Sab's just a little frustrated right now. After asking me to suck his dick and I said no, and then saying he wanted to fuck my mom in another thread and she turned him down he's just a little pent up. I didn't know my Iraq writing got you so hot and bothered.
i think motown is a little frustrated because his little pea brain cant comprehend that things may not turn out the way he hoped, and so he is reduced to making ad hominem attacks against me becasue all the newspapers he plagiarizes from are no longer printing what he wants to put in his "treatise" (used very loosely).
Little stressed out are we Sab? Not getting any got you a little frustrated? When you read my writing about Iraq does the blood flow to the wrong head?
coming from someone who gets a hard on for dead soldiers, that really hurts.
Coming from somonew who obviously hasn't cum in a while.
its actually kind of sad to see you reduced to this.
And it's REALLY sad that you wanted me to suck your dick and fuck my mom. I think you're letting out more about your home life than anyone wants to know.
add another chapter to your book report dick-breath. Don't feel bad, you can still surrender to my big fat American cock and suck it you faggot sonofabitch.
Love
Peter.
i dont want to hurt your feelings Motown because I know how sensitive your types are, but when i said those things ... I wasn't really coming on to you. I know it hurts when you have a crush on someone and it turns out that they dont actually like you. But you have to read between the lines a little. Its like a New York Times Op-Ed piece.
Exactly my point, you're actually letting on about your home situation more than anyone wants to know about.
As much as he tries to make it sound professional, his "bookreport" is really nothing more than the junior high school bathroom jokes that he resorts to when he cant cut and paste his responses. He just attempts to add a veneer of respectability to that shit by adding "according to a government think tank .... blah blah blah" and stupid titles like "Iraq: anatomy of a popsicle" But when the facts dont fit his story-line, he just disregards them rather than try to assimilate them. Too much work, better to wait for someone to spin them the right way and then just cut and paste.
Yes, this from someone who has never been able to actually respond to someone's points.
See Sab, you've set such a high standard with your never ending shit talking, homo erotic offers and MILF fantasies, that I'm just trying to respond in a way that you'll understand without coming down to your level, which apparently you wanted me to be at your waste line. It's been apparent from the first day you've stepped on the Strut that it's the only way you can interact with people, which is a sad commentary on your social skills. It's now been revealed that you're just projecting your frustrations onto the Strut from your sad home life. Is that why the wife is never smiling in the pics you post of her?
And if anyone is actually interested, probably the main reason why Baghdad is stabilizing is because the violence and ethnic cleansing was mostly finished by early 2007 before the extra surge troops arrived. That plus Sadr decided to stand down his militia twice. They were the main perpetrators of the attacks in the capital.
Sab I'm just feeling sorry for you right now, so I'll leave you alone and suggest that you talk to more people in your office and take the wife out to dinner. Out of the kindness of my heart for your sad situation I'll let you have the last word because I'm sure you can't hold back from more shit spewing out of your keyboard.
Iraqis are voting with their feet by returning home after exile The figures are hard to estimate precisely but the process could involve hundreds of thousands of people. The numbers are certainly large enough, as we report today, for a mass convoy to be planned next week as Iraqis who had opted for exile in Syria return to their homeland. It is one of the most striking signs that not only has violence in Baghdad and adjacent provinces decreased dramatically in recent months, but confidence in the economic and political future of Iraq has risen sharply. Nor is this movement the action of men and women who could easily reverse course and turn back again. Tighter visa restrictions imposed by Damascus mean that those who are returning to Iraq cannot assume that they could quickly retreat again to Syria if that suited them. This is, for many, a one-way decision. It represents a vote of confidence in Iraq.
The homecoming is not an isolated development. The security situation in Baghdad, while far from totally peaceful, has improved substantially in the past few months, with civilian fatalities falling by three quarters since the early summer. This has been reflected on the streets with markets, clubs and restaurants that had been closed for months, especially at night, now reopening. This good news has not attracted the attention that it should because critics of the conflict in 2003 and its aftermath have been extremely reluctant to acknowledge progress in the country. Yet even observers from publications long hostile to US policy in Iraq, such as The New York Times, are finally conceding that ???the violence has diminished significantly since the United States reinforced troop levels in Iraq and adopted a new counter-insurgency strategy???.
The ???surge??? associated with General David Petraeus is indeed paying extraordinary dividends. The positive effects were seen in Anbar province, which had become a hotbed of Sunni resistance to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and are increasingly seen in the Iraqi capital. It has enabled Sunnis to disassociate themselves decisively from al-Qaeda in Iraq, in effect switching sides, while some of the extreme Shias linked to the rebel cleric Moqtada al-Sadr have felt obliged to observe a ceasefire. All these fundamental shifts have allowed Iraqis the chance to rebuild an economy that, particularly with oil at its current price, should be among the strongest in their region. This opportunity has been recognised by exiles such as those who have been located in Syria. Iraq can only benefit from the return of some of its most talented citizens.
None of this means that Iraq is set on a certain path to imminent prosperity. While the numbers of car bombings and military fatalities have fallen dramatically there is always a risk that atrocities will take place. In fact, it is certain that there will be further tragedies. There remains a compelling need for the political parties and factions in Iraq to settle on an acceptable compromise on the Constitution, the internal distribution of oil revenues and the fate of those who were once members of the Baathist establishment.
The crucial point, however, is that American and British policy towards Iraq should reflect the optimism of the moment. Troops should not be withdrawn prematurely when tangible success is being recorded. It would be catastrophic for those soldiers to retreat just at the time when Iraqis themselves are returning home in droves.
Funny, I thought you would be sitting in a cubicle ignoring the plight of returning soldiers you supposedly support and making excuses for the lack of VA funding.
hey, I'm only interested in soldiers after they die, and then i scribble their names all over the Portland sidewalks.
Oh, wait a minute, thats you.
P.S. I have an office,
with a window
over park avenue.
how's the doorman coming? Pretty soon you'll have made it. Me and the boys can't wait to see you at the club.
Battle of Baghdad Is Over ??? and the Shiites won[/b]
The war in Iraq has gone through many unexpected changes. No one expected the Samarra bombing in early 2006 and the ruthless sectarian fighting and ethnic cleansing that ensued. Few imagined that the Sunni tribes and insurgents would turn against Al Qaeda in Iraq in early 2007. The latest development is the turn around in Baghdad. The number of dead bodies found on the streets and sectarian killings are down, along with the number of bombings. Ethnic cleansing is still occurring and violence still happens, but it is concentrated in certain neighborhoods rather than across the city as it once was. The largest drops in violence however, occurred at the beginning of 2007 before large numbers of additional troops were sent under the surge. By the time they arrived they were seeing a very different city that had been transformed from a majority Sunni capital with mostly mixed neighborhoods, to a majority Shiite and segregated one. The main cause of the turn around appears to be that the Shiites largely won the battle for Baghdad.
The Improved Security Situation In Baghdad[/b]
The newspapers today are full of stories about the drop in violence in Baghdad. In December 2006, the height of sectarian killing, Baghdad the was the bloodiest city in the country with 1,030 bodies found on the streets. By October 2007 that number had dropped to 174. Likewise the Iraqi Interior Ministry reported that the number of deaths went from 896 in July 2007 to 317 by October. The U.S. claimed car bombings went from 38 in December 2007 to 20 by October 2007, while death squad killings decreased 80% by November.
The increased American troops presence helped improve the security situation in Baghdad, but it was only one factor. Under the surge, the U.S. changed from protecting themselves in large bases to protecting the Iraqi people in forward operating stations spread throughout the city. This increased their familiarity with the neighborhoods they were tasked to protect as well as allowed them to get to know the public, which increased tips about insurgents tremendously over time.
A Bradley Fighting Vehicle at a forward operating base in southern Bagdad
The most important development for the Americans however, was the Sunni population largely turning against Al Qaeda in Iraq. This trend started in Anbar province in September 2006 and spread throughout the Sunni community, reaching Baghdad by the summer of 2007. The U.S. allied themselves with local insurgent groups in the capital under a don???t ask, don???t tell policy where they let their previous attacks on Americans go unpunished if they would fight Al Qaeda in Iraq. If they did, the U.S. would provide them with money, uniforms, and sometimes weapons, and more importantly, respect and power, something that had been a main cause of the insurgency amongst Sunnis. By November 2007 the U.S. had spent around $17 million organizing 67,000 Sunnis into neighborhood watch units in Baghdad.
Former Islamic Army leader, turned Ameriya Knight, neighborhood security chief, Ameriya, West Rashid District of Baghdad
At its peak however, the surge has never controlled more than 50% of Baghdad. The Sunnis that are now working with the U.S. are also a decided minority in the capital today. Therefore there must be other factors to account for the drop in violence.
Rise of Shiite Power In Baghdad[/b]
Shiite leaders Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) head Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
The major cause of change in Baghdad is that the Shiites now control most of the city. Their multi-faceted hard and soft power is apparent throughout the capital with the prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and some of the major political parties such as the Sadrists and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) being Shiite, to their command of the instruments of violence with most police in Baghdad being aligned with the militias, to the Shiite neighborhoods having more electricity, clean streets, safe hospitals, and thriving business districts compared to their Sunni neighbors.
A U.S. erected blast wall that divided the Sunnis from Shiites in a neighborhood of Baghdad
More importantly the fact that the Shiites were basically finished with ethnically cleansing the capital of Sunnis by the time of the surge also accounts for the turn around in security. Before the war Baghdad was 65% Sunni and consisted mostly of mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods. Today, the city is 75-85% Shiite with mixed neighborhoods only existing in the central part of the city along the Tigris River and in the southern and northern extremities. There is still cleansing of Sunnis to this day as the Iraqi Red Crescent and U.N. International Organization for Migration report that the number of displaced from Baghdad has tripled since the surge, with the majority being Sunnis, but it doesn???t involve the levels of violence as before. When the surge started the U.S. also erected blast walls to secure their operating environment. These walls had the effect of cementing in place the ethnic cleansing that had gone on before, ensuring the Shiites of their newly created majority, and making it harder for the two sides to fight each other.
In February 2007 a Shiite army unit came to the Sunni neighborhood of Ghazaliya in the Kadamiya District of Baghdad and destroyed a whole blocks worth of shops to try to force the population out.
This is what the block looked like afterwards
The BBC has an excellent interactive map showing Baghdad before and after the ethnic cleansing of 2006. Click on ???Ethnic areas??? to see the dramatic change in the capital.
Another major factor in the transformation of Baghdad was the fact that Moqtada al-Sadr twice ordered his militia to stand down in 2007. The first time was in January 2007 after Bush announced the surge. Sadr was afraid that the U.S. would attack him personally, but he also hoped that the Americans would focus on his Sunni rivals, which they largely did. The second time was in August after the Mahdi Army clashed with its rival the SIIC in southern Iraq. Both times, there was a large drop off in violence. At the same time, the surge has actually increased Sadr???s power as it went after rogue Mahdi elements, thus increasing his control over his organization, and the U.S. never really entered Sadr City, thus ensuring his core base of support.
Members of the Mahdi Army carrying a poster of Moqtada al-Sadr
Glimpses of Baghdad???s Neighborhoods[/b]
Map of Baghdad???s districts with the locations of the U.S. join security posts. Note that there is only one in Sadr City.
To really understand what???s going on in Baghdad however, you need an overview of the city???s many neighborhoods. The following are glimpses of the developments in six of the capital???s ten major districts.
Kadamiya District, northwest Baghdad Shiite majority with Sunnis in west Kadamiya is
still the scene of sectarian clashes as the district has been transformed from a mixed one to a Shiite majority
Ghazaliya neighborhood - Sunni majority with some Shiites - Was split by sectarian fighting in 2006 - Sunnis invited in Al Qaeda in Iraq, while Mahdi Army moved in - Both conducted ethnic cleansing - Shiite police helped Mahdi Army - Government cut off services to Sunni sections - August 2007 U.S. organized the local insurgents into the Ghazaliya Guardians under the protest of the residents who said they had terrorized the neighborhood and imposed Islamic law - August freeze by Sadr greatly reduced violence - Sunnis not allowing Shiites to return using threats and drive-bys
Huriya neigborhood - Shiite majority with some Sunnis - Taken over by Mahdi Army right before surge started in Jan. 2007 - Violence down because Sunnis kicked out - Home for Shiites pushed out of Sunni areas - Shiites now fighting each other over control of spoils such as houses to be sold, etc.
Shula neibhorhood - Almost all Shiite - Mahdi Army controls, no U.S. presence
West Rashid District, southwest Baghdad Mixed Shiite and Sunni, one of the few areas that still has largely mixed neighborhoods. Still facing ethnic cleansing in some neighborhoods and insurgent activity, while the U.S. has been able to form truces in others.
Amiriya neighborhood - Sunni majority, some Shiites - Was home to many Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters who fled Anbar in 2006 - Al Qaeda declared it its Islamic capital spring 2006 - U.S. cut deal with 1920 Revolutionary Brigades and Islamic Army insurgents to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq under the surge - Formed Amiriya Revolutionaries led by former Islamic Army commander - All vehicles banned from streets - Markets now open, streets cleaned - No Shiites have returned however to once mixed neighborhood
Bayaa neighborhood - Shiite majority, some Sunnis - Mahdi Army tried to kick out Sunnis during summer 2007 - US brokered cease-fire between sides by November
Saidiya neighborhood - Mixed Sunni-Shiite - Iraqi police and Mahdi Army fighting insurgents and trying to kick out Sunnis - Insurgents pushed into area by U.S. presence in neighboring district - Shiite politician and cleric also trying to move Shiites in - Government cut off services to Sunni sections - Shiite police have also attacked US units in district - US trying to organize Sunnis in face off Mahdi Army - Iraqi government opposed to policy
Jihad and Amil neighborhoods - Mixed Sunn-Shiite - Mahdi Army trying to ethnically cleanse Sunnis - US brokered cease-fires by November 2007
Adhamiya District, northeast baghdad - Mixed Sunni-Shiite, one of few eastern areas that still has Sunni majority areas - US organizing Sunnis into neighborhood security units - Insurgents still active - Claimed to have forced out Al Qaeda in Iraq by November 2007
Mansour District, western Baghdad - Almost exclusively Sunni - US organizing Sunnis into local security forces - Insurgents still active, some sectarian conflict in areas bordering Shiites - Shiites largely pushed out - District has been revitalized with U.S. reconstruction money - Businesses open
Re-opened Baghdad market
Yarmouk neighborhood - April 2007 Sunnis pushed out Shiites - Now businesses open and even some Shiites shop there, but none have returned
Washash neighborhood - Borders Shiite area - Mahdi Army trying to take over
Khadra neighborhood - Some Sunni displaced families returning - US organized Sunni Awakening Council
East Rashid District, southwestern Baghdad - Use to be mixed but Sunni majority, now still mixed but Shiite majority - October 2007 worked out deal with Sunni insurgents and Mahdi Army
Dora neighborhood - Use to be insurgent stronghold - Now quieted by surge, and most insurgents forced into neighboring Saidiya
Karrada District, southeastern Baghdad - Shiite exclusively - Considered one of the safest areas of capital - Cite of new TV show ???Baghdad Nights??? that shows reborn night life in city - Businesses open
Conclusion:[/b]
Baghdad has been the scene of some dramatic changes in the last year. Once the center of violence, it is now calmer as the city has been largely divided and conquered by the Shiites. Many residents are still skeptical whether this is a lasting change. In the last major public opinion poll published in September 2007, 80% of the residents questioned said the security situation was still bad compared to only 19% who said that it was good. The Shiite led Iraqi government has also continued with its sectarian policies, not providing services to many Sunni neighborhoods and refusing to recognize many of the Sunni fighters now working with the U.S. Almost all of the revitalized Sunni areas of the city have been paid for by American forces, which don???t intend to foot the bill forever. The U.S. has been pushing the Maliki government to take over these duties as a sign of reconciliation, but it has been recalcitrant. The U.S. military is increasingly frustrated with this inaction and is asking more and more what will happen if the government never reaches out to the Sunnis in Baghdad. The role of Moqtada al-Sadr also looms large on the horizon as he is the most powerful figure in the city controlling not only the Mahdi Army and providing services to many Shiites, but also runs many government ministries. Overall, the main question facing both Iraqis and the Americans is whether these changes are short-term gains with long-term problems ahead, or the new status quo in Baghdad. In a few months that question may begin to be answered as the U.S. begins drawing down troops.
Bibliography[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq???s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007
White House, ???Benchmark Assessment Report,??? 9/14/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Cordesman, Anthony, ???America???s Last Chance in Iraq: Changing US Strategy to Meet Iraq???s Real Needs,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/4/07 - ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07 - ???Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07 - ???Pandora???s Box: Iraqi Federalism, Separatism, ???Hard??? Partitioning, and US Policy,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10/9/07 - ???The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/6/07
Korb, Lawrence Biddle, Stephen, ???Violence by the Numbers in Iraq: Sound Data or Shaky Statistics???? Council on Foreign Relations, 9/25/07
Newspapers[/b]
Al-Mada, ???Local news: death and injury of civilians bombings that targeted a gathering of citizens in Al Bai???aa intersection ??? arrested one of princes ???rule??? in Mandali ??? The armed clashes in recent Baghdad,??? 11/20/07
Ambramowitz, Michael and DeYoung, Karen, ???Petraeus Disappointed At Political State of Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/8/07
Azzaman, ???Qaeda defeated in main Baghdad neighborhood,??? 11/12/07 - ???Surge reported in number of internally displaced Iraqis,??? 11/6/07
Barnes, Julian, ???Sadr???s army proves hard to beat,??? Los Angeles Times, 8/23/07
BBC News, ???Iraq poll September 2007: In graphics,??? 9/10/07
Cave, Damien, ???4 Truck Bombs Kill 190 in Kurdish Area of Iraq,??? New York Times, 8/15/07
Cave, Damien, and Farrell, Stephen, ???At Street Level, Unmet Goals of Troop Buildup,??? New York Times, 9/9/07
Cave, Damien, and Rubin, Alissa, ???Baghdad???s Weary Start to Exhale as Security Improves,??? New York Times, 11/20/07
Cloud, David, ???American and Iraqi Forces Control Half of Baghdad,??? New York Times, 9/22/07
DeYoung, Karen, ???Experts Doubt Drop In Violence in Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/6/07
Economist, ???Is the surge going to fizzle???? 6/21/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Despite violence drop, officers see bleak future for Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/15/07 - ???Embattled Baghdad shows signs of hope,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/13/07 - ???Security in Iraq still elusive,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/7/07
Farrell, Stephen, Rubin, Alissa, Cave, Damien, Buckley, Cara, Mizher, Qais, Al-Husseini, Mudhafer, ???Around Baghdad, Signs of Normal Life Creep Back,??? New York Times.com, 11/19/07
Foreign Policy, ???Seven Questions: Is the Surge Working in Iraq???? September 2007
Fresh Air, ???'Fiasco' Author Reports On the Petraeus Report,??? NPR, 9/12/07
Glanz, James, ???Civilian Death Toll Falls in Baghdad but Rises Across Iraq,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???More Iraqis Said to Flee Since Troop Increase,??? New York Times, 8/24/07
Glanz, James and Rubin, Alissa, ???Future Look of Iraq Complicated by Internal Migration,??? New York Times, 9/19/07
Gordon, Michael, ???The Former-Insurgent-Counterinsurgency,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Gordon, Michael and Rubin, Alissa, ???Trial Near for Shiite Ex-Officials in Sunni Killings,??? New York Times, 11/5/07
Greenwell, Megan, ???Villagers Battle Insurgents After Attack on Sheik Near Baqubah,??? Washington Post, 8/24/07
Hoyt, Clark, ???When the Issue Is War, Take Nothing for Granted,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Hurst, Steven, ???Thousands Return to Safer Iraqi Capital,??? Associated Press, 11/4/07 - ???Violence lessens in Baghdad as it grows elsewhere,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/26/07
Kilcullen, Dave, ???Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,??? Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07
Nordland, Rod, ???Baghdad Comes Alive,??? Newsweek, 11/26/07
Packer, George, ???Inside The Surge,??? New Yorker, 11/19/07
Parker, Ned, ???Iraqi civilian deaths plunge,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/1/07 - ???Iraqi militia leader???s death shatters truce,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/23/07 - ???U.S. seeks pact with Shiite militia,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/12/07
Partlow, Joshua, ??????I Don???t Think This Place Is Worth Another Soldier???s Life,?????? Washington Post, 10/27/07
Reid, Robert, ???August particularly deadly for Iraqis,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 9/2/07
Schoof, Renee and Strobel, Warren, ???Report: Surge hasn???t cut attacks on Iraqi civilians,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/4/07
Shishkin, Philip, ???In Baghdad Neighborhood, A Tale of Shifting Fortunes,??? Wall Street Journal, 10/31/07
Sudarsan, Raghavan, ???No Relief From Fear,??? Washington Post, 9/5/07
Susman, Tina, ???Troop buildup fails to reconcile Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/4/07
Tavernise, Sabrina, ???In Air Attack, U.S. Soldiers Kill 18 Gunmen,??? New York Times, 8/25/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,??? Washington Post, 9/30/07 - ???U.S. Planners See Shiite Militias as Rising Threat,??? Washington Post, 10/22/07
Westervelt, Eric, ???Iraqis Skeptical New Sense of Security Can Last,??? All Things Considered ??? NPR, 11/1/07
Yates, Dean, ???Drop in Baghdad violence sustainable: general,??? Reuters, 11/7/07
That Sun story misses and underplays some important points about the movement of displaced Iraqis.
1) There are more Iraqis returning to Baghdad now, but that has been a pattern occuring for a while now. The international organizations that track the refugees say that many Iraqis first leave the city because of the violence and then return again, usually multiple times because they are looking for jobs or move back to a different part of the city searching for a safer environment. They usually end up leaving again and then returning.
2) The story starts off with saying that countries are cracking down on Iraqi visas but then underplays it by saying that's not the real reason they're coming back, it's because they believe in Iraq. The article basically says they have no choice because they're getting kicked out of the neighboring countries.
3) The number of displaced has increased since the surge. A little over 1 million are internal refugees, while the other 1 million have left the country. The outflow from Baghdad has tripled since the surge and outnumbers the families now returning.
The military side of the surge is going so well that many forget that improving security is only a tactical means, to a strategic end, a political solution to Iraq. As Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz is often quoted as saying, war is only politics by other means. The problem is that the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has made absolutely no moves towards political reconciliation while sectarian, insurgent and militia violence are all decreasing in Iraq. U.S. commanders are increasingly worried about what will happen if the Iraqi government never reaches out to its political opponents and starts the first steps towards peace in the country.
Maliki???s Sectarian Tendencies[/b]
President Bush meeting with Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq
When the Bush administration was secretly contemplating changing course in Iraq in the winter of 2006, Bush???s National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley wrote a secret memo that was later leaked to the press about Prime Minister Maliki???s government and whether it was capable of political reconciliation. The first half of the paper documented how out of touch Maliki was from the public, how he only relied upon a small group of advisors, and how he stood by as his government and Shiite political allies carried out ethnic cleansing and other sectarian policies. Hadley wasn???t sure whether Maliki was either powerless to change things or complicit in those actions. Either way, he painted a dire picture of Maliki writing, ???But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.??? Despite these warnings, the White House decided that there were no alternatives, so the U.S. had to work with Maliki no matter what. Their decision has proven futile as the government has continued with its ineffective and sectarian policies throughout the surge.
Not Seizing the Moment[/b]
The American Sunni policy is one of the success stories of the surge. The U.S. is hoping that Baghdad will eventually incorporate the Sunni fighters into the security forces and take over responsibility for the reconstruction projects started in Sunni neighborhoods. While Maliki has promised to do so, his lack of action is louder than his words. By August 2007, Maliki and his deputy national security advisor said that while they agreed with the Sunni policy in theory, they were not ready to actually support it yet because they feared the Sunnis would eventually turn on the government.
Pressured by the Americans, Baghdad eventually hired some of the units as police and Maliki met with Sunni tribal leaders giving the public face that he was open to reconciliation and the U.S. policy, but behind the scenes his government has been actively working to undermine it at the same time. The Interior Ministry has not agreed to include all of the Sunnis into the police in Anbar and Diyala provinces, does not adequately equip them, and has sent Shiite units to Sunni areas even though they exacerbate the situation because most act sectarian. The government also objected to having Sunni officers in the police so the U.S. was forced to set up its own police academy in Anbar. Most strikingly, in November Maliki announced that 18,000 Shiite militiamen were to join the security forces in a move meant to ensure that the Shiites are still in control.
Sunni police cadets at the new Anbar Police Academy
There has also been no movement on major legislation, which was at the heart of the 18 benchmarks of the surge. Instead the cabinet has held endless discussions about draft laws rather than send any to Parliament for actual action.
At the heart of the matter is how Maliki and the Shiite politicians see politics. Even though Shiites are a majority in Iraq, they still act like a repressed group. Most politicians see things in zero sum terms, where any concessions to the Sunnis would be a loss for them. Shiites also talk about justice rather than reconciliation, where their main priority is punishing the Sunnis for their years of repression under Saddam, rather than making peace with them.
American Frustration[/b]
No. 2 Commander in Iraq Gen. Odierno has said that the Maliki government has to reach out to the Sunnis soon
Beginning in August 2007 American officers began airing their discontent with Maliki by making public warnings that all the gains of the surge could fall apart if the prime minister did not reach out to the Sunnis. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Casey told newspapers after a trip to Iraq that month, ???There???s a frustration with his inability to be a reconciliation leader, and a fear that the momentum generated by the surge could just be fritted away.??? In September, the Defense Department in its quarterly report to Congress on Iraq warned, ???In the short term, Iraqi political leaders will likely be less concerned about reconciliation than with consolidating power and posturing for a future power struggle,??? while the Comptroller General for the Government Accountability Office told Congress that the Iraqi government was ???dysfunctional.??? The frustration with Maliki has only increased since then with military officers recently telling the Washington Post that Maliki was the biggest threat to the future of the country, even more than Al Qaeda in Iraq or the Shiite militias.
Possible Consequences ??? Signs of Hope[/b]
The worst-case scenario for American officials is that if Maliki never reaches out the Sunnis that they will go back to fighting. Another possible outcome might be that Sunnis move towards autonomy in their areas creating separate Sunni fiefdoms controlled by tribes and former insurgents. The problem with this is that the Sunni areas have no resources and the majority of the money flowing into them comes from the U.S., a role they don???t want to and probably can???t sustain long-term. On the more hopefully side, there are actually signs of ???bottom up reconciliation.??? In October and November Sunnis began reaching out to Shiites. In October the Sunni Vice President met with Shiite religious leader Grand Ayatollah Sistani and began putting out feelers to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. In November, Sunni tribal leaders from Anbar met with Shiite tribal leaders to see if they had anything in common, and also held discussions with Maliki to see whether they could replace the boycotting Sunni parties in the government.
Sunni sheikhs from Anbar meeting with Prime Minister Maliki
In the short term, the Sunnis are unlikely to return to violence. In Anbar, the tribes are reaping the benefits of their decision to turn on Al Qaeda in Iraq with money, jobs, and power. In Baghdad, Sunnis are only a quarter or less of the population and have been defeated in the battle for the capital. Any return to violence could mean their total elimination from the city. In other provinces where the U.S. is trying to spread the Sunni policy such as Salahaddin and Diyala the situation is more dicey. Tribal cooperation is being bought rather than earned. If the money were to dry up, as could happen unless the government finally agrees to support the policy, the tribes could go back to fighting. The most likely scenario is that Anbar is left to its own devices, Sunnis in other provinces either find an easy truce or small scale fighting returns, while the Shiites solidify their control of the government and security
forces. 2007 Iraq was known for the atomization of Iraq with different regions and groups carrying out their own policies because the government was either incompetent, incapable or not willing to do its job. Baghdad???s intransigence on political reconciliation with the Sunni is one sign of this process.
Bibliography[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Christoff, Joseph, ???Security, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq GAO Audis and Key Oversight Issues Testimony Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, U.S. House of Representatives,??? Government Accountability Office, 10/30/07
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? September 2007
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,??? 10/31/07
Walker, David, ???Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,??? Government Accountability Office, 9/4/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
News Reports[/b]
Associated Press, ???Shiite visits Sunni Anbar region,??? USA Today, 10/15/07
Bing, West, ???Will the Petraeus Strategy Be the Last???? Atlantic.com, 9/17/07
Cave, Damien, ???Iraqi Premier Stirs Discontent, Yet Hangs On,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
DeYoung, Karen and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Military Officials in Iraq Fault GAO Report,??? Washington Post, 9/5/07
Diwani, Abeer, ???Sunni, Shiite tribes unite to fight Qaeda,??? Azzaman, 11/7/07
Drezen, Yochi and Jaffe, Greg, ???Maliki Faces Fresh Doubts, Tests,??? Wall Street Journal, 8/21/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Security in Iraq still elusive,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/7/07 - ???U.S. support for Maliki dismays Iraqi opposition,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/11/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Gordon, Michael, ???Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,??? New York Times, 10/28/07
Greenwall, Megan, ???Iraqi Leaders Reach Accord On Prisoners, Ex-Baathists,??? Washington Post, 8/27/07
Hadley, Stephen, ???Text of U.S. Security Adviser???s Iraq Memo,??? New York Times, 11/29/06
Hussain, Alwan, ???More militia members join army, police,??? Azzaman, 11/11/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Top Iraqis Pull Back From Key U.S. Goal,??? Washington Post, 10/8/07
Ricks, Thomas, ???Iraqis Wasting An Opportunity, U.S. Officers Say,??? Washington Post, 11/15/07
Stockman, Farah, ???US struggles to keep leader at helm Defections strike Maliki???s coalition,??? Boston Globe, 8/21/07
Tarabay, Jamie, ???Sunni Tribal Leaders Demand Government Support,??? All Things Considered NPR, 11/13/07
Westervelt, Eric, ???Iraqis Skeptical New Sense of Security Can Last,??? All Things Considered ??? NPR, 11/1/07
Zaman, Az, ???Iraqi Papers Sat: Front of the ???Moderates,?????? IraqSlogger.com, 8/17/07
2006 was known as the year of sectarian civil war as Shiites and Sunnis fought a bloody battle for control of Iraq. By 2007 the Shiites had mostly won. This year the conflict in Iraq has became regionalized and more diverse with Sunnis fighting Americans, Sunnis fighting Shiites, Sunnis fighting Sunnis, Shiites fighting Shiites, and on the international front Kurds fighting Turks and Iranians. As Iraq splintered the U.S. found itself without a unified policy despite the surge, which has become largely a military one. There has been no political reconciliation and some don???t believe it will happen. In September 2007 Bush changed the U.S.???s goal to bottom up reconciliation, but it has no policy on how to achieve it. The Iraqi government has been reluctantly pushed into accepting Sunnis, but is still not doing it???s best to integrate them into the government and security forces. The U.S. has also largely ignored the Kurdish north and Shiite South, leaving them to their own devices. Here???s a yearend review of where Iraq stands region by region.
2007 saw the Kurds extend their power within and without Iraq. In Iraq???s central government, the two leading Kurdish parties became more powerful as they became one of the backbones of Prime Minister Maliki???s shrinking ruling coalition. The Kurds asserted their newfound influence by breaking with parliament over the Hydrocarbon/Oil law. The last draft of the legislation would give control of oil contracts to the central government. The Kurds disagreed claiming that power should rest with the provinces that would then share the profits with the central government. Instead of supporting the draft, the Kurds passed their own oil law and began signing foreign contracts of their own.
Iraqi President Jalal Talibani is head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and one of the backbones of Prime Minister Maliki???s ruling coalition
Kurdistan also happens to the be the most prosperous part of the country with foreign investment, a booming economy with trade between both Turkey and Iran. This is directly related to the fact that Kurdistan is the most secure part of the country.
As a sign of their new found power the Kurdish region signed two separate oil deals. One was with the Norwegian company DNO. This is a Kurdish soldier guarding one of their facilities.
The future of the city of Kirkuk continued to be a festering problem. There was suppose to be a referendum and census for the city to determine whether it would join the Kurdistan region, but because it has caused so much conflict, the Kurds held off postponing it for sometime in the future. Until then, the Kurds continue to try to push Arabs and Turkoman out of the city while giving incentives to Kurds to return.
The power of the Kurds in Iraq also inspired their brethren in other countries, especially Turkey and Iran where the separatist group the PKK and its offshoot the PJKK carried out cross border raids killing dozens of foreign troops. This came to a head in the fall of 2007 when Turkey threatened a cross border operation to clear the area of guerrilla fighters. The intervention of the U.S. that began sharing intelligence with the Turks to fight the rebels seems to have calmed things down. On the other hand, the U.S. still has not resolved the problem long-term despite repeated promises to Ankara. It has also done nothing about the PJKK because it attacks Iran and that is seen as to the advantage of the U.S., which wants to pressure Tehran.
PKK fighters along the Iraqi-Turkey border. The U.S. promised Turkey that they would take care of the PKK, which the U.S. labels a terrorist organization, but did absolutely nothing until the fall of 2007 when Turkey threatened military operations into Iraqi to clear out their bases. Since then the U.S. has begun to share intelligence on the PKK with Turkey so that they can carry out more effective operations against them, alleviating the crisis.
In Baghdad, the security situation is much improved with far fewer deaths and sectarian fighting. The U.S. has been able to organize Sunnis throughout the city into neighborhood watch groups. Unable to turn Shiites against Moqtada al-Sadr, the U.S. has also begun cutting deals with the Mahdi Army, rather than confront them. Ethnic cleansing continues but without the widespread violence of before. Some Iraqis are returning to the city because of the improved security situation, but the number leaving has tripled since the surge. Overall, the capital is still much more stable than it was before because the Shiites have basically taken control of most of the city, and the Sunnis are cooperating with the U.S. to hold onto their remaining neighborhoods.
The government of Prime Minister Maliki also fell apart in 2007. Two Shiite parties, Fadhila and the Sadrists, along with the Sunnis left the cabinet and their positions have not been filled. The government is completely corrupt and sectarian, and has made no move on the major benchmarks that the U.S. set out at the beginning of the surge. Besides paying salaries, the government has very little effect outside of the Green Zone in Baghdad. Because there is no one to replace Maliki was able to stay in office.
A map of Irqa???s many tribes. In rural areas they are still the main power brokers and the U.S. has attempted to work with both Sunni and Shiite ones to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Shiite Mahdi Army. In Anbar, the policy has been most successful because the tribes decided to turn on the Islamists themselves, in the other provinces the results have been more mixed with American money playing the main factor in whether tribes cooperate or not.
In the surrounding provinces the situation isn???t as good. The surge has forced many insurgents into these areas, especially north of Baghdad such as Salahaddin, Diyala, and Ninawa. In response the U.S. has tried to expand its Sunni policy to these areas, and was hoping that Shiite tribes would also join. The results have been mixed. In Anbar there is one major tribe, but in other provinces such as Salahaddin there are up to 30 different, not all of which are cooperating with the U.S. The provinces are also largely mixed Sunni-Shiite so Sunnis not only face the threat of Al Qaeda in Iraq, but also Shiite militias, which gives them an extra incentive to keep fighting to protect their areas from their rivals. Shiites have also not found much reason to work with the U.S. yet. Cooperation from the tribes is also being bought with American money rather than out of any sense of loyalty. U.S. forces have also concentrated military operations in Diyala. The Iraqi government has been very afraid of the spread of the tribal policy, refusing to accept many of the tribesmen into the security forces. The existing police and army are also largely Shiite controlled and linked to militias. As a result, fighting is still intense north of Baghdad, but not at the previous levels.
T
he U.S. has concentrated its military operations in Diyala province to clear out insurgents that relocated there during the surge.
The economy of the central Iraqi provinces is also mixed depending upon the security situation. Businesses in Baghdad are just beginning to re-open with the improved security, but overall it still has high unemployment and a crippled economy. In contrast, in Diyala security is good in the north so the economy is finally growing, but there is still fighting in the south so there is little economic activity. Baghdad is also having problems spending its budget. In fact, it is still spend its 2006 budget despite it being the end of 2007. Corruption amongst the various ministries is also rampant and goes unpunished, hampering any kind of real economic development for all but Kurdistan. The increasing regionalization of Iraq also means that Baghdad has no control over its electricity production. Many provinces deny Baghdad its share of power and keep it for themselves. The government and provinces overall have also been unable to take responsibility for many of the U.S. reconstruction projects because they lack the money and expertise. That leaves the U.S. to continue to run them even though they don???t want to or for the projects to simply fall apart.
Western Iraq
13. Anbar
Anbar has been the scene of the most dramatic transformation in Iraq in 2007. Beginning in September 2006 the main Sunni tribe turned against Al Qaeda in Iraq for a number of reasons ranging from blood feuds to rejecting their strict form of Islam. As a result Anbar went from one of the deadliest areas in Iraq to one of the safest. There are still occasional attacks such as when the leading Sunni sheikh was assassinated by Al Qaeda in Iraq, but they are in the dozens rather than the hundreds. Cooperating with the U.S. has also given the Sunnis power and respect, things that originally inspired the insurgency. The Anbar tribes are even trying to expand their influence to Baghdad. The tribes recently asked Prime Minister Maliki if they could take over the positions in the cabinet being boycotted by the Sunni parties. Baghdad has also integrated some of the Sunnis into the security forces and seems to be reluctantly accepting the tribes??? new found position because it is away from the center of Shiite power in central and southern Iraq.
In March Prime Minister Maliki met with the tribal leaders of the Anbar Awakening that had turned against Al Qaeda in Iraq beginning in September 2006. Since then Baghdad and Anbar have worked out a rough truce.
Although major cities such as Ramadi and Fallujah are still destroyed due to past fighting, the economy is seeing a mild come back fueled by American reconstruction funds. The tribes that the U.S. are working with are also thoroughly corrupt and are taking large sums of money in bribes and graft from the projects.
Ramadi is the provincial capital of Anbar province. It still lays in ruins after repeated fighting between the U.S. and insurgents. A sign of the rough times ahead to rebuild the economy of western Iran.
Southern Iraq is mostly Shiite and has become the new center of tension. In most of the region, Sadr and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) are vying for control. In Basra, Iraq???s second largest city and home to most of the oil industry, the Fadhila party and several other smaller Shiite parties are also involved. There are armed clashes off and on throughout the region, especially in Basra, Karbala and Najaf along with assassinations such as the provincial governors of Qadisiyyah and Muthanna, and several aides to grand Ayatollah Sistani. The Mahdi Army is also trying to impose their version of Islamic law in many areas such as Basra. Militiamen for example, have attacked dozens of women in the city for not wearing hard scarves.
Mahdi Army members marching through Basra, Iraq???s second largest city and center of the oil industry. Sadrists are competing with the SIIC, Fadhila and several other smaller Shiite parties for control of the city. When the British withdrew in the fall, they were forced to sign a cease-fire with the Mahdi Army so that they were not attacked.
After a deadly clash in Augsut 2007 between the Mahdi Army and security forces controlled by the SIIC in Karbala, Sadr announced the second stand down by his militia in 2007. The result was a marked decrease in violence, especially in Baghdad.
Karbala is one of the holiest cities for the Shiites. Besides being one of the mainstays of the South???s economy drawing in thousands of religious tourists, especially from neighboring Iran each year, it has also seen fierce battles between the SIIC and Sadrists.
The economy in the south is also stagnant to falling apart. Besides Basra, which is the major oil port for Iraq, the other provinces rely mostly on subsistence farming and religious tourism. The south thus has the highest unemployment rate in the country ranging from 40-60%. Because of the oil, Basra is also one of the most corrupt cities in Iraq with the different political parties each stealing portions of the oil to fund themselves.
There is very little U.S. presence in the South and the British who were given control of the area have mostly withdrawn to a single airport outside of Basra. American Provincial Reconstruction Teams are suppose to be working in the area, but because of the clashes between rival Shiites, they rarely leave their offices and are basically ineffective.
Conclusion[/b]
Because of the changes in Iraq in 2007, you can longer speak of one conflict in the country. Rather there are different issues in each area. The north is the most safe and has the best economy. Its success is inspiring Kurds in Turkey and Iran that have increased tensions with those countries. The West is just beginning to stabilize and is taking the first steps towards accommodation with Baghdad. Central Iraq is mixed with the capital being more secure, but the insurgency and fighting having been pushed north. Southern Iraq is tense with inter-Shiite rivalries. The result is that while security has improved overall, there are now multiple problems with no apparent policy by the Americans nor willingness or ability by the government to address them. It will take political deals throughout Iraq to solve these problems something the U.S. has not been able to accomplish yet with the surge, and might prove more difficult once it ends in 2008. Either way, the U.S. will continue its involvement in the country for years, probably decades even under a new administration because Iraq has proven to be so difficult and ever changing.
Bibliography[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Christoff, Joseph, ???Security, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq GAO Audis and Key Oversight Issues Testimony Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, U.S. House of Representatives,??? Government Accountability Office, 10/30/07
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? September 2007
Government Accountability Office, ???Stabilizing And Rebuildin
g Iraq U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,??? October 2007
Katzman, Kenneth, ???Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks,??? Congressional Research Service, 8/10/07
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq???s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,??? 7/30/07 - ???Quarterly Report To The United States Congress,??? 10/30/07
Walker, David, ???Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,??? Government Accountability Office, 9/4/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Borden, Anthony, ???Iraqi Governance Report,??? Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Bruno, Greg, ???Iraq Security Statistics,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 9/12/07
Cordesman, Anthony, ???America???s Last Chance in Iraq: Changing US Strategy to Meet Iraq???s Real Needs,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/4/07 - ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07 - ???Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07 - ???The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/6/07
Institute For War & Peace Reporting, ???Battling for Power in Basra,??? 8/7/07
Korb, Lawrence Biddle, Stephen, ???Violence by the Numbers in Iraq: Sound Data or Shaky Statistics???? Council on Foreign Relations, 9/25/07
Ross, Dennis, ???Stagecraft, Not Statecraft: Diagnosing Bush???s Failure in Iraq,??? Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10/22/07
News Reports[/b]
Ali, Ahmed, ???IRAQ: Sectarianism Splits Security in Diyala,??? Inter Press Service, 8/7/07
Allan, Hannah, ???Iraqi insurgency taking cut of U.S. rebuilding money,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/27/07
Arsu, Sebnem and Tavernise, Sabrina, ???Turkey Authorizes Troops to Enter Iraq to Fight Rebels,??? New York Times, 10/10/07
Attewill, Fred, and agencies, ???Iraq bombs death toll rises to 400,??? Guardian Unlimited, 8/16/07
Azzaman, ???Surge reported in number of internally displaced Iraqis,??? 11/6/07
Bergen, Peter & Cruickshank, Paul, ???Al Qaeda in Iraq: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,??? Mother Jones, 10/18/07
Bing, West, ???Will the Petraeus Strategy Be the Last???? Atlantic.com, 9/17/07
Calvan, Bobby Caina and Taha, Yaseen, ???Maliki can???t stop PKK attacks, officials say,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 10/24/07
Cave, Damien, ???4 Truck Bombs Kill 190 in Kurdish Area of Iraq,??? New York Times, 8/15/07 - ???Iraqi Factions??? Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress,??? New York Times, 8/25/07
Cave, Damien, and Farrell, Stephen, ???At Street Level, Unmet Goals of Troop Buildup,??? New York Times, 9/9/07
Cloud, David, ???American and Iraqi Forces Control Half of Baghdad,??? New York Times, 9/22/07
Curtis, Kim, ???Ramadi War Zone Now Rare Bright Spot,??? Washington Post, 10/28/07
Dagher, Sam, ???As British troops exit Basra, Shiites vie to fill power vacuum,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/17/07 - ???Trouble grows in Iraq???s Shiite south,??? Christian Science Monitor, 8/13/07 - ???U.S., Iran dial down tensions in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/7/07 - ???Will ???armloads??? of US cash buy tribal loyalty???? Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/07
Daragahi, Borzou, ???Kurdish dreams find a foothold in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 10/13/07 - ???Security may trump ethnicity in Kirkuk,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/28/07
Dehghanpisheh, Babak and Kaplow, Larry, ???As Sunnis Flee, Shiites Now Dominate Baghdad,??? Newsweek, 9/10/07
DeYoung, Karen and Ricks, Thomas, ???As British Leave, Basra Deteriorates,??? Washington Post, 8/7/07
Dreazen, Yochi and Shishking, Philip and Jaffe, Greg, ???U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/4/07
Economist, ???Is the surge going to fizzle???? 6/21/07
Evans, Dominic, ???Sunni recruits to police volatile Abu Ghraib,??? Reuters, 9/25/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Despite violence drop, officers see bleak future for Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/15/07 - ???Security in Iraq still elusive,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/7/07
Farrell, Stephen, ???50 Die in Fight Between Shiite Groups in Karbala,??? New York Times, 8/29/07 - ???Governor of Iraqi Province Assassinated,??? New York Times, 8/21/07
Fletcher, Michael, ???Iraq Oil Deal Gets Everybody???s Attention,??? Washington Post, 9/24/07
Fletcher, Michael and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Bush, Advisers Make Surprise Visit to Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/3/07 - ???In Iraq, Bush Cites Gains,??? Washington Post, 9/4/07
Fresh Air, ???'Fiasco' Author Reports On the Petraeus Report,??? NPR, 9/12/07
Gamel, Kim, ???U.S. Expands Anbar Model to Iraq Shiites,??? Associated Press, 9/16/07
Glanz, James, ???Compromise on Oil Law in Iraq Seems to Be Collapsing,??? New York Times, 9/13/07 - ???Provinces Use Rebuilding Money in Iraq,??? New York Times, 10/1/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07 - ???Militias Seizing Control of Iraqi Electricity Grid,??? New York Times, 8/23/07 - ???More Iraqis Said to Flee Since Troop Increase,??? New York Times, 8/24/07
Glanz, James and Rubin, Alissa, ???Future Look of Iraq Complicated by Internal Migration,??? New York Times, 9/19/07
Gordon, Michael, ???The Former-Insurgent-Counterinsurgency,??? New York times, 9/2/07 - ???Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,??? New York Times, 10/28/07 - ???Sunnis Say Baghdad Hampers Anbar Gains,??? New York Times, 11/3/07
Greenwell, Megan, ???Villagers Battle Insurgents After Attack on Sheik Near Baqubah,??? Washington Post, 8/24/07
Hendawi, Hamza, ???Brittle Bond: Iraqi Sheik Joins US Fight,??? Washington Post, 10/12/07 - ???Two More Al-Sistani Aides Killed,??? Associated Press, 9/21/07
Howard, Michael, ???The struggle for Iraq???s oil flares up as Kurds open doors to foreign investors,??? Guardian, 8/7/07
Hurst, Steven, ???Thousands Return to Safer Iraqi Capital,??? Associated Press, 11/4/07 - ???Violence lessens in Baghdad as it grows elsewhere,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/26/07
Kaplow, Larry, ???Iraq Blackouts Get Worse, Fuel Anger,??? Newsweek, 8/22/07
Kilcullen, Dave, ???Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,??? Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07
Klein, Joe, ???The Next War in Iraq,??? Time, 9/3/07
Lubold, Gordon, ???A quieter Anbar Province rebuilds,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/5/07 - ???Anbar streets illustrate Petraeus???s testimony,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/12/07 - ???U.S. takes Anbar model to Iraq Shiites,??? Christian Science Monitor, 10/2/07
Mortenson, Darrin, ???America???s New Shi???a Allies,??? Time, 10/12/07
Oppel, Richard, ???In Iraq, Conflict Simmers on a 2nd Kurdish Front,??? New York Times, 10/23/07 - ???Quieter Fallujah fears U.S. exit,??? San Francisco
Chronicle, 8/19/07
Paley, Amit, ???Maliki Intends to Lift Curfew in Baghdad,??? Washington Post, 11/13/07
Parker, Ned, ???Iraqi civilian deaths plunge,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/1/07 - ???U.S. seeks pact with Shiite militia,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/12/07
Partlow, Joshua, ??????I Don???t Think This Place Is Worth Another Soldier???s Life,?????? Washington Post, 10/27/07 - ???Shelling Near Iranian Border Is Forcing Iraqi Kurds to Flee,??? Washington Post, 9/13/07 - ???Singing Up Sunnis With ???Insurgent??? on Their Resumes,??? Washington Post, 9/4/07 - ???Top Iraqis Pull Back From Key U.S. Goal,??? Washington Post, 10/8/07
Partlow, Joshua and Sarhan, Saad, ???Sadr Orders ???Freeze??? on Militia Actions,??? Washington Post, 8/30/07
Reid, Robert, ???Progress Slow As Iraqi Politics in Flux,??? Associated Press, 9/16/07
Reuters, ???Kurdish Rebels Kill 13 Soldiers on Turkish Border With Iraq,??? New York Times, 10/8/07
Ricks, Thomas, ???Iraqis Wasting An Opportunity, U.S. Officers Say,??? Washington Post, 11/15/07
Rubin, Alissa, ???Blaming Politics, Iraqi Antigraft Official Vows to Quit,??? New York Times, 9/7/07
Rubin, Alissa and Cave, Damien, ???Envoy???s Upbeat Tone Glosses Over Baghdad???s Turmoil,??? New York Times, 9/11/07
Sudarsan, Raghavan, ???No Relief From Fear,??? Washington Post, 9/5/07
Susman, Tina, ???Looking to Anbar for Iraq???s future,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/10/07
Tarabay, Jamie, ???Anbar Alliance May Not Translate to Other Provinces,??? All Things Considered ??? National Public Radio, 9/25/07
Tavernise, Sabrina, ???In the Rugged North of Iraq, Kurdish Rebels Flout Turkey,??? Washington Post, 10/29/07
Today???s Zaman, ???Turkey plans long stay in northern Iraq,??? 10/15/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Iraq Is Criticized for Slow Hire of Police,??? Washington Post, 10/27/07 - ???Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,??? Washington Post, 8/9/07 - ???Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,??? Washington Post, 9/30/07
Wright, Robin and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Iraqi official: Iran supplying arms to insurgents attacking U.S. forces,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 10/6/07
Youssef, Nancy, ???Baghdad violence, U.S. deaths hit new lows for year,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 10/31/07 - ???U.S. finds a way to pacify Iraqi town ??? by using cash,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/12/07
Zaman, Az, ???Iraqi Papers Sat: Front of the ???Moderates,?????? IraqSlogger.com, 8/17/07
Zavis, Alexandra, ???U.S. courts sheiks in Hussein terrain,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/14/07
2007 has been a bell weather year for Iraq. The second half of the year was the first time things did not get worse in the country. The main causes were interrelated, the end of the battle for Baghdad and the American surge. These two events made Iraqis realize that the Shiites had beaten the Sunnis for control of the country, and that the Americans would be in Iraq for the long haul. As a result, Iraqis began thinking about their future in different ways. There seemed to be a growing trend towards a patchwork solution to Iraq???s problems that would allow for co-existence among the different groups and factions.
Background to Iraq???s Politics[/b]
Iraq has no democratic tradition. The two Iraqi elections were given before institutions and parties were really able to form in the country, and only resulted in sectarian groups taking over the government. The Shiites and Kurds who came to power saw things in zero sum terms, and had a history of being oppressed. As a result, one of their main concerns was to ensure that the Sunnis could never come back to power. That has been the main reason why there has been no political reconciliation, even with the surge decreasing violence in the country. In 2007 however, the first signs of change in attitudes began to emerge.
Changing Attitudes[/b]
The major causes of this change centered around Baghdad. The city went from a Sunni majority to a Shiite one in 2006. At the same time, the American surge started and solidified the Shiite gains. Sunnis in the city began working with the Americans as much as because they had grown sick of Al Qaeda in Iraq as to ensure that they weren???t completely kicked out of the city by Shiite militias. Statements by General Petraeus, Defense Secretary Gates, and other American politicians, also made Iraqis realize that rather than Americans exiting after the surge, they would be in the country for years, long past the presidency of George Bush.
Together these made Iraqis think differently. First, the Sunnis gave up on their idea of ever returning to power in Iraq. They were thoroughly defeated in Baghdad, being pushed out of central Iraq, and isolated in Anbar province. Conversely, the victors, the Shiites and Kurds, took the first steps towards being able to live with their former enemies the Sunnis. When Sunnis started working with Americans, the Shiites and Kurds were alarmed that they were simply arming them for a future civil war. American statements, however made Iraqi politicians think that the Americans would be around to police these newly formed Sunni units rather than leaving them to fight another day. The result is that the first signs of actual accommodation are being seen in Iraq.
The Baghdad government has grudgingly started to incorporate some of the Sunni groups into the regular security forces. The Americans still pay most of their salaries, but the government might eventually take over this job. Prime Minister Maliki also met with Sunni tribal leaders and said they might accept candidates from Anbar to replace the Sunni politicians that have been boycotting the cabinet for months now. The U.S. has also been able to forge some cease-fires in the capital between Sunnis and the Mahdi Army. This might all lead to an Iraqi model of co-existence, similar to Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Kurdish Example[/b]
Kurdistan is ruled by two Kurdish parties the Patriot Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The two were bitter rivals for years that often fought each other as much as they fought Saddam. Before the U.S. invasion they came to an agreement to divide Kurdistan into two regions, with each side gaining control of one part. The lack of democratic principals and zero sum thinking meant that the two could not agree to one party ruling the other with protections for the ruled. Rather they both had to have power. That might be the model for the future of Iraq.
A Patchwork Model For Iraq[/b]
This means Iraq will not have a western federal system of government, or even the soft partition model advocated by some such as Senator Biden. Instead, Iraq could become a patchwork of semi-autonomous communities and provinces divided up amongst the main armed factions. This could lead to Sunni tribal control of Anbar, a Shiite dominated Baghdad with Sunni enclaves, a patchwork of Sunni and Shiite majority towns in the central region surrounding the capital, a Shiite south divided up between the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Sadrists, and in Basra, the Fadhila Party, and of course, a Kurdistan autonomous region in the north.
This also means that Iraq will not be quite democratic either. Instead, it might turn out to be something like turn of the century America during the Gilded Age. That period was marked by party bosses that were responsible to their local communities and parties, doling out patronage and favors while enriching themselves through graft in the process. Deals were usually made between bosses behind closed doors that determined elections and decisions before they were made public. Iraq???s major political parties already act something like this. Under the patchwork version of Iraq, the number of bosses would expand tremendously with one from each community and region, forcing them to come to agreements with each other to co-exist to gain money, jobs, positions, etc. for their followers.
The American Role[/b]
The U.S. has played an ambiguous role in these developments. The surge has helped this process along in central and western Iraq by creating new power bases amongst Sunnis. The Americans have also brought the government kicking and screaming to the table to accept this new policy. U.S. plans don???t go much farther than getting Sunnis accepted into the security forces however. What comes next has not been really thought out. The U.S. also has no real plans for the Kurdish north and Shiite south other than to leave them to their own devices. General Petraeus said as much during his September testimony to Congress when he said the South would have an Iraqi solution, meaning the U.S. didn???t really have a role to play there. The U.S. also has a bad tendency to only think about its own needs and apply American solutions to Iraqi problems. That could impede the Iraqis and only draw out the process longer than needs be.
Conclusion[/b]
This will not be a short, nor easy, nor peaceful process anyways. Fighting will occur such as the armed clashes between Sadrists and the SIIC in the south, but it will be far below the all out sectarian war that broke out in 2006. These changes are only just the beginning, and will take years as Iraqis figure out a formula that will allow them to live together again. Reverses will probably be made, and American forces will be in Iraq for years trying to act as a referee between the different groups. These are the first signs of progress in Iraq since the U.S. invasion however. Hopefully they will lead to co-existence, and eventually reconciliation in the future. Whether these changes have staying power will be shown soon, as U.S. troops begin drawing down in December.
Bibliography[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Christoff, Joseph, ???Security, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq GAO Audis and Key Oversight Issues Testimony Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, U.S. House of Representatives,??? Government Accountability Office, 10/30/07
Government Accountability Office, ???Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,??? October 2007
Mathews, Jessica, ???The Situation in Iraq,??? House Armed Services Committee, 7/18/07
White House, ???Benchmark Assessment Report,??? 9/14/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
br />Cordesman, Anthony, ???America???s Last Chance in Iraq: Changing US Strategy to Meet Iraq???s Real Needs,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/4/07 - ???Pandora???s Box: Iraqi Federalism, Separatism, ???Hard??? Partitioning, and US Policy,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10/9/07
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Biddle: Security, Political Improvements Seen in Iraq in Recent Months,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 11/15/07
Ross, Dennis, ???Stagecraft, Not Statecraft: Diagnosing Bush???s Failure in Iraq,??? Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10/22/07
Simon, Steven, ???Prepared testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 7/17/07
News Reports[/b]
Associated Press, ???Shiite visits Sunni Anbar region,??? USA Today, 10/15/07 - ???Top Democratic candidates won???t vow full Iraq pullout by 2013,??? 9/27/07
Burns, Robert, ???What happens after ???surge??? over is key,??? Associated Press, 9/7/07
Cave, Damien, ???Iraqi Factions??? Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress,??? New York Times, 8/25/07
Clawson, Patrick, ???Iraq???s Future: A Concept Paper,??? Middle East Review of International Affairs, June 2006
Dagher, Sam, ???Will ???armloads??? of US cash buy tribal loyalty???? Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/07
Dehghanpisheh, Babak and Kaplow, Larry, ???As Sunnis Flee, Shiites Now Dominate Baghdad,??? Newsweek, 9/10/07
Diwani, Abeer, ???Sunni, Shiite tribes unite to fight Qaeda,??? Azzaman, 11/7/07
Dreazen, Yochi and Shishking, Philip and Jaffe, Greg, ???U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/4/07
Kilcullen, Dave, ???Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,??? Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07
Mannion, Jim, ???Gates hopes for Iraq drawdown to 100,000 troops by end of 2008,??? Agence France Presse, 9/14/07
Murray, Shailagh, ???After Iraq Trip, Unshaken resolve,??? Washington Post, 8/26/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Top Iraqis Pull Back From Key U.S. Goal,??? Washington Post, 10/8/07
Partlow, Joshua and Paley, Amit, ???Maliki Renews Call to Give Some Insurgents Amnesty,??? Washington Post, 11/12/07
Pollack, Kenneth, ???The Seven Deadly Sins Of Failure In Iraq: A Retrospective Analysis Of The Reconstruction,??? Middle East Review of International Affairs, December, 2006
Ricks, Thomas, ???For a Democrat, Options in Iraq Could Be Few,??? Washington Post, 9/29/07 - ???Iraqis Wasting An Opportunity, U.S. Officers Say,??? Washington Post, 11/15/07
Sennott, Charles, ???Q&A with General David Petraeus,??? Boston Globe, 9/7/07
Shishkin, Philip, ???In Baghdad Neighborhood, A Tale of Shifting Fortunes,??? Wall Street Journal, 10/31/07
Tarabay, Jamie, ???Sunni Tribal Leaders Demand Government Support,??? All Things Considered NPR, 11/13/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,??? Washington Post, 8/9/07 - ???Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,??? Washington Post, 9/30/07
Cave, Damien, ???Pressure for Results: The Politics of Tallying the Number of Iraqis Who Return Home,??? New York Times, 11/26/07[/b] - Iraqi government counting every Iraqi crossing border as a returning refugee - Spokesman from Ministry of displacement and migration said they weren???t asking anyone that crossed the border whether they were refugees or not, just counted everyone - ???We didn???t ask them if they were displaced and neither did the Interior Minstry.??? Spokesman for Ministry of Displacement and Migration - Counted Iraqi New York Times employee that visited relatives in Syria and then came home - Included three suspected insurgents who were arrested that police said had gone to Syria and then crossed back into Iraq - November, Iraqi general said 46,030 refugees had returned in October - Minister of Displacement and Migraiton said 1,600 returning every day - In comparison Iraqi travel agencies and drivers said 50 families coming from Syria a day - November saw a decline as well according to agencies and drivers - Iraqi government playing politics with numbers because trying to inflate them as sign of progress - UN survey from November of 110 families that returned said 46% coming back because out of money, 25% because Syria tightening visa rules, only 14% said because security better - Many returnees didn???t go back to their homes either. Going to area that is their sect, continuing segregation of Baghdad - Iraqi government tyring to encourage people to return, paying for buses from Syria - 28,017 Iraqis newly displaced internally in October according to UN
The fate of Iraq???s displaced is the newest political football in Iraq. The U.S. military and Iraqi government pointed to the return of Iraqi refugees as a sign that security was improving and that the surge was working. Humanitarian organizations questioned the numbers and why Iraqis were coming back. By December however, all three were telling Iraqi refugees to not come back to Iraq because they could not be taken care of and could cause more problems than solve.
Early Reports ???[/b]
The initial reports about Iraq???s displaced were overly optimistic. When the surge first started in early 2007 both the U.S. military and Iraqi government claimed that some Iraqis had returned to their homes in Baghdad. By May the U.S. was claiming that it had stopped the internal displacement of Iraqis, while in November the Iraqi government claimed that 46,000 had come back from Syria, and 60,000 refugees and internally displaced had registered to be repatriated to Baghdad. At the end of November the government even set up a special convoy of buses to pick up Iraqis in Syria and bring them back to Baghdad, offering them $800 a piece.
Iraqis returning from Syria to Baghdad
In comparison, humanitarian groups like the Iraqi Red Crescent and U.N. International Organization for Migration claimed that the number of refugees actually increased during the surge from 499,000 in February 2007 to 1.1 million by August, while the internally displaced went up to 2.3 million, a 16% increase from August to October. 69% came from Baghdad, the center of the new U.S. military plan. In a poll by the U.N. 63% said that they had fled because they feared for their lives, while 25% said they had been forced out of their homes in ethnic cleansing. Many of those from Baghdad either left for another neighborhood or exited the capital all together, either to be with relatives, an internally displaced camp, or to another country. Many of those that left Baghdad also returned more than once to the city in search of jobs.
Iraqis at a camp for the displaced
??? Compared To The Later Ones[/b]
Later reports said that Iraqis were coming home, but at much lower numbers than originally claimed. At the end of November the New York Times broke the story that the Maliki government was exaggerating the rate of return for Iraqi refugees. Their number of 46,000 coming back from Syria was actually the total number of Iraqis that had crossed the border whether for business, pleasure, visits, returning refugees, or in one case, insurgents. The Iraqi Red Crescent said that perhaps 25,000-28,000 Iraqis returned from Syria between September and November. Aid groups estimated that around 60,000 Iraqis in total had returned from all Arab countries, but was still only 2.4%. The Red Crescent also reported the first drop in internally displaced with around 110,000 going home in October, a 4.8% drop, but the total still numbered over 2.1 million.
Causes[/b]
At first, the U.S. military and Iraqi government were quick to jump on the displaced issue to claim that security was improving and that the government was making progress. The government was also offering money to help out those who came back to Iraq from other countries, although it averaged out to only about $6 per person. Newspaper reports and polls conducted by humanitarian groups however, found a variety of reasons why Iraqi refugees were returning ranging from running out of money, being unable to find work, countries tightening their visa rules, and also the new security situation. A UN survey of 110 families that had come back found that 46% returned because they were out of money, 25% said it was because Syria had tightened visa rules, while 14% said it was because of better security. Many of the Iraqis that had gone to other countries were middle class professionals who had the money to leave. Their savings however eventually ran out. Many neighboring countries, worried that the Iraqis would end up staying for good, also placed restrictions on them. Syria for example, denied Iraqis work, charged them $50 for each family member, and limited the number of visas issued and the method to acquire one in October, just as the first reports of returnees began.
Potential Problems[/b]
By the end of November the U.S. military and Iraqi government were changing their tune. The U.S. was increasingly concerned about the lack of any plans by Prime Minister Maliki to take care of the returned. Besides questioning whether they could provide the displaced with services and finding them work, the most pressing issue was the fact that many had their homes taken over by insurgents or militias, who in turn sold or rented them out to people of their own sect. Many neighborhoods had thus been ethnically cleansed going from mixed Sunni-Shiite, to being dominated by just one group. The U.S. was afraid that if the displaced asked for their homes back it could set off a new wave violence. One U.S. officer told the New York Times that he hoped that the Iraqi government would build new homes for the refugees to solve the problem. Many others however, were worried that the government would never come through. Foreign and private money for refugees is also running out, although the U.N. did just promise $11 million to help with the aid packages for around 30,000 returnees. Ultimately, many in the U.S. are worried that they will be left with the job because the Iraqis are simply overtaxed and too incompetent to do it themselves.
The growing concerns about Iraq???s displaced led the U.N. High Commission for Refugees in mid-November to ask that Iraqis not return home yet. By the next month, Maliki???s government and the U.S. military were saying the same thing.
Conclusion[/b]
A variety of push and pull factors are causing Iraqis to begin to return to their homes at the end of 2007. This will have repercussions throughout the country. First, the government is not prepared for this influx as it already struggles to provide basic services to people, and has not come through with its previous promises to the displaced. Fears of renewed violence are probably not going to be fulfilled however. In Baghdad, the majority of those coming back are ending up in segregated neighborhoods of their own sect rather than trying to claim back their old homes, which are now controlled by insurgents and militias. If all the displaced are to return, it will require a massive building program to house them all. That means in the short-term aid groups will have to care for them, but the main bill will probably end up with the U.S. military who will have to add yet another job to their growing list of responsibilities.
Where Have They Come From? Where Have They Gone?[/b]
Where They???ve Come From:
68% from Baghdad, 15% from Diyala, 6% from Anbar, 4% from Salah al-Din, 2% from Basrah, 2% from Ninewa, 1% from Babylon, 1% from Tameem, 1% from Thi-Qar, 1% from Wassit, Unknown for Erbil, Kerbala, Qadissiya, Muthanna
Map of Iraq???s internally displaced by province
Where Have They Gone:
1.5 million ??? Syria 750-500,000 ??? Jordan 200,000 Saudi Arabia 100-80,000 ??? Egypt 57,000 - Iran 40,000 - Lebanon 10,000 ??? Turkey 2,000 ??? Gulf States
Map of Iraqi refugees, where they???ve gone and how many
Sources[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report To Th
e United States Congress,??? 10/30/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Bruno, Greg, ???Refugees Return but Concerns Linger,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 11/20/07
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
News Sources[/b]
Agence France Presse, ???First drop in Iraq???s internally displaced: Red Crescent,??? 12/5/07
Al Jazeera.Net, ???Returning Iraqis pose new challenge,??? 12/6/07
Allam, Hannah, ???Baghdad may be safer, but few Iraqis in Syria risk returning,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 12/5/07
Azzaman, ???Surge reported in number of internally displaced Iraqis,??? 11/6/07
Cave, Damien, ???Pressure for Results: The Politics of Tallying the Number of Iraqis Who Return Home,??? New York Times, 11/26/07
Cave, Damien and Rubin, Alissa, ???Baghdad???s Weary Start to Exhale as Security Improves,??? New York Times, 11/20/07
Dagher, Sam, ???Aid shrinks as Iraq???s internal refugee tally grows,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/30/07
Perils and Progress With America???s New Sunni Policy[/b]
America???s Sunni policy took off in the second half of 2007 during the surge. The U.S. offered money to local Sunnis if they fought against Al Qaeda in Iraq and secured their own areas. The plan quickly spread throughout western and central parts of the country. Although the U.S. adopted one approach fits all, it is actually dealing with many different Sunni groups that offer both problems and opportunities in the future.
Sunni Awakenings and Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs)[/b]
The first break between the insurgency and the Sunni community occurred in 2005. In Anbar, Al Qaeda in Iraq encroached upon one of the major tribe???s smuggling and robbery business. This led to clashes and the eventual formation of the Anbar Salvation Council in September 2006. They were able to forge an alliance with the U.S. in the province later that year, but it took the military command in the Green Zone several months to take note. The U.S. had in fact tried to work with tribes in Anbar and other parts of Iraq before with little effect in the past. General Petraeus was quick to make up for lost time however, and by the summer of 2007 had ordered all U.S. units to develop local Sunni security units called Awakening Councils or Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) where they were operating. The new policy might have come about from the fact that the U.S. was facing high casualty rates early in the surge, and General Petraeus latched onto the Sunnis plan as a way to change things. The new Sunni groups were one of the major causes for the decrease in attacks across the country that began in the fall of 2007.
Map of Awakenings and Concerned Local Citizens groups across Iraq
America???s New Sunni Allies[/b]
The U.S. is working with different types of Sunnis in each part of Iraq. All have the same basic motivation. They want money, guns and power. Some are better organized than others to take advantage of the situation. In Anbar for example, the U.S. is working with large and well-organized Salvation Council. It has its own economic base with tribal businesses, and security forces based upon their tribal fighters. In Baghdad, the Sunnis are almost exclusively ex-insurgents from the 1920 Revolution Brigades and Islamic Army. They have changed sides because of feuds with Al Qaeda in Iraq and the need to preserve their remaining enclaves in Baghdad from the new Shiite majority that won the battle for the capital. Some are Islamists, many are Baathists, and almost all are ex-military. In the provinces around Baghdad, such as Babil, Diyala, Salahaddin, and Ninawa, the U.S. is dealing with a mix of insurgents and tribes. Unlike in Anbar, the tribes here are small and fractured. Some are mixed Sunni-Shiite, while young sheikhs who wish to replace the older generation in their tribes lead others. In Salahaddin province for example, there are at least 30 different tribes, some of which continue to work with the insurgency and oppose the new U.S.-Sunni alliance. Many saw what happened in Anbar and want to receive the same benefits from the U.S.
Map of Iraq???s tribes
Prospects and Perils[/b]
Each Sunni grouping and region offers different prospects and perils for the U.S. and Iraq. Anbar has the greatest chance for lasting change. There the Salvation Council is well organized, and has forged a political plan. They want to replace the Sunni parties not only in the province, but in Baghdad as well. The Council has already joined many of the town councils in Anbar, and is trying to take over the provincial council from the Sunni Islamic Party. The Council has also offered to replace the Sunni ministers that have boycotted Prime Minister Maliki???s cabinet for months now. Because they are removed from Baghdad in Sunni dominated western Iraq, Maliki???s government has been most open to them. There have been meetings with the prime minister and his advisors, as well as the Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council party. The security improvements in Anbar might be sustainable as well because of the blood feud they have with Al Qaeda in Iraq, while thousands of tribesmen have been accepted into the local police by the government. Improved security means reconstruction might begin in an area devastated by fighting. The Council will benefit from this as well because their businesses are getting the majority of American financed reconstruction projects. This follows the pattern of successful counterinsurgency operations in the past where locals turn against the insurgency, security improves, new leaders emerge, and the government is forced to accommodate them.
Central Iraq on the other hand has the most perils. In the short-term there is still the potential for violence to explode in parts of the region. There have been shoot-outs between Awakening groups and Shiite militias and police, as well as claims of ethnic cleansing in Baghdad. The Sunni units are also becoming the new target of insurgents with cooperating sheikhs, clerics and commanders being assassinated, and checkpoints attacked.
More importantly, the U.S. doesn???t intend to employ the Sunni fighters indefinitely. At first, the U.S. hoped that the Iraqi government would eventually integrate these Sunnis into the security forces, but most don???t want to join the largely Shiite force, while the Shiite government doesn???t want the Sunni units in and around Baghdad. The government lacks the resources to deal with new recruits anyways. Together that has meant only about 5% of the 70,000 or so Sunnis have gotten jobs with the government. The new plan emerging is for the U.S. and Iraq to employ these Sunnis in civil reconstruction projects. Again, it is very questionable whether Prime Minister Maliki will come through either with the money or leadership to make this happen.
The lack of jobs is one major cause of the sectarian violence and insurgency in Iraq. What will happen if these fighters rejoin the ranks of the unemployed is a huge concern. The Sunnis in Baghdad are unlikely to return to the all out fighting of late 2006, early 2007 because they would be wiped out by the Shiites. They have already lost the battle for Baghdad and know it. In the rest of central Iraq however there are still high levels of violence and instability. There the Sunnis could very well rejoin the insurgency if things don???t work out for them.
There are long-term problems as well. In the provinces in and around Baghdad the economy is stagnant. Most rely upon farming, which is at subsistence levels. Some small-scale reconstruction projects have begun as the U.S. has expanded the Sunni policy, but with little to no help from Baghdad. The tribes and former insurgent groups tend to be small, unorganized and fractious, meaning there is little hope for a united front to emerge there as it has in Anbar. The U.S. could be just empowering new warlords in a country that is breaking up into local communities and regions, and providing a band-aid for an area that has little hope for economic or political progress. This follows the history of failed counterinsurgency policies where local security improves, but that never leads to any kind of reconciliation or change in the national government that remains weak and unresponsive to its citizens.
Conclusion[/b]
The U.S. once believed that it could shape Iraq into the kind of country it wanted. Years of bloody fighting and failed policies might have finally made the U.S. realize that Iraqis will determine what their country will look like in the future, not the Americans. The Sunni policy is a sign of this change as the U.S. has agreed to work with many of its former enemies and allowed them to create their own security forces. In order to keep this under control and not spiral i
nto a new round of Sunni on Shiite fighting, the U.S. most closely police these Sunni units. This will become harder for the Americans as the number of troops goes down to post-surge levels by the summer of 2008. In Anbar and Baghdad, that may not be a problem because the Salvation Council wants to rebuild the local economy and move into the national political arena, while the Sunnis in the capital know that they could be expelled if the Shiites wanted. The provinces around Baghdad are where the real potential flash points exist with many small Sunni groups that face a bleak economic picture that could turn for the worse if they lose their new security jobs. That could be a recipe for renewed violence in areas that are already the most dangerous in the country. Gambling on the Sunni policy has led to tactical gains in the military situation in Iraq, but could still go either way in the more important political sphere in the future.
Selected Overview of Sunni Groups Cooperating With the U.S.[/b]
Anbar Province
Founder of the Anbar Salvation Council Sheikh Abu Risha before his assassination
Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha formed the Anbar Salvation Council in September 2006. His tribe had a growing feud with Al Qaeda in Iraq over control of the smuggling and robbery in the province. Al Qaeda in Iraq ended up killing members of the sheikh???s family, and he in turn created the Anbar Salvation Council to kick out the Islamists. This later led to an alliance with the U.S., and provided the model for the Sunni policy across Iraq. Abu Risha was later killed by insurgents and his brother Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha took over. They have formed a political council in the province, joined local councils and have attempted to negotiate with the Iraqi Islamic Party that dominates the provincial government to gain seats there. The Salvation Council has also met with Pres. Bush, Prime Minister Maliki, his advisors, and the Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, as well as Sunni and Shiite tribes in central Iraq. The alliance with the U.S. has also given them the majority of reconstruction contracts in the province as the Council owns construction and trucking companies. They are by far the best organized and most independent of the Sunni groups that the U.S. is now working with.
Salahaddin Province
The U.S. is attempting to organize the fractious tribes in the province into the Salahaddin Support Council, modeled after the Anbar Salvation Council. The U.S. has organized the tribes into various security units and started funneling reconstruction projects to them. Baghdad has refused to recognize the Council.
Tikrit has been the major base of operation for the U.S. in the province. There, 3,000 tribesmen have been formed into a new security force. The tribes??? sheikh however is a rival to the deputy governor of the province who tried to have him arrested in October 2007. U.S. officers are also weary of the sheikh who they fear may be power hungry and keeping money handed out by the U.S. for himself.
Kirkuk Province
A leading sheikh in Kirkuk accused the U.S. of arresting members of his family that refused to work with the U.S. He accused the U.S. of splitting the tribes in the area and making the security situation worse.
In Hawija, south of Kirkuk, the U.S. has signed up 6,000 Sunnis into security units. They are fighting insurgents that are still active in the city.
Babil Province
In the town of Jurf Al Sakhr the U.S. organized the local tribe that use to work with the Islamic Army, into a security force. The tribe negotiated a cease-fire with the Mahdi Army and Shiite leaders in the neighboring town, and has tried to work with the Shiite controlled provincial government. The U.S. is now attempting to start reconstruction projects using tribe members, and restart civil society in the town. Baghdad has provided nothing to help the situation, and refused to integrate the Sunnis into the security forces. The sheikh has warned that if the money stops flowing, the insurgents will return. The Americans also made him mayor of the town.
Diyala Province
The Sunni Awakening commander in Diyala???s provincial capital of Baquba was a former insurgent leader. In December his force got into a shoot out with Shiite police who tried to arrest him and his driver for kidnapping. In January 2008 the commander was assassinated. There are reports that the group is breaking up into rival factions.
Baghdad
The Ghazaliya Guardians were organized in late summer 2007. Local residents protested their formation at first because they were former insurgents and members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Islamists that had imposed strict Islamic law. Shiite police were initially banned from the neighborhood by the Guardians. In December 2007 four of their fighters were killed in a bombing, which they blamed on Shiite militias and a Shiite army unit that were nearby.
The Ameriya Knights has 600 fighters, and is led by a former Islamic Army commander and intelligence officer under Saddam. He claimed to have turned his insurgent group into the Knights. The commander use to work with Al Qaeda in Iraq, but turned against them when they demanded a 25% tax to pay for their operations. Since then, the Knights have taken up police powers in neighborhood even though they don???t have official authority to do so. They do not allow the local Shiite police to enter the area. In turn, the government has not provided any services to the area. The Knights have allowed 70 Shiite families to return to the area.
Jammiya has 300 in its Concerned Local Citizens unit. Early on the group came into conflict with the local Iraqi army unit that ordered them off the streets. The U.S. was able to work out a deal where they would jointly man checkpoints in and out of the neighborhood. Since then the U.S. has tried to rebuild the area with mixed results.
The Sadiyah Guardians were formed in September 2007, led by a former Iraqi general. Shiites claimed that the unit was ethnically cleansing the neighborhood, and the government ordered the Sunnis to remove their checkpoints in November 2007.
The Sunni group in Dora use to have two factions, one of which was a neighborhood militia that was formed to stop ethnic cleansing by Shiites, while the other was made up of insurgents that were once allied with Al Qaeda in Iraq. Early on the two sides fought each other for control of the area. Now the local council has 300 fighters, but the U.S. is watching them closely and broken them up into different groups to try to stave off further clashes. The U.S. has also started small reconstruction projects in the neighborhood. In December the Sunni unit got into a shootout with members of the Mahdi Army.
Fadhil???s Awakening Council is led by a former insurgent and Republican Guard. He too turned his insurgent group into the new Awakening Council. He refuses to work with the Maliki government.
Members of the Lions of Adhamiya
Adhamiya has the 1400 strong Lions of Adhamiya formed in November 2007. Only half of them are paid by the U.S. Many are former Baathists and come from the 1920 Revolution Brigades. Shortly after being organized their leader was arrested and beaten by Shiite police who were going to turn him over to the Mahdi Army before the U.S. got him released. Later the Lions tried to stop an Iraqi Army unit from conducting raids in the neighborhood that led to a shoot out between the two sides. The leader of the Lions claimed that he was controlling his area like Saddam use to, just before he was assassinated in early January 2008.
Bibliography[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Bowen, Stuart, ???
Effectiveness Of The Provincial reconstruction Team Program In Iraq Statement Of Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Before The United States House Of Representatives Committee On Armed Services Subcommittee On Oversight And Investigations,??? Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, 10/18/07
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? December 2007
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq???s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07 - ???Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07
Francke, Rend Al-Rahim, ???Political Progress in Iraq During the Surge,??? United States Institute of Peace, December 2007
Pollack, Kenneth, ???Apres-Surge: The Next Iraq Debates,??? Brookings Institution, 12/31/07
Articles[/b]
Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith, ???Meet Abu Abed: the US???s new ally against al-Qaida,??? Guardian, 11/10/07
Brooks, Bradley, ???Sunni Fighters Need Political Role,??? Associated Press, 12/23/07
Buckley, Cara, ???U.S. Military Plans to Bolster Iraqi Security Forces by 10,000,??? New York Times, 11/30/07
Cave, Damien, ???Iraqi Factions??? Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress,??? New York Times, 8/25/07 - ???Remains of 40 Found in Mass Grave,??? New York Times, 11/22/07
Christian Science Monitor, ???As violence ebbs, the next hurdle for Iraq is political progress,??? 1/8/08
Crain, Charles, ???Iraq???s New Job Insecurity,??? Time, 12/24/07
Dagher, Sam, ???Will ???armloads??? of US cash buy tribal loyalty???? Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/07
DeYoung, Karen and Pale, Amit, ???U.S. Plans to Form Job Corps For Iraqi Security Volunteers,??? Washington Post, 12/7/07
Diwani, Abeer, ???Sunni, Shiite tribes unite to fight Qaeda,??? Azzaman, 11/7/07
Dreazen, Yochi and Chon, Gina, ???Will the Security Improvements in Iraq Endure???? Wall Street Journal, 12/3/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Security in Iraq still elusive,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/7/07 - ???U.S. sponsorship of Sunni groups worries Iraq???s government,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/28/07
Frayer, Lauren, ???6,000 Sunnis Join Pact With US in Iraq,??? Associated Press, 11/29/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Gordon, Michael, ???The Former-Insurgent-Counterinsurgency,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Greenwall, Megan, ???Blast Injures U.S.-Allied Sunni Cleric,??? Washington Post, 8/12/07 - ???Villagers Battle Insurgents After Attack on Sheik Near Baqubah,??? Washington Post, 8/24/07
Kilcullen, Dave, ???Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,??? Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07
Looney, Robert, ???Half Full of Half Empty? An Assessment of the Crocker Report on Iraqi Economic Conditions,??? Strategic Insights, December 2007
Michaels, Jim, ???U.S. gamble on sheiks is paying off ??? so far,??? USA Today, 12/26/07
Mohsen, Amer, ???Arab Papers Monday: 2007, Year of the Sahwa,??? IraqSlogger.com, 12/23/07
Mulrine, Anna, ???Quieting Mean Streets,??? U.S. News & World Report, 10/22/07
Nordland, Rod, ???Baghdad Comes Alive,??? Newsweek, 11/17/07
Nouri, Naseer and Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???Bomb Kills Iraqi Police Chief Praised by U.S.,??? Washington Post, 12/10/07
Oppel, Richard and Al-Husaini, ???Suicide Bomber Kills Key Sunni Leader,??? New York Times, 1/8/08
Parker, Ned, ???Iraq calmer, but more divided,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/10/07 - ???Ruthless, shadowy ??? and a U.S. ally,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/22/07
Partlow, Joshua and Sabah, Zaid, ???Iraqi Volunteers Angry Over Bomb Blast,??? Washington Post, 12/23/07
Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???New Leaders Of Sunnis Make Gains In Influence,??? Washington Post, 1/8/08
Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, ???For U.S., The Goal Is Now ???Iraqi Solution,?????? Washington Post, 1/10/08
Rubin, Alissa, ???A Calmer Iraq: Fragile and Possibly Fleeting,??? New York Times, 12/4/07
Rubin, Alissa and Cave, Damien, ???In a Force or Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict,??? New York Times, 12/23/07
Sabah, Zaid and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Security Pact on Iraq Would Set U.S. Exit,??? Washington Post, 12/11/07
Salaheddin, Sinan, ???Iraq: Volunteer Militias to Expand,??? Associated Press, 12/5/07
Simmons, Ann, ???In one Iraqi village, a taste of what might be,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/24/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???A Deadly Clash at Donkey Island,??? Washington Post, 8/19/07 - ???Iraq Is Criticized for Slow Hire of Police,??? Washington Post, 10/27/07
Westervelt, Eric, ???Security Situation Uneven Across Baghdad,??? All Things Considered ??? NPR, 11/28/07
Yoshino, Kimi, ???Unrest in Iraq???s Diyala province,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/5/08
Youssef, Nancy, ???U.S. finds a way to pacify Iraqi town ??? by using cash,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/12/07
Zavis, Alexandra, ???Sunnis divided in Anbar province,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/3/08 - ???U.S. courts sheiks in Hussein terrain,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/14/07
I just saw Charlie Wilson's War yesterday. It's amazing that we have blown it there not once but twice now, allowing for rise of the Islamists.
Still no political reconciliation in Iraq. Still no oil revenue sharing. Still lots of people, including Americans, dying. I say we declare victory and get the fuck out.
On January 12, 2008 Iraq???s parliament voted on a new deBaathification act called the Accountability and Justice Law. While many parliamentarians were absent or boycotted, enough votes were garnered to pass the law, which now goes onto one final body for actual ratification. This is the first of the major legislative benchmarks that Prime Minister Maliki???s government has been able to pass since it came to power in 2006. What effect the law will have is up to debate, and comes at a time of major political maneuverings by the various factions within the government who are vying to either prop up Maliki or have him replaced.
History of the DeBaathificiation Process[/b]
The first major order that Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority issued when it came into existence in 2003 was CPA Order 1 ???The De-Baathification of Iraqi Society??? that banned the top three levels of the party from work within post-Saddam Iraq. The idea was that the old order needed to be swept away as the U.S. did in Germany after World War II with the Nazis. The law however, was never applied evenly or fairly and had an effect far past the top three echelons of Baathists. Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress was put in charge of the DeBaathification committee and used it against not only Baathists but his political opponents as well. While high ranking former Baathists like Ilyad Allawi was able to become the interim prime minister despite the law, up to 150,000 other members of the party lost their jobs in 2003, which became a major cause of the insurgency, made the Sunnis feel that they were being persecuted, and robbed the new Iraqi government and armed forces of officers and professionals. By 2004 the U.S. was attempting to bring back these people to help end the insurgency. As a result, around 102,000 former Baathists found jobs in the government, including 45,000 former soldiers who either got pensions or returned to the security forces.
Ever since Prime Minister Maliki formed his government in 2006 he has promised and been pressured into passing a new DeBaathification law as a sign of reconciliation with the Sunnis. After five promises, a new law was finally introduced in March 2007, and sent to parliament in November. After it was shouted down by law-makers, it was revised, amended and finally voted on in January 2008. Some of the Sunni parties and Sadrists boycotted the event, but the largest Sunni bloc voted in favor of it. As a result, only 143 of 275 politicians were present, showing the great divide over the law. There is still one more step before it gets ratified, and there still might be revisions, but it is now basically assured of passage.
The Political Maneuvers Behind Passage of the New Law[/b]
The main reason why the new law was finally passed after over a year of delay was the changing political coalitions in parliament between supporters and opponents of Maliki. In 2007 Maliki???s government fell apart. Sunni and Shiite cabinet minister boycotted his government, causing his ruling coalition to fall apart, and lawmakers refused to show up to parliament leading to no political movement on anything of consequence. Maliki was forced to align himself with the Kurds and Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) to stay in power. In return Maliki promised the Kurds that they would gain control of the disputed city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq and that he would stave off Turkish attacks upon their zone of the country. Maliki didn???t come through with either promise. That has led the Kurds to threaten to leave Maliki???s coalition, and in turn, pushed them towards the Sunnis looking for new friends and coalitions. In December 2007 for example, the Kurds and Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party formed an alliance. At the same time, the anti-Maliki forces have been coalescing with a grouping of Sadrists, former prime minister Ilyad Allawi???s nationalist Iraqi National List, and the Sunni National Dialogue List joining together to attempt to push Maliki out of office. Maliki???s only source of support outside of his own Dawa Party, that is also divided between friends and foes of the prime minister, is the SIIC that has been calling for the boycotting cabinet ministers to return to government. It too has tried to reach out to Sunnis. It was within this context that the new Accountability and Justice Law was passed to try to appease the Sunnis and have them back Maliki???s faltering political position within the government.
Possible Effects of the New Law[/b]
Within Iraq, the possible effects of the new law are hotly debated. Like the old law, the new one will ban the top 3 levels of the Baath party from jobs within the government. This time however, they will have the opportunity to apply for pensions with a new deBaathification committee. Those denied could also appeal their cases, something that wasn???t allowed under the original law. It???s estimated that 3,500 former Baathists will be ineligible for jobs, but are now open to pensions, while 12,000-30,000 could apply for either. A sticking point in the new legislation is the fact that it says Baathists are banned from jobs in the Interior, Defense, Justice, Finance and Foreign Affairs ministries, the most powerful in the country. Some Iraqi politicians claim that up to 7,000 employees of the Interior Ministry as well as soldiers could lose their jobs as a result. It could also ban many of the Sunni Awakening Councils and Concerned Local Citizens groups from joining the Iraqi security forces because of their backgrounds. Many Sunnis interviewed by American and Iraqi newspapers also said they were still afraid of the Shiite run government. Many Baathists already fled the country after 2003, while others are living in hiding, fearing retribution by Shiites or Kurds.
Conclusion[/b]
In order for the new law to be the first step in reconciliation between the warring sides in Iraq, the deep levels of distrust must be overcome. One of the greatest fears of many Shiites is the return of the Baathists to power, while many Sunnis fear domination by the Shiites. The actual implementation of the law will be what matters, whether it will be used fairly or evenly, or be abused like the former act was. The Maliki government has not had a good record when it comes to sectarian biases, which is not a good starting point for this important law.
Ibrahim, Waleed, ???Main Iraq Sunni Arab bloc says ready to return to government,??? Reuters, 1/14/07
Karim, Ammar, ???Iraq Shiite and Sunni MPs sign new ???unity??? pact,??? Agence France Presse, 1/13/08
Karouny, Mariam, ???Row mars Iraq parliament hearing on Baathists bill,??? Reuters, 11/25/07
Mardini, Ramzy, ???Implications o the New Kurdish-Sunni Alliance for Security in Iraq???s Ninawa Governorate,??? Jamestown Foundation, 1/14/08
Moore, Solomon, ???Ex-Baathists Get a Break. Or Do They???? New York Times, 1/14/08
Moubayed, Sami, ???Iraq???s Sunnis reclaim lost ground,??? Asia Times, 1/15/08
Oppel, Richard and Myers, Steven Lee, ???Iraq Eases Curb for Former Officials of Hussein???s Party,??? New York Times, 1/13/08
Parker, Ned, ???Hard-line Iraqi clerics group shut down,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/15/07
Partlow, Joshua and Abramowitz, Michael, ???Iraq Passes Bill on Baathists,??? Washington Post, 1/13/08
Senanayake, Sumedha, ?
??Iraq: Will Passage Of New Law Appease Sunnis???? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1/15/08
Walker, David, ???Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,??? Government Accountability Office, 9/4/07
White House, ???Benchmark Assessment Report,??? 9/14/07
How The Democratic Congress Became Part Of The Problem On Iraq[/b]
Democrats took control of Congress largely over discontent with Iraq. They promised to end the war and bring the troops back. Shortly afterwards President Bush dismissed Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfled, and it seemed like the winds of change were sweeping through the government. However the Democrats split over what to do, and turned to partisan politics as Washington became deadlocked over the war just as it had been before.
Withdrawal Proposals[/b]
In 2007 the Democrats took control over Congress, but with only the slimmest of margins. In the Senate, for example, their lead was just 51-49. Getting a bill passed on withdrawing troops from Iraq was a top priority, but with such a slim majority they needed Republicans to get anything done. Right after the election that seemed possible, as there were plenty of GOP members discontent with war policy as well.
That opportunity was quickly lost. In the Senate, Majority Leader Henry Reid attempted to reach out to Republicans by giving the task of drafting a bill to Republican John Warner. Before he could drum up any support, anti-war Democrats began attacking his proposals, effectively ending debate on it before it even got started. In the House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi gave the job to the head of the House Appropriations Committee Democrat David Obey. There was no attempt to even reach out to Republican Representatives, and that bill faced the same fate as the one in the Senate.
Back To Business As Usual On Iraq[/b]
During the summer there was a new push for bipartisan withdrawal bills, but the Democrats proved too divided to do anything about them. Republicans Richard Lugar, Lamar Alexander, and Warner among others, brought up proposals for partial withdrawals from Iraq, but they went nowhere because the Democrats couldn???t decide on what kind of stance to take on the war. There were some who wanted a complete withdrawal from Iraq, while there were others that argued for a partial withdrawal while maintaining a U.S. presence. There were some that wanted a specific timeline for a pullout, and others that wanted to be more flexible. The result was nothing got done.
Gen. Petraeus??? positive report on the surge to Congress in September put the nail in the coffin on withdrawal bills. By October, the Democrat leadership said they had given up on the subject. At the same time Democrats increasingly turned to blaming Republicans for the failure to pass any legislation and told them they would be defeated in the 2008 elections. The debate on Iraq thus disintegrated back into partisan politics.
Bush In The Driver???s Seat[/b]
Foreign policy is mostly the domain of the president. Rarely can the Congress change direction on foreign issues. At best they can set limits. Even when Democrats took control of Congress they had to play a balancing act to keep their own party unified on the war, while reaching out across the aisle to Republicans to get anything done. The Democrats failed on both counts, and ended up being just like the Republicans they had replaced with their partisan attacks. That has allowed Bush to follow through with his Iraq policies uninhibited, which will continue until he leaves office in 2009.
Sources[/b]
Baker, Peter and Weisman, Jonathan, ???Warner Calls for Pullouts By Winter,??? Washington Post, 8/24/07
Branigin, William, ???Rumsfeld to Step Down as Defense Secretary,??? Washington Post, 11/8/06
Flaherty, Anne, ???Debate on troop withdrawals on hold,??? Associated Press, 10/10/07
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Haas: Petraeus, crocker Blunt Congressional Criticisms on Iraq,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 9/11/07
Levey, Noam, ???Moderates seek to end Iraq impasse,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/6/07
Lugar, Senator Richard, ???Lugar Slams Bush Policy, Iraqi Progress,??? IraqSlogger.com, 6/26/07 - ???Why Congress didn???t bring the troops home,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/27/08
Murray, Shailagh and Weisman, Jonathan, ???Democrats Seek GOP Support in Votes on Iraq War,??? Washington Post, 7/10/07
Packer, George, ???Interview with Lee Hamilton,??? New Yorker.com, 9/11/07 - ???Planning For Defeat,??? New Yorker, 9/17/07
Stolberg, Sheryl and Mazzetti, Mark, ???Democrats Push for Troop Cuts Within Months,??? New York Times, 11/13/06
Weisman, Jonathan and Murray, Shailagh, ???In GOP, Growing Friction On Iraq,??? Washington Post, 7/11/07
Comments
Exactly my point, you're actually letting on about your home situation more than anyone wants to know about.
this.
its fun seeing Motown unravel,
aside from the fact that I've coaxed him down into the mud with his pseudo-scholarly "anatomy of a barnacle:" bullshit, right where it belongs.
See Sab, you've set such a high standard with your never ending shit talking, homo erotic offers and MILF fantasies, that I'm just trying to respond in a way that you'll understand without coming down to your level, which apparently you wanted me to be at your waste line. It's been apparent from the first day you've stepped on the Strut that it's the only way you can interact with people, which is a sad commentary on your social skills. It's now been revealed that you're just projecting your frustrations onto the Strut from your sad home life. Is that why the wife is never smiling in the pics you post of her?
- says the idiot who cant even get his avatar to work.
Just proving my point about not being able to respond and interact with people.
you want the intellectual implication that goes along with berzerkley and the street credibility of Oakland, and instead you get neither.
Only ridicule and shame.
see you next week.
Nov. 20, 2007
Road From Damascus
Iraqis are voting with their feet by returning home after exile
The figures are hard to estimate precisely but the process could involve hundreds of thousands of people. The numbers are certainly large enough, as we report today, for a mass convoy to be planned next week as Iraqis who had opted for exile in Syria return to their homeland. It is one of the most striking signs that not only has violence in Baghdad and adjacent provinces decreased dramatically in recent months, but confidence in the economic and political future of Iraq has risen sharply. Nor is this movement the action of men and women who could easily reverse course and turn back again. Tighter visa restrictions imposed by Damascus mean that those who are returning to Iraq cannot assume that they could quickly retreat again to Syria if that suited them. This is, for many, a one-way decision. It represents a vote of confidence in Iraq.
The homecoming is not an isolated development. The security situation in Baghdad, while far from totally peaceful, has improved substantially in the past few months, with civilian fatalities falling by three quarters since the early summer. This has been reflected on the streets with markets, clubs and restaurants that had been closed for months, especially at night, now reopening. This good news has not attracted the attention that it should because critics of the conflict in 2003 and its aftermath have been extremely reluctant to acknowledge progress in the country. Yet even observers from publications long hostile to US policy in Iraq, such as The New York Times, are finally conceding that ???the violence has diminished significantly since the United States reinforced troop levels in Iraq and adopted a new counter-insurgency strategy???.
The ???surge??? associated with General David Petraeus is indeed paying extraordinary dividends. The positive effects were seen in Anbar province, which had become a hotbed of Sunni resistance to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and are increasingly seen in the Iraqi capital. It has enabled Sunnis to disassociate themselves decisively from al-Qaeda in Iraq, in effect switching sides, while some of the extreme Shias linked to the rebel cleric Moqtada al-Sadr have felt obliged to observe a ceasefire. All these fundamental shifts have allowed Iraqis the chance to rebuild an economy that, particularly with oil at its current price, should be among the strongest in their region. This opportunity has been recognised by exiles such as those who have been located in Syria. Iraq can only benefit from the return of some of its most talented citizens.
None of this means that Iraq is set on a certain path to imminent prosperity. While the numbers of car bombings and military fatalities have fallen dramatically there is always a risk that atrocities will take place. In fact, it is certain that there will be further tragedies. There remains a compelling need for the political parties and factions in Iraq to settle on an acceptable compromise on the Constitution, the internal distribution of oil revenues and the fate of those who were once members of the Baathist establishment.
The crucial point, however, is that American and British policy towards Iraq should reflect the optimism of the moment. Troops should not be withdrawn prematurely when tangible success is being recorded. It would be catastrophic for those soldiers to retreat just at the time when Iraqis themselves are returning home in droves.
how's the doorman coming? Pretty soon you'll have made it. Me and the boys can't wait to see you at the club.
The war in Iraq has gone through many unexpected changes. No one expected the Samarra bombing in early 2006 and the ruthless sectarian fighting and ethnic cleansing that ensued. Few imagined that the Sunni tribes and insurgents would turn against Al Qaeda in Iraq in early 2007. The latest development is the turn around in Baghdad. The number of dead bodies found on the streets and sectarian killings are down, along with the number of bombings. Ethnic cleansing is still occurring and violence still happens, but it is concentrated in certain neighborhoods rather than across the city as it once was. The largest drops in violence however, occurred at the beginning of 2007 before large numbers of additional troops were sent under the surge. By the time they arrived they were seeing a very different city that had been transformed from a majority Sunni capital with mostly mixed neighborhoods, to a majority Shiite and segregated one. The main cause of the turn around appears to be that the Shiites largely won the battle for Baghdad.
The Improved Security Situation In Baghdad[/b]
The newspapers today are full of stories about the drop in violence in Baghdad. In December 2006, the height of sectarian killing, Baghdad the was the bloodiest city in the country with 1,030 bodies found on the streets. By October 2007 that number had dropped to 174. Likewise the Iraqi Interior Ministry reported that the number of deaths went from 896 in July 2007 to 317 by October. The U.S. claimed car bombings went from 38 in December 2007 to 20 by October 2007, while death squad killings decreased 80% by November.
The increased American troops presence helped improve the security situation in Baghdad, but it was only one factor. Under the surge, the U.S. changed from protecting themselves in large bases to protecting the Iraqi people in forward operating stations spread throughout the city. This increased their familiarity with the neighborhoods they were tasked to protect as well as allowed them to get to know the public, which increased tips about insurgents tremendously over time.
A Bradley Fighting Vehicle at a forward operating base in southern Bagdad
The most important development for the Americans however, was the Sunni population largely turning against Al Qaeda in Iraq. This trend started in Anbar province in September 2006 and spread throughout the Sunni community, reaching Baghdad by the summer of 2007. The U.S. allied themselves with local insurgent groups in the capital under a don???t ask, don???t tell policy where they let their previous attacks on Americans go unpunished if they would fight Al Qaeda in Iraq. If they did, the U.S. would provide them with money, uniforms, and sometimes weapons, and more importantly, respect and power, something that had been a main cause of the insurgency amongst Sunnis. By November 2007 the U.S. had spent around $17 million organizing 67,000 Sunnis into neighborhood watch units in Baghdad.
Former Islamic Army leader, turned Ameriya Knight, neighborhood security chief, Ameriya, West Rashid District of Baghdad
At its peak however, the surge has never controlled more than 50% of Baghdad. The Sunnis that are now working with the U.S. are also a decided minority in the capital today. Therefore there must be other factors to account for the drop in violence.
Rise of Shiite Power In Baghdad[/b]
Shiite leaders Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) head Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
The major cause of change in Baghdad is that the Shiites now control most of the city. Their multi-faceted hard and soft power is apparent throughout the capital with the prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and some of the major political parties such as the Sadrists and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) being Shiite, to their command of the instruments of violence with most police in Baghdad being aligned with the militias, to the Shiite neighborhoods having more electricity, clean streets, safe hospitals, and thriving business districts compared to their Sunni neighbors.
A U.S. erected blast wall that divided the Sunnis from Shiites in a neighborhood of Baghdad
More importantly the fact that the Shiites were basically finished with ethnically cleansing the capital of Sunnis by the time of the surge also accounts for the turn around in security. Before the war Baghdad was 65% Sunni and consisted mostly of mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods. Today, the city is 75-85% Shiite with mixed neighborhoods only existing in the central part of the city along the Tigris River and in the southern and northern extremities. There is still cleansing of Sunnis to this day as the Iraqi Red Crescent and U.N. International Organization for Migration report that the number of displaced from Baghdad has tripled since the surge, with the majority being Sunnis, but it doesn???t involve the levels of violence as before. When the surge started the U.S. also erected blast walls to secure their operating environment. These walls had the effect of cementing in place the ethnic cleansing that had gone on before, ensuring the Shiites of their newly created majority, and making it harder for the two sides to fight each other.
In February 2007 a Shiite army unit came to the Sunni neighborhood of Ghazaliya in the Kadamiya District of Baghdad and destroyed a whole blocks worth of shops to try to force the population out.
This is what the block looked like afterwards
The BBC has an excellent interactive map showing Baghdad before and after the ethnic cleansing of 2006. Click on ???Ethnic areas??? to see the dramatic change in the capital.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/baghdad_navigator/
Another major factor in the transformation of Baghdad was the fact that Moqtada al-Sadr twice ordered his militia to stand down in 2007. The first time was in January 2007 after Bush announced the surge. Sadr was afraid that the U.S. would attack him personally, but he also hoped that the Americans would focus on his Sunni rivals, which they largely did. The second time was in August after the Mahdi Army clashed with its rival the SIIC in southern Iraq. Both times, there was a large drop off in violence. At the same time, the surge has actually increased Sadr???s power as it went after rogue Mahdi elements, thus increasing his control over his organization, and the U.S. never really entered Sadr City, thus ensuring his core base of support.
Members of the Mahdi Army carrying a poster of Moqtada al-Sadr
Glimpses of Baghdad???s Neighborhoods[/b]
Map of Baghdad???s districts with the locations of the U.S. join security posts. Note that there is only one in Sadr City.
To really understand what???s going on in Baghdad however, you need an overview of the city???s many neighborhoods. The following are glimpses of the developments in six of the capital???s ten major districts.
Kadamiya District, northwest Baghdad
Shiite majority with Sunnis in west
Kadamiya is still the scene of sectarian clashes as the district has been transformed from a mixed one to a Shiite majority
Ghazaliya neighborhood
- Sunni majority with some Shiites
- Was split by sectarian fighting in 2006
- Sunnis invited in Al Qaeda in Iraq, while Mahdi Army moved in
- Both conducted ethnic cleansing
- Shiite police helped Mahdi Army
- Government cut off services to Sunni sections
- August 2007 U.S. organized the local insurgents into the Ghazaliya Guardians under the protest of the residents who said they had terrorized the neighborhood and imposed Islamic law
- August freeze by Sadr greatly reduced violence
- Sunnis not allowing Shiites to return using threats and drive-bys
Huriya neigborhood
- Shiite majority with some Sunnis
- Taken over by Mahdi Army right before surge started in Jan. 2007
- Violence down because Sunnis kicked out
- Home for Shiites pushed out of Sunni areas
- Shiites now fighting each other over control of spoils such as houses to be sold, etc.
Shula neibhorhood
- Almost all Shiite
- Mahdi Army controls, no U.S. presence
West Rashid District, southwest Baghdad
Mixed Shiite and Sunni, one of the few areas that still has largely mixed neighborhoods. Still facing ethnic cleansing in some neighborhoods and insurgent activity, while the U.S. has been able to form truces in others.
Amiriya neighborhood
- Sunni majority, some Shiites
- Was home to many Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters who fled Anbar in 2006
- Al Qaeda declared it its Islamic capital spring 2006
- U.S. cut deal with 1920 Revolutionary Brigades and Islamic Army insurgents to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq under the surge
- Formed Amiriya Revolutionaries led by former Islamic Army commander
- All vehicles banned from streets
- Markets now open, streets cleaned
- No Shiites have returned however to once mixed neighborhood
Bayaa neighborhood
- Shiite majority, some Sunnis
- Mahdi Army tried to kick out Sunnis during summer 2007
- US brokered cease-fire between sides by November
Saidiya neighborhood
- Mixed Sunni-Shiite
- Iraqi police and Mahdi Army fighting insurgents and trying to kick out Sunnis
- Insurgents pushed into area by U.S. presence in neighboring district
- Shiite politician and cleric also trying to move Shiites in
- Government cut off services to Sunni sections
- Shiite police have also attacked US units in district
- US trying to organize Sunnis in face off Mahdi Army
- Iraqi government opposed to policy
Jihad and Amil neighborhoods
- Mixed Sunn-Shiite
- Mahdi Army trying to ethnically cleanse Sunnis
- US brokered cease-fires by November 2007
Adhamiya District, northeast baghdad
- Mixed Sunni-Shiite, one of few eastern areas that still has Sunni majority areas
- US organizing Sunnis into neighborhood security units
- Insurgents still active
- Claimed to have forced out Al Qaeda in Iraq by November 2007
Mansour District, western Baghdad
- Almost exclusively Sunni
- US organizing Sunnis into local security forces
- Insurgents still active, some sectarian conflict in areas bordering Shiites
- Shiites largely pushed out
- District has been revitalized with U.S. reconstruction money
- Businesses open
Re-opened Baghdad market
Yarmouk neighborhood
- April 2007 Sunnis pushed out Shiites
- Now businesses open and even some Shiites shop there, but none have returned
Washash neighborhood
- Borders Shiite area
- Mahdi Army trying to take over
Khadra neighborhood
- Some Sunni displaced families returning
- US organized Sunni Awakening Council
East Rashid District, southwestern Baghdad
- Use to be mixed but Sunni majority, now still mixed but Shiite majority
- October 2007 worked out deal with Sunni insurgents and Mahdi Army
Dora neighborhood
- Use to be insurgent stronghold
- Now quieted by surge, and most insurgents forced into neighboring Saidiya
Karrada District, southeastern Baghdad
- Shiite exclusively
- Considered one of the safest areas of capital
- Cite of new TV show ???Baghdad Nights??? that shows reborn night life in city
- Businesses open
Conclusion:[/b]
Baghdad has been the scene of some dramatic changes in the last year. Once the center of violence, it is now calmer as the city has been largely divided and conquered by the Shiites. Many residents are still skeptical whether this is a lasting change. In the last major public opinion poll published in September 2007, 80% of the residents questioned said the security situation was still bad compared to only 19% who said that it was good. The Shiite led Iraqi government has also continued with its sectarian policies, not providing services to many Sunni neighborhoods and refusing to recognize many of the Sunni fighters now working with the U.S. Almost all of the revitalized Sunni areas of the city have been paid for by American forces, which don???t intend to foot the bill forever. The U.S. has been pushing the Maliki government to take over these duties as a sign of reconciliation, but it has been recalcitrant. The U.S. military is increasingly frustrated with this inaction and is asking more and more what will happen if the government never reaches out to the Sunnis in Baghdad. The role of Moqtada al-Sadr also looms large on the horizon as he is the most powerful figure in the city controlling not only the Mahdi Army and providing services to many Shiites, but also runs many government ministries. Overall, the main question facing both Iraqis and the Americans is whether these changes are short-term gains with long-term problems ahead, or the new status quo in Baghdad. In a few months that question may begin to be answered as the U.S. begins drawing down troops.
Bibliography[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq???s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007
White House, ???Benchmark Assessment Report,??? 9/14/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Cordesman, Anthony, ???America???s Last Chance in Iraq: Changing US Strategy to Meet Iraq???s Real Needs,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/4/07
- ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
- ???Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07
- ???Pandora???s Box: Iraqi Federalism, Separatism, ???Hard??? Partitioning, and US Policy,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10/9/07
- ???The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/6/07
Korb, Lawrence Biddle, Stephen, ???Violence by the Numbers in Iraq: Sound Data or Shaky Statistics???? Council on Foreign Relations, 9/25/07
Newspapers[/b]
Al-Mada, ???Local news: death and injury of civilians bombings that targeted a gathering of citizens in Al Bai???aa intersection ??? arrested one of princes ???rule??? in Mandali ??? The armed clashes in recent Baghdad,??? 11/20/07
Ambramowitz, Michael and DeYoung, Karen, ???Petraeus Disappointed At Political State of Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/8/07
Azzaman, ???Qaeda defeated in main Baghdad neighborhood,??? 11/12/07
- ???Surge reported in number of internally displaced Iraqis,??? 11/6/07
Barnes, Julian, ???Sadr???s army proves hard to beat,??? Los Angeles Times, 8/23/07
BBC News, ???Iraq poll September 2007: In graphics,??? 9/10/07
Cave, Damien, ???4 Truck Bombs Kill 190 in Kurdish Area of Iraq,??? New York Times, 8/15/07
Cave, Damien, and Farrell, Stephen, ???At Street Level, Unmet Goals of Troop Buildup,??? New York Times, 9/9/07
Cave, Damien, and Rubin, Alissa, ???Baghdad???s Weary Start to Exhale as Security Improves,??? New York Times, 11/20/07
Cloud, David, ???American and Iraqi Forces Control Half of Baghdad,??? New York Times, 9/22/07
DeYoung, Karen, ???Experts Doubt Drop In Violence in Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/6/07
Economist, ???Is the surge going to fizzle???? 6/21/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Despite violence drop, officers see bleak future for Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/15/07
- ???Embattled Baghdad shows signs of hope,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/13/07
- ???Security in Iraq still elusive,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/7/07
Farrell, Stephen, Rubin, Alissa, Cave, Damien, Buckley, Cara, Mizher, Qais, Al-Husseini, Mudhafer, ???Around Baghdad, Signs of Normal Life Creep Back,??? New York Times.com, 11/19/07
Foreign Policy, ???Seven Questions: Is the Surge Working in Iraq???? September 2007
Fresh Air, ???'Fiasco' Author Reports On the Petraeus Report,??? NPR, 9/12/07
Glanz, James, ???Civilian Death Toll Falls in Baghdad but Rises Across Iraq,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???More Iraqis Said to Flee Since Troop Increase,??? New York Times, 8/24/07
Glanz, James and Rubin, Alissa, ???Future Look of Iraq Complicated by Internal Migration,??? New York Times, 9/19/07
Gordon, Michael, ???The Former-Insurgent-Counterinsurgency,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Gordon, Michael and Rubin, Alissa, ???Trial Near for Shiite Ex-Officials in Sunni Killings,??? New York Times, 11/5/07
Greenwell, Megan, ???Villagers Battle Insurgents After Attack on Sheik Near Baqubah,??? Washington Post, 8/24/07
Hoyt, Clark, ???When the Issue Is War, Take Nothing for Granted,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Hurst, Steven, ???Thousands Return to Safer Iraqi Capital,??? Associated Press, 11/4/07
- ???Violence lessens in Baghdad as it grows elsewhere,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/26/07
IraqSlogger.com, ???Ghazaliya Protests Pro-US Fighters,??? 8/21/07
Kahl, Colin, Brimley, Shawn, ???The Sorcerer???s Apprentice,??? Foreign Policy, September 2007
Kilcullen, Dave, ???Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,??? Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07
Nordland, Rod, ???Baghdad Comes Alive,??? Newsweek, 11/26/07
Packer, George, ???Inside The Surge,??? New Yorker, 11/19/07
Parker, Ned, ???Iraqi civilian deaths plunge,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/1/07
- ???Iraqi militia leader???s death shatters truce,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/23/07
- ???U.S. seeks pact with Shiite militia,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/12/07
Partlow, Joshua, ??????I Don???t Think This Place Is Worth Another Soldier???s Life,?????? Washington Post, 10/27/07
Reid, Robert, ???August particularly deadly for Iraqis,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 9/2/07
Schoof, Renee and Strobel, Warren, ???Report: Surge hasn???t cut attacks on Iraqi civilians,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/4/07
Shishkin, Philip, ???In Baghdad Neighborhood, A Tale of Shifting Fortunes,??? Wall Street Journal, 10/31/07
Sudarsan, Raghavan, ???No Relief From Fear,??? Washington Post, 9/5/07
Susman, Tina, ???Troop buildup fails to reconcile Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/4/07
Tavernise, Sabrina, ???In Air Attack, U.S. Soldiers Kill 18 Gunmen,??? New York Times, 8/25/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,??? Washington Post, 9/30/07
- ???U.S. Planners See Shiite Militias as Rising Threat,??? Washington Post, 10/22/07
Westervelt, Eric, ???Iraqis Skeptical New Sense of Security Can Last,??? All Things Considered ??? NPR, 11/1/07
Yates, Dean, ???Drop in Baghdad violence sustainable: general,??? Reuters, 11/7/07
1) There are more Iraqis returning to Baghdad now, but that has been a pattern occuring for a while now. The international organizations that track the refugees say that many Iraqis first leave the city because of the violence and then return again, usually multiple times because they are looking for jobs or move back to a different part of the city searching for a safer environment. They usually end up leaving again and then returning.
2) The story starts off with saying that countries are cracking down on Iraqi visas but then underplays it by saying that's not the real reason they're coming back, it's because they believe in Iraq. The article basically says they have no choice because they're getting kicked out of the neighboring countries.
3) The number of displaced has increased since the surge. A little over 1 million are internal refugees, while the other 1 million have left the country. The outflow from Baghdad has tripled since the surge and outnumbers the families now returning.
The military side of the surge is going so well that many forget that improving security is only a tactical means, to a strategic end, a political solution to Iraq. As Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz is often quoted as saying, war is only politics by other means. The problem is that the Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has made absolutely no moves towards political reconciliation while sectarian, insurgent and militia violence are all decreasing in Iraq. U.S. commanders are increasingly worried about what will happen if the Iraqi government never reaches out to its political opponents and starts the first steps towards peace in the country.
Maliki???s Sectarian Tendencies[/b]
President Bush meeting with Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq
When the Bush administration was secretly contemplating changing course in Iraq in the winter of 2006, Bush???s National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley wrote a secret memo that was later leaked to the press about Prime Minister Maliki???s government and whether it was capable of political reconciliation. The first half of the paper documented how out of touch Maliki was from the public, how he only relied upon a small group of advisors, and how he stood by as his government and Shiite political allies carried out ethnic cleansing and other sectarian policies. Hadley wasn???t sure whether Maliki was either powerless to change things or complicit in those actions. Either way, he painted a dire picture of Maliki writing, ???But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.??? Despite these warnings, the White House decided that there were no alternatives, so the U.S. had to work with Maliki no matter what. Their decision has proven futile as the government has continued with its ineffective and sectarian policies throughout the surge.
Not Seizing the Moment[/b]
The American Sunni policy is one of the success stories of the surge. The U.S. is hoping that Baghdad will eventually incorporate the Sunni fighters into the security forces and take over responsibility for the reconstruction projects started in Sunni neighborhoods. While Maliki has promised to do so, his lack of action is louder than his words. By August 2007, Maliki and his deputy national security advisor said that while they agreed with the Sunni policy in theory, they were not ready to actually support it yet because they feared the Sunnis would eventually turn on the government.
Pressured by the Americans, Baghdad eventually hired some of the units as police and Maliki met with Sunni tribal leaders giving the public face that he was open to reconciliation and the U.S. policy, but behind the scenes his government has been actively working to undermine it at the same time. The Interior Ministry has not agreed to include all of the Sunnis into the police in Anbar and Diyala provinces, does not adequately equip them, and has sent Shiite units to Sunni areas even though they exacerbate the situation because most act sectarian. The government also objected to having Sunni officers in the police so the U.S. was forced to set up its own police academy in Anbar. Most strikingly, in November Maliki announced that 18,000 Shiite militiamen were to join the security forces in a move meant to ensure that the Shiites are still in control.
Sunni police cadets at the new Anbar Police Academy
There has also been no movement on major legislation, which was at the heart of the 18 benchmarks of the surge. Instead the cabinet has held endless discussions about draft laws rather than send any to Parliament for actual action.
At the heart of the matter is how Maliki and the Shiite politicians see politics. Even though Shiites are a majority in Iraq, they still act like a repressed group. Most politicians see things in zero sum terms, where any concessions to the Sunnis would be a loss for them. Shiites also talk about justice rather than reconciliation, where their main priority is punishing the Sunnis for their years of repression under Saddam, rather than making peace with them.
American Frustration[/b]
No. 2 Commander in Iraq Gen. Odierno has said that the Maliki government has to reach out to the Sunnis soon
Beginning in August 2007 American officers began airing their discontent with Maliki by making public warnings that all the gains of the surge could fall apart if the prime minister did not reach out to the Sunnis. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Casey told newspapers after a trip to Iraq that month, ???There???s a frustration with his inability to be a reconciliation leader, and a fear that the momentum generated by the surge could just be fritted away.??? In September, the Defense Department in its quarterly report to Congress on Iraq warned, ???In the short term, Iraqi political leaders will likely be less concerned about reconciliation than with consolidating power and posturing for a future power struggle,??? while the Comptroller General for the Government Accountability Office told Congress that the Iraqi government was ???dysfunctional.??? The frustration with Maliki has only increased since then with military officers recently telling the Washington Post that Maliki was the biggest threat to the future of the country, even more than Al Qaeda in Iraq or the Shiite militias.
Possible Consequences ??? Signs of Hope[/b]
The worst-case scenario for American officials is that if Maliki never reaches out the Sunnis that they will go back to fighting. Another possible outcome might be that Sunnis move towards autonomy in their areas creating separate Sunni fiefdoms controlled by tribes and former insurgents. The problem with this is that the Sunni areas have no resources and the majority of the money flowing into them comes from the U.S., a role they don???t want to and probably can???t sustain long-term. On the more hopefully side, there are actually signs of ???bottom up reconciliation.??? In October and November Sunnis began reaching out to Shiites. In October the Sunni Vice President met with Shiite religious leader Grand Ayatollah Sistani and began putting out feelers to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. In November, Sunni tribal leaders from Anbar met with Shiite tribal leaders to see if they had anything in common, and also held discussions with Maliki to see whether they could replace the boycotting Sunni parties in the government.
Sunni sheikhs from Anbar meeting with Prime Minister Maliki
In the short term, the Sunnis are unlikely to return to violence. In Anbar, the tribes are reaping the benefits of their decision to turn on Al Qaeda in Iraq with money, jobs, and power. In Baghdad, Sunnis are only a quarter or less of the population and have been defeated in the battle for the capital. Any return to violence could mean their total elimination from the city. In other provinces where the U.S. is trying to spread the Sunni policy such as Salahaddin and Diyala the situation is more dicey. Tribal cooperation is being bought rather than earned. If the money were to dry up, as could happen unless the government finally agrees to support the policy, the tribes could go back to fighting. The most likely scenario is that Anbar is left to its own devices, Sunnis in other provinces either find an easy truce or small scale fighting returns, while the Shiites solidify their control of the government and security forces. 2007 Iraq was known for the atomization of Iraq with different regions and groups carrying out their own policies because the government was either incompetent, incapable or not willing to do its job. Baghdad???s intransigence on political reconciliation with the Sunni is one sign of this process.
Bibliography[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Christoff, Joseph, ???Security, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq GAO Audis and Key Oversight Issues Testimony Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, U.S. House of Representatives,??? Government Accountability Office, 10/30/07
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? September 2007
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,??? 10/31/07
Walker, David, ???Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,??? Government Accountability Office, 9/4/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
News Reports[/b]
Associated Press, ???Shiite visits Sunni Anbar region,??? USA Today, 10/15/07
Bing, West, ???Will the Petraeus Strategy Be the Last???? Atlantic.com, 9/17/07
Cave, Damien, ???Iraqi Premier Stirs Discontent, Yet Hangs On,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
DeYoung, Karen and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Military Officials in Iraq Fault GAO Report,??? Washington Post, 9/5/07
Diwani, Abeer, ???Sunni, Shiite tribes unite to fight Qaeda,??? Azzaman, 11/7/07
Drezen, Yochi and Jaffe, Greg, ???Maliki Faces Fresh Doubts, Tests,??? Wall Street Journal, 8/21/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Security in Iraq still elusive,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/7/07
- ???U.S. support for Maliki dismays Iraqi opposition,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/11/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Gordon, Michael, ???Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,??? New York Times, 10/28/07
Greenwall, Megan, ???Iraqi Leaders Reach Accord On Prisoners, Ex-Baathists,??? Washington Post, 8/27/07
Hadley, Stephen, ???Text of U.S. Security Adviser???s Iraq Memo,??? New York Times, 11/29/06
Hussain, Alwan, ???More militia members join army, police,??? Azzaman, 11/11/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Top Iraqis Pull Back From Key U.S. Goal,??? Washington Post, 10/8/07
Ricks, Thomas, ???Iraqis Wasting An Opportunity, U.S. Officers Say,??? Washington Post, 11/15/07
Stockman, Farah, ???US struggles to keep leader at helm Defections strike Maliki???s coalition,??? Boston Globe, 8/21/07
Tarabay, Jamie, ???Sunni Tribal Leaders Demand Government Support,??? All Things Considered NPR, 11/13/07
Westervelt, Eric, ???Iraqis Skeptical New Sense of Security Can Last,??? All Things Considered ??? NPR, 11/1/07
Zaman, Az, ???Iraqi Papers Sat: Front of the ???Moderates,?????? IraqSlogger.com, 8/17/07
2006 was known as the year of sectarian civil war as Shiites and Sunnis fought a bloody battle for control of Iraq. By 2007 the Shiites had mostly won. This year the conflict in Iraq has became regionalized and more diverse with Sunnis fighting Americans, Sunnis fighting Shiites, Sunnis fighting Sunnis, Shiites fighting Shiites, and on the international front Kurds fighting Turks and Iranians. As Iraq splintered the U.S. found itself without a unified policy despite the surge, which has become largely a military one. There has been no political reconciliation and some don???t believe it will happen. In September 2007 Bush changed the U.S.???s goal to bottom up reconciliation, but it has no policy on how to achieve it. The Iraqi government has been reluctantly pushed into accepting Sunnis, but is still not doing it???s best to integrate them into the government and security forces. The U.S. has also largely ignored the Kurdish north and Shiite South, leaving them to their own devices. Here???s a yearend review of where Iraq stands region by region.
Regions Of Iraq[/b]
Northern Iraq
15. Dahuk
16. Arbil
17. Kirkuk
18. As-Sulaymaniyyah
2007 saw the Kurds extend their power within and without Iraq. In Iraq???s central government, the two leading Kurdish parties became more powerful as they became one of the backbones of Prime Minister Maliki???s shrinking ruling coalition. The Kurds asserted their newfound influence by breaking with parliament over the Hydrocarbon/Oil law. The last draft of the legislation would give control of oil contracts to the central government. The Kurds disagreed claiming that power should rest with the provinces that would then share the profits with the central government. Instead of supporting the draft, the Kurds passed their own oil law and began signing foreign contracts of their own.
Iraqi President Jalal Talibani is head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and one of the backbones of Prime Minister Maliki???s ruling coalition
Kurdistan also happens to the be the most prosperous part of the country with foreign investment, a booming economy with trade between both Turkey and Iran. This is directly related to the fact that Kurdistan is the most secure part of the country.
As a sign of their new found power the Kurdish region signed two separate oil deals. One was with the Norwegian company DNO. This is a Kurdish soldier guarding one of their facilities.
The future of the city of Kirkuk continued to be a festering problem. There was suppose to be a referendum and census for the city to determine whether it would join the Kurdistan region, but because it has caused so much conflict, the Kurds held off postponing it for sometime in the future. Until then, the Kurds continue to try to push Arabs and Turkoman out of the city while giving incentives to Kurds to return.
The power of the Kurds in Iraq also inspired their brethren in other countries, especially Turkey and Iran where the separatist group the PKK and its offshoot the PJKK carried out cross border raids killing dozens of foreign troops. This came to a head in the fall of 2007 when Turkey threatened a cross border operation to clear the area of guerrilla fighters. The intervention of the U.S. that began sharing intelligence with the Turks to fight the rebels seems to have calmed things down. On the other hand, the U.S. still has not resolved the problem long-term despite repeated promises to Ankara. It has also done nothing about the PJKK because it attacks Iran and that is seen as to the advantage of the U.S., which wants to pressure Tehran.
PKK fighters along the Iraqi-Turkey border. The U.S. promised Turkey that they would take care of the PKK, which the U.S. labels a terrorist organization, but did absolutely nothing until the fall of 2007 when Turkey threatened military operations into Iraqi to clear out their bases. Since then the U.S. has begun to share intelligence on the PKK with Turkey so that they can carry out more effective operations against them, alleviating the crisis.
Central Iraq
1. Baghdad
2. Salahaddin
3. Diyala
4. Wasit
10. Babil
14. Ninawa
In Baghdad, the security situation is much improved with far fewer deaths and sectarian fighting. The U.S. has been able to organize Sunnis throughout the city into neighborhood watch groups. Unable to turn Shiites against Moqtada al-Sadr, the U.S. has also begun cutting deals with the Mahdi Army, rather than confront them. Ethnic cleansing continues but without the widespread violence of before. Some Iraqis are returning to the city because of the improved security situation, but the number leaving has tripled since the surge. Overall, the capital is still much more stable than it was before because the Shiites have basically taken control of most of the city, and the Sunnis are cooperating with the U.S. to hold onto their remaining neighborhoods.
The government of Prime Minister Maliki also fell apart in 2007. Two Shiite parties, Fadhila and the Sadrists, along with the Sunnis left the cabinet and their positions have not been filled. The government is completely corrupt and sectarian, and has made no move on the major benchmarks that the U.S. set out at the beginning of the surge. Besides paying salaries, the government has very little effect outside of the Green Zone in Baghdad. Because there is no one to replace Maliki was able to stay in office.
A map of Irqa???s many tribes. In rural areas they are still the main power brokers and the U.S. has attempted to work with both Sunni and Shiite ones to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Shiite Mahdi Army. In Anbar, the policy has been most successful because the tribes decided to turn on the Islamists themselves, in the other provinces the results have been more mixed with American money playing the main factor in whether tribes cooperate or not.
In the surrounding provinces the situation isn???t as good. The surge has forced many insurgents into these areas, especially north of Baghdad such as Salahaddin, Diyala, and Ninawa. In response the U.S. has tried to expand its Sunni policy to these areas, and was hoping that Shiite tribes would also join. The results have been mixed. In Anbar there is one major tribe, but in other provinces such as Salahaddin there are up to 30 different, not all of which are cooperating with the U.S. The provinces are also largely mixed Sunni-Shiite so Sunnis not only face the threat of Al Qaeda in Iraq, but also Shiite militias, which gives them an extra incentive to keep fighting to protect their areas from their rivals. Shiites have also not found much reason to work with the U.S. yet. Cooperation from the tribes is also being bought with American money rather than out of any sense of loyalty. U.S. forces have also concentrated military operations in Diyala. The Iraqi government has been very afraid of the spread of the tribal policy, refusing to accept many of the tribesmen into the security forces. The existing police and army are also largely Shiite controlled and linked to militias. As a result, fighting is still intense north of Baghdad, but not at the previous levels.
T he U.S. has concentrated its military operations in Diyala province to clear out insurgents that relocated there during the surge.
The economy of the central Iraqi provinces is also mixed depending upon the security situation. Businesses in Baghdad are just beginning to re-open with the improved security, but overall it still has high unemployment and a crippled economy. In contrast, in Diyala security is good in the north so the economy is finally growing, but there is still fighting in the south so there is little economic activity. Baghdad is also having problems spending its budget. In fact, it is still spend its 2006 budget despite it being the end of 2007. Corruption amongst the various ministries is also rampant and goes unpunished, hampering any kind of real economic development for all but Kurdistan. The increasing regionalization of Iraq also means that Baghdad has no control over its electricity production. Many provinces deny Baghdad its share of power and keep it for themselves. The government and provinces overall have also been unable to take responsibility for many of the U.S. reconstruction projects because they lack the money and expertise. That leaves the U.S. to continue to run them even though they don???t want to or for the projects to simply fall apart.
Western Iraq
13. Anbar
Anbar has been the scene of the most dramatic transformation in Iraq in 2007. Beginning in September 2006 the main Sunni tribe turned against Al Qaeda in Iraq for a number of reasons ranging from blood feuds to rejecting their strict form of Islam. As a result Anbar went from one of the deadliest areas in Iraq to one of the safest. There are still occasional attacks such as when the leading Sunni sheikh was assassinated by Al Qaeda in Iraq, but they are in the dozens rather than the hundreds. Cooperating with the U.S. has also given the Sunnis power and respect, things that originally inspired the insurgency. The Anbar tribes are even trying to expand their influence to Baghdad. The tribes recently asked Prime Minister Maliki if they could take over the positions in the cabinet being boycotted by the Sunni parties. Baghdad has also integrated some of the Sunnis into the security forces and seems to be reluctantly accepting the tribes??? new found position because it is away from the center of Shiite power in central and southern Iraq.
In March Prime Minister Maliki met with the tribal leaders of the Anbar Awakening that had turned against Al Qaeda in Iraq beginning in September 2006. Since then Baghdad and Anbar have worked out a rough truce.
Although major cities such as Ramadi and Fallujah are still destroyed due to past fighting, the economy is seeing a mild come back fueled by American reconstruction funds. The tribes that the U.S. are working with are also thoroughly corrupt and are taking large sums of money in bribes and graft from the projects.
Ramadi is the provincial capital of Anbar province. It still lays in ruins after repeated fighting between the U.S. and insurgents. A sign of the rough times ahead to rebuild the economy of western Iran.
Southern Iraq
5. Maysan
6. Basra
7. Dhi Qar
8. Muthanna
9. Qadisiyyah
11. Karbala
12. Najaf
Southern Iraq is mostly Shiite and has become the new center of tension. In most of the region, Sadr and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) are vying for control. In Basra, Iraq???s second largest city and home to most of the oil industry, the Fadhila party and several other smaller Shiite parties are also involved. There are armed clashes off and on throughout the region, especially in Basra, Karbala and Najaf along with assassinations such as the provincial governors of Qadisiyyah and Muthanna, and several aides to grand Ayatollah Sistani. The Mahdi Army is also trying to impose their version of Islamic law in many areas such as Basra. Militiamen for example, have attacked dozens of women in the city for not wearing hard scarves.
Mahdi Army members marching through Basra, Iraq???s second largest city and center of the oil industry. Sadrists are competing with the SIIC, Fadhila and several other smaller Shiite parties for control of the city. When the British withdrew in the fall, they were forced to sign a cease-fire with the Mahdi Army so that they were not attacked.
After a deadly clash in Augsut 2007 between the Mahdi Army and security forces controlled by the SIIC in Karbala, Sadr announced the second stand down by his militia in 2007. The result was a marked decrease in violence, especially in Baghdad.
Karbala is one of the holiest cities for the Shiites. Besides being one of the mainstays of the South???s economy drawing in thousands of religious tourists, especially from neighboring Iran each year, it has also seen fierce battles between the SIIC and Sadrists.
The economy in the south is also stagnant to falling apart. Besides Basra, which is the major oil port for Iraq, the other provinces rely mostly on subsistence farming and religious tourism. The south thus has the highest unemployment rate in the country ranging from 40-60%. Because of the oil, Basra is also one of the most corrupt cities in Iraq with the different political parties each stealing portions of the oil to fund themselves.
There is very little U.S. presence in the South and the British who were given control of the area have mostly withdrawn to a single airport outside of Basra. American Provincial Reconstruction Teams are suppose to be working in the area, but because of the clashes between rival Shiites, they rarely leave their offices and are basically ineffective.
Conclusion[/b]
Because of the changes in Iraq in 2007, you can longer speak of one conflict in the country. Rather there are different issues in each area. The north is the most safe and has the best economy. Its success is inspiring Kurds in Turkey and Iran that have increased tensions with those countries. The West is just beginning to stabilize and is taking the first steps towards accommodation with Baghdad. Central Iraq is mixed with the capital being more secure, but the insurgency and fighting having been pushed north. Southern Iraq is tense with inter-Shiite rivalries. The result is that while security has improved overall, there are now multiple problems with no apparent policy by the Americans nor willingness or ability by the government to address them. It will take political deals throughout Iraq to solve these problems something the U.S. has not been able to accomplish yet with the surge, and might prove more difficult once it ends in 2008. Either way, the U.S. will continue its involvement in the country for years, probably decades even under a new administration because Iraq has proven to be so difficult and ever changing.
Bibliography[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Christoff, Joseph, ???Security, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq GAO Audis and Key Oversight Issues Testimony Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, U.S. House of Representatives,??? Government Accountability Office, 10/30/07
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? September 2007
Government Accountability Office, ???Stabilizing And Rebuildin g Iraq U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,??? October 2007
Katzman, Kenneth, ???Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks,??? Congressional Research Service, 8/10/07
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq???s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,??? 7/30/07
- ???Quarterly Report To The United States Congress,??? 10/30/07
Walker, David, ???Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,??? Government Accountability Office, 9/4/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Borden, Anthony, ???Iraqi Governance Report,??? Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Bruno, Greg, ???Iraq Security Statistics,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 9/12/07
Cordesman, Anthony, ???America???s Last Chance in Iraq: Changing US Strategy to Meet Iraq???s Real Needs,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/4/07
- ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
- ???Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07
- ???The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/6/07
Institute For War & Peace Reporting, ???Battling for Power in Basra,??? 8/7/07
Korb, Lawrence Biddle, Stephen, ???Violence by the Numbers in Iraq: Sound Data or Shaky Statistics???? Council on Foreign Relations, 9/25/07
Ross, Dennis, ???Stagecraft, Not Statecraft: Diagnosing Bush???s Failure in Iraq,??? Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10/22/07
News Reports[/b]
Ali, Ahmed, ???IRAQ: Sectarianism Splits Security in Diyala,??? Inter Press Service, 8/7/07
Allan, Hannah, ???Iraqi insurgency taking cut of U.S. rebuilding money,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/27/07
Arsu, Sebnem and Tavernise, Sabrina, ???Turkey Authorizes Troops to Enter Iraq to Fight Rebels,??? New York Times, 10/10/07
Attewill, Fred, and agencies, ???Iraq bombs death toll rises to 400,??? Guardian Unlimited, 8/16/07
Azzaman, ???Surge reported in number of internally displaced Iraqis,??? 11/6/07
Bergen, Peter & Cruickshank, Paul, ???Al Qaeda in Iraq: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,??? Mother Jones, 10/18/07
Bing, West, ???Will the Petraeus Strategy Be the Last???? Atlantic.com, 9/17/07
Calvan, Bobby Caina and Taha, Yaseen, ???Maliki can???t stop PKK attacks, officials say,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 10/24/07
Cave, Damien, ???4 Truck Bombs Kill 190 in Kurdish Area of Iraq,??? New York Times, 8/15/07
- ???Iraqi Factions??? Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress,??? New York Times, 8/25/07
Cave, Damien, and Farrell, Stephen, ???At Street Level, Unmet Goals of Troop Buildup,??? New York Times, 9/9/07
Cloud, David, ???American and Iraqi Forces Control Half of Baghdad,??? New York Times, 9/22/07
Curtis, Kim, ???Ramadi War Zone Now Rare Bright Spot,??? Washington Post, 10/28/07
Dagher, Sam, ???As British troops exit Basra, Shiites vie to fill power vacuum,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/17/07
- ???Trouble grows in Iraq???s Shiite south,??? Christian Science Monitor, 8/13/07
- ???U.S., Iran dial down tensions in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/7/07
- ???Will ???armloads??? of US cash buy tribal loyalty???? Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/07
Daragahi, Borzou, ???Kurdish dreams find a foothold in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 10/13/07
- ???Security may trump ethnicity in Kirkuk,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/28/07
Dehghanpisheh, Babak and Kaplow, Larry, ???As Sunnis Flee, Shiites Now Dominate Baghdad,??? Newsweek, 9/10/07
DeYoung, Karen and Ricks, Thomas, ???As British Leave, Basra Deteriorates,??? Washington Post, 8/7/07
Dreazen, Yochi and Shishking, Philip and Jaffe, Greg, ???U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/4/07
Economist, ???Is the surge going to fizzle???? 6/21/07
Evans, Dominic, ???Sunni recruits to police volatile Abu Ghraib,??? Reuters, 9/25/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Despite violence drop, officers see bleak future for Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/15/07
- ???Security in Iraq still elusive,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/7/07
Farrell, Stephen, ???50 Die in Fight Between Shiite Groups in Karbala,??? New York Times, 8/29/07
- ???Governor of Iraqi Province Assassinated,??? New York Times, 8/21/07
Fletcher, Michael, ???Iraq Oil Deal Gets Everybody???s Attention,??? Washington Post, 9/24/07
Fletcher, Michael and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Bush, Advisers Make Surprise Visit to Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/3/07
- ???In Iraq, Bush Cites Gains,??? Washington Post, 9/4/07
Fresh Air, ???'Fiasco' Author Reports On the Petraeus Report,??? NPR, 9/12/07
Gamel, Kim, ???U.S. Expands Anbar Model to Iraq Shiites,??? Associated Press, 9/16/07
Glanz, James, ???Compromise on Oil Law in Iraq Seems to Be Collapsing,??? New York Times, 9/13/07
- ???Provinces Use Rebuilding Money in Iraq,??? New York Times, 10/1/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
- ???Militias Seizing Control of Iraqi Electricity Grid,??? New York Times, 8/23/07
- ???More Iraqis Said to Flee Since Troop Increase,??? New York Times, 8/24/07
Glanz, James and Rubin, Alissa, ???Future Look of Iraq Complicated by Internal Migration,??? New York Times, 9/19/07
Gordon, Michael, ???The Former-Insurgent-Counterinsurgency,??? New York times, 9/2/07
- ???Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,??? New York Times, 10/28/07
- ???Sunnis Say Baghdad Hampers Anbar Gains,??? New York Times, 11/3/07
Greenwell, Megan, ???Villagers Battle Insurgents After Attack on Sheik Near Baqubah,??? Washington Post, 8/24/07
Hendawi, Hamza, ???Brittle Bond: Iraqi Sheik Joins US Fight,??? Washington Post, 10/12/07
- ???Two More Al-Sistani Aides Killed,??? Associated Press, 9/21/07
Howard, Michael, ???The struggle for Iraq???s oil flares up as Kurds open doors to foreign investors,??? Guardian, 8/7/07
Hurst, Steven, ???Thousands Return to Safer Iraqi Capital,??? Associated Press, 11/4/07
- ???Violence lessens in Baghdad as it grows elsewhere,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/26/07
IraqSlogger.com, ???Iraq Papers Mon: Crisis in Karbala,??? 11/4/07
- ???Iraq Papers Monday: ???Tribal??? Ministers???? 11/11/07
- ???Iraq Papers Thur: Karbala Blockaded,??? 10/24/07
- ???Iraq Papers Thur: Splits in Karbala???s Police,??? 11/14/07
Kahl, Colin, Brimley, Shawn, ???The Sorcerer???s Apprentice,??? Foreign Policy, September 2007
Kaplow, Larry, ???Iraq Blackouts Get Worse, Fuel Anger,??? Newsweek, 8/22/07
Kilcullen, Dave, ???Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,??? Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07
Klein, Joe, ???The Next War in Iraq,??? Time, 9/3/07
Lubold, Gordon, ???A quieter Anbar Province rebuilds,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/5/07
- ???Anbar streets illustrate Petraeus???s testimony,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/12/07
- ???U.S. takes Anbar model to Iraq Shiites,??? Christian Science Monitor, 10/2/07
Mortenson, Darrin, ???America???s New Shi???a Allies,??? Time, 10/12/07
Oppel, Richard, ???In Iraq, Conflict Simmers on a 2nd Kurdish Front,??? New York Times, 10/23/07
- ???Quieter Fallujah fears U.S. exit,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/19/07
Paley, Amit, ???Maliki Intends to Lift Curfew in Baghdad,??? Washington Post, 11/13/07
Parker, Ned, ???Iraqi civilian deaths plunge,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/1/07
- ???U.S. seeks pact with Shiite militia,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/12/07
Partlow, Joshua, ??????I Don???t Think This Place Is Worth Another Soldier???s Life,?????? Washington Post, 10/27/07
- ???Shelling Near Iranian Border Is Forcing Iraqi Kurds to Flee,??? Washington Post, 9/13/07
- ???Singing Up Sunnis With ???Insurgent??? on Their Resumes,??? Washington Post, 9/4/07
- ???Top Iraqis Pull Back From Key U.S. Goal,??? Washington Post, 10/8/07
Partlow, Joshua and Sarhan, Saad, ???Sadr Orders ???Freeze??? on Militia Actions,??? Washington Post, 8/30/07
Reid, Robert, ???Progress Slow As Iraqi Politics in Flux,??? Associated Press, 9/16/07
Reuters, ???Kurdish Rebels Kill 13 Soldiers on Turkish Border With Iraq,??? New York Times, 10/8/07
Ricks, Thomas, ???Iraqis Wasting An Opportunity, U.S. Officers Say,??? Washington Post, 11/15/07
Rubin, Alissa, ???Blaming Politics, Iraqi Antigraft Official Vows to Quit,??? New York Times, 9/7/07
Rubin, Alissa and Cave, Damien, ???Envoy???s Upbeat Tone Glosses Over Baghdad???s Turmoil,??? New York Times, 9/11/07
Salaheddin, Sinan, ???Iraq frees 500 from detention camp,??? Associated Press, 11/8/07
Schneider, Howard and Wright, Robin, ???Sheik Risha Killed in Bomb Attack in Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/13/07
Schoof, Renee, ???Iraqi judge: Corruption undermines Iraq???s future,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 10/4/07
Sly, Liz, ???Oil-rich Kirkuk a thorny issue for Kurds,??? Chicago Tribune, 8/19/07
Strobel, Warren, ???Former envoy: U.S. driving Turkey, Iran together,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/1/07
Sudarsan, Raghavan, ???No Relief From Fear,??? Washington Post, 9/5/07
Susman, Tina, ???Looking to Anbar for Iraq???s future,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/10/07
Tarabay, Jamie, ???Anbar Alliance May Not Translate to Other Provinces,??? All Things Considered ??? National Public Radio, 9/25/07
Tavernise, Sabrina, ???In the Rugged North of Iraq, Kurdish Rebels Flout Turkey,??? Washington Post, 10/29/07
Today???s Zaman, ???Turkey plans long stay in northern Iraq,??? 10/15/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Iraq Is Criticized for Slow Hire of Police,??? Washington Post, 10/27/07
- ???Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,??? Washington Post, 8/9/07
- ???Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,??? Washington Post, 9/30/07
Wright, Robin and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Iraqi official: Iran supplying arms to insurgents attacking U.S. forces,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 10/6/07
Youssef, Nancy, ???Baghdad violence, U.S. deaths hit new lows for year,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 10/31/07
- ???U.S. finds a way to pacify Iraqi town ??? by using cash,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/12/07
Zaman, Az, ???Iraqi Papers Sat: Front of the ???Moderates,?????? IraqSlogger.com, 8/17/07
Zavis, Alexandra, ???U.S. courts sheiks in Hussein terrain,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/14/07
2007 has been a bell weather year for Iraq. The second half of the year was the first time things did not get worse in the country. The main causes were interrelated, the end of the battle for Baghdad and the American surge. These two events made Iraqis realize that the Shiites had beaten the Sunnis for control of the country, and that the Americans would be in Iraq for the long haul. As a result, Iraqis began thinking about their future in different ways. There seemed to be a growing trend towards a patchwork solution to Iraq???s problems that would allow for co-existence among the different groups and factions.
Background to Iraq???s Politics[/b]
Iraq has no democratic tradition. The two Iraqi elections were given before institutions and parties were really able to form in the country, and only resulted in sectarian groups taking over the government. The Shiites and Kurds who came to power saw things in zero sum terms, and had a history of being oppressed. As a result, one of their main concerns was to ensure that the Sunnis could never come back to power. That has been the main reason why there has been no political reconciliation, even with the surge decreasing violence in the country. In 2007 however, the first signs of change in attitudes began to emerge.
Changing Attitudes[/b]
The major causes of this change centered around Baghdad. The city went from a Sunni majority to a Shiite one in 2006. At the same time, the American surge started and solidified the Shiite gains. Sunnis in the city began working with the Americans as much as because they had grown sick of Al Qaeda in Iraq as to ensure that they weren???t completely kicked out of the city by Shiite militias. Statements by General Petraeus, Defense Secretary Gates, and other American politicians, also made Iraqis realize that rather than Americans exiting after the surge, they would be in the country for years, long past the presidency of George Bush.
Together these made Iraqis think differently. First, the Sunnis gave up on their idea of ever returning to power in Iraq. They were thoroughly defeated in Baghdad, being pushed out of central Iraq, and isolated in Anbar province. Conversely, the victors, the Shiites and Kurds, took the first steps towards being able to live with their former enemies the Sunnis. When Sunnis started working with Americans, the Shiites and Kurds were alarmed that they were simply arming them for a future civil war. American statements, however made Iraqi politicians think that the Americans would be around to police these newly formed Sunni units rather than leaving them to fight another day. The result is that the first signs of actual accommodation are being seen in Iraq.
The Baghdad government has grudgingly started to incorporate some of the Sunni groups into the regular security forces. The Americans still pay most of their salaries, but the government might eventually take over this job. Prime Minister Maliki also met with Sunni tribal leaders and said they might accept candidates from Anbar to replace the Sunni politicians that have been boycotting the cabinet for months now. The U.S. has also been able to forge some cease-fires in the capital between Sunnis and the Mahdi Army. This might all lead to an Iraqi model of co-existence, similar to Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Kurdish Example[/b]
Kurdistan is ruled by two Kurdish parties the Patriot Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The two were bitter rivals for years that often fought each other as much as they fought Saddam. Before the U.S. invasion they came to an agreement to divide Kurdistan into two regions, with each side gaining control of one part. The lack of democratic principals and zero sum thinking meant that the two could not agree to one party ruling the other with protections for the ruled. Rather they both had to have power. That might be the model for the future of Iraq.
A Patchwork Model For Iraq[/b]
This means Iraq will not have a western federal system of government, or even the soft partition model advocated by some such as Senator Biden. Instead, Iraq could become a patchwork of semi-autonomous communities and provinces divided up amongst the main armed factions. This could lead to Sunni tribal control of Anbar, a Shiite dominated Baghdad with Sunni enclaves, a patchwork of Sunni and Shiite majority towns in the central region surrounding the capital, a Shiite south divided up between the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Sadrists, and in Basra, the Fadhila Party, and of course, a Kurdistan autonomous region in the north.
This also means that Iraq will not be quite democratic either. Instead, it might turn out to be something like turn of the century America during the Gilded Age. That period was marked by party bosses that were responsible to their local communities and parties, doling out patronage and favors while enriching themselves through graft in the process. Deals were usually made between bosses behind closed doors that determined elections and decisions before they were made public. Iraq???s major political parties already act something like this. Under the patchwork version of Iraq, the number of bosses would expand tremendously with one from each community and region, forcing them to come to agreements with each other to co-exist to gain money, jobs, positions, etc. for their followers.
The American Role[/b]
The U.S. has played an ambiguous role in these developments. The surge has helped this process along in central and western Iraq by creating new power bases amongst Sunnis. The Americans have also brought the government kicking and screaming to the table to accept this new policy. U.S. plans don???t go much farther than getting Sunnis accepted into the security forces however. What comes next has not been really thought out. The U.S. also has no real plans for the Kurdish north and Shiite south other than to leave them to their own devices. General Petraeus said as much during his September testimony to Congress when he said the South would have an Iraqi solution, meaning the U.S. didn???t really have a role to play there. The U.S. also has a bad tendency to only think about its own needs and apply American solutions to Iraqi problems. That could impede the Iraqis and only draw out the process longer than needs be.
Conclusion[/b]
This will not be a short, nor easy, nor peaceful process anyways. Fighting will occur such as the armed clashes between Sadrists and the SIIC in the south, but it will be far below the all out sectarian war that broke out in 2006. These changes are only just the beginning, and will take years as Iraqis figure out a formula that will allow them to live together again. Reverses will probably be made, and American forces will be in Iraq for years trying to act as a referee between the different groups. These are the first signs of progress in Iraq since the U.S. invasion however. Hopefully they will lead to co-existence, and eventually reconciliation in the future. Whether these changes have staying power will be shown soon, as U.S. troops begin drawing down in December.
Bibliography[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Christoff, Joseph, ???Security, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq GAO Audis and Key Oversight Issues Testimony Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, U.S. House of Representatives,??? Government Accountability Office, 10/30/07
Government Accountability Office, ???Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,??? October 2007
Mathews, Jessica, ???The Situation in Iraq,??? House Armed Services Committee, 7/18/07
White House, ???Benchmark Assessment Report,??? 9/14/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
br />Cordesman, Anthony, ???America???s Last Chance in Iraq: Changing US Strategy to Meet Iraq???s Real Needs,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/4/07
- ???Pandora???s Box: Iraqi Federalism, Separatism, ???Hard??? Partitioning, and US Policy,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10/9/07
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Biddle: Security, Political Improvements Seen in Iraq in Recent Months,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 11/15/07
Ross, Dennis, ???Stagecraft, Not Statecraft: Diagnosing Bush???s Failure in Iraq,??? Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10/22/07
Simon, Steven, ???Prepared testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 7/17/07
News Reports[/b]
Associated Press, ???Shiite visits Sunni Anbar region,??? USA Today, 10/15/07
- ???Top Democratic candidates won???t vow full Iraq pullout by 2013,??? 9/27/07
Burns, Robert, ???What happens after ???surge??? over is key,??? Associated Press, 9/7/07
Cave, Damien, ???Iraqi Factions??? Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress,??? New York Times, 8/25/07
Clawson, Patrick, ???Iraq???s Future: A Concept Paper,??? Middle East Review of International Affairs, June 2006
Dagher, Sam, ???Will ???armloads??? of US cash buy tribal loyalty???? Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/07
Dehghanpisheh, Babak and Kaplow, Larry, ???As Sunnis Flee, Shiites Now Dominate Baghdad,??? Newsweek, 9/10/07
Diwani, Abeer, ???Sunni, Shiite tribes unite to fight Qaeda,??? Azzaman, 11/7/07
Dreazen, Yochi and Shishking, Philip and Jaffe, Greg, ???U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/4/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Embattled Baghdad shows signs of hope,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/13/07
Foreign Policy, ???Seven Questions: Phebe Marr on the End Game in Iraq,??? November 2007
Fresh Air, ???'Fiasco??? Author Reports On the Petraeus Report,??? NPR, 9/12/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Jaffe, Greg, ???Gates Crafts Long-Term Iraq Plan, With Limited Role for U.S. Forces,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/19/07
Kahl, Colin, Brimley, Shawn, ???The Sorcerer???s Apprentice,??? Foreign Policy, September 2007
Kilcullen, Dave, ???Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,??? Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07
Mannion, Jim, ???Gates hopes for Iraq drawdown to 100,000 troops by end of 2008,??? Agence France Presse, 9/14/07
Murray, Shailagh, ???After Iraq Trip, Unshaken resolve,??? Washington Post, 8/26/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Top Iraqis Pull Back From Key U.S. Goal,??? Washington Post, 10/8/07
Partlow, Joshua and Paley, Amit, ???Maliki Renews Call to Give Some Insurgents Amnesty,??? Washington Post, 11/12/07
Pollack, Kenneth, ???The Seven Deadly Sins Of Failure In Iraq: A Retrospective Analysis Of The Reconstruction,??? Middle East Review of International Affairs, December, 2006
Ricks, Thomas, ???For a Democrat, Options in Iraq Could Be Few,??? Washington Post, 9/29/07
- ???Iraqis Wasting An Opportunity, U.S. Officers Say,??? Washington Post, 11/15/07
Sennott, Charles, ???Q&A with General David Petraeus,??? Boston Globe, 9/7/07
Shishkin, Philip, ???In Baghdad Neighborhood, A Tale of Shifting Fortunes,??? Wall Street Journal, 10/31/07
Tarabay, Jamie, ???Sunni Tribal Leaders Demand Government Support,??? All Things Considered NPR, 11/13/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,??? Washington Post, 8/9/07
- ???Tribal Members Join in Effort To Assist U.S., Iraqi Forces,??? Washington Post, 9/30/07
Cave, Damien, ???Pressure for Results: The Politics of Tallying the Number of Iraqis Who Return Home,??? New York Times, 11/26/07[/b]
- Iraqi government counting every Iraqi crossing border as a returning refugee
- Spokesman from Ministry of displacement and migration said they weren???t asking anyone that crossed the border whether they were refugees or not, just counted everyone
- ???We didn???t ask them if they were displaced and neither did the Interior Minstry.??? Spokesman for Ministry of Displacement and Migration
- Counted Iraqi New York Times employee that visited relatives in Syria and then came home
- Included three suspected insurgents who were arrested that police said had gone to Syria and then crossed back into Iraq
- November, Iraqi general said 46,030 refugees had returned in October
- Minister of Displacement and Migraiton said 1,600 returning every day
- In comparison Iraqi travel agencies and drivers said 50 families coming from Syria a day
- November saw a decline as well according to agencies and drivers
- Iraqi government playing politics with numbers because trying to inflate them as sign of progress
- UN survey from November of 110 families that returned said 46% coming back because out of money, 25% because Syria tightening visa rules, only 14% said because security better
- Many returnees didn???t go back to their homes either. Going to area that is their sect, continuing segregation of Baghdad
- Iraqi government tyring to encourage people to return, paying for buses from Syria
- 28,017 Iraqis newly displaced internally in October according to UN
The fate of Iraq???s displaced is the newest political football in Iraq. The U.S. military and Iraqi government pointed to the return of Iraqi refugees as a sign that security was improving and that the surge was working. Humanitarian organizations questioned the numbers and why Iraqis were coming back. By December however, all three were telling Iraqi refugees to not come back to Iraq because they could not be taken care of and could cause more problems than solve.
Early Reports ???[/b]
The initial reports about Iraq???s displaced were overly optimistic. When the surge first started in early 2007 both the U.S. military and Iraqi government claimed that some Iraqis had returned to their homes in Baghdad. By May the U.S. was claiming that it had stopped the internal displacement of Iraqis, while in November the Iraqi government claimed that 46,000 had come back from Syria, and 60,000 refugees and internally displaced had registered to be repatriated to Baghdad. At the end of November the government even set up a special convoy of buses to pick up Iraqis in Syria and bring them back to Baghdad, offering them $800 a piece.
Iraqis returning from Syria to Baghdad
In comparison, humanitarian groups like the Iraqi Red Crescent and U.N. International Organization for Migration claimed that the number of refugees actually increased during the surge from 499,000 in February 2007 to 1.1 million by August, while the internally displaced went up to 2.3 million, a 16% increase from August to October. 69% came from Baghdad, the center of the new U.S. military plan. In a poll by the U.N. 63% said that they had fled because they feared for their lives, while 25% said they had been forced out of their homes in ethnic cleansing. Many of those from Baghdad either left for another neighborhood or exited the capital all together, either to be with relatives, an internally displaced camp, or to another country. Many of those that left Baghdad also returned more than once to the city in search of jobs.
Iraqis at a camp for the displaced
??? Compared To The Later Ones[/b]
Later reports said that Iraqis were coming home, but at much lower numbers than originally claimed. At the end of November the New York Times broke the story that the Maliki government was exaggerating the rate of return for Iraqi refugees. Their number of 46,000 coming back from Syria was actually the total number of Iraqis that had crossed the border whether for business, pleasure, visits, returning refugees, or in one case, insurgents. The Iraqi Red Crescent said that perhaps 25,000-28,000 Iraqis returned from Syria between September and November. Aid groups estimated that around 60,000 Iraqis in total had returned from all Arab countries, but was still only 2.4%. The Red Crescent also reported the first drop in internally displaced with around 110,000 going home in October, a 4.8% drop, but the total still numbered over 2.1 million.
Causes[/b]
At first, the U.S. military and Iraqi government were quick to jump on the displaced issue to claim that security was improving and that the government was making progress. The government was also offering money to help out those who came back to Iraq from other countries, although it averaged out to only about $6 per person. Newspaper reports and polls conducted by humanitarian groups however, found a variety of reasons why Iraqi refugees were returning ranging from running out of money, being unable to find work, countries tightening their visa rules, and also the new security situation. A UN survey of 110 families that had come back found that 46% returned because they were out of money, 25% said it was because Syria had tightened visa rules, while 14% said it was because of better security. Many of the Iraqis that had gone to other countries were middle class professionals who had the money to leave. Their savings however eventually ran out. Many neighboring countries, worried that the Iraqis would end up staying for good, also placed restrictions on them. Syria for example, denied Iraqis work, charged them $50 for each family member, and limited the number of visas issued and the method to acquire one in October, just as the first reports of returnees began.
Potential Problems[/b]
By the end of November the U.S. military and Iraqi government were changing their tune. The U.S. was increasingly concerned about the lack of any plans by Prime Minister Maliki to take care of the returned. Besides questioning whether they could provide the displaced with services and finding them work, the most pressing issue was the fact that many had their homes taken over by insurgents or militias, who in turn sold or rented them out to people of their own sect. Many neighborhoods had thus been ethnically cleansed going from mixed Sunni-Shiite, to being dominated by just one group. The U.S. was afraid that if the displaced asked for their homes back it could set off a new wave violence. One U.S. officer told the New York Times that he hoped that the Iraqi government would build new homes for the refugees to solve the problem. Many others however, were worried that the government would never come through. Foreign and private money for refugees is also running out, although the U.N. did just promise $11 million to help with the aid packages for around 30,000 returnees. Ultimately, many in the U.S. are worried that they will be left with the job because the Iraqis are simply overtaxed and too incompetent to do it themselves.
The growing concerns about Iraq???s displaced led the U.N. High Commission for Refugees in mid-November to ask that Iraqis not return home yet. By the next month, Maliki???s government and the U.S. military were saying the same thing.
Conclusion[/b]
A variety of push and pull factors are causing Iraqis to begin to return to their homes at the end of 2007. This will have repercussions throughout the country. First, the government is not prepared for this influx as it already struggles to provide basic services to people, and has not come through with its previous promises to the displaced. Fears of renewed violence are probably not going to be fulfilled however. In Baghdad, the majority of those coming back are ending up in segregated neighborhoods of their own sect rather than trying to claim back their old homes, which are now controlled by insurgents and militias. If all the displaced are to return, it will require a massive building program to house them all. That means in the short-term aid groups will have to care for them, but the main bill will probably end up with the U.S. military who will have to add yet another job to their growing list of responsibilities.
Where Have They Come From? Where Have They Gone?[/b]
Where They???ve Come From:
68% from Baghdad, 15% from Diyala, 6% from Anbar, 4% from Salah al-Din, 2% from Basrah, 2% from Ninewa, 1% from Babylon, 1% from Tameem, 1% from Thi-Qar, 1% from Wassit, Unknown for Erbil, Kerbala, Qadissiya, Muthanna
Map of Iraq???s internally displaced by province
Where Have They Gone:
1.5 million ??? Syria
750-500,000 ??? Jordan
200,000 Saudi Arabia
100-80,000 ??? Egypt
57,000 - Iran
40,000 - Lebanon
10,000 ??? Turkey
2,000 ??? Gulf States
Map of Iraqi refugees, where they???ve gone and how many
Sources[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report To Th e United States Congress,??? 10/30/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Bruno, Greg, ???Refugees Return but Concerns Linger,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 11/20/07
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
News Sources[/b]
Agence France Presse, ???First drop in Iraq???s internally displaced: Red Crescent,??? 12/5/07
Al Jazeera.Net, ???Returning Iraqis pose new challenge,??? 12/6/07
Allam, Hannah, ???Baghdad may be safer, but few Iraqis in Syria risk returning,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 12/5/07
Azzaman, ???Surge reported in number of internally displaced Iraqis,??? 11/6/07
Cave, Damien, ???Pressure for Results: The Politics of Tallying the Number of Iraqis Who Return Home,??? New York Times, 11/26/07
Cave, Damien and Rubin, Alissa, ???Baghdad???s Weary Start to Exhale as Security Improves,??? New York Times, 11/20/07
Dagher, Sam, ???Aid shrinks as Iraq???s internal refugee tally grows,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/30/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Embattled Baghdad shows signs of hope,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/13/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???More Iraqis Said to Flee Since Troop Increase,??? New York Times, 8/24/07
Glanz, James and Rubin, Alissa, ???Future Look of Iraq Complicated by Internal Migration,??? New York Times, 9/19/07
Gordon, Michael and Farrell, Stephen, ???Iraq Lacks Plan on the Retrn of Refugees, Military Says,??? New York Times, 11/30/07
Hurst, Steven, ???Violence lessens in Baghdad as it grows elsewhere,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/26/07
IraqSlogger.com, ???IRCO: 25,000 Refugees back from Syria,??? 12/1/07
Kaplow, Larry, Nordland, Rod, and Spring, Silvia, ???There???s No Place Like ??? Iraq???? Newsweek, 11/24/07
Marshall, Andrew, ???Iraq???s displaced struggle to restart their lives,??? Reuters, 11/15/07
Moubayed, Sami, ???Muqtada moves to stop a Sunni ???surge,?????? Asia Times, 11/15/07
Ricks, Thomas, ???Iraqis Wasting An Opportunity, U.S. Officers Say,??? Washington Post, 11/15/07
Schoof, Renee and Strobel, Warren, ???Report: Surge hasn???t cut attacks on Iraqi civilians,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/4/07
Schulman, Dan, ???U.S. Out of Iraq How?: Interview With Stephen Biddle,??? Mother Jones, 10/18/07
Susman, Tina, ???Troop buildup fails to reconcile Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/4/07
Youssef, Nancy, ???Baghdad refugees happy to be home again,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/20/07
America???s Sunni policy took off in the second half of 2007 during the surge. The U.S. offered money to local Sunnis if they fought against Al Qaeda in Iraq and secured their own areas. The plan quickly spread throughout western and central parts of the country. Although the U.S. adopted one approach fits all, it is actually dealing with many different Sunni groups that offer both problems and opportunities in the future.
Sunni Awakenings and Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs)[/b]
The first break between the insurgency and the Sunni community occurred in 2005. In Anbar, Al Qaeda in Iraq encroached upon one of the major tribe???s smuggling and robbery business. This led to clashes and the eventual formation of the Anbar Salvation Council in September 2006. They were able to forge an alliance with the U.S. in the province later that year, but it took the military command in the Green Zone several months to take note. The U.S. had in fact tried to work with tribes in Anbar and other parts of Iraq before with little effect in the past. General Petraeus was quick to make up for lost time however, and by the summer of 2007 had ordered all U.S. units to develop local Sunni security units called Awakening Councils or Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) where they were operating. The new policy might have come about from the fact that the U.S. was facing high casualty rates early in the surge, and General Petraeus latched onto the Sunnis plan as a way to change things. The new Sunni groups were one of the major causes for the decrease in attacks across the country that began in the fall of 2007.
Map of Awakenings and Concerned Local Citizens groups across Iraq
America???s New Sunni Allies[/b]
The U.S. is working with different types of Sunnis in each part of Iraq. All have the same basic motivation. They want money, guns and power. Some are better organized than others to take advantage of the situation. In Anbar for example, the U.S. is working with large and well-organized Salvation Council. It has its own economic base with tribal businesses, and security forces based upon their tribal fighters. In Baghdad, the Sunnis are almost exclusively ex-insurgents from the 1920 Revolution Brigades and Islamic Army. They have changed sides because of feuds with Al Qaeda in Iraq and the need to preserve their remaining enclaves in Baghdad from the new Shiite majority that won the battle for the capital. Some are Islamists, many are Baathists, and almost all are ex-military. In the provinces around Baghdad, such as Babil, Diyala, Salahaddin, and Ninawa, the U.S. is dealing with a mix of insurgents and tribes. Unlike in Anbar, the tribes here are small and fractured. Some are mixed Sunni-Shiite, while young sheikhs who wish to replace the older generation in their tribes lead others. In Salahaddin province for example, there are at least 30 different tribes, some of which continue to work with the insurgency and oppose the new U.S.-Sunni alliance. Many saw what happened in Anbar and want to receive the same benefits from the U.S.
Map of Iraq???s tribes
Prospects and Perils[/b]
Each Sunni grouping and region offers different prospects and perils for the U.S. and Iraq. Anbar has the greatest chance for lasting change. There the Salvation Council is well organized, and has forged a political plan. They want to replace the Sunni parties not only in the province, but in Baghdad as well. The Council has already joined many of the town councils in Anbar, and is trying to take over the provincial council from the Sunni Islamic Party. The Council has also offered to replace the Sunni ministers that have boycotted Prime Minister Maliki???s cabinet for months now. Because they are removed from Baghdad in Sunni dominated western Iraq, Maliki???s government has been most open to them. There have been meetings with the prime minister and his advisors, as well as the Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council party. The security improvements in Anbar might be sustainable as well because of the blood feud they have with Al Qaeda in Iraq, while thousands of tribesmen have been accepted into the local police by the government. Improved security means reconstruction might begin in an area devastated by fighting. The Council will benefit from this as well because their businesses are getting the majority of American financed reconstruction projects. This follows the pattern of successful counterinsurgency operations in the past where locals turn against the insurgency, security improves, new leaders emerge, and the government is forced to accommodate them.
Central Iraq on the other hand has the most perils. In the short-term there is still the potential for violence to explode in parts of the region. There have been shoot-outs between Awakening groups and Shiite militias and police, as well as claims of ethnic cleansing in Baghdad. The Sunni units are also becoming the new target of insurgents with cooperating sheikhs, clerics and commanders being assassinated, and checkpoints attacked.
More importantly, the U.S. doesn???t intend to employ the Sunni fighters indefinitely. At first, the U.S. hoped that the Iraqi government would eventually integrate these Sunnis into the security forces, but most don???t want to join the largely Shiite force, while the Shiite government doesn???t want the Sunni units in and around Baghdad. The government lacks the resources to deal with new recruits anyways. Together that has meant only about 5% of the 70,000 or so Sunnis have gotten jobs with the government. The new plan emerging is for the U.S. and Iraq to employ these Sunnis in civil reconstruction projects. Again, it is very questionable whether Prime Minister Maliki will come through either with the money or leadership to make this happen.
The lack of jobs is one major cause of the sectarian violence and insurgency in Iraq. What will happen if these fighters rejoin the ranks of the unemployed is a huge concern. The Sunnis in Baghdad are unlikely to return to the all out fighting of late 2006, early 2007 because they would be wiped out by the Shiites. They have already lost the battle for Baghdad and know it. In the rest of central Iraq however there are still high levels of violence and instability. There the Sunnis could very well rejoin the insurgency if things don???t work out for them.
There are long-term problems as well. In the provinces in and around Baghdad the economy is stagnant. Most rely upon farming, which is at subsistence levels. Some small-scale reconstruction projects have begun as the U.S. has expanded the Sunni policy, but with little to no help from Baghdad. The tribes and former insurgent groups tend to be small, unorganized and fractious, meaning there is little hope for a united front to emerge there as it has in Anbar. The U.S. could be just empowering new warlords in a country that is breaking up into local communities and regions, and providing a band-aid for an area that has little hope for economic or political progress. This follows the history of failed counterinsurgency policies where local security improves, but that never leads to any kind of reconciliation or change in the national government that remains weak and unresponsive to its citizens.
Conclusion[/b]
The U.S. once believed that it could shape Iraq into the kind of country it wanted. Years of bloody fighting and failed policies might have finally made the U.S. realize that Iraqis will determine what their country will look like in the future, not the Americans. The Sunni policy is a sign of this change as the U.S. has agreed to work with many of its former enemies and allowed them to create their own security forces. In order to keep this under control and not spiral i nto a new round of Sunni on Shiite fighting, the U.S. most closely police these Sunni units. This will become harder for the Americans as the number of troops goes down to post-surge levels by the summer of 2008. In Anbar and Baghdad, that may not be a problem because the Salvation Council wants to rebuild the local economy and move into the national political arena, while the Sunnis in the capital know that they could be expelled if the Shiites wanted. The provinces around Baghdad are where the real potential flash points exist with many small Sunni groups that face a bleak economic picture that could turn for the worse if they lose their new security jobs. That could be a recipe for renewed violence in areas that are already the most dangerous in the country. Gambling on the Sunni policy has led to tactical gains in the military situation in Iraq, but could still go either way in the more important political sphere in the future.
Selected Overview of Sunni Groups Cooperating With the U.S.[/b]
Anbar Province
Founder of the Anbar Salvation Council Sheikh Abu Risha before his assassination
Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha formed the Anbar Salvation Council in September 2006. His tribe had a growing feud with Al Qaeda in Iraq over control of the smuggling and robbery in the province. Al Qaeda in Iraq ended up killing members of the sheikh???s family, and he in turn created the Anbar Salvation Council to kick out the Islamists. This later led to an alliance with the U.S., and provided the model for the Sunni policy across Iraq. Abu Risha was later killed by insurgents and his brother Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha took over. They have formed a political council in the province, joined local councils and have attempted to negotiate with the Iraqi Islamic Party that dominates the provincial government to gain seats there. The Salvation Council has also met with Pres. Bush, Prime Minister Maliki, his advisors, and the Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, as well as Sunni and Shiite tribes in central Iraq. The alliance with the U.S. has also given them the majority of reconstruction contracts in the province as the Council owns construction and trucking companies. They are by far the best organized and most independent of the Sunni groups that the U.S. is now working with.
Salahaddin Province
The U.S. is attempting to organize the fractious tribes in the province into the Salahaddin Support Council, modeled after the Anbar Salvation Council. The U.S. has organized the tribes into various security units and started funneling reconstruction projects to them. Baghdad has refused to recognize the Council.
Tikrit has been the major base of operation for the U.S. in the province. There, 3,000 tribesmen have been formed into a new security force. The tribes??? sheikh however is a rival to the deputy governor of the province who tried to have him arrested in October 2007. U.S. officers are also weary of the sheikh who they fear may be power hungry and keeping money handed out by the U.S. for himself.
Kirkuk Province
A leading sheikh in Kirkuk accused the U.S. of arresting members of his family that refused to work with the U.S. He accused the U.S. of splitting the tribes in the area and making the security situation worse.
In Hawija, south of Kirkuk, the U.S. has signed up 6,000 Sunnis into security units. They are fighting insurgents that are still active in the city.
Babil Province
In the town of Jurf Al Sakhr the U.S. organized the local tribe that use to work with the Islamic Army, into a security force. The tribe negotiated a cease-fire with the Mahdi Army and Shiite leaders in the neighboring town, and has tried to work with the Shiite controlled provincial government. The U.S. is now attempting to start reconstruction projects using tribe members, and restart civil society in the town. Baghdad has provided nothing to help the situation, and refused to integrate the Sunnis into the security forces. The sheikh has warned that if the money stops flowing, the insurgents will return. The Americans also made him mayor of the town.
Diyala Province
The Sunni Awakening commander in Diyala???s provincial capital of Baquba was a former insurgent leader. In December his force got into a shoot out with Shiite police who tried to arrest him and his driver for kidnapping. In January 2008 the commander was assassinated. There are reports that the group is breaking up into rival factions.
Baghdad
The Ghazaliya Guardians were organized in late summer 2007. Local residents protested their formation at first because they were former insurgents and members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, and Islamists that had imposed strict Islamic law. Shiite police were initially banned from the neighborhood by the Guardians. In December 2007 four of their fighters were killed in a bombing, which they blamed on Shiite militias and a Shiite army unit that were nearby.
The Ameriya Knights has 600 fighters, and is led by a former Islamic Army commander and intelligence officer under Saddam. He claimed to have turned his insurgent group into the Knights. The commander use to work with Al Qaeda in Iraq, but turned against them when they demanded a 25% tax to pay for their operations. Since then, the Knights have taken up police powers in neighborhood even though they don???t have official authority to do so. They do not allow the local Shiite police to enter the area. In turn, the government has not provided any services to the area. The Knights have allowed 70 Shiite families to return to the area.
Jammiya has 300 in its Concerned Local Citizens unit. Early on the group came into conflict with the local Iraqi army unit that ordered them off the streets. The U.S. was able to work out a deal where they would jointly man checkpoints in and out of the neighborhood. Since then the U.S. has tried to rebuild the area with mixed results.
The Sadiyah Guardians were formed in September 2007, led by a former Iraqi general. Shiites claimed that the unit was ethnically cleansing the neighborhood, and the government ordered the Sunnis to remove their checkpoints in November 2007.
The Sunni group in Dora use to have two factions, one of which was a neighborhood militia that was formed to stop ethnic cleansing by Shiites, while the other was made up of insurgents that were once allied with Al Qaeda in Iraq. Early on the two sides fought each other for control of the area. Now the local council has 300 fighters, but the U.S. is watching them closely and broken them up into different groups to try to stave off further clashes. The U.S. has also started small reconstruction projects in the neighborhood. In December the Sunni unit got into a shootout with members of the Mahdi Army.
Fadhil???s Awakening Council is led by a former insurgent and Republican Guard. He too turned his insurgent group into the new Awakening Council. He refuses to work with the Maliki government.
Members of the Lions of Adhamiya
Adhamiya has the 1400 strong Lions of Adhamiya formed in November 2007. Only half of them are paid by the U.S. Many are former Baathists and come from the 1920 Revolution Brigades. Shortly after being organized their leader was arrested and beaten by Shiite police who were going to turn him over to the Mahdi Army before the U.S. got him released. Later the Lions tried to stop an Iraqi Army unit from conducting raids in the neighborhood that led to a shoot out between the two sides. The leader of the Lions claimed that he was controlling his area like Saddam use to, just before he was assassinated in early January 2008.
Bibliography[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Bowen, Stuart, ??? Effectiveness Of The Provincial reconstruction Team Program In Iraq Statement Of Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction Before The United States House Of Representatives Committee On Armed Services Subcommittee On Oversight And Investigations,??? Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, 10/18/07
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? December 2007
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq???s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
- ???Iraqi Force Development: A Progress Report,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/23/07
Francke, Rend Al-Rahim, ???Political Progress in Iraq During the Surge,??? United States Institute of Peace, December 2007
Pollack, Kenneth, ???Apres-Surge: The Next Iraq Debates,??? Brookings Institution, 12/31/07
Articles[/b]
Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith, ???Meet Abu Abed: the US???s new ally against al-Qaida,??? Guardian, 11/10/07
Brooks, Bradley, ???Sunni Fighters Need Political Role,??? Associated Press, 12/23/07
Buckley, Cara, ???U.S. Military Plans to Bolster Iraqi Security Forces by 10,000,??? New York Times, 11/30/07
Cave, Damien, ???Iraqi Factions??? Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress,??? New York Times, 8/25/07
- ???Remains of 40 Found in Mass Grave,??? New York Times, 11/22/07
Christian Science Monitor, ???As violence ebbs, the next hurdle for Iraq is political progress,??? 1/8/08
Crain, Charles, ???Iraq???s New Job Insecurity,??? Time, 12/24/07
Dagher, Sam, ???Will ???armloads??? of US cash buy tribal loyalty???? Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/07
DeYoung, Karen and Pale, Amit, ???U.S. Plans to Form Job Corps For Iraqi Security Volunteers,??? Washington Post, 12/7/07
Diwani, Abeer, ???Sunni, Shiite tribes unite to fight Qaeda,??? Azzaman, 11/7/07
Dreazen, Yochi and Chon, Gina, ???Will the Security Improvements in Iraq Endure???? Wall Street Journal, 12/3/07
Eisenstadt, Lieutenant Colonel Michael, ???Iraq Tribal engagement Lessons Learned,??? Military Review, September-October 2007
Fadel, Leila, ???Security in Iraq still elusive,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/7/07
- ???U.S. sponsorship of Sunni groups worries Iraq???s government,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/28/07
Frayer, Lauren, ???6,000 Sunnis Join Pact With US in Iraq,??? Associated Press, 11/29/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Gordon, Michael, ???The Former-Insurgent-Counterinsurgency,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Greenwall, Megan, ???Blast Injures U.S.-Allied Sunni Cleric,??? Washington Post, 8/12/07
- ???Villagers Battle Insurgents After Attack on Sheik Near Baqubah,??? Washington Post, 8/24/07
IraqSlogger.com, ???Ghazaliya Protests Pro-US Fighters,??? 8/21/07
Kilcullen, Dave, ???Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,??? Small Wars Journal: SWJ Blog, 8/29/07
Looney, Robert, ???Half Full of Half Empty? An Assessment of the Crocker Report on Iraqi Economic Conditions,??? Strategic Insights, December 2007
Michaels, Jim, ???U.S. gamble on sheiks is paying off ??? so far,??? USA Today, 12/26/07
Mohsen, Amer, ???Arab Papers Monday: 2007, Year of the Sahwa,??? IraqSlogger.com, 12/23/07
Mulrine, Anna, ???Quieting Mean Streets,??? U.S. News & World Report, 10/22/07
Nordland, Rod, ???Baghdad Comes Alive,??? Newsweek, 11/17/07
Nouri, Naseer and Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???Bomb Kills Iraqi Police Chief Praised by U.S.,??? Washington Post, 12/10/07
Oppel, Richard and Al-Husaini, ???Suicide Bomber Kills Key Sunni Leader,??? New York Times, 1/8/08
Parker, Ned, ???Iraq calmer, but more divided,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/10/07
- ???Ruthless, shadowy ??? and a U.S. ally,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/22/07
Partlow, Joshua and Sabah, Zaid, ???Iraqi Volunteers Angry Over Bomb Blast,??? Washington Post, 12/23/07
Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???New Leaders Of Sunnis Make Gains In Influence,??? Washington Post, 1/8/08
Ricks, Thomas and DeYoung, Karen, ???For U.S., The Goal Is Now ???Iraqi Solution,?????? Washington Post, 1/10/08
Rubin, Alissa, ???A Calmer Iraq: Fragile and Possibly Fleeting,??? New York Times, 12/4/07
Rubin, Alissa and Cave, Damien, ???In a Force or Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict,??? New York Times, 12/23/07
Sabah, Zaid and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Security Pact on Iraq Would Set U.S. Exit,??? Washington Post, 12/11/07
Salaheddin, Sinan, ???Iraq: Volunteer Militias to Expand,??? Associated Press, 12/5/07
Simmons, Ann, ???In one Iraqi village, a taste of what might be,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/24/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???A Deadly Clash at Donkey Island,??? Washington Post, 8/19/07
- ???Iraq Is Criticized for Slow Hire of Police,??? Washington Post, 10/27/07
Westervelt, Eric, ???Security Situation Uneven Across Baghdad,??? All Things Considered ??? NPR, 11/28/07
Yoshino, Kimi, ???Unrest in Iraq???s Diyala province,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/5/08
Youssef, Nancy, ???U.S. finds a way to pacify Iraqi town ??? by using cash,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 11/12/07
Zavis, Alexandra, ???Sunnis divided in Anbar province,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/3/08
- ???U.S. courts sheiks in Hussein terrain,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/14/07
Still no political reconciliation in Iraq. Still no oil revenue sharing. Still lots of people, including Americans, dying. I say we declare victory and get the fuck out.
On January 12, 2008 Iraq???s parliament voted on a new deBaathification act called the Accountability and Justice Law. While many parliamentarians were absent or boycotted, enough votes were garnered to pass the law, which now goes onto one final body for actual ratification. This is the first of the major legislative benchmarks that Prime Minister Maliki???s government has been able to pass since it came to power in 2006. What effect the law will have is up to debate, and comes at a time of major political maneuverings by the various factions within the government who are vying to either prop up Maliki or have him replaced.
History of the DeBaathificiation Process[/b]
The first major order that Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority issued when it came into existence in 2003 was CPA Order 1 ???The De-Baathification of Iraqi Society??? that banned the top three levels of the party from work within post-Saddam Iraq. The idea was that the old order needed to be swept away as the U.S. did in Germany after World War II with the Nazis. The law however, was never applied evenly or fairly and had an effect far past the top three echelons of Baathists. Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress was put in charge of the DeBaathification committee and used it against not only Baathists but his political opponents as well. While high ranking former Baathists like Ilyad Allawi was able to become the interim prime minister despite the law, up to 150,000 other members of the party lost their jobs in 2003, which became a major cause of the insurgency, made the Sunnis feel that they were being persecuted, and robbed the new Iraqi government and armed forces of officers and professionals. By 2004 the U.S. was attempting to bring back these people to help end the insurgency. As a result, around 102,000 former Baathists found jobs in the government, including 45,000 former soldiers who either got pensions or returned to the security forces.
Ever since Prime Minister Maliki formed his government in 2006 he has promised and been pressured into passing a new DeBaathification law as a sign of reconciliation with the Sunnis. After five promises, a new law was finally introduced in March 2007, and sent to parliament in November. After it was shouted down by law-makers, it was revised, amended and finally voted on in January 2008. Some of the Sunni parties and Sadrists boycotted the event, but the largest Sunni bloc voted in favor of it. As a result, only 143 of 275 politicians were present, showing the great divide over the law. There is still one more step before it gets ratified, and there still might be revisions, but it is now basically assured of passage.
The Political Maneuvers Behind Passage of the New Law[/b]
The main reason why the new law was finally passed after over a year of delay was the changing political coalitions in parliament between supporters and opponents of Maliki. In 2007 Maliki???s government fell apart. Sunni and Shiite cabinet minister boycotted his government, causing his ruling coalition to fall apart, and lawmakers refused to show up to parliament leading to no political movement on anything of consequence. Maliki was forced to align himself with the Kurds and Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) to stay in power. In return Maliki promised the Kurds that they would gain control of the disputed city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq and that he would stave off Turkish attacks upon their zone of the country. Maliki didn???t come through with either promise. That has led the Kurds to threaten to leave Maliki???s coalition, and in turn, pushed them towards the Sunnis looking for new friends and coalitions. In December 2007 for example, the Kurds and Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party formed an alliance. At the same time, the anti-Maliki forces have been coalescing with a grouping of Sadrists, former prime minister Ilyad Allawi???s nationalist Iraqi National List, and the Sunni National Dialogue List joining together to attempt to push Maliki out of office. Maliki???s only source of support outside of his own Dawa Party, that is also divided between friends and foes of the prime minister, is the SIIC that has been calling for the boycotting cabinet ministers to return to government. It too has tried to reach out to Sunnis. It was within this context that the new Accountability and Justice Law was passed to try to appease the Sunnis and have them back Maliki???s faltering political position within the government.
Possible Effects of the New Law[/b]
Within Iraq, the possible effects of the new law are hotly debated. Like the old law, the new one will ban the top 3 levels of the Baath party from jobs within the government. This time however, they will have the opportunity to apply for pensions with a new deBaathification committee. Those denied could also appeal their cases, something that wasn???t allowed under the original law. It???s estimated that 3,500 former Baathists will be ineligible for jobs, but are now open to pensions, while 12,000-30,000 could apply for either. A sticking point in the new legislation is the fact that it says Baathists are banned from jobs in the Interior, Defense, Justice, Finance and Foreign Affairs ministries, the most powerful in the country. Some Iraqi politicians claim that up to 7,000 employees of the Interior Ministry as well as soldiers could lose their jobs as a result. It could also ban many of the Sunni Awakening Councils and Concerned Local Citizens groups from joining the Iraqi security forces because of their backgrounds. Many Sunnis interviewed by American and Iraqi newspapers also said they were still afraid of the Shiite run government. Many Baathists already fled the country after 2003, while others are living in hiding, fearing retribution by Shiites or Kurds.
Conclusion[/b]
In order for the new law to be the first step in reconciliation between the warring sides in Iraq, the deep levels of distrust must be overcome. One of the greatest fears of many Shiites is the return of the Baathists to power, while many Sunnis fear domination by the Shiites. The actual implementation of the law will be what matters, whether it will be used fairly or evenly, or be abused like the former act was. The Maliki government has not had a good record when it comes to sectarian biases, which is not a good starting point for this important law.
SOURCES[/b]
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, ???Iraq Parliament Back: Weighs No Key Laws,??? Associated Press, 9/4/07
Associated Press, ???Former Baathists don???t trust job plan,??? 1/14/08
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
Cole, Juan, ???The war against Iraq???s prime minister,??? Salon.com, 8/29/07
Hurst, Steven, ???Shiite Leaders Urges Outreach to Sunnis,??? Associated Press, 1/11/08
Ibrahim, Waleed, ???Main Iraq Sunni Arab bloc says ready to return to government,??? Reuters, 1/14/07
Karim, Ammar, ???Iraq Shiite and Sunni MPs sign new ???unity??? pact,??? Agence France Presse, 1/13/08
Karouny, Mariam, ???Row mars Iraq parliament hearing on Baathists bill,??? Reuters, 11/25/07
Mardini, Ramzy, ???Implications o the New Kurdish-Sunni Alliance for Security in Iraq???s Ninawa Governorate,??? Jamestown Foundation, 1/14/08
Moore, Solomon, ???Ex-Baathists Get a Break. Or Do They???? New York Times, 1/14/08
Moubayed, Sami, ???Iraq???s Sunnis reclaim lost ground,??? Asia Times, 1/15/08
Oppel, Richard and Myers, Steven Lee, ???Iraq Eases Curb for Former Officials of Hussein???s Party,??? New York Times, 1/13/08
Parker, Ned, ???Hard-line Iraqi clerics group shut down,??? Los Angeles Times, 11/15/07
Partlow, Joshua and Abramowitz, Michael, ???Iraq Passes Bill on Baathists,??? Washington Post, 1/13/08
Senanayake, Sumedha, ? ??Iraq: Will Passage Of New Law Appease Sunnis???? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1/15/08
Walker, David, ???Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,??? Government Accountability Office, 9/4/07
White House, ???Benchmark Assessment Report,??? 9/14/07
Democrats took control of Congress largely over discontent with Iraq. They promised to end the war and bring the troops back. Shortly afterwards President Bush dismissed Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfled, and it seemed like the winds of change were sweeping through the government. However the Democrats split over what to do, and turned to partisan politics as Washington became deadlocked over the war just as it had been before.
Withdrawal Proposals[/b]
In 2007 the Democrats took control over Congress, but with only the slimmest of margins. In the Senate, for example, their lead was just 51-49. Getting a bill passed on withdrawing troops from Iraq was a top priority, but with such a slim majority they needed Republicans to get anything done. Right after the election that seemed possible, as there were plenty of GOP members discontent with war policy as well.
That opportunity was quickly lost. In the Senate, Majority Leader Henry Reid attempted to reach out to Republicans by giving the task of drafting a bill to Republican John Warner. Before he could drum up any support, anti-war Democrats began attacking his proposals, effectively ending debate on it before it even got started. In the House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi gave the job to the head of the House Appropriations Committee Democrat David Obey. There was no attempt to even reach out to Republican Representatives, and that bill faced the same fate as the one in the Senate.
Back To Business As Usual On Iraq[/b]
During the summer there was a new push for bipartisan withdrawal bills, but the Democrats proved too divided to do anything about them. Republicans Richard Lugar, Lamar Alexander, and Warner among others, brought up proposals for partial withdrawals from Iraq, but they went nowhere because the Democrats couldn???t decide on what kind of stance to take on the war. There were some who wanted a complete withdrawal from Iraq, while there were others that argued for a partial withdrawal while maintaining a U.S. presence. There were some that wanted a specific timeline for a pullout, and others that wanted to be more flexible. The result was nothing got done.
Gen. Petraeus??? positive report on the surge to Congress in September put the nail in the coffin on withdrawal bills. By October, the Democrat leadership said they had given up on the subject. At the same time Democrats increasingly turned to blaming Republicans for the failure to pass any legislation and told them they would be defeated in the 2008 elections. The debate on Iraq thus disintegrated back into partisan politics.
Bush In The Driver???s Seat[/b]
Foreign policy is mostly the domain of the president. Rarely can the Congress change direction on foreign issues. At best they can set limits. Even when Democrats took control of Congress they had to play a balancing act to keep their own party unified on the war, while reaching out across the aisle to Republicans to get anything done. The Democrats failed on both counts, and ended up being just like the Republicans they had replaced with their partisan attacks. That has allowed Bush to follow through with his Iraq policies uninhibited, which will continue until he leaves office in 2009.
Sources[/b]
Baker, Peter and Weisman, Jonathan, ???Warner Calls for Pullouts By Winter,??? Washington Post, 8/24/07
Branigin, William, ???Rumsfeld to Step Down as Defense Secretary,??? Washington Post, 11/8/06
Flaherty, Anne, ???Debate on troop withdrawals on hold,??? Associated Press, 10/10/07
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Haas: Petraeus, crocker Blunt Congressional Criticisms on Iraq,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 9/11/07
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Packer, George, ???Interview with Lee Hamilton,??? New Yorker.com, 9/11/07
- ???Planning For Defeat,??? New Yorker, 9/17/07
Stolberg, Sheryl and Mazzetti, Mark, ???Democrats Push for Troop Cuts Within Months,??? New York Times, 11/13/06
Weisman, Jonathan and Murray, Shailagh, ???In GOP, Growing Friction On Iraq,??? Washington Post, 7/11/07