almost 20,000 Iraqis, mostly Sunni prisoners this year. There are extensive programs to rehabilitate them before release, but the major problem is that there are no jobs for them once they???re out. Unemployment has been a major factor in the growth of militias and the insurgency. There is also no way to monitor the prisoners after they???re released.
Last, the Sadrists are making noises about ending the stand down of the Mahdi Army, which has been a major factor in the decrease in violence in the country. Spokesmen have claimed the government, and especially their main Shiite rival the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) are persecuting them. The Sadrists say they are fed up and might strike back. Their discontent was shown when Iraq???s national security advisor was trapped in a mosque in Baghdad by Sadrists and had to call on the police to rescue him. While some Sadrist leaders want to compete in the political field, others think violence is a way to rally the Shiite masses to their cause.
Any of these could derail the security gains that have been achieved in recent months. That???s why the Bush administration is pushing for a new agreement that would ensure a long term U.S. troop presence in Iraq. The U.S. and Iraq disagree on the details however. Iraqis want some kind of deadline for when U.S. forces will leave. That led Iraq???s foreign and defense ministers to say that the U.S. will be out by 2018 when Iraqis are capable of protecting their borders and taking over internal security. The U.S. wants more of an open ended agreement, probably with de facto permanent bases. The declaration of principles that was released in November 2007 for example, said that the U.S. would protect Iraq from both internal and external threats, something the U.S. has not promised any other country. That would give the U.S. the authority to prop up the Iraqi government for as long as they wanted.
Politics: Gridlock and Maneuverings Behind The Scenes[/b]
Violence might have spiked in January, but the real problem with Iraq continues to be its government. The Maliki prime ministership is incompetent, sectarian and still divided. It hasn???t come through with any of the political benchmarks that it has been promising since it took office in 2006. A new deBaathiication law was voted on by Parliament but Sunni Vice President Hashemi says he will hold up its passage into law until its amended. The constitutional review committee missed its deadline once again and has asked for another extension of its work. Provincial elections have also been postponed, mostly because the ruling parties see them as a threat to their power. Bush and Maliki promised that Iraq would spend $10 billion on reconstruction as part of the surge, but has only spent about $3 billion or less. Most of this money continues to go to Shiite areas more than Sunni ones. The only thing that keeps Iraq running is the U.S. military which is the real government in the country. They deliver services, build infrastructure, shuttle politicians to and fro, cut political deals, etc. This kind of intensive nation building can???t last and builds dependence amongst the Iraqis. Why should they do anything if they know the U.S. will do it for them?
Vice President Hashemi wants the government to release Sunni prisoners and give other concessions in order for the Sunni parties to return to the government
This gridlock has led the political parties to a ttempt to remake the government. Maliki???s ruling coalition fell apart in 2007 and he only finds support from his own Dawa Party and the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC). The SIIC has been working feverishly to create a new bloc to support Maliki, calling on the boycotting cabinet members to return. At the same time, the Kurds, that use to be one of Maliki???s main backers have grown disillusioned with the prime minister because he failed to stop Turkish attacks on Kurdistan and failed to follow through with a promise to have elections over the future of Kirkuk. The Kurds have been working independently to bring in as many political parties as possible to resolve the Kirkuk issue so that it is annexed by them, while threatening a no confidence vote unless Maliki consults with more people when making decisions. The Sunni parties have been meeting with Maliki, the SIIC and the Kurds to try to negotiate their return to government as well. They are ready to come back because they feel threatened by the Sunni Anbar Awakening Council that wants a voice in government. The Sunni parties want to get back their positions in government before the Awakening Council can become an actual political party and displace them.
Opposed to these machinations is a nationalist bloc made up of Sadrists, former prime minister Ilyad Allawi???s Iraqi National List and the Sunni National Dialogue Front. They want to depose Maliki, are against the Kurds??? expansionist aspirations and want national control over Iraq???s oil. 138 members of parliament are needed for a no confidence vote in Maliki, but so far, the various coalitions either for or against him have only around 100.
All of these moves are symbolic of how Iraqi politics have changed over the last year. Two of the major blocs, the Sunis and Shites, have fallen apart. Political parties act more out of their own interests rather than larger sectarian concerns. This allows for more flexibility and alliances. Whether this will lead to a functioning government is yet to be seen. The political parties have used the government???s ministries as a way to enrich themselves and their followers rather than to actually run the country. Maliki has also shown no signs of change, especially because President Bush always says he stands behind him. Given this background, the impending announcement that boycotting parties will return to Maliki???s cabinet may be just a new coalition that maintains the status quo.
Maliki???s ruling coalition disintegrated in 2007, but a new one seems to be forming. No matter who is part of it, Maliki is assured of staying in office.
Economics: Oil Profits Hide Massive Structural Problems[/b]
Iraq???s oil wealth obscures problems with the rest of Iraq???s economy
Macroeconomic reports on Iraq were good in the opening of 2008, but they hid problems with how the economy was actually affecting the public. The IMF reported that Iraq???s economy would grow by 7% in 2008 because of high oil prices. They also hoped that exports would increase even though they were below previous years and didn???t meet the government???s production goals. At the same time two major oil refineries were shut down because they couldn???t get electricity, while a third was attacked and closed for repairs. There is still no new oil law either, and one is probably dead for now because of disagreements with the Kurds over who has the power to make contracts.
The larger economic indicators also hide what???s actually going on within the country. The Pentagon???s December 2007 report gave an optimistic report on Iraq???s electricity output, but the Electricity Minister said there had been no improvement in power for the last year. 2 hours of electricity during the day is the norm across the country. Much of northern Iraq has simply run out of electricity. Iraqi papers report that it is the worst energy crisis since the start of the war. There is also a water shortage that has cut farm production, the second largest business in the country after oil.
This all points to how oil wealth is a chimera. It provides large profits, good numbers, but few jobs. The government uses the profits for massive social programs for a public that is bereft of opportunities. The situation is made worse by the fact that Iraq is in the middle of a war that has created massive unemployment and disrupted all services.
Conclusion[/b]
Overall, the U.S. is attempting to consolidate its gains before the surge ends in the summer of 2008, but there are still long term threats to security. These come from armed factions, the inability of the government to carry out its duties, and the faltering economy. If Baghdad doesn???t start to deliver, the insurgents will continue their struggle, the Awakening groups will get fed up and disrupt things, the Shiites will continue to fracture and fight amongst each other, the Kurds will increasingly go their own way, services will continue to deteriorate, and Iraq will maintain its position as one of the worst failed states in the world. These are all problems that the U.S. won???t be able to walk away from for decades.
Sources[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Biddle, Stephen, ???Iraq after the Surge,??? Committee on Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, 1/23/08
Government Accountability Office, ???Iraq Reconstruction: Better Data Needed to Assess Iraq???s Budget Execution,??? January 2008
Think Tank And U.N. Reports[/b]
Cordesman, Anthony, ???The Evolving Security Situation in Iraq: The Continuing Need for Strategic Patience,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/21/08
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Cordesman: Despite Gains, Future in Iraq, Afghanistan Remains ???Uncertain,?????? Council on Foreign Relations, 1/14/08
Hamre, John, ???Alternative Strategies or Iraq in the Post-Surge Environment, Testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/16/08
Mardini, Ramzy, ???Implications o the New Kurdish-Sunni Alliance for Security in Iraq???s Ninawa Governorate,??? Jamestown Foundation, 1/14/08
Serwer, Daniel and al-Rahim, Rend, ???Iraq: Politics Unfrozen, Direction Still Unclear,??? United States Institute of Peace, January 2008
United Nations Security Council, ???Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1770 (2007),??? 1/14/08
Articles[/b]
Alsumaria, ???Accordance Front return to Cabinet imminent,??? 1/25/08
- ???Agriculture production decreases in Iraq,??? 1/22/08
- ???Iraq tribes request role in decision making,??? 1/18/08
- ???Iraq VP decries Justice & Accountability law,??? 1/22/08
Associated Press, ???Al-Qaeda targets Sunni tribal groups,??? 1/2/08
Aswat Aliraq, ???272 gunmen killed, wounded or captured in Basra, Nassiriya clashes ??? ministry,??? 1/20/08
- ???Casualties from Basra clashes reach 314,??? 1/19/08
- ???Gunmen kill Sadrist Sheikh in Najaf,??? 1/26/08
- ???IAF to ponder return to government ??? source,??? 1/17/08
- ???IED kills 3 governor bodyguards, wounds 2 in Diala,??? 1/19/08
- ???Iraqi Alliances: Shifting Sands,??? 1/28/08
- ???Messianic cults in Iraq, an increase in numbers and expansion,??? 1/26/08
- ???New alliances not new intentions in Iraq,??? 1/29/08
- ???PM receives IAF delegation, stresses reconciliation,??? 1/26/08
- ???Sadr may extend freeze if govt. stops measures against loyalists ??? spokesman,??? 1/21/08
- ???Sunni party about to join 4-way alliance ??? SIIC,??? 1/25/08
- ???VP intends to hinder approvi ng accountability bill ??? MP,??? 1/23/08
Battat, Abed, ???Security worsens in three southern provinces,??? Azzaman, 1/21/08
BBC News, ???Agencies see good year for Iraq,??? 1/17/08
Becatoros, Elena, ???U.S. hopes jobs dim allure of Iraq???s militant groups,??? Associated Press, 1/3/08
Boot, Max, ???We Are Winning. We Haven???t Won,??? Weekly Standard, 1/28/08
Boot, Max and West, Bing, ???Iraq???s Number 1 Problem,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/28/08
Bowman, Tom, ???A Year Later, Surge???s Impact Seen in Some Areas,??? Morning Edition ??? NPR, 1/7/08
Christian Science Monitor, ???As violence ebbs, the next hurdle for Iraq is political progress,??? 1/8/08
Cockburn, Patrick, ??????If there is no change in three months, there will be war again,?????? Independent, 1/28/08
- ???US troops will be gone within 10 years, says Iraqi minister,??? Independent, 1/25/08
Farrell, Stephen, ???U.S. Attack in Iraq Is No Surprise to Many Insurgents,??? New York Times, 1/9/08
Gamel, Kim, ???Iraqi Troops Clash With Shiite Cult,??? Washington Post, 1/18/08
Garrels, Anne, ???Despite Security Gains, Iraqi Government Paralyzed,??? Morning Edition ??? NPR, 1/9/08
- ???Long-Awaited Fallujah Rebuilding Shows Promise,??? Morning Edition ??? NPR, 1/23/08
Gumbrecht, Jamie and Yousse, Nancy, ???In Iraq, U.S. airstrikes target insurgents near supposedly safe zone,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 1/10/08
Hurst, Steven, ???Shiite Leaders Urges Outreach to Sunnis,??? Associated Press, 1/11/08
Ibrahim, Waleed, ???Main Iraq Sunni Arab bloc says ready to return to government,??? Reuters, 1/14/07
Imad, Ammar, ???Iraq???s national grid grinds to a halt,??? Azzaman, 1/13/08
Karim, Ammar, ???Iraq Shiite and Sunni MPs sign new ???unity??? pact,??? Agence France Presse, 1/13/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Fallujah safer but residents still lack basic services,??? USA Today 1/24/08
al-Maamouri, Falah, ???No improvement in electricity output ??? minister,??? Azzaman, 1/28/08
al-Mawsawi, Abdulati, ???Production halted at two major Iraqi refineries,??? Azzaman, 1/18/08
Moore, Solomon and Oppel, Richard, ???Attacks Imperil U.S.-Backed Militias in Iraq,??? New York Times, 1/24/08
Moubayed, Sami, ???Iraq???s Sunnis reclaim lost ground,??? Asia Times, 1/15/08
Oppel, Richard and Al-Ansary, Khalid, ???Shiite Priases Anti-Insurgent Militias,??? New York Times, 1/4/08
Oppel, Richard and Al-Husaini, ???Suicide Bomber Kills Key Sunni Leader,??? New York times, 1/8/08
Oppel, Richard and Mizher, Qais, ???Bomber Kills Sunni Allies of the U.S.,??? New York Times, 1/21/08
Pepper, Daniel, ???The U.S. Financial Crisis ??? in Iraq,??? Time, 1/23/08
Peterson, Scott, ???How fear turns to resolve in one Iraqi village,??? Christian Science Monitor, 1/23/08
Raz, Guy, ???Long-Term Pact with Iraq Raises Questions,??? National Public Radio, 1/24/08
- ???Some Say U.S. May Shift to Peacekeeping in Iraq,??? All Things Considered ??? NPR, 1/10/08
Reuters, ???Iraqi forces battle cult gunman,??? 1/18/08
Rubin, Alissa, ???Despite Deadly Clashes in Iraq, Shiite Pilgrims Spared,??? New York Times, 1/19/08
Salaheddin, Sinan, ???Iraqi Oil Exports Rise by 9.2 Percent,??? Associated Press, 1/24/08
Samuels, Lennox, ???The Protection Business,??? Newsweek, 1/11/08
Shanker, Thom, ???Minister Sees Need for U.S. Help in Iraq Until 2018,??? New York Times, 1/15/08
Therolf, Garrett, ???Fire shuts oil refinery in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/16/08
Virtue, ???Al Fadhila Party rejects new Iraq alliances,??? Alsumaria, 1/17/08
Yoshino, Kimi, ???Unrest in Iraq???s Diyala province,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/5/08
Youssef, Nancy, ???Despite dropping violence, Gates calls for extended U.S. presence in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 1/17/08
Zavis, Alexandra, ???Sunnis divided in Anbar province,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/3/08
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080206/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq
News flash! In February 2008 Saba declares that Al Qaeda in Iraq is evil!
Wow Sab, how many people know about this? You need to spread the word. This is a Frickin' revelation! YOu have a true news scoop here.
They must not have heard that the insurgents have been using kids as look outs and to plant bombs since the insurgency started in 2003.
They must not have read about how insurgents used two handicapped women for those market bombings last week.
They must not have read about how in Diyala insurgents left bodies with their heads cut off to try to deter people from joining Concerned Local Citizens groups the U.S. was trying to organize.
They must not have read how torture houses have been uncovered in Anbar and Diyala recently as the U.S. has been sweeping through those areas.
And I'm sure you didn't read how I wrote that one of the main reasons why Sunnis turned against Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamists was because they imposed a strict form of Islamic law and killed people that didn't follow it.
And I'm sure you didn't read about how I wrote that one of the causes for the Anbar tribes to turn against AL Qaeda in Iraq was because the insurgents tried to force marriages upon the tribes and ended up killing entire families when they refused.
And they must not have read that the insurgents continue to do this in Diyala.
And you must not know that some of the CLCs that the U.S. has set up in Baghdad like the Ghazilya Guardians are in fact former Islamists that went around imposing Islamic law and killing people.
I guess it was just the monthly time for Sab to wave the flag and claim victory.
When you catch up and know what the hell is going on in Iraq, please let us all know.
Dude wouldn't know what homework was if it hit him in the head. He is the worst kind of political commentator; he's a true believer, just like Rummy and Perle. Reality is not part of his equation.
Doctor, doctor. It hurts when i do this...
Then you might want to pull it out of your.....
They forogt to note that, if any two of the four get made into law, they'll be outperforming the Democratic Congress.
Towards the end of 2007 one of the hottest news stories of the time were reports on Iraqi refugees. Egged on by a propaganda campaign led by the Iraqi government to prove that things were getting better in the country, newspapers reported on thousands of Iraqis returning to their country from Syria because of the improved security conditions. The optimistic stories soon faded from the headlines, while follow up and analysis of the possible consequences were left to the wayside. Since then, trends have reversed with more Iraqis fleeing the country than returning, and conflicts over the ones that have come back.
Ebb and Flow In Reporting On Iraqi Refugees[/b]
Beginning in November 2007, Baghdad orchestrated a story of tens of thousands refugees coming home, topped by a government sponsored bus convoy that brought back 800 refugees. Prime Minister Maliki???s office claimed that people were coming back because of the new found security provided by the government and the surge. A U.N. survey of returnees however, found that the main reasons were Iraqis running out of money, lack of opportunities in other countries, and visa restrictions. The Iraqi numbers were also proven to be inflated as they were counting every single Iraqi crossing the border from Syria whether they were a refugee or not. By December the story had changed as Baghdad and the United Nations called on Iraqis not to return because the government and aid agencies could not take care of them. After that, the story largely disappeared from the headlines.
The Current Situation[/b]
What has happened to Iraqi refugees since then has not been pretty. When reporters took the time to actually interview Iraqi refugees they found that most were very pessimistic about the situation in Iraq. Those misgivings turned into hard reality quickly. While there were some reports of local councils assisting people, many found their homes occupied by new residents that refused to leave. In Baghdad especially, the refugees seemed to have increased tensions. In the capital???s Adil neighborhood for example, the U.S. military claims 70% of the violence there is due to returnees trying to regain their former residences. Shiite security forces and the Mahdi Army are trying to force out Sunnis for Shiite refugees, while the local Concerned Local Citizen group is using threats and violence to push out Shiites for Sunnis. In other areas, returning Shiites found their homes controlled by local Mahdi Army factions who had rented out their places. Many refugees have been forced to find alternate housing, thus joining the ranks of Iraq???s internally displaced. To add to the difficulties, the U.S. military has been ordered not to intervene when it comes to housing disputes fearing that they will have to do another job that Iraqis should be doing. At the same time, aid agencies reported that they were overburdened by the existing refugee problem and couldn???t handle the new arrivals. The Iraqi government hasn???t helped the situation either. It continues to run ads in Syria calling on refugees to return, while it has no real program to deal with them if they do. Many refugees, being Sunni, are afraid to register for any help anyways because they fear the Shiite controlled government. Together, this convergence of events probably accounted for the latest report by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees in February 2008 that found that more Iraqis were fleeing to Syria than returning to Iraq.
Conclusion[/b]
Today, the United Nations does not feel that it is the right time for Iraqis to return. They are asking for more aid, and a study to be conducted to try to determine when it is safe for the refugees to come home. In the meantime they are calling on neighboring countries to help settle the Iraqis, something the governments are diametrically opposed to. They fear that the Iraqis are the new Palestinians, a permanent refugee population that will never leave and pose a drain on resources. The irony is that thousands of Iraqis have tried to go home in recent months, but their plight has been largely ignored. Because only 1-2% live in refugee camps, there are no eye catching pictures for the news to use. Instead, most live in homes, just not their original ones, which means they are basically out of sight, and out of mind.
Overview of Iraq???s External and Internal Refugees[/b]
Iraq has 2 million external refugees and 2.4 million internally displaced. The majority are Sunni, and 80% come from Baghdad. Neighboring Syria has received the biggest brunt of this exodus being home to 1.5 million Iraqis, and having to spend $1.2 billion a year to support them. The majority of internal refugees live with relatives or rent in the capital, rather than camps. During 2007 the number of displaced increased because of continued sectarian cleansing by Shiite militias, especially in the capital, and increased military action due to the U.S. surge.
In December 2007 the United Nations conducted a survey of Iraqis living in Syria. Here are some of their major findings:
78% came from Baghdad
35% fled from July-October 2007 during the height of the surge
30% fled in 2006 because of sectarian violence
More than 50% had been threatened or been bombed
54% had dead or missing relatives, up from 22% in the previous survey
20% said they had been victims of torture or violence
40% had been living in Syria for more than a year
Most are highly educated and represent the brain drain from Iraq since the 2003 invasion
Most are nearly broke with 33% saying they???d run out of money in 3 months
Many had their children dropping out of schools in Syria
Many rely on U.N. assistance, especially for health care
A February 2008 U.N. High Commission for Refugees report found that while 700 Iraqis were returning to Iraq from Syria, 1,200 were fleeing to Syria.
The Iraqi Red Crescent has counted 67,000 Iraqis returning to the country from September 2007 to January 2008. Up to 100,000 internal refugees have attempted to regain their homes as well.
The Internal Organization for Migration said only 20-30% of returnees were able to get their homes back, while 50% said they wouldn???t even try to. 50% were also unable to find jobs.
Sources[/b]
Government, Think Tank, and United Nations Reports[/b]
Bruno, Greg, ???Refugees Return but Concerns Linger,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 11/20/07
Ferris, Elizabeth, ???The Real Challenge of Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Future,??? Brookings Institution, 12/6/07
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report To The United States Congress,??? 10/30/07
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ???UNHCR Syria Update on Iraqi Refugees,??? February 2003
News Reports[/b]
Al Jazeera, ???Returning Iraqis pose new challenge,??? 12/6/07
Allam, Hannah, ???Baghdad may be safer, but few Iraqis in Syria risk returning,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 12/5/07
- ???Survey: Many Iraqis in Syria fled during U.S. troop buildup,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 12/14/07
Azzaman, ???Surge reported in number of internally displaced Iraqis,??? 11/6/07
Barnes-Dacey, Julien and Dagher, Sam, ???Returning from Syria, Iraqis question safety,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/28/07
Buckley, Cara, ???Refugees Risk Coming Home to an Unready Iraq,??? New York Times, 12/20/07
Cave, Damien, ???Pressure for Results: The Politics of Tallying the Number of Iraqis Who Return Home,??? New York Times, 11/26/07
Cave, Damien and Rubin, Alissa, ???Baghdad???s Weary Start to Exhale as Security Improves,??? New York Times, 11/20/07
Dagher, Sam, ???Aid shrinks as Iraq???s internal refugee tally grows,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/30/07
DeYoung, Karen, ???Balkanized Homecoming ,??? Washington Post, 12/16/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???More Iraqis Said to Flee Since Troop Increase,??? New York Times, 8/24/07
Gumbrecht, Jamie, ???Returning Iraqis face lack of services, property disputes,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 1/1/08
Hurst, Steven, ???Thousands Return to Safer Iraqi Capital,??? Associated Press, 11/4/07
Jordans, Frank, ???UNHCR: Many Iraq Areas Unsafe for Return,??? Associated Press, 12/7/07
Kaplow, Larry, Nordland, Rod, and Spring, Silvia, ???There???s No Place Like ??? Iraq???? Newsweek, 11/24/07
Lannen, Steve, ???Militia in 2nd province ends cooperation with U.S.,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 2/16/08
Mattar, Shafika, ???Jordan Restricts Visas for Iraqis,??? Associated Press, 2/14/08
Paley, Amit, ???Iraq Urges Refugees To Stay Put,??? Washington Post, 12/5/07
Rasheed, Ahmed and Mohammed, Wisam, ???Iraq???s returnees crave a future free of bloodshed,??? Reuters, 2/7/08
Schoof, Renee and Strobel, Warren, ???Report: Surge hasn???t cut attacks on Iraqi civilians,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/4/07
Susman, Tina, ???Some Iraqis returnees face uncertain lives,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/13/07
- ???Troop buildup fails to reconcile Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/4/07
Therolf, Garrett, "Dispute over vacant homes in Iraq often turn violent," Los Angeles, 2/17/08
Yoshino, Kimi and Ahmed, Caesar, ???Baghdad???s housing boom,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/29/08
Youssef, Nancy, ???Baghdad refugees happy to be home again,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/20/07
"Downtown Baghdad traffic poses serious challenges for Iraqi commuters."
In the words of the Obama. "yes we can"
If Sab was just a little bit brighter he would've noticed that ALL news on Iraq whether good or bad has declined over the last year or so.
Of the major newspapers, NY Times, Wash. Post, USA Today, LA Times, Christian Science Monitor, McClatchy that have bureaus in Iraq reporting has dropped from 2-4 news stories a day down to about 1. The Christian Science Monitor only reports on Iraq about once a week. In fact, unless there is a major event like the Turkish incursion into Kurdistan there have been days when half the major newspapers don't have any stories about Iraq. TV News reportage, given the time restraint and interest, tends to report even less than the print media.
(Based on a Jan. report from the Project for Excellence in Journalism)
The Attempted Transformation Of The Sadrist Movement[/b]
Moqtada al-Sadr
One of the most important events of the last year was the decision by Moqtada al-Sadr to call off his Mahdi Army in August 2007. After the Sadrists clashed with Iraqi security forces in the holy city of Karbala, Sadr ordered his forces to stand down. The effects were felt immediately throughout Iraq as the Mahdi Army had been responsible for thousands of deaths of Sunnis, especially in Baghdad, and attacks on Coalition forces throughout the country. There are differing opinions about the motivations behind the order, was it because Sadr was losing control over his movement or was it because of military pressure by the U.S., but since then the Sadrists have attempted to change their stripes. The movement has gone through an extensive, and sometime bloody, housecleaning, become more involved in politics, while Sadr has gone to Iran for religious training to become an Ayatollah. Overall, the Sadrists hope to transform themselves into an Iraqi version of Hezbollah, a combined religious, political, social and military organization.
Theories On The Freeze[/b]
In August 2007 Sadrists were attempting to enter the holy city of Karbala when they came into conflict with Iraqi security forces controlled by their rivals the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). A firefight ensued that spread across neighboring cities in the region as dozens were killed and hundreds of militia members were arrested. Afterwards Sadr ordered his Mahdi Army to stand down and that has been renewed every six months since then. There are two different version of why Sadr made this move.
Some believe that the Sadrists were in a position of weakness politically and militarily. This line of thought believes that increasing raids, arrests and killings of Sadrists by U.S. and Iraqi forces, as well organizing Shiites into Concerned Local Citizens groups that could splinter his movement during the surge made Sadr call the stand down or be destroyed. The withdrawal of Sadrists from the cabinet in Prime Minister Maliki???s government also gave the Mahdi Army no friends in government to stop the attacks. U.S., Iraqi and SIIC forces have continued this pressure, which might be why Sadr continues with the cease-fire.
Sadrists
Another argument believes that Sadr was losing control of his movement. From 2006-2007 the Mahdi Army had gained hundreds of new recruits and expanded its base throughout Baghdad and its suburbs through vicious ethnic cleansing. With its success and new real estate it also began turning on fellow Shiites, extorting money, confiscating property, threatening civilians, etc. The fact that the Mahdi Army contains a large criminal element made the situation worse. It was also coming into increasing conflict with the SIIC in southern Iraq with a spate of clashes and assassinations of officials. Together, these forces might have made Sadr call the cease-fire so that he might regain control of his group.
Following the Hezbollah Model[/b]
Since the freeze, the Sadrists have concentrated on purging its ranks, forging a nationalist coalition in parliament against Maliki and the Kurds, and attempted to increase its religious standing and independence.
One of the most common news stories after the cease-fire has been of the Mahdi Army weaning unwanted elements. Like the reasons behind the stand down, there are differing opinions on this phenomenon. Some believe that Sadr is getting rid of the riff raff that joined his movement during the last two years. Some are told to leave, while special teams within the Mahdi Army assassinate others. Others believe this is a public relations ploy to make it seem like Sadr is reforming his group when he isn???t. They point to the fact that when the surge first started in early 2007, Sadr ordered his forces off the streets to avoid the new Americans forces, and there was an immediate drop in sectarian violence. This means there are fewer ???rogue??? elements of the militia than is often reported.
Either way, the majority of the Mahdi Army has followed the cease-fire, and that is one of the major reasons behind the drop in violence throughout the country. There are still occasional clashes with the SIIC in the south, and more importantly the U.S. has increasingly claimed Special Groups of the Mahdi that work with Iranian agents continue to attack U.S. forces, but the large scale ethnic cleansing and Shiite death squads that ravaged Baghdad and other areas appear to be over.
On the political front, the Sadrists have tried to increase their influence in parliament by opposing Prime Minister Maliki???s government and the Kurds. They have joined ranks with nationalist groups in parliament and formed a coalition that is against the Kurds??? desires to annex the city of Kirkuk and sign independent oil deals, as well as try to topple Maliki. They have also attempted to gain more power over the important port city of Basra.
Sadr has also left Iraq for religious training in Iran. Sadr has always been treated like a stepchild by the Shiite religious establishment in Iraq for his lack of religious education. He is attempting to remedy this problem by becoming a full-fledged ayatollah. This would allow him to stand as an equal to Shiite clerics as well as issue fatwa???s for his followers. At the same time, the Sadrists have announced their desire to transform themselves into more of a social movement that provides services to Shiites, especially the poor, who are the base of Sadr???s support.
This all follows the model of Hezbollah that not only has its own militia, but is a powerful member in Lebanon???s parliament and provides social services. Sadrists have had first hand experience with this model having had extensive contacts and training with the Lebanese group.
In the short term, Sadr???s goals appear to be to reorganize his organization, create a new governing coalition in Iraq, declare his independence from the Shiite establishment, take over the religious centers of Karbala and Najaf, and defeat the SIIC. They are also hoping for a new round of local elections by the end of 2008 that they hope will allow them to sweep into power over many local and provincial governments. Although violence is still on the table, most of these goals are being worked on peacefully.
Conclusion[/b]
Whether Sadr is successful in transforming his movement is still to be seen. What is more important for the time being is that his cease-fire and following actions show that the Mahdi Army is moving away from violence and the bloody purging of Sunnis from central Iraq that was engulfing the country previously. There are still reports of elements of the Mahdi Army working with Iranian special forces to attack the U.S., and low level fighting between Shiites in the South, but these are nothing like previous levels. Instead, the movement is moving towards the political and social realms as it continues to change its public face while continuing to oppose its rivals.
Sources[/b]
Government Reports
Biddle, Stephen, ???Iraq after the Surge,??? Committee on Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, 1/23/08
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? December 2007
Think Tank Reports
Borden, Anthony, ???Iraqi Governance Report,??? Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Institute For War & Peace Reporting, ???Battling for Power in Basra,??? 8/7/07
International Crisis Group, ???Iraq???s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,??? 2/7/08
Rahimi, Babak, ???Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Politics of Moqtada al-Sadr,??? Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 2/8/08
- ???The Hakim-Sadr Pact: A New Era in Shiite Politics???? Jamestown Foundation, 10/25/07
News Reports
Agence France Presse, ???Iraq cracks down on Sadr militants,??? 11/19/07
Al-Laithi, Nidhal, ???Iraq to ???swim in lack of blood??? if Sadr killed,??? Azzaman, 2/27/08
- ???U.S. accused of taking sides in Shiite factional fighting,??? Azzaman, 11/17/07
Alsumaria, ???Iraq Cabinet to work out disputes with Kurds,??? 1/31/08
- ???Sadr to extend activities half decision,??? 2/11/08
Asharq Alawsat, ???Iraqi Alliances: Shifting Sands,??? 1/28/08
Aswat Aliraq, ???MP unleashes details of agreement to pass key laws,??? 2/13/08
- ???Reports on govt. reshuffle media hype ??? Sadrist MP,??? 2/15/08
Azzaman, ???Assassination Hizbollah leader had links with Iraq???s Mahdi Army,??? 2/22/08
- ???Sadr movement says government cracking down on members,??? 11/5/07
Bennett, Brian, ???Underestimating al-Sadr ??? Again,??? Time, 2/12/08
Cockburn, Patrick, ???Shia call on Mehdi Army to take up arms again in Iraq,??? Independent, 2/7/08
Cole, Juan, ???Turkish-Kurd Military Confrontation,??? Informed Comment, JuanCole.com, 2/22/08
Crain, Charles, ???Sadr???s Freeze Greeted With Skepticism,??? Time, 9/19/07
Dagher, Sam, ???As British leave Basra, militias dig in,??? Christian Science Monitor 8/28/07
- ???As British troops exit Basra, Shiites vie to fill power vacuum,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/17/07
- ???Iraq???s Sadr uses lull to rebuild Army,??? Christian Science Monitor, 12/11/07
- ???U.S., Iran dial down tensions in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/7/07
Dehghanpisheh, Babak, ???The Great Moqtada Makeover,??? Newsweek, 1/19/08
DeYoung, Karen and Ricks, Thomas, ???As British Leave, Basra Deteriorates,??? Washington Post, 8/7/07
Dreyfuss, Robert, ???Is Iran Winning the War in Iraq,??? The Nation, 2/26/08
Economist, ???The enigma of Muqtada al-Sadr,??? 2/14/08
Farrell, Stephen, ???50 Die in Fight Between Shiite Groups in Karbala,??? New York Times, 8/29/07
- ???Governor of Iraqi Province Assassinated,??? New York Times, 8/21/07
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, ???Al-Sadr overhauling his Shiite militia,??? Seattle Times, 9/10/07
IraqSlogger.com, ???Iraq Papers Mon: Crisis in Karbala,??? 11/4/07
- ???Iraq Papers Monday: ???Tribal??? Ministers???? 11/11/07
- ???Iraq Papers Thur: Splits in Karbala???s Police,??? 11/14/07
Latif, Nizar and Sands, Phil, ???Mehdi fighters ???trained by Hizbollah in Lebanon,?????? Independent, 8/20/07
Mohsen, Amer, ???Arab Papers Fri: Disarming the Mahdi Army,??? IraqSlogger.com, 2/28/08
Moubayed, Sami, ???Iraq???s Sunnis reclaim lost ground,??? Asia Times, 1/15/08
- ???Muqtada moves to stop a Sunni ???surge,?????? Asia Times, 11/15/07
Paley, Amit, ???Maliki Intends to Lift Curfew in Baghdad,??? Washington Post, 11/13/07
- ???Sadr???s Militia Enforces Cease-Fire With a Deadly Purge,??? Washington Post, 2/21/08
Parker, Ned, ???Sadr militia moves to clean house,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/7/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Iraq Police Tied to Attack on U.S. Base,??? Washington Post, 10/21/07
Partlow, Joshua and Sarhan, Saad, ???Sadr Orders ???Freeze??? on Militia Actions,??? Washington Post, 8/30/07
Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???Disaffected Iraqis Spurn Dominant Shiite Clerics,??? Washington Post, 12/21/07
- ???Iraq???s Youthful Militiamen Build Power Through Fear,??? Washington Post, 12/13/07
- ???Moqtada Al-Sadr Extends Cease-Fire,??? Washington Post, 2/22/08
- ???Shiite Contest Sharpens In Iraq,??? Washington Post, 12/26/07
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Paley, Amit, ???Sadr Extends Truce In Iraq,??? Washington Post, 2/23/08
Reid, Robert, ???U.S. Blames Shiites in New Iraq Violence,??? Associated Press, 11/24/07
Ricks, Thomas, ???In Iraq, Three Wars Engage U.S.,??? Washington Post, 2/3/08
Roggio, Bill, ???Captured Iranian agent identified, 15 Special Groups operatives captured in Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 9/30/07
- ???Dividing the Mahdi Army,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/27/07
- ???Iraqi Security Forces take on the Mahdi Army in Diwaniyah,??? Long War Journal.org, 11/19/07
- ???Mahdi Army trains with Hezbollah,??? Long War Journal.org, 8/20/07
- ???Pressure on Sadr and the Iranian-backed Special Groups continues,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/18/08
- ???Sadr to extend cease-fire,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/21/08
Rubin, Alissa, ???Despite Deadly Clashes in Iraq, Shiite Pilgrims Spared,??? New York Times, 1/19/08
Smith, David, ???Hopes of UK troop cuts in Basra dashed,??? Observer, 2/24/08
Tavernise, Sabrina, ???Relations Sour Between Shiites and Iraq Militia,??? New York Times, 10/12/07
Motown, is just a human rss reader. No-one gives a fuck about you son.
Don't you have something better to do like collect mp3s and create more fantasies in that little head of yours?
Much of Iraq???s government started from scratch after the 2003 U.S. invasion. Despite millions of dollars in aid and advice, many of Iraq???s ministries are deeply troubled. The fact that various political parties that care more about themselves rather than the country as a whole control them creates more problems. The Iraqi Health and Justice Ministries are two examples. In February 2008 the Iraqi justice system was unable to prosecute the former Deputy Health Minister and the head of the ministry???s security forces. The two ex-officials were members of Moqtada al-Sadr???s movement, and were charged with running death squads out of the ministry and corruption. Their release was a sign of the problems with Iraq???s justice system and the power of sectarian forces.
Iraq???s Health Ministry: A Haven For Sectarian Murders[/b]
After the December 2005 elections the Sadrists were one of several new parties that came to power. As part of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, they were given control of several ministries in the new government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. One of these was the Ministry of Health. Up to 80% of the staff left and were replaced with Sadrists, while the security forces were filled with members of the Mahdi Army. Together they began a systematic program of murder, abduction and corruption throughout the ministry. Sunni patients at hospitals and visitors to Baghdad???s morgue were routinely kidnapped and killed. Ambulances were used to ferry militiamen, weapons and abductees, while some hospitals were used as prisons and torture centers by Sadrists. The ministry???s officials also funneled money to the Mahdi Army, and stole drugs to be sold on the black market. Together the actions helped lead to the destruction of Iraq???s health care system, and played a role in the bloody sectarian war that took place from 2006-2007.
In 2006, U.S. forces began collecting intelligence on the Sadrists??? operations and conducted at least one raid on the Health Ministry in Baghdad. This culminated in the arrest of the deputy health minister and the head of the ministry???s security forces in February 2007 on charges of murder, kidnapping, and corruption. The ministry???s police were also disbanded. A year later they were to go on trial, but charges were dismissed because of a lack of evidence in March 2008. The Iraqi justice system relies upon confessions and there were none in the case. Witnesses also refused to appear in court due to threats. One judge on the three-judge panel that was to try the case was said to have promised to find the defendants innocent and another was removed.
Former Deputy Health Minister Hakem Abbas al-Zamili after the charges against him were dropped and he was released
How The Case Reflects On Iraq???s Justice System[/b]
Despite five years of American and foreign assistance, Iraq still does not have a functioning justice system. Iraqi courts are overloaded with cases, judges are routinely assassinated and threatened, and the police are often corrupt, sectarian, and loyal to local forces. The arrest of the Health Ministry officials was the most prominent case since the 2003 U.S. invasion, yet nothing happened. The trial was seen as a test case to see whether the Shiite dominated government of Prime Minister Maliki was capable of trying fellow Shiites from a powerful political party, and it failed. The decision to release the two officials was widely condemned by Sunni political parties as evidence that the government was sectarian. The case highlights the fact that the Iraqis right now are simply not capable of handling many of their most pressing affairs.
Sources[/b]
BBC News, ???Sunni anger at Iraq trial failure,??? 3/5/08
CBS, ???CBS: Death Squads In Iraqi Hospitals,??? 10/4/06
CNN, ???Deputy health minister arrested in U.S.-Iraqi raid,??? 2/8/07
Cole, Juan, ???Sadrists Demand Release of al-Zamili,??? Informed Comment.com, 3/5/08
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07
Drezen, Yochi and Jaffe, Greg, ???Maliki Faces Fresh Doubts, Tests,??? Wall Street Journal, 8/21/07
Glantz, Aaron, ???Iraqi Health Ministry Severs Ties With US Over Raid,??? AntiWar.com, 8/15/06
Gordon, Michael and Rubin, Alissa, ???Trial Near for Shiite Ex-Officials in Sunni Killings,??? New York Times, 11/5/07
Jones, General James, ???The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,??? Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, 9/6/07
McCaffrey, Gen. Barry, ???Ater Action Report ??? Visit Iraq And Kuwait 5-11 December 2007,??? United States Military Academy, 12/18/07
Moore, Solomon, ???Thousands of New Prisoners Overwhelm Iraqi System,??? New York Times, 2/14/08
Pfaff, Tony, ???Development And Reform Of The Iraqi Police Forces,??? Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, January 2008
Rathmell, Andrew, ???Fixing Iraq???s Internal Security Forces: Why is Reform of the Ministry Interior so hard???? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11/13/07
Roggio, Bill, ???Pressure on Sadr and the Iranian-backed Special Groups continues,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/18/08
Rubin, Alissa, ???Charges Are Dropped Against 2 Shiite Ex-Officials Accused in Sectarian Killings,??? New York Times, 3/4/08
- ???Trial of 2 Ex-Officials in Iraq Is Delayed as Witnesses Fail to Show,??? New York Times, 2/20/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,??? 7/30/07
- ???Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,??? 10/31/07
Sunday Times, ???Death squads roam Baghdad???s hospitals,??? 12/3/06
U.S. Embassy, ???Review of Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq Working Draft,??? 2007
Motown:
Juan Cole
whne you have an original thought, go ahead and post it.
Pathetic....
You mean like this?
Wow, February 2008 sab declares that Al Qaeda in Iraq does bad shit. That's some really original cutting and pasting there.
Was that an original idea or did you hear or read that somewhere. I didn't see any footnotes or sources on there so I can only assume that by your own standards that you are a plagiarst.
In fact, besides shit talking, all you do in this thread is cut and paste which means you haven't had one original idea besides thinking of how you can be an asshole.
So now that we've established that you are a hypocrite, why don't you shut the fuck up and talk about something you know about rather than continue to post about a topic, Iraq, that you have proven again and again you know nothing about.
P.S. - I think it says a lot about you that on one of the most pressing issues that America has faced over the last couple years, and will probably face for the next decade, the only thing you can really do is have hissy fits where you make homoerotic offers to suck your dick and talk shit.
In 2007 Al Qaeda in Iraq was soundly defeated in its former strongholds of Anbar province and the Baghdad area. Today its forces are trying to regroup in northern Iraq around the city of Mosul. Over the last three years, its indiscriminate use of violence especially against Iraqis, and its insistence that it lead the insurgency have turned most of the population against it. That is usually the turning point in a guerrilla war, and thus Al Qaeda in Iraq finds itself on the run in many provinces today. The fact that the surge is coming to a close however, means that there will always be safe havens for the group to hide in, and they will still be able to carry out attacks for the foreseeable future. 2007 thus saw the demise, but not death of Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Background[/b]
Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi founded Al Qaeda in Iraq. Originally it was called Attawhid wal Jihad (Unity and Holy War) and carried out a number of high profile bombings soon after the U.S. invasion ended in 2003 such as the destruction of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad. Zarqawi was a dogmatic and ruthless Islamist who saw the U.S. occupation of Iraq as a way to turn himself into a terrorist celebrity. It wasn???t until 2004 that Zarqawi pledged allegiance to bin Laden and his group became known as Al Qaeda in Iraq. Zarqawi wanted the brand name recognition Al Qaeda offered, and like a fast food restaurant started his own franchise in Iraq. Despite the new name, Zarqawi was always highly independent and didn???t listen to advice and admonitions from Al Qaeda central. In several letters that were later published by the U.S. Al Qaeda leaders such as #2 man Ayman al-Zawhiri remonstrated Zarqawi for his attacks on Shiites, his refusal to work with fellow insurgents that didn???t follow his leadership, and his general dismissal of the Sunni population???s concerns in Iraq. Zarqawi never changed his policies and was killed in June 2006.
Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in life and death
The Initial Split With Al Qaeda in Iraq[/b]
Just as Al Qaeda central warned, Zarqawi???s harsh tactics turned many people against his organization. That was a change because during the first few years of the insurgency, many Sunnis looking to fight the Americans turned towards Zarqawi and his followers for money, weapons and organization. By 2005 however many Iraqis had enough.
The first reports of a split occurred in mid-2005 in Anbar province. In May and June 2005 two tribes in Anbar and several insurgent groups began turning their guns on their former allies. The causes were many. For the tribes, Al Qaeda in Iraq had attempted to take over their smuggling and robbery trade in Anbar to finance their insurgency, angering sheikhs. The tribes also didn???t like Al Qaeda imposing its form of Islamic law upon their people, especially because the militants often killed those that didn???t follow their interpretation of the religion. Zarqawi???s followers also assassinated sheikhs that attempted to work with the government. For the insurgents, their complaints were three fold. First, they were tired of Al Qaeda trying to boss them around and killing their leaders and fighters if they didn???t obey. Second, Al Qaeda???s increasing use of car bombs that killed Sunnis and their sectarian attacks on Shiites that were aimed at provoking a sectarian civil war divided the insurgency over tactics and costs. Finally, the vast majority of Sunnis had boycotted the first round of elections in 2005 and felt left out of the political process. Many were determined to vote on the Constitution in December, even if many were against its passage. Zarqawi stated that his group would kill anyone that took part in the election. Instead, many insurgent groups cut a deal with the U.S. in October 2005 to work together to ensure there would be no major violence during the polling.
The Tribal Awakening Movement[/b]
Sunni tribes in western Iraq were the first ones to really organize against Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the spring and summer of 2005 tribes began fighting with Al Qaeda in Iraq and reached out to the U.S. for help. At first the U.S. Marines were standoffish, but eventually agreed to help. By March 2006 the tribes had formed at least two different military organizations to fight the militants, leading to the deaths of six Al Qaeda in Iraq commanders. In the fall of 2006 the sheikhs founded the Anbar Salvation Council that included 26 tribes in the province and 30,000 fighters, led by sheikh Sattar Rishawi.
The newly organized tribesmen were able to put the pressure on Al Qaeda in Iraq in the province during 2007. With their new alliance with the Americans, the tribes began providing recruits for the provincial police in cities like Ramadi where the number of police went from 35 in June 2006 to 1,300 by November. In turn, attacks in the city dropped by as much as 50% by the end of the year. The tribes also formed eight Provincial Security Forces of 10,000 fighters, eight Emergency Response Units, plus a small group of special forces that operated outside of Anbar tracking down and killing Al Qaeda in Iraq leaders. Together, these tribal units were able to force Al Qaeda in Iraq into northern and eastern Anbar, and killed Zarqawi???s successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri in Salahaddin province in May 2007.
The Council grew confident enough that they began sending out emissaries to other Iraqi tribes in Diyala, Ninewa, Salahaddin, Babil, and Baghdad to form their own Awakening movements. Even after Al Qaeda in Iraq was able to kill the Salvation Council???s head, Sheikh Sattar Rishawi, the group was able to expand their influence. By late 2007-early 2008 attacks in Anbar had dropped to the lowest point since the war, 23,000 tribesmen had joined the Anbar police force, and the Council was trying to transform itself into a political party to take part in the government.
Sheikh Sattar Rishawi who lead the Anbar Salvation Council until his assassination by Al Qaeda in Iraq in September 2007
The Insurgency Turns On Al Qaeda In Iraq And the Birth Of the Concerned Local Citizens Movement[/b]
Many nationalist insurgent groups also began turning on Al Qaeda in 2005-2006. Two of the main ones were the Islamic Army of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigades. Both were mostly former soldiers and Baathists that had become more Islamist as the insurgency wore on, but grew tired of Al Qaeda in Iraq. In 2005 there were repeated clashes between the insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar over participation in the December 2005 elections and Zarqawi???s murdering of commanders of the Islamic Army and the 1920 Revolution Brigade that didn???t follow his leadership. In January 2006 Al Qaeda in Iraq also killed 70 Sunni police recruits in Ramadi, which led to a shoot out with the Islamic Army. The U.S. began to realize and exploit these divisions by opening negotiations with insurgents that were opposed to Zarqawi. They were helped by the death of the terrorist leader in June 2006.
Zarqawi???s successor Masri attempted to patch up relations with Iraqis. He formed a number of umbrella organizations to try to unite the insurgency, such as the Mutayibeen Coalition, the Islamic Emirate of Iraq, the Mujahadeen Shura Council, and finally the Islamic State of Iraq. The problem was that Al Qaeda in Iraq always insisted that they be in the lead and continued on with Zarqawi???s tradition of killing anyone that didn???t get into line behind them.
By early 2007 many elements of the insurgency were in open revolt against Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Islamic Army and 1920 Revolution Brigade had several clashes including the assassination of the latter???s leader by Al Qaeda in Iraq in March 2007. In May 2007 the Islamic Army a nd two other insurgent group formed their own coalition, the Reformation and Jihad Front to oppose Al Qaeda in Iraq. More importantly, some members of the 1920 Revolution Brigade formed the Adhamiya Awakening in Baghdad to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq. This was the first of many Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) groups that would pop up around Baghdad???s Sunni enclaves, and then to other regions in central and northern Iraq to fight the militants.
Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri took over command of Al Qaeda in Iraq after Zarqawi???s death in June 2006 and attempted to reach out to tribes and other insurgents unsuccessfully in 2007 until his death at the hands of the Anbar Salvation Council in May 2007
The Effects of the Surge[/b]
The main focus of the surge was in Baghdad and Anbar province, just where Sunnis were beginning to revolt against Al Qaeda in Iraq. When the extra troops began to arrive in early 2007 they were able to take advantage of this turn in events. In May 2007, 2nd in command Gen. Odierno outlined the new U.S. policy towards Sunnis. He said there were reconcilable and irreconcilable members of the insurgency. The reconcilable ones were open to negotiations and involvement in the nation???s future like the Sunni tribes in Anbar and the nationalist groups such as the Islamic Army and 1920 Revolution Brigade. The irreconcilable was Al Qaeda in Iraq that would never talk with the U.S. and only believed in their victory. The next month Gen. Petraeus and his advisor held a conference and decided that the Sunnis were ripe for negotiations and cooperation with the U.S. military against Al Qaeda in Iraq. They began negotiating with tribes and insurgent groups throughout central and northern Iraq.
CLC fighters in Salman Pak outside of Baghdad
The Sunni policy spread like wildfire. By February 2008 there were 71,000 CLC/Awakening fighters. 43,000 in Baghdad, 10,000 in Ninewah, Salahaddin, and Tamin, 6,000 in Babil, 4,000 in Diyala and 8,000 in Anbar provinces, plus another 54,000 members of the Anbar Salvation Council and Anbar provincial police that mostly came from the Council. The CLCs and tribal Awakening movements were able to clear and hold cities with the cooperation of U.S. forces, and deny Al Qaeda in Iraq new recruits. The Americans also launched repeated military operations in other regions where Al Qaeda in Iraq was fleeing to, to keep them off balance.
By early 2008 Al Qaeda in Iraq was on the run. Their headquarters had been pushed from Anbar to Diyala province to Mosul in Ninawa province. They were also still operating west of Kirkuk, in Tikrit and Samarra in Salahaddin, Baquba in Diyala, south Baghdad, north of Karbala and around Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar. This was a far cry from 2006 when Al Qaeda in Iraq announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq, had a parade through Ramadi in Anbar to celebrate it, and was able to fly its flags in a Sunni neighborhood in the center of Baghdad.
A U.S. military map showing in red the areas where Al Qaeda in Iraq is still active in December 2007. The insert map on the left hand corner is of Baghdad
Not The End of Al Qaeda In Iraq[/b]
Despite the shrinking area within which Al Qaeda in Iraq is able to operate in, the group is not defeated. U.S. officers are quick to point out that the situation in Iraq is still tenuous, and militants are still able to carry out deadly attacks. Al Qaeda in Iraq also appears to have finally learned from their mistakes and changed their tactics. In Mosul, they have started warning civilians before attacks, they haven???t impose Islamic law, and haven???t attacked civilians. They have also changed their targets to blowing up pipelines and power stations, and attacking CLCs and Awakening movements with several leaders having been assassinated in 2008.
Conclusion[/b]
In 2006 the U.S. released a letter from Al Qaeda central leader Attyia al-Jaza???ri to Zarqawi. Al-Jaza???ri was a veteran of the Islamist insurgency in Algeria that was crushed by the government. Al-Jaza???ri, like the early letter by Al Qaeda leader Zawahiri, warned that Zarqawi???s policies would lead his organization down the road of ruin. Al-Jaza???ri wrote:
???[The] al mujadhidin are our brothers, the Sunni are our brothers and our friends, as long as they are Muslims, even if they are disobedient, or insolent; whether they come into the organization with us or not, for they are our brothers, our friends, and our loved ones. We should cooperate with them, help and support them, and work together. Besides, how do you know you won???t be humbled tomorrow, while they are strengthened? You may diminish while they increase! ??? Their [the Algerian Islamists] enemy did not defeat them, but rather they defeated themselves, were consumed and fell.???
His words proved prophetic in Iraq. Al Qaeda had always been at their best when they went into a troubled area and worked alongside the locals providing assistance. In Iraq, Zarqawi and his successors demanded that they be in the lead even though none of them were Iraqis, they did not have the same religious beliefs as Iraqis, and turned to killing and intimidation against anyone that stood in their way. The price for their stance was to lose the sympathies of most Iraqis, turn the country towards civil war with attacks on Shiites, and eventually lose their bases throughout the country. Unfortunately, just as the organization is on the ropes, the surge is ending. The pressure is still on Al Qaeda in Iraq, but with fewer U.S. troops there???s little hope they can actually be defeated anytime soon. As the series of attacks and increase in violence in February and March 2008 prove, the group is still alive and able to dish out death in Iraq.
SOURCES:[/b]
Government Reports
Biddle, Stephen, ???Iraq after the Surge,??? Committee on Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, 1/23/08
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? December 2007
McCaffrey, Gen. Barry, ???Ater Action Report ??? Visit Iraq And Kuwait 5-11 December 2007,??? United States Military Academy, 12/18/07
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq???s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007
White House, ???Benchmark Assessment Report,??? 9/14/07
Think Tank Reports:
Bakier, Abdul Hameed, ???Al-Qaeda Adapts its Methods in Iraq as Part of a Global Strategy,??? Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 12/20/07
Beehner, Lionel, ???Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Resurging or Splintering???? Council on Foreign Relations, 7/16/07
Cordesman, Anthony, ???The Evolving Security Situation in Iraq: The Continuing Need for Strategic Patience,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/21/08
- ???Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07
- ???The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/6/07
Fishman, Brian, ???The Imaginary Emir: Al-Qa???ida in Iraq???s Strategic Mistake,??? Combating Terrorism Center, 7/18/07
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Cordesman: Despite Gains, Future in Iraq, Afghanistan Remains ???Uncertain,?????? Council on Foreign Relations, 1/14/08
Kagan, Kimberly, ???The Anbar Awakening: Displacing al Qaeda from Its Stronghold in Western Iraq,??? Institute For The Sstudy of War and WeeklyStandard.com, 8/21/06-3/30/07
Katulis, Brian, Juul, Peter, and Moss, Ian, ???Awakening to New Dangers in Iraq,??? Center for American Progress, Febru ary 2008
Khalil, Lydia, ???Anbar Revenge Brigade Makes Progress in the Fight Against al-Qaeda,??? Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 3/28/06
- ???Divisions Within the Iraqi Insurgency,??? Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 4/12/07
Kohlmann, Evan, ???State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: August 2007,??? NEFA Foundation, August 2007
Scheuer, Michael, ???Al-Qaeda and Iraq: Too Soon to Declare Victory,??? Jamestown Foundation, 10/24/07
Simon, Steven, ???Prepared testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 7/17/07
Steinberg, Guido, ???The Iraqi Insurgency,??? German Institute for International and Security Affairs, December 2006
Articles:
Agence France Presse, ???Fewer foreign attackers entering Iraq: US general Petraeus,??? 9/14/07
- ???Sunni tribes of Iraq???s rebel bastion declare war on Zarqawi,??? 3/5/06
- ???US commander gives part credit to Syria for military gains in Iraq,??? 11/21/07
Al-Ansary, Khalid and Adeeb, Ali, ???Most Tribes in Anbar Agree to Unite Against Insurgents,??? New York Times, 9/18/06
Al Jazeera, ???Al-Qaeda denies death of Iraq chief,??? 5/1/07
- ???Iraqi group ???splits??? from al-Qaeda,??? 4/12/07
Al-Khalidi, Suleiman, ???Iraqi Sunnis set up fatwa body to combat al Qaeda,??? Reuters,
Allam, Hannah and al Dulaimy, Mohammed, ???Marine-led Campaign Killed Friends and Foes, Iraqi Leaders Say,??? Knight Ridder, 5/17/05
Alsumaria, ???Iraq Qaeda tactic relies on suicide bombers,??? 1/22/08
Anderson, John Ward, ???Iraqi Tribes Strike Back at Insurgents,??? Washington Post, 3/7/06
Associated Press, ???Al-Qaida linked group moves to patch up rift among insurgent factions,??? 4/17/07
- ???Al-Qaeda targets Sunni tribal groups,??? 1/2/08
- ???Purported spokesman for an Iraqi insurgent group offers negotiations with the United States,??? 10/5/06
Aswat Aliraq, ???Double suicide bombing kills Sahwa leader in Fallujah,??? 2/23/08
BBC News, ???Iraq chiefs vow to fight al-Qaeda,??? 9/18/06
Beaumont, Peter, ???Iraqi tribes launch battle to drive al-Qaida out of troubled province,??? Guardian, 10/3/06
Bergen, Peter & Cruickshank, Paul, ???Al Qaeda in Iraq: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,??? Mother Jones, 10/18/07
Bing, West, ???Will the Petraeus Strategy Be the Last???? Atlantic.com, 9/17/07
Boot, Max, ???We Are Winning. We Haven???t Won,??? Weekly Standard, 1/28/08
Burns, John and Rubin, Alissa, ???U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies,??? New York Times, 6/11/07
Carroll, Rory, ???Al-Qaida in Iraq seizes border town as it mobilizes against poll,??? Guardian, 9/7/05
Cave, Damien, ???Remains of 40 Found in Mass Grave,??? New York Times, 11/22/07
Cave, Damien, and Farrell, Stephen, ???At Street Level, Unmet Goals of Troop Buildup,??? New York Times, 9/9/07
Chon, Gina, ???Under U.S. Pressure, AL Qaeda in Iraq Shifts Tactics,??? Baghdad Life, Wall Street Journal.com, 1/20/08
CNN, ???Admiral: Al Qaeda in Iraq ???killing off??? former allies,??? 2/18/08
Crain, Charles, ???Iraq???s New Job Insecurity,??? Time, 12/24/07
Curtis, Kim, ???Ramadi War Zone Now Rare Bright Spot,??? Washington Post, 10/28/07
Dagher, Sam, ???Rift threatens U.S. antidote to Al Qaeda in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 2/13/08
- ???Risky US alliances in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 7/17/07
- ???Sunni Muslim sheikhs join US in fighting Al Qaeda,??? Christian Science Monitor, 5/3/07
- ???Will ???armloads??? of US cash buy tribal loyalty???? Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/07
DVIDS News, ???Paramount Sheiks Sign Peace Agreement,??? 5/2/07
Economist, ???I want to kill you, but not today,??? 10/4/07
Eisenstadt, Lieutenant Colonel Michael, ???Iraq Tribal engagement Lessons Learned,??? Military Review, September-October 2007
Evans, Dominic, ???Sunni recruits to police volatile Abu Ghraib,??? Reuters, 9/25/07
Farrell, Stephen, ???U.S. Attack in Iraq Is No Surprise to Many Insurgents,??? New York Times, 1/9/08
Fletcher, Martin, ???Fighting back: the city determined not to become al-Qaeda???s capital,??? Times, 11/20/06
Foreign Policy, ???Seven Questions: Phebe Marr on the End Game in Iraq,??? November 2007
Fumento, Michael, ???Return to Ramadi,??? Weekly Standard, 11/27/06
Gamel, Kim, ???US Commanders Welcome Fallujah Revival,??? Associated Press, 2/9/08
Ghoash, Bobby, ???A Truce Between U.S. Enemies in Iraq,??? Time, 6/6/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Gordon, Michael, ???The Former-Insurgent-Counterinsurgency,??? New York times, 9/2/07
- ???Pushed Out of Baghdad, Insurgents Move North,??? New York Times, 12/6/07
Gordon, Michael and Farrell, Stephen, ???Iraq Lacks Plan on the Retrn of Refugees, Military Says,??? New York Times, 11/30/07
Greenwall, Megan, ???Blast Injures U.S.-Allied Sunni Cleric,??? Washington Post, 8/12/07
- ???Villagers Battle Insurgents After Attack on Sheik Near Baqubah,??? Washington Post, 8/24/07
Gumbrecht, Jamie and Yousse, Nancy, ???In Iraq, U.S. airstrikes target insurgents near supposedly safe zone,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 1/10/08
Guardian, ??????We don???t need al-Qaida,?????? 10/27/05
Hurst, Steven, ???al-Qaida Regaining Some Footing,??? 2/11/08
Irish Times, ???Iraq???s Sunni offer to join Shia-majority police,??? 10/2/06
Kelly, Mary Louise, ???Rift Appears Among Iraq Insurgent Groups,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/14/07
Kilcullen, Dave, ???Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,??? Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07
Kimmage, Daniel, and Ridolfo, Kathleen, ???Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images And Ideas,??? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 2007
Klein, Joe, ???Is al-Qaeda on the Run in Iraq???? Time, 5/23/07
Kraul, Chris, ???Sunni chiefs in Anbar join mainstream,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 4/20/07
Kukis, Mark, ???Turning Iraq???s Tribes Against Al-Qaeda,??? Time, 12/26/06
Lannen, Steve, ???Mosul, the next major test for the U.S. military in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 1/31/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Al-Qaeda tries to salvage image,??? USA Today, 2/6/08
Lubold, Gordon, ???A quieter Anbar Province rebuilds,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/5/07
- ???Anbar streets illustrate Petraeus???s testimony,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/12/07
- ???U.S. takes Anbar model to Iraq Shiites,??? Christian Science Monitor, 10/2/07
Malkasian, Carter, ???Did the Coalition Need More Forces in Iraq???? Joint Forces Quarterly, July 2007
Martin, Paul, ???Washington seeks partial truce with Iraqi insurgents,??? Washington Times, 12/21/05
Michaels, Jim, ???U.S. gamble on sheiks is paying off ??? so far,??? USA Today, 12/26/07
Mohsen, Amer, ???Iraqi Papers Thur: Sunni-Kurdish Pact,??? IraqSlogger.com, 12/26/07
Moore, Solomon and Oppel, Richard, ???Attacks Imperil U.S.-Backed Militias in Iraq,??? New York Times, 1/24/08
Murphy, Dan, ???How Al Qaeda views a long Iraq war,??? Christian Science Monitor, 10/9/06
Oppel, Richard, ???Magnet for Iraq Insurgents Is a Crucial Test of New U.S. Strategy,??? New York Times, 6/16/05
- ???Quieter Fallujah fears U.S. exit,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/19/07
Oppel, Richard and Al-Husaini, ???Suicide Bomber Kills Key Sunni Leader,??? New York Times, 1/8/08
Oppel, Richard and Mizher, Qais, ???Bomber Kills Sunni Allies of the U.S.,??? New York Times, 1/21/08
Paley, Amit, ???Iraqis Joining Insurgency Less for Cause Than Cash,??? Washington
Post, 11/20/07
- ???Shift in Tacti cs Aims to Revive Struggling Insurgency,??? Washington Post, 2/8/08
Parker, Ned, ???Hard-line Iraqi clerics group shut down,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/15/07
- ???Insurgents report a split with Al Qaeda in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 3/27/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Rival Sunnis in Deadly Gunfight,??? Washington Post, 11/11/07
- ???Sheiks Help Curb Violence in Iraq???s West, U.S. Says,??? Washington Post, 1/27/07
- ???Singing Up Sunnis With ???Insurgent??? on Their Resumes,??? Washington Post, 9/4/07
- ???Sunni Insurgent Leader Paints Iran as ???Real Enemy,?????? Washington Post, 7/14/07
Partlow, Joshua and Paley, Amit, ???Sunni Violence in Baghdad Called Disrupted,??? Washington Post, 10/28/07
Peterson, Scott, ???How fear turns to resolve in one Iraqi village,??? Christian Science Monitor, 1/23/08
Pitman, Todd, ???Sunni Sheiks Join Fight Vs. Insurgency,??? Associated Press, 3/25/07
Price, Jay and Basri, Ali Omar al, ???In Basra, vigilantes wage deadly campaign against women,??? McClatchy Newspaper, 10/4/07
Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???20 Die as Gunmen Descend on Village,??? Washington Post, 12/2/07
- ???Diary of an Insurgent In Retreat,??? Washington Post, 2/10/08
- ???In Iraq, a Perilous Alliance With Former Enemies,??? Washington Post, 8/4/07
Reuters, ???Iraqi insurgents??? clash with Qaeda kills 16,??? 10/27/07
- ???Rebels call on Al Qaeda to ???review??? behaviour,??? 4/7/07
- ???Two suicide car bombs kill 11 in Iraq???s Ramadi,??? 2/19/07
Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, ???Al-Qaeda In Iraq Reported Crippled,??? Washington Post, 10/15/07
Ridolfo, Kathleen, ???Iraq: Al-Qaeda Tactics Lead To Splits Among Insurgents,??? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 4/17/07
Roggio, Bill, ???1920s Revolution Brigades turns on al Qaeda in Diyala,??? Long War Journal.org, 6/12/07
- ???Al Douri forms nationalist Sunni coalition; 1920s Revolution Brigades denounces al Qaeda,??? Long War Journal.org, 10/4/07
- ???Al Qaeda establishes ???a haven in Diyala,?????? Long War Journal.org, 12/30/07
- ???al Qaeda on Sunni violence in Anbar,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/25/07
- ???al Qaeda???s Grand Coalition in Anbar,??? Long War Journal.org, 10/12/06
- ???Amariyah, the Anbar Salvation Council and Reconciliation,??? Long War Journal.org, 6/1/07
- ???Anbar Rising,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/11/07
- ???The Anbar Salvation Council goes expeditionary,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/2/07
- ???Anbar Tribes vs. al Qaeda,??? Long War Journal.org, 9/29/06
- ???The Anbar Tribes vs. al Qaeda, Continued,??? Long War Journal.org, 11/22/06
- ???The Awakening, al Qaeda clash in Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 12/17/07
- ???Choosing Sides in the Sunni Insurgency,??? Long War Journal.org, 10/6/06
- ???Divisions in al Qaeda in Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 10/13/06
- ???The Diyala Salvation Front,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/10/07
- ???Harmony: The Attyia ??? Zarqawi Letter,??? Long War Journal.org, 9/27/06
- ???Islamic Army of Iraq splits from Al Qaeda,??? Long War Journal.org, 4/12/07
- ???Securing Eastern Anbar Province,??? Long War Journal.org, 6/15/07
- ???The Sunni Awakening,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/3/07
- ???The Sunni Civil War,??? Long War Journal.org, 3/27/07
- ???Why the violence has declined in Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 11/8/07
Rosen, Nir, ???The Many Faces of Abu Musab al Zarqawi,??? Truthdig.com, 6/9/06
Roug, Louise and Boudreaux, Richard, ???Deadly Rift Grows Among Insurgents,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/29/06
Rubin, Alissa and Cave, Damien, ???In a Force or Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict,??? New York Times, 12/23/07
Sabah, Zaid and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Security Pact on Iraq Would Set U.S. Exit,??? Washington Post, 12/11/07
Samuels, Lennox, ???The Protection Business,??? Newsweek, 1/11/08
Schwartz, Michael, ???Car bombings: Iraq???s time bomb,??? Asia Times, 6/8/05
Shahine, Alaa, ???Qaeda changing tactics in Iraq???s Diyala: U.S. general,??? Reuters, 12/8/07
Susman, Tina, ???Attacks on Iraq volunteers rise,??? Los Angeles Times, 2/8/08
Tarabay, Jamie, ???Anbar Alliance May Not Translate to Other Provinces,??? All Things Considered ??? National Public Radio, 9/25/07
Tavernise, Sabrina, ???In Air Attack, U.S. Soldiers Kill 18 Gunmen,??? New York Times, 8/25/07
- ???Marines See Signs Iraq Rebels Are Battling Foreign Fighters,??? New York Times, 6/21/05
Tavernise, Sabrina and Filkins, Dexter, ???Local Insurgents Tell of Clashes With Al Qaeda???s Forces in Iraq,??? New York Times, 1/12/06
Tilghman, Andrew, ???The Myth of AQI,??? Washington Monthly, October 2007
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???A Deadly Clash at Donkey Island,??? Washington Post, 8/19/07
- ???Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,??? Washington Post, 8/9/07
- ???Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,??? Washington Post, 9/30/07
Whitlock, Craig, ???Al-Zarqawi???s Biography,??? WashingtonPost, 6/8/06
Yates, Dean, ???Drop in Baghdad violence sustainable: general,??? Reuters, 11/7/07
Youssef, Nancy, ???Beyond the surge, an Iraqi city suffers,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 12/3/07
Zavis, Alexandra, ???U.S. courts sheiks in Hussein terrain,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/14/07
Zunes, Stephen and Leaver, Erik, ???Annotate This ??? President Bush???s Sept 13 Speech to the Nation on Iraq,??? Foreign Policy In Focus, 9/14/07
Another example of how sab is full of shit because when discussing tbe previous pole by the same news companies he said the BBC hates America and only cares about American's killing babies, but now is all too happy to cut and paste the results of their latest findings.
even a broken clock is right twice a day.
Motown....do you think this poll is accurate??
Are things really getting better over there??
There is a new status quo in Iraq. Violence is down from the civil war days of late 06-early 07. Political parties are beginning to think like parties that want to help themselves and their followers rather than just their sectarian group. That being said I think Iraq's public has been traumatized by post-invasion Iraq and are very cautious. In Baghdad there are lots of shops open, people are out and about a lot more, but they tend to stick to their own neighborhoods. Violence has also spiked since Jan. as well which makes people weary. Overall, I think for the first time since the invasion there is a ray of hope for Iraq, which is reflected in that new poll.
Iraq's future for the next ten years is probably the following: The economy will be booming but only because of high oil prices. That hides the high unemployment and lack of basic services in the country. Violence will hopefully stay low, but with peaks and valleys. The government will slowly but surely pass laws, but only some of them will be implemented fairly and effectively. Baghdad will continue to be incompetent while the provinces start working, but only because the U.S. military is facilitating and funding them. Corruption will continue to be a major problem.
The two big impending issues are the Sunni vs. Sunni and Shiite vs. Shiite disputes, not the insurgency or Al Qaeda in Iraq. The tribes in Anbar behind the Awakening movement want power in both their province and in Baghdad, but are opposed by the Sunni political parties. The Shiites are split between the Sadrists and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, plus in Basra, the 2nd most important city in Iraq, you have the Fadhila Party. That will come to a head by the end of 2008 if they hold local elections as planned. That will shape the future of the country because they all have different ideas about Iraq, but none of them can agree or make compromises right now. That could also lead to more violence.
2007 12 April - A bomb blast rocks parliament, killing an MP.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
18 April - Bombings in Baghdad kill nearly 200 people in the worst day of violence since a US-led security drive began in the capital in February.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
2007 May - The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, is reported killed.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
2007 July - President Bush says there's been only limited military and political progress in Iraq following his decision to reinforce US troops levels there.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
2007 August - The main Sunni Arab political bloc in Iraq, the Iraqi Accordance Front, withdraws from the cabinet, plunging the government into crisis.
Truck and car bombs hit two villages of Yezidi Kurds, killing at least 250 people - the deadliest attack since 2003.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
Sun Aug 26, 6:27 PM ET
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Iraq's top Shi'ite, Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders announced on Sunday they had reached consensus on some key measures seen as vital to fostering national reconciliation.
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.
March 20th 2008 5 long years, Sunni US alliance falling apart and...
Saba says everything is fine and the war is almost over much to liberals dissapointment.