Why is everybody holding their breathe waiting for Petraeus' report. Does anyone believe that he is going to say anything other than the surge is working and that we need to give him more time?
The important thing isn't Petraeus' report, which he isn't going to write anyways the White House is, it's what happens in the Spring of 08 when the surge has to end when troop rotations are up. Will anyone in Congress be able to forge a consensus on Iraq or will Bush just be able to play out his hand until his administration ends? Bush is going to win in this case.
Why is everybody holding their breathe waiting for Petraeus' report. Does anyone believe that he is going to say anything other than the surge is working and that we need to give him more time?
The important thing isn't Petraeus' report, which he isn't going to write anyways the White House is, it's what happens in the Spring of 08 when the surge has to end when troop rotations are up. Will anyone in Congress be able to forge a consensus on Iraq or will Bush just be able to play out his hand until his administration ends? Bush is going to win in this case.
and we all know that the most important thing isnt whether we succeed or not in Iraq, but that Bush not be able to "win" -- whatever the fuck that means.
Why is everybody holding their breathe waiting for Petraeus' report. Does anyone believe that he is going to say anything other than the surge is working and that we need to give him more time?
The important thing isn't Petraeus' report, which he isn't going to write anyways the White House is, it's what happens in the Spring of 08 when the surge has to end when troop rotations are up. Will anyone in Congress be able to forge a consensus on Iraq or will Bush just be able to play out his hand until his administration ends? Bush is going to win in this case.
and we all know that the most important thing isnt whether we succeed or not in Iraq, but that Bush not be able to "win" -- whatever the fuck that means.
You mean Bush had a plan to win in Iraq all this time?
???Well, from the day we got in, the plan was to get out at the earliest possible opportunity.[/b] At least that was the plan in the mind of the Defense Department.??? ??? Michael Gordon, military correspondent for the New York Times, author of the book on the invasion and occupation of Iraq Cobra II
???I think that from the outset our emphasis was on getting out of Iraq as quickly as possible[/b], and that had always been the president???s strategy; it had always been Secretary Rumsfeld???s approach, and it was the approach that Gen. Abizaid and Casey had.??? ??? Frederick Kagan, former military historian at West Point, co-author of the current surge policy, resident at the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute
???[Casey] underwrites the notion that we should conduct, large, conventional sweeps into areas where we think the enemy is living and operating. So we move across Anbar province. We go into towns and villages. ??? We end up, ultimately, making far more enemies than we kill because we go into these areas and we kill lots of innocent people[/b]. ??? And in the meantime, because these are large, predictable operations, most of the enemy that you went in there to get is gone before you arrive, melts away. ??? He doesn???t understand that he has reinforced all the wrong things all the way along to make matters worse.??? ??? Col. Douglas Macgregor (Ret.), served in U.S. Army until 2004, military analyst for Jim Lehrer, CNN, NBC, and Fox News
???Casey didn???t understand the situation, didn???t recognize the basic realities of what was happening in Iraq. .. The question Casey has to address is, can we dig ourselves out of this hole? ??? This is best summarized by the study that [Kalev] Sepp, [professor, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California] does for him in I think the fall of ???04. He does a list of best practices in counterinsurgency and worst practices in counterinsurgency. I think of the 12 worst practices, the major mistakes that militaries have made in trying to put down an insurgency, the United States is committing nine of the 12[/b].??? ??? Thomas Ricks, Washington Post
???Enter George Casey, and to his credit, in the summer of ???04, after he arrived, he put together a campaign plan to get everybody on the same page. ???. Nowhere in there is a plan to defeat the insurgency, so we had no military strategy to defeat the insurgency.[/b] We were resting on a political strategy that would hopefully stem the violence because the Sunnis would come into the political process and therefore seek a political solution to the confrontation, no longer an armed solution. We over relied on that. And then there was no forcing function, because we were not defeating the insurgents.[/b]??? ??? Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.), former Army vice chief of staff 1999-2004, co-author of the current surge policy
???As somebody put it ??? it was a-strategic.[/b] The emphasis was on transferring responsibility to the Iraqis, generating more Iraqi soldiers and police, shrinking the number of American bases, beginning to draw down American combat brigades. And to some in the State Department and maybe on the NSC staff, it looked like this process had a life of its own, and it was almost a bit disconnected from the events in Iraq.??? ??? Michael Gordon, New York Times
???This point???s critical ??? you have to have a strategy country wide that tells your battalion and company commanders what their jobs are. ??? That???s what [was] missing. ??? Because the commanding generals did not prepare one.??? ??? Philip Zelikow, former advisor to Secretary of State Rice on Iraq from 2005-2007
???During this time frame in late 2005 and 2006, the White House is talking about a strategy for victory. When I was out in Iraq in Anbar and in Baghdad, I always thought there was a pretty profound disconnect between the rhetoric coming out of Washington in this time frame and what was actually happening, because I don???t think we were really trying to achieve victory. In fact, my sense was that the generals then looked at the insurgency, saw it was resilient, concluded that it couldn???t be defeated in the near term, put the emphasis on building up the Iraqis and handing over to them, and that the actual strategy was premised on the assumption that there would not be a near-term victory. There would be a continued war that we would support. So my sense is we never were going all out to win. We weren???t fighting the war. We were managing the war within available resources, and this was very much the emphasis in the first part of 2006.[/b]??? ??? Michael Gordon, New York Times
???Secretary Rice clearly got the president sold on clear, hold and build. ??? And the weird thing is that the president, having endorsed that particular strategy, seems to have no effect on the ground, because the president has then announced this strategy which the military then doesn???t execute. And I think Rumsfeld at one point even says, ???Oh, we???re not doing clear, hold, build. ??? What I can tell you from the outside is that???s a dysfunctional administration. Something???s not working there if you???ve got the secretary of state enunciating a policy like that, the president adhering to it and endorsing it, and then the military commanders not executing. Something is broken.[/b]??? ??? Frederick Kagan, American Enterprise Institute, co-author of the current surge policy
???Because the rhetoric that the president was evidencing in his remarks almost consistently for three years, he would use terms like ???win,??? ???We???re going to defeat the insurgents,??? ???victory.??? That all would lend itself to a military strategy whose purpose was to defeat the insurgency. We never had that as a mission in Iraq.[/b] And I don???t know if the president, through all those three years, truly understood that.??? ??? Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.), former Army vice chief of staff 1999-2004, co-author of the current surge policy
???As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. ??? The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere.[/b]??? Buddhika Jayamaha, Wesley Smith, Jeremy Roebuck, Omar Mora, Edward Sandmeier, Yance Gray, and Jeremy Murphy, NCOs, 82nd Airborne, currently serving in Iraq
Why is everybody holding their breathe waiting for Petraeus' report. Does anyone believe that he is going to say anything other than the surge is working and that we need to give him more time?
According to the most recent reports he is going to suggest troop reduction.
Why is everybody holding their breathe waiting for Petraeus' report. Does anyone believe that he is going to say anything other than the surge is working and that we need to give him more time?
According to the most recent reports he is going to suggest troop reduction.
He HAS to suggest troop reductions. Tours are up beginning in January-February 2008. Most of the troops in the surge have already had their rotations extended from the dictated 12 months to 15 months. Bush isn't going to extend them anymore. The White House'll try to package this as a change in policy and attempt to placate the public and Congress that are increasing calling for withdrawals, but it's something that basically was going to happen no matter what.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Sec. of Def. Gates would like to drawdown troops to the 100,000 level after the surge is up, but Bush will probalby order troop levels to stay at the pre-surge mark of 130,000.
The next question is, what happens to the surge and security with fewer troops? The U.S. has only been able to secure 50% of Baghdad. In majority Sunni areas security is improved. In mixed Sunni-Shiite areas it's pretty precarious. They've done nothing in Shiite neithborhoods which are the majority of the city. Ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from the capitol continues and violence is up in the rest of the country. Since they're having such success in Anbar, they could probably reposition troops by drawing down slightly there and sending more to Baghdad, but it won't be enough to maintain what they've got going right now.
Based on the current state of the Bush regime he could easily initiate a lottery draft without much political damage to himself, his friends OR his party.
Every recognizeable staff member or close confidant have bailed.
ALL the Republican candidates are already distancing as far from GWB as possible and some will even use his mistakes in Iraq as campaign fodder.
The fact is Patreaus made a sensible and correct decision if troop reduction is his recommendation.
One that I personally hope and want to believe was made via logic, common sense and the desire to "do the right thing" vs. politics.
I honestly think that certain segments of our Military may be the only non-partison, government sponsored representitives left in our society.
Based on the current state of the Bush regime he could easily initiate a lottery draft without much political damage to himself, his friends OR his party.
Every recognizeable staff member or close confidant have bailed.
ALL the Republican candidates are already distancing as far from GWB as possible and some will even use his mistakes in Iraq as campaign fodder.
The fact is Patreaus made a sensible and correct decision if troop reduction is his recommendation.
One that I personally hope and want to believe was made via logic, common sense and the desire to "do the right thing" vs. politics.
I honestly think that certain segments of our Military may be the only non-partison, government sponsored representitives left in our society.
A draft is not going to happen because the military does not want one. End of story. The last thing the military wants is a bunch of people forced to join that don't want to be there, especially during an unpopular war. The Army and Marines almost collapsed because of problems they had with draftees during the Vietnam War. They don't want a repeat.
The decision to draw down troops IS based upon logic. Petraeus doesn't want his troops to revolt by serving an addition 3-6 months in Iraq after they've already been extended past the 12 months of combat duty they were promised when they signed up. It's also not ultimatley his decision because Bush is commander and chief. He doesn't want military families complaining about not seeing their loved ones during an election year in 2008.
As far as the military goes on Iraq, they are politiczed. I don't know if you read my last piece, but the military cooks the books on Iraq because they know high casualty rates makes things look bad. If soldiers get attacked and no one is injured they don't count it. If there's an attack and they don't know who did it it doesn't get counted. If an Iraqi gets murdered they don't count it. If Sunnis kill Sunnis they don't count it. If Shiites kill Shiites they don't count it. In July 2006 the military claimed there were only 93 attacks in the country. The Iraq Study Group found there were atually 1,100. During that same summer the military claimed violence was down in Baghdad 52% during the last campaign there Operation Together Forward II. Afterwards it was revealed that violence and ethnic cleansing were actually escalating then.
Today, the head of the Government Accountability Office David Walker in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
"Let's just say that there are several different sources within the administration on violence, and those sources do not agree. So I don't know what Gen. Petraeus is giving you."
This was in reply to a question by Republican Sen. Coleman of Minnesota who said he was shown charts by Gen. Petraeus that violence was down during a trip to Iraq.
One of the tactical military goals of the surge was to try to, but the U.S. doesn't have the troops and the Iraqi security forces are usually working with militias to kick out the remaining Sunnis. There's a good new article in Newsweek about it.
Thanks for that Mo. I had heard about Gen P's plan to draw down but I heard that they are making this conditional on the state of Iraq next spring. Sounds like more book cooking since the ultimate prize is not lessening of violence but political reconciliation which no one (even the Bush camp) is claiming is even near to occurring. In fact, as you (and many journalists) have pointed out, the coopting of Sunni's in Anbar and elsewhere made only lead to an even more bloody civil war once we leave (which it appears is inevitable). Without political reconciliation there can be no peace in Iraq. So I guess I agree with Sabambibada that the situation is basically hopeless. Fuck the demos and their defeatism.
Thanks for that Mo. I had heard about Gen P's plan to draw down but I heard that they are making this conditional on the state of Iraq next spring. Sounds like more book cooking since the ultimate prize is not lessening of violence but political reconciliation which no one (even the Bush camp) is claiming is even near to occurring. In fact, as you (and many journalists) have pointed out, the coopting of Sunni's in Anbar and elsewhere made only lead to an even more bloody civil war once we leave (which it appears is inevitable). Without political reconciliation there can be no peace in Iraq. So I guess I agree with Sabambibada that the situation is basically hopeless. Fuck the demos and their defeatism.
Petraeus seems to be coming up with a new plan for Iraq, which basically gives up on Bush's lofty goals for the surge and Iraq in general. Petraeus is coming to the conclusion that the Maliki government doesn't work, the security forces are not to be trusted, the Shiites have taken over the south and doing so in Baghdad, so the U.S. is left to work with whoever will work with them, i.e. some Iraqi army units and some Sunni tribes. The U.S. will provide money and security to those groups on a case by case, locality by locality basis. If that means getting rid of Iraqi security units, undermining the Maliki government, whatever, they'll do it. It's not really a strategy to win from the sounds of it, but rather to provide protection for the few people they can as the rest of the country goes up in flames.
I just read this great line that said the surge really wasn't to provide cover for Maliki, but for Bush until he ends his presidency. I really think Petraeus and the Pentagon are in a holding pattern until the next president. They're hoping that they can hold on until then, because the next president, no matter what party they come from, will most likely stage a partial withdrawal and redefine the mission in Iraq to containing the conflict.
One of the foundations of the surge plan was the belief that the Maliki government could rise above its sectarian biases and become a partner in a political peace process. That hasn???t happened because the Maliki government is part of the problem in Iraq, not the solution. Maliki is a weak and sectarian leader who is atop a government that doesn???t function, and is often at odds with itself.
December 2005 Iraqi Elections and the Formation of the Maliki Government[/b]
Nouri al-Maliki came to power after the December 2005 elections in Iraq. The major winner in the election was the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance that consisted mainly of the then Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) now Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Moqtada al-Sadr and the Dawa Party. They did not win a majority however, so they joined with the two leading Kurdish parties to form a new government. It took six months, but Maliki, of the Dawa Party, was eventually named prime minister.
Of the major players in the new government, the Dawa Party was the smallest and weakest. Maliki and most of the Dawa leadership had fled during the Saddam dictatorship and lacked popular support within the country upon their return. They also did not have an armed militia like Sadr, SIIC or the Kurds. That was one of the reasons why he was chosen as prime minister. He was a compromise candidate between the rival Shiite SIIC and Sadr. This put Maliki at a serious disadvantage when trying to actually lead the country because he did not have a strong base behind him. Instead, he had to make compromises with parties that were more powerful than him.
Sectarianism, Patronage and Corruption Of The New Government[/b]
Maliki???s government is suppose to be a national unity one, but it actually reflects the sectarian divisions running rampant in the country. Each major party including the Sunnis got cabinet positions. None of them had any real experience running a government before. When they took office they saw their respective ministries as a power base to dole out patronage to their supporters and to embezzle money from. The Sadrists for example were given control of transportation, health, and agriculture. At hospitals across the country Sadr sent in his Mahdi Army militia to man security, purged Sunnis and placed religious rules on procedures that led many doctors to leave. Sunnis quickly learned that if they were sent to a Shiite led hospital they could end up dead instead of receiving medical treatment.
The important Interior and Defense Ministries were given to the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance and the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front respectively. Both are ripe with corruption with security officials stealing money, selling weapons, etc. At the Shiite dominated Interior Ministry, most Sunnis have been forced out, rival Shiite factions control different departments, and security chiefs have to walk through the ministry building in Baghdad with armed guards because they are afraid of being assassinated by rivals. The majority of the police under the ministry???s control are Shiite, loyal to a political party and/or militia, corrupt, and attack Sunnis.
Maliki himself has stood by as Sunnis were ethnically cleansed and denied services. Baghdad use to be 65% Sunni before the war, now it???s down to 15% due to the actions of Shiite militias like Sadr???s Mahdi Army. One of the reasons the violence might be down during the surge in the capitol is the simple fact that there are fewer Sunnis to be killed by Shiites. The government also refuses to provide services to Sunni areas such as Anbar province. While Maliki probably didn???t officially approve these actions, he did nothing to stop them, and thus is complicit.
Disintegration of Maliki???s Cabinet[/b]
To make things worse, during the summer of 2007 as the surge was suppose to help prop up the Maliki government and allow him to work towards political reconciliation, his cabinet rebelled on him. Almost half of his ministers, including the Sadrists, Fadhila Party, and the secular Iraqi National List led by former interim prime minister Iyad Allawi all withdrew. While Maliki quickly put together a ???moderate??? coalition of Dawa, (SIIC), and the Kurds, but that was actually all the support the prime minister had left. More importantly this grouping did not have the votes in parliament to pass any legislation.
Iraq???s Parliament ??? On Paid Leave[/b]
Iraq???s parliament is just as divided as Maliki???s cabinet. Most of the members don???t even show up to sessions. Iyad Allawi for example, who is currently vying to replace Maliki doesn???t even live in Iraq anymore. On 9/4/07 when the parliament reconvened from their summer vacation only 158 out of 275 members were present. That was actually a good turnout because there was enough for a quorum, something that rarely happens.
Even if Maliki were to get a new law through his divided cabinet, it would then have to be forced through parliament. Each party has its own conflicting vision of Iraq and many are connected to armed groups that are fighting either each other or the U.S. The Sunni parties for example, want to get rid of the deBaathification law, hold new elections because they boycotted the first one, provide amnesty for insurgents, and release Sunni prisoners, all of which are opposed by the Shiites who think these actions might lead to the return of Sunni power. Because of these divisions, the parliament has passed no major legislation that the U.S. has called for to promote political reconciliation.
Maliki Has No Power[/b]
Since Maliki first took office he has always been in a position of weakness. Maliki was chosen to be prime minister because his party was the weakest of the Shiite alliance. He has no fighters to back him up, in a country where guns equal power. Almost half of his cabinet has quit on him, and parliament hardly shows up and can???t agree when they do. Cabinet members see their ministries as private fiefdoms to serve their interests rather than those of the nation, nor even Maliki who they supposedly serve under. Maliki has also supported the rise of Shiites to power in Iraq and the forcible removal of Sunnis from Baghdad. Even if Maliki were to get a new law past his cabinet, and approved by parliament there is no guarantee that it would actually be enforced. Since the ministries are basically independent and loyal to their parties they could chose to not enforce a law and Maliki could do nothing about it. Because of Maliki???s sectarian leanings, there???s also no guarantee that he actually wants to reach out to Sunnis and end the conflict.
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley warned President Bush about these problems in a November 2006 memo, but Bush chose to work with Maliki. The U.S. found itself trying to prop up a sectarian and powerless prime minister. As Maliki???s cabinet walked out on him, there have been more and more calls to replace him, but there is simply no one to fill the job. A new prime minister would come from the same Shiite alliance that created Maliki and they would be no more willing to support reconciliation with Sunnis than Maliki has.
This has led Gen. Petraeus to begin to formulate a new policy of ???bottom up??? reconciliation where he is allying the U.S. with former insurgent Sunni tribes in western Iraq. The thinking is if the government won???t recognize these groups and secure those areas, the U.S. military will. The problem is that the Sunnis still oppose the Shiites and the Maliki government. What Iraq is going through is an atomization of power that might lead to the break up of the country or a decentralized and lawless state where each city and region has its own ruler. This is a far cry from Bush???s call for a unified and democratic Iraq that was suppose to be the ultimate goal of the war.
Sources[/b] Books[/b]
James Baker and Lee Hamilton, ???The Iraq Study Group Report,??? Vintage Books, 2006
Government Reports[/b]
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? August, 2006 - ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? March, 2007 - ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? June, 2007
Government Accountability Office, ???Securing, Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq,??? January, 2007
House Committee on Armed Services, ???Stand Up And Be Counted: The Continuing Challegenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,??? U.S. House Of Representatives, 6/26/07
Kenneth Katzman, ???Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks,??? Congressional Research Service, 6/27/07 - ???Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks,??? Congressional Research Service, 8/10/07
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq's Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August, 2007
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,??? 7/30/07
U.S. Department of State, ???Iraq - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices ??? 2006,??? 3/6/07
U.N. Reports[/b]
UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, ???Human Rights Report,??? United Nations, 3/31/07 - ???UNAMI Human Rights Report,??? 1 November - 31 December 2006
U.N. Secretary-General, ???Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004),??? United National Security Council, 6/5/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Pauline Baker, ???A Way Out: The Union Of Iraqi States,??? Fund For Peace, March 2003 to June 2007
Anthony Borden, ???Iraqi Governance Report,??? Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Anthony Cordesman, ???Benchmarks in Iraq: The True Status,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/12/07 - ???Iraq's Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/27/06 - ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07 - ???Iraq's Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and Its Evoling Insurgency,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/2/07 - ???Iraq's Troubled Future: The Uncertain Way Ahead,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/13/07 - ???Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11/28/06 - ???Still Losing? The June 2007 Edition of ???Measuring Stability in Iraq,?????? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6/20/07 - ???The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/6/07
Ilan Goldberg, ???Benchmark Report Face Check,??? National Security Network, 7/12/07
Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, and Peter Juul, ???Strategic Reset,??? Center for American Progress, June, 2007
Ashraf al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, ???Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq,??? Brookings Institution, October, 2006
Phebe Marr, ???Iraq's New Political Map,??? United States Institute Of Peace, January, 2007
Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Audra Grant, Terrence Kelly, Andrew Rathmell, David Brannan, ???U.S. Policy Options for Iraq,??? RAND Project Air Force, 8/8/07
Kenneth Pollack, ???A Switch In Time,??? Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, February, 2006
Babak Rahimi, ???A Shiite Storm Looms on the Horizon: Sadr and SIIC Relations,??? Jamestown Foundation, 5/24/07 - ???Maliki Government Faces a Governance Crisis,??? Jamestown Foundation, 7/10/07
Gareth Stansfield, ???Accepting Realities in Iraq,??? Chatham House, May, 2007
Jeffrey White, ???Key Trends to Watch in Iraq,??? Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12/28/06
Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Lee Keath, ???Feuding Iraq Gov't Groups Launch Charges,??? Guardian of London, 10/10/06
Michael Abramowitz, ???White House Wants Iraqi Leaders to Reach 'Political Accommodation,?????? Washington Post, 7/22/07
Michael Abramowitz and Robin Wright, ???Doubts About Iraqi Leader's Capabilities Persist,??? Washington Post, 12/17/06
Agence France Presse, ???Iraq using Saddam-era law to block corruption probes: audit,??? 4/30/07 - ???US political pressure on Maliki intensifies,??? 8/26/07
BBC News, ???Iraq corruption 'costs billions',??? BBC News.com, 11/9/06 - ???Iraq torture 'worse after Saddam',??? BBC News.com, 11/21/06 - ???Iraq's PM longs to leave office,??? BBC News.com, 1/3/07
Nicholas Berry, ???Iraq Is Not a Military Problem,??? Foreign Policy Forum, 8/1/07
Damien Cave, ???4 Truck Bombs Kill 190 in Kurdish Area of Iraq,??? New York Times, 8/15/07 - ???Deputy health minister held for aiding militants,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 2/9/07 - ???For Iraqis, a New Rule of Life: Don't Trust Anyone in Uniform,??? New York Times, 8/3/06 - ???Iraq Parliament Finds a Quorum Hard to Come By,??? New York Times, 1/24/07 - ???Iraqi Factions' Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress,??? New York Times, 8/25/07 - ???Iraqi Premier Stirs Discontent, Yet Hangs On,??? New York Times, 8/19/07 - ???Iraqis Are Failing to Meet U.S. Benchmarks,??? New York Times, 6/13/07
David Cloud , ???Panel Will Urge Broad Overhaul of Iraqi Police,??? New York Times, 8/31/07
Juan Cole, ???The war against Iraq???s prime minister,??? Salon.com, 8/29/07
Helene Cooper and David Sanger, ???Iraqis' Progress Lags Behind Pace Set by Bush Plan,??? New York Times, 3/15/07
Anthony Cordesman, ???The elephant gives birth to a mouse,??? Asia Times, 12/8/06
David Corn, ???Secret Report: Corruption is "Norm" Within Iraqi Government,??? The Nation.com, 8/30/07
Sam Dagher, ???Crisis summit aims to save Iraq's Maliki,??? Christian Science Monitor, 8/16/07 - ???In Iraq, a parliament in disarray,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/16/07 - ???Iraq's Shiite political fissures widen,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/18/07 - ???Iraqi government in deepest crisis,??? Christian Science Monitor, 7/27/07 - ???US faced with Iraqi Army turncoats,??? Christian Science Monitor, 7/10/07
Borzou Daragahi, ???Government Fissures Widening,??? Los Angeles Times, 10/16/06
Borzou Daragahi and Alissa Rubin, ???Shiite-Kurds Goals Stymier U.S.,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/22/06
Babak Dehghanpisheh and Larry Kaplow, ???As Sunnis Flee, Shiites Now Dominate Baghdad,??? Newsweek, 9/10/07
Karen DeYoung, ???Doubts Run Deep on Reforms Crucial to Bush's Iraq Strategy,??? Washington Post, 2/4/07
Toby Dodge, ???Staticide in Iraq,??? Le Monde diplomatique, February, 2007
Yochi Drezen and Greg Jaffe, ???Maliki Faces Fresh Doubts, Tests,??? Wal Street Journal, 8/21/07
Yochi Dreazen and Philip Shshkin and Greg Jaffe, ???U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/4/07
Economist, ???Is the surge going to fizzle???? 6/21/07
Leila Fadel, ???Despite violence drop, officers see bleak future for Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/15/07 - ???Iraqi government unraveling as more ministers announce boycott,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/6/07
Stephen Farrell, ???Iraqi President Starts Talk to Try to Bring Sunnis Back,??? New York Times, 8/6/07 - ???Sunni Faction Quits Iraqi Cabinet; Blasts Kill 76 in Capital,??? New York Times, 8/2/07
James Fearon, ???Iraq's Civil War,??? Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2007
Mic
hael Fletcher and Ann Scott Tyson, ???Bush, Advisers Make Surprise Visit to Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/3/07
Peter Galbraith, ???The Mess,??? New York Review Of Books, 3/9/06
Bobby Ghosh, ???After Maliki, Few Good Alternatives,??? Time, 8/22/07 - ???Why They Hate Each Other,??? Time, 3/5/07
James Glanz, ???Billions in Oil Missing in Iraq, U.S. Study Says,??? New York Times, 5/12/07 -???Civilian Death Toll Falls in Baghdad but Rises Across Iraq,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Michael Gordon, ???U.S. adviser reports doubts on al-Maliki,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 11/28/06
Stephen Hadley, ???Text of U.S. Security Adviser's Iraq Memo,??? New York Times, 11/29/06
Hamza Hendawl and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ???Talks Under Way to Replace Iraq PM,??? Associated Press, Associated Press
Jimes Hilder, ???3,000 police are sacked as rulers remain cut off and impotent,??? Times UK, 10/18/06
Dahr Jamail and Ali Al-Fadhily, ???Iraqi Militias Take Refuge in Facilities Protection Service,??? AntiWar.com, 11/8/06 - ???When Iraqis Gave Up on Government,??? Inter Press Service, 12/27/06
Rick Jervis, ???Al-Maliki support eroding in Iraq,??? USA Today, 4/24/07 - ???Iraq ousts 10,000 in security ministry,??? USA Today, 3/5/07
Zeyad Kasim, ???Sunni Bloc Calls Political Process ???Disaster,?????? IraqSlogger.com, 5/4/07
Ellen Knickmeyer, ???Shiite Giant' Extends Its Reach,??? Washington Post, 8/24/06
Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, ???Iraqi Vote Draws Big Turnout Of Sunnis,??? Washington Post, 12/16/05
Howard LaFranchi, ???Missing: a functional Iraqi state,??? Christian Science Monitor, 12/19/06 - ???US raises pressure on Iraq's leader,??? Christian Science Monitor, 5/10/07
Tom Lasseter, ???U.S. ignored Shiite militias, focused on Sunni insurgency,??? Knight Ridder, 4/18/06
Carolyn Lochhead, ???Shiite clerics challenge U.S. goal in Iraq,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 4/24/03
Ernesto Londono, ???In Baghdad, Rice Acknowledges Frustrations in U.S.,??? Washington Post, 2/18/07
Alastair Macdonald, ???Analysis - After Iraq vote success, now for the hard part,??? Reuters, 12/15/05
Patrick McDonnell, ???Why the Numbers Don't Add Up in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/10/06
Amer Mohsen, ???Iraqi Papers Sat: Who Will Replace Maliki???? IraqSlogger.com, 8/3/07 - ???Iraqi Papers Tues: A New Political Pact?,??? IraqSlogger.com, 3/26/07
Solomon Moore, ???Iraqi Militias Seen as Spinning Out of Control,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/12/06 - ???Lopsided provincial councils keep Iraq off balance,??? Los Angeles Times, 3/11/07
Sami Moubayed, ???Iraq's cabinet falls short,??? Asia Times, 5/21/06
Bassem Mroue and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ???Iraq loses $8 billion through corruption,??? Associated Press, 4/4/07
Shailagh Murray , ???After Iraq Trip, Unshaken resolve,??? Washington Post, 8/26/07
Vali Nasr, ???When the Shiites Rise,??? Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006
Amit Paley, ???Iraqi Hospitals Are War's New 'Killing Fields,?????? Washington Post, 8/30/06
Amit Paley and K.I. Ibrahim, ???Sadr Political Bloc Calls for Overhaul of Iraqi Cabinet,??? Washington Post, 10/2/06
Ned Parker, ???Interior Ministry mirrors chaos of a fractured Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 7/30/07 - ???Iraq's leader can't get out of 1st gear,??? Los Angeles Times, 6/6/07 - ???Shiite militia infiltrates Iraqi forces,??? Los Angles Times, 8/16/07
Joshua Partlow, ???Iraqi Shiites, Kurds Announce New Political Alliance,??? Washington Post, 8/17/07 - ???Six Members of Sunni Bloc Quit Iraq Cabinet in Protest,??? Washington Post, 6/30/07
Joshua Partlow and Robin Wright, ???Top Iraqi Officials Growing Restless,??? Washington Post, 6/21/07
Carlos Pascual and Kenneth Pollack, ???The Critical Battles: Political Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Iraq,??? Washington Quarterly, Summer 2007
Walter Pincus, ???Shhh ??? There Is Corruption in Iraq,??? Washington Post, 6/25/07 - ???U.S. Military Urging Iraq to Rein In Guard Force,??? Washington Post, 12/25/06
Llene Prusher, ???Next in Iraq: coalition-building,??? Christian Science Monitor, 12/19/05
Sudarsan Raghavan, ???For Iraq's Shiites, a Dream Deferred Breeds Mistrust of U.S.,??? Washington Post, 1/2/07 - ???Maliki's Impact Blunted By Own Party's Fears,??? Washington Post, 8/3/07
Sudarsan Raghavan and Ellen Knickmeyer, ???Sadr, a Question Mark Etched in Black,??? Washington Post, 9/11/06
Reuters, ???Iraq charges 100 over prions torture,??? 11/7/06
Paul Richter, ???U.S. Frustrated by Pace of Change in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/16/06
Thomas Ricks, ???McCaffrey Paints Gloomy Picture of Iraq,??? Washington Post, 3/28/07
Nir Rosen, ???Anatomy of a Civil War,??? Boston Review, November-December 2006
Alissa Rubin, ???Iraqi Shiite Parties Agree to Try to Unite Moderates,??? New York Times, 6/29/07 - ???Moderates Try to Break Iraq's Sectarian Legjam,??? New York Times, 7/6/07 - ???Sunni Ministers Threaten to Quit Cabinet in Iraq,??? New York Times, 5/1/07
San Francisco Chronicle, ???U.S. military divided on troop withdrawal,??? 8/25/07
David Sanger, ???Bush Is Said to Approve More Aid to Iraqi Sunnis Battling Extremist Groups,??? New York Times, 9/2/07 - ???The White House Scales back Talk of Iraq Progress,??? New York Times, 4/28/07
Mark Seibel and Leila Fadel, ???U.S. officials: Militias main threat to Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 7/31/07
Megan Stack and Borzou Daragahi, ???Unity Government Begins A New Chapter For Iraq,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 5/21/06
Matthew Stannard, ???Experts doubt Iraqis can make Bush plan work,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 1/13/07
Farah Stockman, ???US struggles to keep Iraqi leader at helm,??? Boston Globe, 8/21/07
Tina Susman, ???Troop buildup fails to reconcile Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/4/07
Sabrina Tavernise, ???Shiite leader voices distrust of Sunnis within legislature,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 10/2/06
Ivan Watson, ???U.S. Weapons from Iraq Making Their Way to Turkey,??? National Public Radio, 8/24/07
Edward Wong, ???Dobuts Rise on Iraqi Premier's Strength,??? New York Times, 9/20/06
Edward Wong and Paul von Zielbauer, ???Iraq police riddled by Shiite militia,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 9/17/06
Robert Worth and Sabrina Tavernise, ???Radical Cleric Rising as a Kingmaker in Iraqi Politics,??? New York Times, 2/15/06
Nancy Youssef, ???Defense chief: U.S. underestimated sectarian hatred in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/2/07
Fareed Zakaria, ???Rethinking Iraq: The Way Forward,??? Newsweek, 11/6/06
Az-Zaman, ???Iraqi Papers Sat: Front of the ???Moderates,?????? IraqSlogger.com, 8/17/07
Alexander Zavis, ???Lawmakers seek moderates,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 2/1/07
Big September Report For The Surge? Don???t Believe The Hype[/b]
No Political Success? Fix The Numbers And Emphasize The Military Side[/b]
At the end of August, Gen. Petraeus made the audacious statement to The Australian newspaper that violence was down 75% in the capitol. [/b]Somehow all of this had been accomplished with only half of the city secured by U.S. forces by August. In fact, deaths have been up and down during the surge in Baghdad, and other forms of sectarian violence have continued, if not increased. In order to argue these points, the U.S. has been fixing numbers.[/b]
The National Security Network did a study of four reports by the Pentagon to Congress from August 2006 to June 2007. It found that in three out of the four reports the military changed how it counted deaths. During some periods this caused a dramatic drop, and in others a just as sharp increase during the same time period. For example, in an August 2006 report the Pentagon said that there were approximately 1,750 ???casualties??? in Iraq in one month. In the following three reports, the Pentagon only counted ???deaths by execution??? during that same month and the number miraculously dropped by 1,000 to around 750. Likewise, the same change in counting produced an increase from 5,500 sectarian deaths over a series of months right before the surge started to 7,400, and then amazingly enough, a dramatic drop after the military plan was implemented.
As the Iraq Study Group found, the U.S. has been playing with the numbers since the beginning to give the war a positive spin. It found that on one day in July 2006 the U.S. officially claimed 93 attacks, when there had actually been 1,100. The study group found that murders of Iraqis, attacks that did not harm Americans, or ones that the U.S. could not officially blame on someone were simply left off the books. [/b]By ignoring dozens of acts of violence, the U.S. claimed that violence was down 52% in Baghdad during the summer of 2006 while conducting a campaign to pacify the city. In fact, deaths were dramatically up at the time and the operation was later dubbed a failure. The U.S. still does not count these acts, nor does it include Sunni on Sunni and Shiite on Shiite violence in its numbers. It???s by these manipulations that the military and administration have been able to claim much of its military success with the surge. [/b]
Experts Doubt Drop In Violence in Iraq Military Statistics Called Into Question
By Karen DeYoung Washington Post Staff Writer Thursday, September 6, 2007; A16
The U.S. military's claim that violence has decreased sharply in Iraq in recent months has come under scrutiny from many experts within and outside the government, who contend that some of the underlying statistics are questionable and selectively ignore negative trends.
Reductions in violence form the centerpiece of the Bush administration's claim that its war strategy is working. In congressional testimony Monday, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, is expected to cite a 75 percent decrease in sectarian attacks. [/b]According to senior U.S. military officials in Baghdad, overall attacks in Iraq were down to 960 a week in August, compared with 1,700 a week in June, and civilian casualties had fallen 17 percent between December 2006 and last month. Unofficial Iraqi figures show a similar decrease.
Others who have looked at the full range of U.S. government statistics on violence, however, accuse the military of cherry-picking positive indicators and caution that the numbers -- most of which are classified -- are often confusing and contradictory. "Let's just say that there are several different sources within the administration on violence, and those sources do not agree," Comptroller General David Walker told Congress[/b] on Tuesday in releasing a new Government Accountability Office report on Iraq.
...
The intelligence community has its own problems with military calculations. Intelligence analysts computing aggregate levels of violence against civilians for the NIE puzzled over how the military designated attacks as combat, sectarian or criminal, according to one senior intelligence official in Washington.[/b] "If a bullet went through the back of the head, it's sectarian," the official said. "If it went through the front, it's criminal."
"Depending on which numbers you pick," he said, "you get a different outcome." Analysts found "trend lines . . . going in different directions" compared with previous years, when numbers in different categories varied widely but trended in the same direction. "It began to look like spaghetti."
Among the most worrisome trends cited by the NIE was escalating warfare between rival Shiite militias in southern Iraq[/b] that has consumed the port city of Basra and resulted last month in the assassination of two southern provincial governors. According to a spokesman for the Baghdad headquarters of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), those attacks are not included in the military's statistics. "Given a lack of capability to accurately track Shiite-on-Shiite and Sunni-on-Sunni violence, except in certain instances," the spokesman said, "we do not track this data to any significant degree."[/b]
Attacks by U.S.-allied Sunni tribesmen -- recruited to battle Iraqis allied with al-Qaeda -- are also excluded from the U.S. military's calculation of violence levels.[/b]
This is the big month for reports on Iraq, so here???s a report card on the surge. First it???s important to break the surge into its parts. There???s a military, an economic, and a political side, as well as tactical and strategic goals. In the past 9 months the policy has seen dramatic tactical military success in Anbar province, mixed results in Baghdad, while achieving none of its ultimate political goals. In fact, the Sunni policy and the lack of attention to the rest of the country might be leading to the partition of Iraq. There???s also the looming question of what will happen after the surge ends in the Spring of 2008.
Breaking Down the Parts of the Surge[/b]
The surge is a military tactic to achieve a political goal. When Bush outlined the plan in January 2007 he laid out the tactics, the means, and the strategic goals, the ultimate point, of the plan. Bush said that he would be sending in 30,000 additional troops to Iraq. Around 10,000 would be sent to Anbar province to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq because Bush said they were the main threat to stability in the country. A little over 20,000 would be sent to Baghdad to protect the population. The U.S. and Iraq would also be spending new reconstruction money to help win over the population. This was the tactical side, to use counterinsurgency techniques and reconstruction projects in Baghdad to win the hearts and minds of the public while fighting terrorism in Anbar.
It was hoped that if violence was reduced in the capitol, the Iraqi government would reconcile their differences and pass legislation to bring together the three main factions in Iraq, the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis. This was the ultimate strategic goal of the surge. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Crocker was the one designated to push and cajole the Iraqi government into passing new laws to achieve ultimate peace in the country. These laws included a new Debaathification law, a hydrocarbon law to distribute oil revenues, new local elections, amending the constitution, disarming militias, an amnesty for former insurgents, and resolving the future of Kirkuk.
Grades For The Tactical Military and Economic Side[/b]
Overall Grade: C-
It???s on the tactical military level that the surge has seen its greatest successes, but these are limited to specific areas. There are two parts to the military side of the surge, one focused on Anbar province, and the other on Baghdad. The economic policy has also been mixed.
Anbar Province
Grade: B+
Violence and attacks in Anbar province have dropped dramatically. The harsh tactics and strict religious rules of the Islamist faction of the insurgency turned many Sunni tribes against it, leading these groups to reach out to the U.S. On the other hand, one of the main motivations of the insurgency was to regain power for the Sunnis. Many tribes feel they got as far as they could with the insurgency, and now believe they can get money, recognition and local power from working with the Americans. Many Sunnis are also afraid of the influence Iran now has in the country and see the Shiites as their ultimate enemy.
In turn, the U.S. has paid these tribes for fighters who have formed local security units to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq. Bombings, attacks, etc. are all down across the board in Anbar. It???s an ironic success story however, because turning the tribes against Al Qaeda in Iraq was not a goal of the U.S. nor Iraqi government when the surge was announced. It highlights the fact that Iraqis will ultimately decide the future of Iraq, not Americans.
The major tactical problem in Anbar is that the U.S. wants its newly formed Sunni units to be officially recruited into the Iraqi security services. The Shiite led government has been reluctant to accept many of them. At best, about half of the Sunni fighters have been accepted into the Interior Ministry and the actual numbers might be lower. The stance of Prime Minister Maliki seems to be nervousness that the Sunnis might eventually turn against the government, but as long as they are far away in Anbar they can be largely ignored. Even when the units are accepted into the security forces, Baghdad rarely pays nor supplies them with equipment, leaving that to the Americans.
The highlight of the effort in Anbar is that enough tribes have turned on Al Qaeda in Iraq that it has had to relocate to Diyala province south of Baghdad. The success also does not mean that the insurgency is down and out. There are still other insurgent groups that are alive and well and attacks still occur in Anbar, they are just not as frequent as before.
Baghdad
Grade: C-
In Baghdad military results have been mixed. In largely Sunni areas violence is down. In mixed areas, there are still attacks and ethnic cleansing going on. The U.S. has had little if any impact on Shiite areas, which are the majority of the capitol.
In Sunni areas, the U.S. has tried to replicate the model set in Anbar by organizing former insurgents and armed citizens into local security units. Like Anbar, attacks on U.S. forces have gone down. Again, the main reason Sunnis have switched sides in the capitol, is because they see the Shiites as their main enemy, not the Americans. Fewer of these units have been accepted into the Interior Ministry because the Shiites are attempting to take over the capitol and are afraid of the future intentions of the Sunnis. One U.S. officer complained that when he was given a list of Sunni recruits who had been accepted into the Interior Ministry that he organized, he found that many of their names had been changed. He thought it was a sign that the Shiites were attempting to undermine the Sunni policy.
In mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods the results are mixed at best. Again, the U.S. has tried to organize Sunnis but they have come into conflict with Shiite led army and police units. Shiite army officers say they have the right to arrest any Sunni fighter that is not officially part of the Iraqi government. In one case, a U.S. unit had to call in a flyby with jets to stop an Iraqi army unit from arresting a group of Sunni fighters that could???ve escalated into a riot or shoot-out between the two sides. More importantly, ethnic cleansing by Shiite militias and their allies in the security forces continues unabated in these areas. In May 2007 the U.S. claimed that they had stopped the displacement of Iraqis in the capitol, but humanitarian groups say that more Iraqis are fleeing since the surge started. The capitol has gone from 65% Sunni before the 2003 invasion to around 15% today.
In Shiite areas the U.S. has had a minimal affect. American forces have only approached the border of Sadr City in Baghdad, and have not been able to turn any real segment of the Shiite population away from Moqtada al-Sadr. They have also attempted to organize Shiite tribes like their Sunni counterparts, but the problem is most Shiites see the militias as benefactors rather than nuisances. Militias have continued to grow in power and influence during the surge. Not only do they provide protection and public services to people like electricity and gas, but they rent and sell homes taken from Sunnis to Shiites thus making money while expanding Shiite power in the capitol at the same time.
While Gen. Petraeus has claimed that violence is down 75% in the capitol from December 2006 to August 2007, that number is very debatable. The U.S. has only secured half of the capitol and that is probably the most it can cover. Not only that, but the U.S. military has constantly changed what it counts as sectarian violence since 2006. In fact, the military has admitted that many forms of violence such as Sunni on Sunni and Shiite on Shiite are not counted, and the Government Accountability Office found that the different parts of the U.S. government use different measures leading to different numbers on violence in
Iraq.
Security In The Rest of Iraq
Grade: F
Security in the rest of the Iraq has deteriorated during the surge. Military operations in the Baghdad suburbs have resulted in only minimal gains, violence is up in the rest of the country, and Shiite factions are fighting each other in the South, bringing into question one of the bases of the surge, the centrality of Baghdad to peace in the country.
U.S. forces also launched military campaigns in areas South of Baghdad in an attempt to route out insurgent groups there. These campaigns have had mixed results. While the U.S. killed some fighters and seized weapons caches, they admitted that most insurgents fled long before the U.S. arrived. These campaigns were also short in duration and the insurgents probably returned as soon as U.S. forces moved on.
More importantly, deaths across Iraq are up since the surge. The Associated Press counted around 14,800 deaths from January to August 2007 compared to 13,811 in all of 2006. Many insurgent groups have simply left the capitol and Anbar and relocated in other areas where there are fewer U.S. troops. Shiite factions have also increased attacks on each other for control of southern Iraq as the British have mostly withdrawn their troops. This brings up a tactical flaw in U.S. planning. Surge advocates argued that Baghdad was the center of the conflict in Iraq. With violence bubbling up in other parts of the country however, many Iraqis and the government still feel in a state of crisis rather than more secure as the surge was suppose to achieve.
Reconstruction Efforts
Grade: C
The surge also had an economic side to it. The plan was to provide local reconstruction efforts to secure the goodwill of the population after security had been improved. The Maliki government was also suppose to spend $10 billion in reconstruction money. To achieve this goal the U.S. doubled the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq from 10 to 20. The teams suffer from many problems. They are undermanned, and underfunded and only operate in areas with a strong U.S. military presence. They also do not have an overall command structure with each group doing whatever it wants in its area of operation with little to no coordination with others. These teams have been most successful in Anbar where security is the best, and mixed in Baghdad. On the Iraqi side, things have been worse. The Iraqi government can barely spend its money because of untrained, incompetent and corrupt staff. The government has also consistently refused to send funds to Sunni areas. According to the Inspector General for reconstruction in Iraq, Baghdad had spent $0 of its 2007 budget in Anbar for example, having given the province no new cash as of July 2007.
Security After the Surge?
The surge will come to an end in the spring of 2008 as the additional U.S. troops are withdrawn when their tours are up. The question is what will happen to security afterwards. Iraqi units are suppose to eventually take over security from American forces, but the number of Iraqi units able to operate independently has actually dropped during the surge because the U.S. is not focused on training Iraqi forces anymore. While some Iraqi army units are making progress the police are filled with Shiites and militia members. None of them can go anywhere without U.S. help and many units have half of their personnel missing at any given time. The Iraqi Defense and Interior Ministries are also notoriously corrupt and incompetent. One of the positive innovations of the surge was a change in attitude to the Iraqi forces. Rather than seeing them as a partner, they were considered a part of the problem. For all of these problems it???s nearly impossible to expect the Iraqis to take up security after the surge is over. In the end, Anbar might become self-sustainable with Sunni tribes playing a larger role and fewer U.S. troops, but in Baghdad things will probably deteriorate.
Grades For The Strategic Political Side[/b]
Overall Grade: D-
The U.S. has achieved none of its strategic political goals from the surge. Not only that, but it???s Sunni policy and neglect of the south and north might actually lead to the soft partition or break up of the country rather than achieve Bush???s stated goal of a unified Iraq under a central government.
???Bottom Up??? Local Reconciliation
Grade: D
Gen. Petraeus and President Bush have recently turned to local reconciliation as a sign of political progress resulting from the surge. This was not a part of the surge when it was announced however. The U.S. is hoping that its??? new found Sunni allies in Anbar and Baghdad can be eventually recognized by the central government and provide a means of reconciliation between the sides. However in interview after interview with Sunnis they repeatedly say that they want to fight the Shiites and see the central government as controlled by Iran. The Shiite government and security forces have also been hostile to the Sunni groups. Given the fact that U.S. units have to draw down in 2008 it???s an open question if the Sunni policy can be maintained at the same levels. In Anbar the tribes can probably do what they want because they are so removed from the Shiites. If trends continue in Baghdad however, many Sunni units and their neighborhoods might be wiped out by ethnic cleansing. Given this limited time frame and extenuating circumstances, its probably unlikely that the Shiite led government will reconcile with the Sunnis anytime soon.
More importantly, as the U.S. is only working with Sunnis they might be increasing the sectarian divide in the country, rather than working to end them. Anbar for example, might become a largely autonomous Sunni region.
National Reconciliation
Grade: F
During the surge the Iraqi parliament has passed no major legislation, and can???t be expected to anytime soon. Even if it did, it???s an open question whether the laws would be followed or equally enforced. The Maliki government has promised five times to deal with new laws since the surge began in January 2007, but at the most, they have only been drafted, and sent to parliament where nothing has happened. When parliament recently reconvened in September 2007 they had no reconciliation laws on its agenda. The different factions that make up the government are so divided that they can???t be expected to make any major moves. Maliki???s government has actually fallen apart during the surge with almost half of his cabinet boycotting. Because Maliki holds very little power, and each ministry is almost an independent fiefdom run by the political party that controls it, there???s no telling whether a law would be enforced if passed. Of equal concern is the fact that the Kurdish north, Sunni west and Shiite south are increasingly exerting their independence from the central government so the regions might not follow any laws passed anyway. The surge policy was flawed from the beginning on this count, believing that a largely military plan could get the Maliki government to make any political moves.
Politics After the Surge?
The Iraqi government can be expected to be deadlocked as ever after the surge ends in the spring of 2008. Most legislation will continue to flounder. As many point out, the Iraqi government is dysfunctional. Outside Baghdad, the country is slowly devolving into regional powers that might become autonomous not out of an act of government, but because the government doesn???t work and has little to no authority. All of the different factions have to resolve their differences on their own timetables, not one dictated by the U.S.
Sources[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Bush, President George W., ???President???s Radio Address,??? Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 8/18/07
Katzman, Kenneth, ???Iraq: Government Formatio
n and Benchmarks,??? Congressional Research Service, 8/10/07
Mathews, Jessica, ???The Situation in Iraq,??? House Armed Services Committee, 7/18/07
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq???s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,??? 7/30/07
Walker, David, ???Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,??? Government Accountability Office, 9/4/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Baker, Pauline, ???A War Out: The Union of Iraqi States,??? Fund For Peace, March 2003 to June 2007
Borden, Anthony, ???Iraqi Governance Report,??? Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Bruno, Greg, ???The Preparedness of Iraq Security Forces,??? Council On Foreign Relations, 9/4/07
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07 - ???The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/6/07
National Security Network, ???Drop in Violence???? 8/30/07
Agence France Presse, ???US political pressure on Maliki intensifies,??? 8/26/07
Attewill, Fred, and agencies, ???Iraq bombs death toll rises to 400,??? Guardian Unlimited U.K., 8/16/07
Barnes, Julian, ???Sadr???s army proves hard to beat,??? Los Angeles Times, 8/23/07
Burns, John, ???Militants Said to Flee Before U.S. Offensive,??? New York Times, 6/23/07
Burns, Robert, ???Panel: U.S. Underreported Iraq Violence,??? Associated Press, 12/6/06
Cave, Damien, ???4 Truck Bombs Kill 190 in Kurdish Area of Iraq,??? New York Times, 8/15/07 - ???Iraqi Factions??? Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress,??? New York Times, 8/25/07 - ???Iraqi Premier Stirs Discontent, Yet Hangs On,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Cloud, David, ???Panel Will Urge Broad Overhaul of Iraqi Police,??? New York Times, 8/31/07
Cole, Juan, ???The war against Iraq???s prime minister,??? Salon.com, 8/29/07
Corn, David, ???Secret Report: Corruption is ???Norm??? Within Iraqi Government,??? The Nation.com, 8/30/07
Dagher, Sam, ???As British leave Basra, militias dig in,??? Christian Science Monitor 8/28/07 - ???Crisis summit aims to save Iraq???s Maliki,??? Christian Science Monitor, 8/16/07
Dehghanpisheh, Babak and Kaplow, Larry, ???As Sunnis Flee, Shiites Now Dominate Baghdad,??? Newsweek, 9/10/07
DeYoung, Karen, ???Experts Doubt Drop In Violence In Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/6/07 - ???Pentagon seeks better grades for Iraq in GAO audit,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/31/07
DeYoung, Karen and Ricks, Thomas, ???Report Finds Little Progress On Iraq Goals,??? Washington Post, 8/30/07
Drezen, Yochi and Jaffe, Greg, ???Maliki Faces Fresh Doubts, Tests,??? Wall Street Journal, 8/21/07
Dreazen, Yochi and Shishking, Philip and Jaffe, Greg, ???U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/4/07
Economist, ???Is the surge going to fizzle???? 6/21/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Despite violence drop, officers see bleak future for Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/15/07
Farrell, Stephen, ???50 Die in Fight Between Shiite Groups in Karbala,??? New York Times, 8/29/07
Fletcher, Michael and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Bush, Advisers Make Surprise Visit to Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/3/07 - ???In Iraq, Bush Cites Gains,??? Washington Post, 9/4/07
Glanz, James, ???Civilian Death Toll Falls in Baghdad but Rises Across Iraq,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07 - ???More Iraqis Said to Flee Since Troop Increase,??? New York Times, 8/24/07
Gordon, Michael, ???The Former-Insurgent-Counterinsurgency,??? New York times, 9/2/07
Greenwall, Megan, ???Iraqi Leaders Reach Accord On Prisoners, Ex-Baathists,??? Washington Post, 8/27/07 - ???Sporadic Raids South Of Baghdad Yield Little,??? Washington Post, 8/28/07
Howard, Michael, ???The struggle for Iraq???s oil flares up as Kurds open doors to foreign investors,??? Guardian U.K., 8/7/07
Hurst, Steven, ???Violence lessens in Baghdad as it grows elsewhere,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/26/07
Ignatius, David, ???Post-Iraq Strategy,??? Washington Post, 8/26/07
Jayamaha, Buddhika, Smith, Wesley, Roebuck, Jeremy, Mora, Omar, Sandmeier, Edward, Gray, Yance, and Murphy, Jeremy, ???The War as We Saw It,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Kaplan, Fred, ???Challenging the Generals,??? New York Times, 8/26/07
Kaplow, Larry, ???Iraq Blackouts Get Worse, Fuel Anger,??? Newsweek, 8/22/07
Murray, Shailagh, ???After Iraq Trip, Unshaken resolve,??? Washington Post, 8/26/07
Myers, Steven Lee and Shanker, Thom, ???White House to Offer Iraq Plan of Gradual Cutes,??? New York Times, 8/18/07
O???Hanlon, Michael, ???The Work Behind Our Iraq Views,??? Washington Post, 8/25/07
Oppel, Richard, ???Quieter Fallujah fears U.S. exit,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/19/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Iraqi Shiites, Kurds Announce New Political Alliance,??? Washington Post, 8/17/07 - ???Singing Up Sunnis With ???Insurgent??? on Their Resumes,??? Washington Post, 9/4/07
Pascual, Carlos and Cullin, Brian, ???The U.N.???s Role in Iraq,??? Washington Post, 8/23/07
Reid, Robert, ???August particularly deadly for Iraqis,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 9/2/07
San Francisco Chronicle, ???U.S. military divided on troop withdrawal,??? 8/25/07
Sanger, David, ???Bush Is Said to Approve More Aid to Iraqi Sunnis Battling Extremist Groups,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Schoof, Renee and Strobel, Warren, ???Report: Surge hasn???t cut attacks on Iraqi civilians,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/4/07
Shanahan, Dennis, ???Surge working: top US general,??? Australian, 8/31/07
Stockman, Farah, ???US struggles to keep leader at helm Defections strike Maliki???s coalition,??? Boston Globe, 8/21/07
Sudarsan, Raghavan, ???No Relief From Fear,??? Washington Post, 9/5/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???A Deadly Clash at Donkey Island,??? Washington Post, 8/19/07 - ???New Strategy Urged in Briefing to Petraeus,??? Washington Post, 9/1/07 - ???Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,??? Washington Post, 8/9/07
Youssef, Nancy, ???U.S. general: Iraq ???surge??? likely to end in spring,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/17/07
Zaman, Az, ???Iraqi Papers Sat: Front of the ???Moderates,?????? IraqSlogger.com, 8/17/07
The surge is based upon using classic counterinsurgency tactics. Counterinsurgency is a combined military, economic and political doctrine that sees the public, not the enemy, as the most important factor in the conflict, and attempts to win their loyalty away from the insurgents. A poll conducted by the BBC and ABC News released on 9/10/07 shows that the U.S. effort has failed to gain popular support amongst Iraqis. The poll was conducted amongst 2,000 Iraqis and on every question there was a sense that things were getting worse under the surge rather than better. 70% said security and political reconciliation had gotten worse during the surge and 57% said it was okay to attack U.S. forces. Sentiment has gotten worse since the last time the BBC and ABC released such a poll in March 2007. The only positives were the fact that Sunnis had reduced their negative remarks from the last poll, while still feeling the most desperate of Iraq???s three major groups, and 62% of all Iraqis believed in a unified country.
Security[/b]
If the major tactical military goal of the surge was to provide security and win hearts and minds it doesn???t appear to be working.
When asked what security was like in their area during the surge 70% said it was worse, 10% said no change, around 18% said things had gotten better.
When asked how security was in other parts of Iraq during the surge around 69% said worse, 20% said no change, around 11% said things were better.
When asked how security was broken down by region 32% said all of Iraq was very bad, 24% quite bad, 28% quite good and 15% very good. Central Iraq, which includes Baghdad, had the most negative responses with 51% saying their security was very bad, 31% saying it was quite bad, compared with only 14% saying it was quite good and 4% saying very good. Those results were largely the same as the March 2007 poll. The major change was with Sunnis. In the September poll 42% said security was very bad, down from 70% in March, 25% said quite bad up from 23% in March, 25% said it was quite good, up from 6% in March, and finally 27% said it was quite good compared with 1% in the last poll. While 67% of Sunnis still had a bad view of security, it wasn???t the horrible mark of 93% in March. That reflects the fact that the surge has concentrated on Sunni areas.
57% of Iraqis said that it was acceptable to attack Americans. 93% of Sunnis in the poll said it was okay, compared to 50% of Shiites. While the U.S. was securing Sunni areas, they still appear to be hostile to Americans.
In comparison only 7% of Iraqis said it was acceptable to attack Iraqi security forces.
During the last poll, the U.S. was seen as the leading cause of violence. That feeling has faded and now Iraqis blame Al Qaeda in Iraq, with the U.S. coming in second. That might reflect the change in attitudes amongst many Sunnis who are now working with the U.S.
When asked ???Who do you blame most for the violence that is occurring in the country???? around 21% said Al Qeada in Iraq and foreign fighters, around 19% said the U.S., around 11% said Iran, approximately 9% said the government, around 7% said Pres. Bush, around 6% said Shiite militias, 6% said Sunni insurgents, 5% said sectarian disputes, 4% said criminals, 2% said it was the Iraqi army, 2% the Iraqi police, 2% Saudi Arabia, 2% Syria, 1% Turkey.
Compared to a poll conducted in February 2007 there was a dramatic decrease in those who blamed the U.S. In that earlier poll, the U.S. was far and away seen as the leading cause of violence at 31% with Al Qaeda in Iraq coming in second at 21%. Iran saw a large increase going from 7% in February to 11% in the newer poll.
In a question that relates to ethnic cleansing, more than 70% of Iraqis say people do not have the freedom to live where they want, with almost 95% of Sunnis saying the situation is bad. That probably reflects the fact that Sunnis have continued to be forced out of Baghdad and sections of central Iraq by Shiite militias and their allies in the Iraqi security forces.
On ???freedom to live where choose??? 45% of Iraqis said the situation was very bad, 32% quite bad, 15% quite good, and 8% very good. Sunnis had the worst responses with 64% saying it was very bad, and 31% quite bad. Overall, the insecurity amongst Sunnis has not changed from September when 95% of Sunnis said the situation was bad compared to 96% in March.
Should the U.S. Withdraw or Stay?[/b]
The Iraqi public appears to be increasingly tired of the U.S. presence as more and more Iraqis want the U.S. to leave sooner rather than later.
47% said that the U.S. should leave immediately up from 35% in February 2007. Around 34% said the U.S. should remain until security is restored, down from 39% in February 2007. 10% said the U.S. should remain until the government is stronger, down from 14% in the earlier poll, and 8% said the U.S. should remain until the Iraqis security forces were capable, down from 11% in February.
Economy[/b]
Across the board, the Iraqi economy is seen as only nominally working to not providing for Iraqis at all.
On how reconstruction was going during the surge around 62% said it was worse, approximately 22% said it had no effect, and 10% said it was better.
On how the economy was doing just under 70% said it was worse, around 22% said it had not changed, and around 7% said it was better.
On the availability of jobs 43% said it was very bad, 37% said quite bad, 7% quite good, 4% very good.
On electricity 58% said it was very bad, 35% said quite bad, 6% said good, 2% very good.
On clean water 40% said very bad, 35% quite bad, 16% quite good, 9% very good.
Government[/b]
The Maliki government is widely unpopular and seen as not working. The only positive is that almost 2/3 of Iraqis believe in a unified Iraq rather than a breaking apart of the country or a loose confederation.
When asked how political reconciliation had changed during the surge 70% said things had gotten worse, 20% said no change, 10% said it was better.
When asked how the government was working during the surge around 63% said it was worse, just over 20% said it was no better, and around 11% said it was better.
When asked how the Iraqi government was doing its job overall around 47% said it was doing a very bad job, up from 26% in February 2007. 26% said quite a bad job, unchanged from the last poll, 27% said quite a good job, down from 26% in February, and 6% said very good job, down from 10% last time.
Around 62% disapproved of Prime Minister Maliki, up from around 58% in February 2007.
On their local government 28% said it was very bad, 32% said quite bad, 28% said quite good, 11% very good.
On a positive not, 61% said they supported a unified Iraqi with 95% of Sunnis agreeing, around 57% for Shiites, and only around 8% for Kurds.
Sources[/b]
BBC News, ???Iraq poll September 2007: In graphics,??? 9/10/07 - ???Iraq poll March 2007: In graphics,??? 3/19/07
The whole debate about whether we are making "progress" in Iraq is basically wagging the dog, if the real issue is the supposed war on terrorism. We will have spent $600 billion in Iraq by the end of fiscal year 2008 and its debatable, at best, whether Bush has done more to enable terrorism since 9-11 then prevent it. Iraq is such a fuck-up that its amazing that Democrats are even engaging in this debate about "progress" in Iraq....while basically ignoring the rest of the region and beyond.
Also, when is a democrat gonna stand up and say, as Colin Powell basically did this month in GQ, what are we all so afraid of??? Lets try and manage the more pressing international issues (like forming diplomatic ties with these so-called "evil countries) and tackling important domestic issues, like the fact that there are millions of people without health insurance, before we dedicate every waking moment to the possibility that another bomb could go off in a building somewhere. Moreover, terrorism is a war we can't win, its not going to ever go away. There will always be radicals.
yes, but since there is no way to "win" against terrorism, please justify that $600 billion we are spending in iraq.....and i will allow you to presume that the war in iraq actually has something to do with 9-11.
btw, this was a point made by Colin Powell, the one-time poster boy for the gop.
. Its just empty rhetoric. you say that. i don't accept that as a given and its not my job to prove that you're wrong, the burden is on you.
Regardless of your meaningless talking points, my point was that it is a little harder for someone who lives in downtown manahattan to accept an argument that dismisses a terrorist attack as "a bomb going off somewhere."
earthquakes, hurricanes and tsunamis kill more people than terrorists, so should we spend $600 billion over 4 years towards experimental science that may lessen (or actually increase) the risk of those natural disasters?
no shit people in nyc have more of a reason to worry about terrorism than people in nebraska, but tell me some shit i dont know.
the issue is whether there is any possible justification for spending $600 billion on the iraq war if the goal (war on terror) is unattainable and largely irrelevant to us being there.
the goal (war on terror) is unattainable and largely irrelevant
I would say you dont know that when you make an assertion like this, you should try to back it up with a few facts; placing a word in quotations doesnt give you a free pass on supporting your arguments, but i know you already know that too.
wait, so you are about to be a lawyer, but think that dissenters of the iraq war should have the burden of proving why we shouldn't be there????? i didn't personally cover the $600 billion, but we, as taxpayers did. gtfohwtbs.
also, who in their right mind has said that we are either a) winning the war against terror, b) progressing on the war against terror since being in iraq, or better yet, c) that the greatest chance the us had at fighting this war was by going into iraq in 2003??
no i think that you should have the burden of proving that we can not "win." You can start by defining what "win" means. Since you placed it in quotations, it must mean something different to you than what everyone else understands "win" to mean.
i put it in quotations because its a bullshit term/concept coined by your party. if you think i need to prove that point then you live under a rock. we all know that terrorism will always exist. you tell me what "winning" means? then go back to the original issue of how spending $600 billion in iraq has or could have any impact on reaching that mysterious and undefined goal.
i like that. "[Winning is]a bullshit term/concept." You should tell that to your boss when discussing the cases you are working on. Is "losing" a bullshit term/concept in this context as well? Is "terrorism"?
you keep digging a deeper whole into new depths of stupidity. the whole point is that with regards to terrorism, there is no winning/losing/tying/forfeiting. its like arguing that you can win/lose the war against germs or bacteria. if you want to get back on topic and talk about what that $600 billion has done, please enlighten us.
Comments
The important thing isn't Petraeus' report, which he isn't going to write anyways the White House is, it's what happens in the Spring of 08 when the surge has to end when troop rotations are up. Will anyone in Congress be able to forge a consensus on Iraq or will Bush just be able to play out his hand until his administration ends? Bush is going to win in this case.
and we all know that the most important thing isnt whether we succeed or not in Iraq, but that Bush not be able to "win" -- whatever the fuck that means.
you're right, the use of the word "we" is completely inaccurate.
You mean Bush had a plan to win in Iraq all this time?
???Well, from the day we got in, the plan was to get out at the earliest possible opportunity.[/b] At least that was the plan in the mind of the Defense Department.??? ??? Michael Gordon, military correspondent for the New York Times, author of the book on the invasion and occupation of Iraq Cobra II
???I think that from the outset our emphasis was on getting out of Iraq as quickly as possible[/b], and that had always been the president???s strategy; it had always been Secretary Rumsfeld???s approach, and it was the approach that Gen. Abizaid and Casey had.??? ??? Frederick Kagan, former military historian at West Point, co-author of the current surge policy, resident at the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute
???[Casey] underwrites the notion that we should conduct, large, conventional sweeps into areas where we think the enemy is living and operating. So we move across Anbar province. We go into towns and villages. ??? We end up, ultimately, making far more enemies than we kill because we go into these areas and we kill lots of innocent people[/b]. ??? And in the meantime, because these are large, predictable operations, most of the enemy that you went in there to get is gone before you arrive, melts away. ??? He doesn???t understand that he has reinforced all the wrong things all the way along to make matters worse.??? ??? Col. Douglas Macgregor (Ret.), served in U.S. Army until 2004, military analyst for Jim Lehrer, CNN, NBC, and Fox News
???Casey didn???t understand the situation, didn???t recognize the basic realities of what was happening in Iraq. .. The question Casey has to address is, can we dig ourselves out of this hole? ??? This is best summarized by the study that [Kalev] Sepp, [professor, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California] does for him in I think the fall of ???04. He does a list of best practices in counterinsurgency and worst practices in counterinsurgency. I think of the 12 worst practices, the major mistakes that militaries have made in trying to put down an insurgency, the United States is committing nine of the 12[/b].??? ??? Thomas Ricks, Washington Post
???Enter George Casey, and to his credit, in the summer of ???04, after he arrived, he put together a campaign plan to get everybody on the same page. ???. Nowhere in there is a plan to defeat the insurgency, so we had no military strategy to defeat the insurgency.[/b] We were resting on a political strategy that would hopefully stem the violence because the Sunnis would come into the political process and therefore seek a political solution to the confrontation, no longer an armed solution. We over relied on that. And then there was no forcing function, because we were not defeating the insurgents.[/b]??? ??? Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.), former Army vice chief of staff 1999-2004, co-author of the current surge policy
???As somebody put it ??? it was a-strategic.[/b] The emphasis was on transferring responsibility to the Iraqis, generating more Iraqi soldiers and police, shrinking the number of American bases, beginning to draw down American combat brigades. And to some in the State Department and maybe on the NSC staff, it looked like this process had a life of its own, and it was almost a bit disconnected from the events in Iraq.??? ??? Michael Gordon, New York Times
???This point???s critical ??? you have to have a strategy country wide that tells your battalion and company commanders what their jobs are. ??? That???s what [was] missing. ??? Because the commanding generals did not prepare one.??? ??? Philip Zelikow, former advisor to Secretary of State Rice on Iraq from 2005-2007
???During this time frame in late 2005 and 2006, the White House is talking about a strategy for victory. When I was out in Iraq in Anbar and in Baghdad, I always thought there was a pretty profound disconnect between the rhetoric coming out of Washington in this time frame and what was actually happening, because I don???t think we were really trying to achieve victory. In fact, my sense was that the generals then looked at the insurgency, saw it was resilient, concluded that it couldn???t be defeated in the near term, put the emphasis on building up the Iraqis and handing over to them, and that the actual strategy was premised on the assumption that there would not be a near-term victory. There would be a continued war that we would support. So my sense is we never were going all out to win. We weren???t fighting the war. We were managing the war within available resources, and this was very much the emphasis in the first part of 2006.[/b]??? ??? Michael Gordon, New York Times
???Secretary Rice clearly got the president sold on clear, hold and build. ??? And the weird thing is that the president, having endorsed that particular strategy, seems to have no effect on the ground, because the president has then announced this strategy which the military then doesn???t execute. And I think Rumsfeld at one point even says, ???Oh, we???re not doing clear, hold, build. ??? What I can tell you from the outside is that???s a dysfunctional administration. Something???s not working there if you???ve got the secretary of state enunciating a policy like that, the president adhering to it and endorsing it, and then the military commanders not executing. Something is broken.[/b]??? ??? Frederick Kagan, American Enterprise Institute, co-author of the current surge policy
???Because the rhetoric that the president was evidencing in his remarks almost consistently for three years, he would use terms like ???win,??? ???We???re going to defeat the insurgents,??? ???victory.??? That all would lend itself to a military strategy whose purpose was to defeat the insurgency. We never had that as a mission in Iraq.[/b] And I don???t know if the president, through all those three years, truly understood that.??? ??? Gen. Jack Keane (Ret.), former Army vice chief of staff 1999-2004, co-author of the current surge policy
???As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. ??? The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere.[/b]??? Buddhika Jayamaha, Wesley Smith, Jeremy Roebuck, Omar Mora, Edward Sandmeier, Yance Gray, and Jeremy Murphy, NCOs, 82nd Airborne, currently serving in Iraq
According to the most recent reports he is going to suggest troop reduction.
He HAS to suggest troop reductions. Tours are up beginning in January-February 2008. Most of the troops in the surge have already had their rotations extended from the dictated 12 months to 15 months. Bush isn't going to extend them anymore. The White House'll try to package this as a change in policy and attempt to placate the public and Congress that are increasing calling for withdrawals, but it's something that basically was going to happen no matter what.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Sec. of Def. Gates would like to drawdown troops to the 100,000 level after the surge is up, but Bush will probalby order troop levels to stay at the pre-surge mark of 130,000.
The next question is, what happens to the surge and security with fewer troops? The U.S. has only been able to secure 50% of Baghdad. In majority Sunni areas security is improved. In mixed Sunni-Shiite areas it's pretty precarious. They've done nothing in Shiite neithborhoods which are the majority of the city. Ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from the capitol continues and violence is up in the rest of the country. Since they're having such success in Anbar, they could probably reposition troops by drawing down slightly there and sending more to Baghdad, but it won't be enough to maintain what they've got going right now.
A draft would sustain and even build troops.
Based on the current state of the Bush regime he could easily initiate a lottery draft without much political damage to himself, his friends OR his party.
Every recognizeable staff member or close confidant have bailed.
ALL the Republican candidates are already distancing as far from GWB as possible and some will even use his mistakes in Iraq as campaign fodder.
The fact is Patreaus made a sensible and correct decision if troop reduction is his recommendation.
One that I personally hope and want to believe was made via logic, common sense and the desire to "do the right thing" vs. politics.
I honestly think that certain segments of our Military may be the only non-partison, government sponsored representitives left in our society.
A draft is not going to happen because the military does not want one. End of story. The last thing the military wants is a bunch of people forced to join that don't want to be there, especially during an unpopular war. The Army and Marines almost collapsed because of problems they had with draftees during the Vietnam War. They don't want a repeat.
The decision to draw down troops IS based upon logic. Petraeus doesn't want his troops to revolt by serving an addition 3-6 months in Iraq after they've already been extended past the 12 months of combat duty they were promised when they signed up. It's also not ultimatley his decision because Bush is commander and chief. He doesn't want military families complaining about not seeing their loved ones during an election year in 2008.
As far as the military goes on Iraq, they are politiczed. I don't know if you read my last piece, but the military cooks the books on Iraq because they know high casualty rates makes things look bad. If soldiers get attacked and no one is injured they don't count it. If there's an attack and they don't know who did it it doesn't get counted. If an Iraqi gets murdered they don't count it. If Sunnis kill Sunnis they don't count it. If Shiites kill Shiites they don't count it. In July 2006 the military claimed there were only 93 attacks in the country. The Iraq Study Group found there were atually 1,100. During that same summer the military claimed violence was down in Baghdad 52% during the last campaign there Operation Together Forward II. Afterwards it was revealed that violence and ethnic cleansing were actually escalating then.
"Let's just say that there are several different sources within the administration on violence, and those sources do not agree. So I don't know what Gen. Petraeus is giving you."
This was in reply to a question by Republican Sen. Coleman of Minnesota who said he was shown charts by Gen. Petraeus that violence was down during a trip to Iraq.
One of the tactical military goals of the surge was to try to, but the U.S. doesn't have the troops and the Iraqi security forces are usually working with militias to kick out the remaining Sunnis. There's a good new article in Newsweek about it.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20546328/site/newsweek/
Petraeus seems to be coming up with a new plan for Iraq, which basically gives up on Bush's lofty goals for the surge and Iraq in general. Petraeus is coming to the conclusion that the Maliki government doesn't work, the security forces are not to be trusted, the Shiites have taken over the south and doing so in Baghdad, so the U.S. is left to work with whoever will work with them, i.e. some Iraqi army units and some Sunni tribes. The U.S. will provide money and security to those groups on a case by case, locality by locality basis. If that means getting rid of Iraqi security units, undermining the Maliki government, whatever, they'll do it. It's not really a strategy to win from the sounds of it, but rather to provide protection for the few people they can as the rest of the country goes up in flames.
I just read this great line that said the surge really wasn't to provide cover for Maliki, but for Bush until he ends his presidency. I really think Petraeus and the Pentagon are in a holding pattern until the next president. They're hoping that they can hold on until then, because the next president, no matter what party they come from, will most likely stage a partial withdrawal and redefine the mission in Iraq to containing the conflict.
One of the foundations of the surge plan was the belief that the Maliki government could rise above its sectarian biases and become a partner in a political peace process. That hasn???t happened because the Maliki government is part of the problem in Iraq, not the solution. Maliki is a weak and sectarian leader who is atop a government that doesn???t function, and is often at odds with itself.
December 2005 Iraqi Elections and the Formation of the Maliki Government[/b]
Nouri al-Maliki came to power after the December 2005 elections in Iraq. The major winner in the election was the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance that consisted mainly of the then Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) now Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Moqtada al-Sadr and the Dawa Party. They did not win a majority however, so they joined with the two leading Kurdish parties to form a new government. It took six months, but Maliki, of the Dawa Party, was eventually named prime minister.
Of the major players in the new government, the Dawa Party was the smallest and weakest. Maliki and most of the Dawa leadership had fled during the Saddam dictatorship and lacked popular support within the country upon their return. They also did not have an armed militia like Sadr, SIIC or the Kurds. That was one of the reasons why he was chosen as prime minister. He was a compromise candidate between the rival Shiite SIIC and Sadr. This put Maliki at a serious disadvantage when trying to actually lead the country because he did not have a strong base behind him. Instead, he had to make compromises with parties that were more powerful than him.
Sectarianism, Patronage and Corruption Of The New Government[/b]
Maliki???s government is suppose to be a national unity one, but it actually reflects the sectarian divisions running rampant in the country. Each major party including the Sunnis got cabinet positions. None of them had any real experience running a government before. When they took office they saw their respective ministries as a power base to dole out patronage to their supporters and to embezzle money from. The Sadrists for example were given control of transportation, health, and agriculture. At hospitals across the country Sadr sent in his Mahdi Army militia to man security, purged Sunnis and placed religious rules on procedures that led many doctors to leave. Sunnis quickly learned that if they were sent to a Shiite led hospital they could end up dead instead of receiving medical treatment.
The important Interior and Defense Ministries were given to the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance and the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front respectively. Both are ripe with corruption with security officials stealing money, selling weapons, etc. At the Shiite dominated Interior Ministry, most Sunnis have been forced out, rival Shiite factions control different departments, and security chiefs have to walk through the ministry building in Baghdad with armed guards because they are afraid of being assassinated by rivals. The majority of the police under the ministry???s control are Shiite, loyal to a political party and/or militia, corrupt, and attack Sunnis.
Maliki himself has stood by as Sunnis were ethnically cleansed and denied services. Baghdad use to be 65% Sunni before the war, now it???s down to 15% due to the actions of Shiite militias like Sadr???s Mahdi Army. One of the reasons the violence might be down during the surge in the capitol is the simple fact that there are fewer Sunnis to be killed by Shiites. The government also refuses to provide services to Sunni areas such as Anbar province. While Maliki probably didn???t officially approve these actions, he did nothing to stop them, and thus is complicit.
Disintegration of Maliki???s Cabinet[/b]
To make things worse, during the summer of 2007 as the surge was suppose to help prop up the Maliki government and allow him to work towards political reconciliation, his cabinet rebelled on him. Almost half of his ministers, including the Sadrists, Fadhila Party, and the secular Iraqi National List led by former interim prime minister Iyad Allawi all withdrew. While Maliki quickly put together a ???moderate??? coalition of Dawa, (SIIC), and the Kurds, but that was actually all the support the prime minister had left. More importantly this grouping did not have the votes in parliament to pass any legislation.
Iraq???s Parliament ??? On Paid Leave[/b]
Iraq???s parliament is just as divided as Maliki???s cabinet. Most of the members don???t even show up to sessions. Iyad Allawi for example, who is currently vying to replace Maliki doesn???t even live in Iraq anymore. On 9/4/07 when the parliament reconvened from their summer vacation only 158 out of 275 members were present. That was actually a good turnout because there was enough for a quorum, something that rarely happens.
Even if Maliki were to get a new law through his divided cabinet, it would then have to be forced through parliament. Each party has its own conflicting vision of Iraq and many are connected to armed groups that are fighting either each other or the U.S. The Sunni parties for example, want to get rid of the deBaathification law, hold new elections because they boycotted the first one, provide amnesty for insurgents, and release Sunni prisoners, all of which are opposed by the Shiites who think these actions might lead to the return of Sunni power. Because of these divisions, the parliament has passed no major legislation that the U.S. has called for to promote political reconciliation.
Maliki Has No Power[/b]
Since Maliki first took office he has always been in a position of weakness. Maliki was chosen to be prime minister because his party was the weakest of the Shiite alliance. He has no fighters to back him up, in a country where guns equal power. Almost half of his cabinet has quit on him, and parliament hardly shows up and can???t agree when they do. Cabinet members see their ministries as private fiefdoms to serve their interests rather than those of the nation, nor even Maliki who they supposedly serve under. Maliki has also supported the rise of Shiites to power in Iraq and the forcible removal of Sunnis from Baghdad. Even if Maliki were to get a new law past his cabinet, and approved by parliament there is no guarantee that it would actually be enforced. Since the ministries are basically independent and loyal to their parties they could chose to not enforce a law and Maliki could do nothing about it. Because of Maliki???s sectarian leanings, there???s also no guarantee that he actually wants to reach out to Sunnis and end the conflict.
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley warned President Bush about these problems in a November 2006 memo, but Bush chose to work with Maliki. The U.S. found itself trying to prop up a sectarian and powerless prime minister. As Maliki???s cabinet walked out on him, there have been more and more calls to replace him, but there is simply no one to fill the job. A new prime minister would come from the same Shiite alliance that created Maliki and they would be no more willing to support reconciliation with Sunnis than Maliki has.
This has led Gen. Petraeus to begin to formulate a new policy of ???bottom up??? reconciliation where he is allying the U.S. with former insurgent Sunni tribes in western Iraq. The thinking is if the government won???t recognize these groups and secure those areas, the U.S. military will. The problem is that the Sunnis still oppose the Shiites and the Maliki government. What Iraq is going through is an atomization of power that might lead to the break up of the country or a decentralized and lawless state where each city and region has its own ruler. This is a far cry from Bush???s call for a unified and democratic Iraq that was suppose to be the ultimate goal of the war.
Sources[/b]
Books[/b]
James Baker and Lee Hamilton, ???The Iraq Study Group Report,??? Vintage Books, 2006
Government Reports[/b]
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? August, 2006
- ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? March, 2007
- ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? June, 2007
Government Accountability Office, ???Securing, Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq,??? January, 2007
House Committee on Armed Services, ???Stand Up And Be Counted: The Continuing Challegenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,??? U.S. House Of Representatives, 6/26/07
Kenneth Katzman, ???Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks,??? Congressional Research Service, 6/27/07
- ???Iraq: Government Formation and Benchmarks,??? Congressional Research Service, 8/10/07
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq's Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August, 2007
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,??? 7/30/07
U.S. Department of State, ???Iraq - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices ??? 2006,??? 3/6/07
U.N. Reports[/b]
UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, ???Human Rights Report,??? United Nations, 3/31/07
- ???UNAMI Human Rights Report,??? 1 November - 31 December 2006
U.N. Secretary-General, ???Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004),??? United National Security Council, 6/5/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Pauline Baker, ???A Way Out: The Union Of Iraqi States,??? Fund For Peace, March 2003 to June 2007
Anthony Borden, ???Iraqi Governance Report,??? Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Anthony Cordesman, ???Benchmarks in Iraq: The True Status,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/12/07
- ???Iraq's Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/27/06
- ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
- ???Iraq's Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and Its Evoling Insurgency,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/2/07
- ???Iraq's Troubled Future: The Uncertain Way Ahead,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/13/07
- ???Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11/28/06
- ???Still Losing? The June 2007 Edition of ???Measuring Stability in Iraq,?????? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6/20/07
- ???The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/6/07
Ilan Goldberg, ???Benchmark Report Face Check,??? National Security Network, 7/12/07
Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, and Peter Juul, ???Strategic Reset,??? Center for American Progress, June, 2007
Ashraf al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, ???Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq,??? Brookings Institution, October, 2006
Phebe Marr, ???Iraq's New Political Map,??? United States Institute Of Peace, January, 2007
Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Audra Grant, Terrence Kelly, Andrew Rathmell, David Brannan, ???U.S. Policy Options for Iraq,??? RAND Project Air Force, 8/8/07
Kenneth Pollack, ???A Switch In Time,??? Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, February, 2006
Babak Rahimi, ???A Shiite Storm Looms on the Horizon: Sadr and SIIC Relations,??? Jamestown Foundation, 5/24/07
- ???Maliki Government Faces a Governance Crisis,??? Jamestown Foundation, 7/10/07
Gareth Stansfield, ???Accepting Realities in Iraq,??? Chatham House, May, 2007
Jeffrey White, ???Key Trends to Watch in Iraq,??? Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12/28/06
Articles[/b]
Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ???Iraq: Sadrists ordered to leave Cabinet,??? Seattle Times, 4/16/07
- ???Iraq Parliament back; Weighs No Key Laws,??? Associated Press, 9/4/07
Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Lee Keath, ???Feuding Iraq Gov't Groups Launch Charges,??? Guardian of London, 10/10/06
Michael Abramowitz, ???White House Wants Iraqi Leaders to Reach 'Political Accommodation,?????? Washington Post, 7/22/07
Michael Abramowitz and Robin Wright, ???Doubts About Iraqi Leader's Capabilities Persist,??? Washington Post, 12/17/06
Agence France Presse, ???Iraq using Saddam-era law to block corruption probes: audit,??? 4/30/07
- ???US political pressure on Maliki intensifies,??? 8/26/07
BBC News, ???Iraq corruption 'costs billions',??? BBC News.com, 11/9/06
- ???Iraq torture 'worse after Saddam',??? BBC News.com, 11/21/06
- ???Iraq's PM longs to leave office,??? BBC News.com, 1/3/07
Nicholas Berry, ???Iraq Is Not a Military Problem,??? Foreign Policy Forum, 8/1/07
Damien Cave, ???4 Truck Bombs Kill 190 in Kurdish Area of Iraq,??? New York Times, 8/15/07
- ???Deputy health minister held for aiding militants,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 2/9/07
- ???For Iraqis, a New Rule of Life: Don't Trust Anyone in Uniform,??? New York Times, 8/3/06
- ???Iraq Parliament Finds a Quorum Hard to Come By,??? New York Times, 1/24/07
- ???Iraqi Factions' Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress,??? New York Times, 8/25/07
- ???Iraqi Premier Stirs Discontent, Yet Hangs On,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
- ???Iraqis Are Failing to Meet U.S. Benchmarks,??? New York Times, 6/13/07
David Cloud , ???Panel Will Urge Broad Overhaul of Iraqi Police,??? New York Times, 8/31/07
Juan Cole, ???The war against Iraq???s prime minister,??? Salon.com, 8/29/07
Helene Cooper and David Sanger, ???Iraqis' Progress Lags Behind Pace Set by Bush Plan,??? New York Times, 3/15/07
Anthony Cordesman, ???The elephant gives birth to a mouse,??? Asia Times, 12/8/06
David Corn, ???Secret Report: Corruption is "Norm" Within Iraqi Government,??? The Nation.com, 8/30/07
Sam Dagher, ???Crisis summit aims to save Iraq's Maliki,??? Christian Science Monitor, 8/16/07
- ???In Iraq, a parliament in disarray,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/16/07
- ???Iraq's Shiite political fissures widen,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/18/07
- ???Iraqi government in deepest crisis,??? Christian Science Monitor, 7/27/07
- ???US faced with Iraqi Army turncoats,??? Christian Science Monitor, 7/10/07
Borzou Daragahi, ???Government Fissures Widening,??? Los Angeles Times, 10/16/06
Borzou Daragahi and Alissa Rubin, ???Shiite-Kurds Goals Stymier U.S.,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/22/06
Babak Dehghanpisheh and Larry Kaplow, ???As Sunnis Flee, Shiites Now Dominate Baghdad,??? Newsweek, 9/10/07
Karen DeYoung, ???Doubts Run Deep on Reforms Crucial to Bush's Iraq Strategy,??? Washington Post, 2/4/07
Toby Dodge, ???Staticide in Iraq,??? Le Monde diplomatique, February, 2007
Yochi Drezen and Greg Jaffe, ???Maliki Faces Fresh Doubts, Tests,??? Wal Street Journal, 8/21/07
Yochi Dreazen and Philip Shshkin and Greg Jaffe, ???U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/4/07
Economist, ???Is the surge going to fizzle???? 6/21/07
Leila Fadel, ???Despite violence drop, officers see bleak future for Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/15/07
- ???Iraqi government unraveling as more ministers announce boycott,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/6/07
Stephen Farrell, ???Iraqi President Starts Talk to Try to Bring Sunnis Back,??? New York Times, 8/6/07
- ???Sunni Faction Quits Iraqi Cabinet; Blasts Kill 76 in Capital,??? New York Times, 8/2/07
James Fearon, ???Iraq's Civil War,??? Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2007
Mic hael Fletcher and Ann Scott Tyson, ???Bush, Advisers Make Surprise Visit to Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/3/07
Peter Galbraith, ???The Mess,??? New York Review Of Books, 3/9/06
Bobby Ghosh, ???After Maliki, Few Good Alternatives,??? Time, 8/22/07
- ???Why They Hate Each Other,??? Time, 3/5/07
James Glanz, ???Billions in Oil Missing in Iraq, U.S. Study Says,??? New York Times, 5/12/07
-???Civilian Death Toll Falls in Baghdad but Rises Across Iraq,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Michael Gordon, ???U.S. adviser reports doubts on al-Maliki,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 11/28/06
Stephen Hadley, ???Text of U.S. Security Adviser's Iraq Memo,??? New York Times, 11/29/06
Hamza Hendawl and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ???Talks Under Way to Replace Iraq PM,??? Associated Press, Associated Press
Jimes Hilder, ???3,000 police are sacked as rulers remain cut off and impotent,??? Times UK, 10/18/06
Steven Hurst, ???Iraq PM Stopes Protecting Shiite Militia,??? ABC News.com, 1/21/07
IraqSlogger.com, ???Ghazaliya Protests Pro-US Fighters,??? 8/21/07
Dahr Jamail and Ali Al-Fadhily, ???Iraqi Militias Take Refuge in Facilities Protection Service,??? AntiWar.com, 11/8/06
- ???When Iraqis Gave Up on Government,??? Inter Press Service, 12/27/06
Rick Jervis, ???Al-Maliki support eroding in Iraq,??? USA Today, 4/24/07
- ???Iraq ousts 10,000 in security ministry,??? USA Today, 3/5/07
Zeyad Kasim, ???Sunni Bloc Calls Political Process ???Disaster,?????? IraqSlogger.com, 5/4/07
Ellen Knickmeyer, ???Shiite Giant' Extends Its Reach,??? Washington Post, 8/24/06
Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, ???Iraqi Vote Draws Big Turnout Of Sunnis,??? Washington Post, 12/16/05
Howard LaFranchi, ???Missing: a functional Iraqi state,??? Christian Science Monitor, 12/19/06
- ???US raises pressure on Iraq's leader,??? Christian Science Monitor, 5/10/07
Tom Lasseter, ???U.S. ignored Shiite militias, focused on Sunni insurgency,??? Knight Ridder, 4/18/06
Carolyn Lochhead, ???Shiite clerics challenge U.S. goal in Iraq,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 4/24/03
Ernesto Londono, ???In Baghdad, Rice Acknowledges Frustrations in U.S.,??? Washington Post, 2/18/07
Alastair Macdonald, ???Analysis - After Iraq vote success, now for the hard part,??? Reuters, 12/15/05
Patrick McDonnell, ???Why the Numbers Don't Add Up in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/10/06
Amer Mohsen, ???Iraqi Papers Sat: Who Will Replace Maliki???? IraqSlogger.com, 8/3/07
- ???Iraqi Papers Tues: A New Political Pact?,??? IraqSlogger.com, 3/26/07
Solomon Moore, ???Iraqi Militias Seen as Spinning Out of Control,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/12/06
- ???Lopsided provincial councils keep Iraq off balance,??? Los Angeles Times, 3/11/07
Sami Moubayed, ???Iraq's cabinet falls short,??? Asia Times, 5/21/06
Bassem Mroue and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ???Iraq loses $8 billion through corruption,??? Associated Press, 4/4/07
Shailagh Murray , ???After Iraq Trip, Unshaken resolve,??? Washington Post, 8/26/07
Vali Nasr, ???When the Shiites Rise,??? Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006
Amit Paley, ???Iraqi Hospitals Are War's New 'Killing Fields,?????? Washington Post, 8/30/06
Amit Paley and K.I. Ibrahim, ???Sadr Political Bloc Calls for Overhaul of Iraqi Cabinet,??? Washington Post, 10/2/06
Ned Parker, ???Interior Ministry mirrors chaos of a fractured Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 7/30/07
- ???Iraq's leader can't get out of 1st gear,??? Los Angeles Times, 6/6/07
- ???Shiite militia infiltrates Iraqi forces,??? Los Angles Times, 8/16/07
Joshua Partlow, ???Iraqi Shiites, Kurds Announce New Political Alliance,??? Washington Post, 8/17/07
- ???Six Members of Sunni Bloc Quit Iraq Cabinet in Protest,??? Washington Post, 6/30/07
Joshua Partlow and Robin Wright, ???Top Iraqi Officials Growing Restless,??? Washington Post, 6/21/07
Carlos Pascual and Kenneth Pollack, ???The Critical Battles: Political Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Iraq,??? Washington Quarterly, Summer 2007
Walter Pincus, ???Shhh ??? There Is Corruption in Iraq,??? Washington Post, 6/25/07
- ???U.S. Military Urging Iraq to Rein In Guard Force,??? Washington Post, 12/25/06
Llene Prusher, ???Next in Iraq: coalition-building,??? Christian Science Monitor, 12/19/05
Sudarsan Raghavan, ???For Iraq's Shiites, a Dream Deferred Breeds Mistrust of U.S.,??? Washington Post, 1/2/07
- ???Maliki's Impact Blunted By Own Party's Fears,??? Washington Post, 8/3/07
Sudarsan Raghavan and Ellen Knickmeyer, ???Sadr, a Question Mark Etched in Black,??? Washington Post, 9/11/06
Reuters, ???Iraq charges 100 over prions torture,??? 11/7/06
Paul Richter, ???U.S. Frustrated by Pace of Change in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/16/06
Thomas Ricks, ???McCaffrey Paints Gloomy Picture of Iraq,??? Washington Post, 3/28/07
Nir Rosen, ???Anatomy of a Civil War,??? Boston Review, November-December 2006
Alissa Rubin, ???Iraqi Shiite Parties Agree to Try to Unite Moderates,??? New York Times, 6/29/07
- ???Moderates Try to Break Iraq's Sectarian Legjam,??? New York Times, 7/6/07
- ???Sunni Ministers Threaten to Quit Cabinet in Iraq,??? New York Times, 5/1/07
San Francisco Chronicle, ???U.S. military divided on troop withdrawal,??? 8/25/07
David Sanger, ???Bush Is Said to Approve More Aid to Iraqi Sunnis Battling Extremist Groups,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
- ???The White House Scales back Talk of Iraq Progress,??? New York Times, 4/28/07
Mark Seibel and Leila Fadel, ???U.S. officials: Militias main threat to Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 7/31/07
Megan Stack and Borzou Daragahi, ???Unity Government Begins A New Chapter For Iraq,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 5/21/06
Matthew Stannard, ???Experts doubt Iraqis can make Bush plan work,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 1/13/07
Farah Stockman, ???US struggles to keep Iraqi leader at helm,??? Boston Globe, 8/21/07
Tina Susman, ???Troop buildup fails to reconcile Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/4/07
Sabrina Tavernise, ???Shiite leader voices distrust of Sunnis within legislature,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 10/2/06
Ivan Watson, ???U.S. Weapons from Iraq Making Their Way to Turkey,??? National Public Radio, 8/24/07
Edward Wong, ???Dobuts Rise on Iraqi Premier's Strength,??? New York Times, 9/20/06
Edward Wong and Paul von Zielbauer, ???Iraq police riddled by Shiite militia,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 9/17/06
Robert Worth and Sabrina Tavernise, ???Radical Cleric Rising as a Kingmaker in Iraqi Politics,??? New York Times, 2/15/06
Nancy Youssef, ???Defense chief: U.S. underestimated sectarian hatred in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/2/07
Fareed Zakaria, ???Rethinking Iraq: The Way Forward,??? Newsweek, 11/6/06
Az-Zaman, ???Iraqi Papers Sat: Front of the ???Moderates,?????? IraqSlogger.com, 8/17/07
Alexander Zavis, ???Lawmakers seek moderates,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 2/1/07
Experts Doubt Drop In Violence in Iraq
Military Statistics Called Into Question
By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, September 6, 2007; A16
The U.S. military's claim that violence has decreased sharply in Iraq in recent months has come under scrutiny from many experts within and outside the government, who contend that some of the underlying statistics are questionable and selectively ignore negative trends.
Reductions in violence form the centerpiece of the Bush administration's claim that its war strategy is working. In congressional testimony Monday, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, is expected to cite a 75 percent decrease in sectarian attacks. [/b]According to senior U.S. military officials in Baghdad, overall attacks in Iraq were down to 960 a week in August, compared with 1,700 a week in June, and civilian casualties had fallen 17 percent between December 2006 and last month. Unofficial Iraqi figures show a similar decrease.
Others who have looked at the full range of U.S. government statistics on violence, however, accuse the military of cherry-picking positive indicators and caution that the numbers -- most of which are classified -- are often confusing and contradictory. "Let's just say that there are several different sources within the administration on violence, and those sources do not agree," Comptroller General David Walker told Congress[/b] on Tuesday in releasing a new Government Accountability Office report on Iraq.
...
The intelligence community has its own problems with military calculations. Intelligence analysts computing aggregate levels of violence against civilians for the NIE puzzled over how the military designated attacks as combat, sectarian or criminal, according to one senior intelligence official in Washington.[/b] "If a bullet went through the back of the head, it's sectarian," the official said. "If it went through the front, it's criminal."
"Depending on which numbers you pick," he said, "you get a different outcome." Analysts found "trend lines . . . going in different directions" compared with previous years, when numbers in different categories varied widely but trended in the same direction. "It began to look like spaghetti."
Among the most worrisome trends cited by the NIE was escalating warfare between rival Shiite militias in southern Iraq[/b] that has consumed the port city of Basra and resulted last month in the assassination of two southern provincial governors. According to a spokesman for the Baghdad headquarters of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), those attacks are not included in the military's statistics. "Given a lack of capability to accurately track Shiite-on-Shiite and Sunni-on-Sunni violence, except in certain instances," the spokesman said, "we do not track this data to any significant degree."[/b]
Attacks by U.S.-allied Sunni tribesmen -- recruited to battle Iraqis allied with al-Qaeda -- are also excluded from the U.S. military's calculation of violence levels.[/b]
This is the big month for reports on Iraq, so here???s a report card on the surge. First it???s important to break the surge into its parts. There???s a military, an economic, and a political side, as well as tactical and strategic goals. In the past 9 months the policy has seen dramatic tactical military success in Anbar province, mixed results in Baghdad, while achieving none of its ultimate political goals. In fact, the Sunni policy and the lack of attention to the rest of the country might be leading to the partition of Iraq. There???s also the looming question of what will happen after the surge ends in the Spring of 2008.
Breaking Down the Parts of the Surge[/b]
The surge is a military tactic to achieve a political goal. When Bush outlined the plan in January 2007 he laid out the tactics, the means, and the strategic goals, the ultimate point, of the plan. Bush said that he would be sending in 30,000 additional troops to Iraq. Around 10,000 would be sent to Anbar province to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq because Bush said they were the main threat to stability in the country. A little over 20,000 would be sent to Baghdad to protect the population. The U.S. and Iraq would also be spending new reconstruction money to help win over the population. This was the tactical side, to use counterinsurgency techniques and reconstruction projects in Baghdad to win the hearts and minds of the public while fighting terrorism in Anbar.
It was hoped that if violence was reduced in the capitol, the Iraqi government would reconcile their differences and pass legislation to bring together the three main factions in Iraq, the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis. This was the ultimate strategic goal of the surge. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Crocker was the one designated to push and cajole the Iraqi government into passing new laws to achieve ultimate peace in the country. These laws included a new Debaathification law, a hydrocarbon law to distribute oil revenues, new local elections, amending the constitution, disarming militias, an amnesty for former insurgents, and resolving the future of Kirkuk.
Grades For The Tactical Military and Economic Side[/b]
Overall Grade: C-
It???s on the tactical military level that the surge has seen its greatest successes, but these are limited to specific areas. There are two parts to the military side of the surge, one focused on Anbar province, and the other on Baghdad. The economic policy has also been mixed.
Anbar Province
Grade: B+
Violence and attacks in Anbar province have dropped dramatically. The harsh tactics and strict religious rules of the Islamist faction of the insurgency turned many Sunni tribes against it, leading these groups to reach out to the U.S. On the other hand, one of the main motivations of the insurgency was to regain power for the Sunnis. Many tribes feel they got as far as they could with the insurgency, and now believe they can get money, recognition and local power from working with the Americans. Many Sunnis are also afraid of the influence Iran now has in the country and see the Shiites as their ultimate enemy.
In turn, the U.S. has paid these tribes for fighters who have formed local security units to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq. Bombings, attacks, etc. are all down across the board in Anbar. It???s an ironic success story however, because turning the tribes against Al Qaeda in Iraq was not a goal of the U.S. nor Iraqi government when the surge was announced. It highlights the fact that Iraqis will ultimately decide the future of Iraq, not Americans.
The major tactical problem in Anbar is that the U.S. wants its newly formed Sunni units to be officially recruited into the Iraqi security services. The Shiite led government has been reluctant to accept many of them. At best, about half of the Sunni fighters have been accepted into the Interior Ministry and the actual numbers might be lower. The stance of Prime Minister Maliki seems to be nervousness that the Sunnis might eventually turn against the government, but as long as they are far away in Anbar they can be largely ignored. Even when the units are accepted into the security forces, Baghdad rarely pays nor supplies them with equipment, leaving that to the Americans.
The highlight of the effort in Anbar is that enough tribes have turned on Al Qaeda in Iraq that it has had to relocate to Diyala province south of Baghdad. The success also does not mean that the insurgency is down and out. There are still other insurgent groups that are alive and well and attacks still occur in Anbar, they are just not as frequent as before.
Baghdad
Grade: C-
In Baghdad military results have been mixed. In largely Sunni areas violence is down. In mixed areas, there are still attacks and ethnic cleansing going on. The U.S. has had little if any impact on Shiite areas, which are the majority of the capitol.
In Sunni areas, the U.S. has tried to replicate the model set in Anbar by organizing former insurgents and armed citizens into local security units. Like Anbar, attacks on U.S. forces have gone down. Again, the main reason Sunnis have switched sides in the capitol, is because they see the Shiites as their main enemy, not the Americans. Fewer of these units have been accepted into the Interior Ministry because the Shiites are attempting to take over the capitol and are afraid of the future intentions of the Sunnis. One U.S. officer complained that when he was given a list of Sunni recruits who had been accepted into the Interior Ministry that he organized, he found that many of their names had been changed. He thought it was a sign that the Shiites were attempting to undermine the Sunni policy.
In mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods the results are mixed at best. Again, the U.S. has tried to organize Sunnis but they have come into conflict with Shiite led army and police units. Shiite army officers say they have the right to arrest any Sunni fighter that is not officially part of the Iraqi government. In one case, a U.S. unit had to call in a flyby with jets to stop an Iraqi army unit from arresting a group of Sunni fighters that could???ve escalated into a riot or shoot-out between the two sides. More importantly, ethnic cleansing by Shiite militias and their allies in the security forces continues unabated in these areas. In May 2007 the U.S. claimed that they had stopped the displacement of Iraqis in the capitol, but humanitarian groups say that more Iraqis are fleeing since the surge started. The capitol has gone from 65% Sunni before the 2003 invasion to around 15% today.
In Shiite areas the U.S. has had a minimal affect. American forces have only approached the border of Sadr City in Baghdad, and have not been able to turn any real segment of the Shiite population away from Moqtada al-Sadr. They have also attempted to organize Shiite tribes like their Sunni counterparts, but the problem is most Shiites see the militias as benefactors rather than nuisances. Militias have continued to grow in power and influence during the surge. Not only do they provide protection and public services to people like electricity and gas, but they rent and sell homes taken from Sunnis to Shiites thus making money while expanding Shiite power in the capitol at the same time.
While Gen. Petraeus has claimed that violence is down 75% in the capitol from December 2006 to August 2007, that number is very debatable. The U.S. has only secured half of the capitol and that is probably the most it can cover. Not only that, but the U.S. military has constantly changed what it counts as sectarian violence since 2006. In fact, the military has admitted that many forms of violence such as Sunni on Sunni and Shiite on Shiite are not counted, and the Government Accountability Office found that the different parts of the U.S. government use different measures leading to different numbers on violence in Iraq.
Security In The Rest of Iraq
Grade: F
Security in the rest of the Iraq has deteriorated during the surge. Military operations in the Baghdad suburbs have resulted in only minimal gains, violence is up in the rest of the country, and Shiite factions are fighting each other in the South, bringing into question one of the bases of the surge, the centrality of Baghdad to peace in the country.
U.S. forces also launched military campaigns in areas South of Baghdad in an attempt to route out insurgent groups there. These campaigns have had mixed results. While the U.S. killed some fighters and seized weapons caches, they admitted that most insurgents fled long before the U.S. arrived. These campaigns were also short in duration and the insurgents probably returned as soon as U.S. forces moved on.
More importantly, deaths across Iraq are up since the surge. The Associated Press counted around 14,800 deaths from January to August 2007 compared to 13,811 in all of 2006. Many insurgent groups have simply left the capitol and Anbar and relocated in other areas where there are fewer U.S. troops. Shiite factions have also increased attacks on each other for control of southern Iraq as the British have mostly withdrawn their troops. This brings up a tactical flaw in U.S. planning. Surge advocates argued that Baghdad was the center of the conflict in Iraq. With violence bubbling up in other parts of the country however, many Iraqis and the government still feel in a state of crisis rather than more secure as the surge was suppose to achieve.
Reconstruction Efforts
Grade: C
The surge also had an economic side to it. The plan was to provide local reconstruction efforts to secure the goodwill of the population after security had been improved. The Maliki government was also suppose to spend $10 billion in reconstruction money. To achieve this goal the U.S. doubled the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq from 10 to 20. The teams suffer from many problems. They are undermanned, and underfunded and only operate in areas with a strong U.S. military presence. They also do not have an overall command structure with each group doing whatever it wants in its area of operation with little to no coordination with others. These teams have been most successful in Anbar where security is the best, and mixed in Baghdad. On the Iraqi side, things have been worse. The Iraqi government can barely spend its money because of untrained, incompetent and corrupt staff. The government has also consistently refused to send funds to Sunni areas. According to the Inspector General for reconstruction in Iraq, Baghdad had spent $0 of its 2007 budget in Anbar for example, having given the province no new cash as of July 2007.
Security After the Surge?
The surge will come to an end in the spring of 2008 as the additional U.S. troops are withdrawn when their tours are up. The question is what will happen to security afterwards. Iraqi units are suppose to eventually take over security from American forces, but the number of Iraqi units able to operate independently has actually dropped during the surge because the U.S. is not focused on training Iraqi forces anymore. While some Iraqi army units are making progress the police are filled with Shiites and militia members. None of them can go anywhere without U.S. help and many units have half of their personnel missing at any given time. The Iraqi Defense and Interior Ministries are also notoriously corrupt and incompetent. One of the positive innovations of the surge was a change in attitude to the Iraqi forces. Rather than seeing them as a partner, they were considered a part of the problem. For all of these problems it???s nearly impossible to expect the Iraqis to take up security after the surge is over. In the end, Anbar might become self-sustainable with Sunni tribes playing a larger role and fewer U.S. troops, but in Baghdad things will probably deteriorate.
Grades For The Strategic Political Side[/b]
Overall Grade: D-
The U.S. has achieved none of its strategic political goals from the surge. Not only that, but it???s Sunni policy and neglect of the south and north might actually lead to the soft partition or break up of the country rather than achieve Bush???s stated goal of a unified Iraq under a central government.
???Bottom Up??? Local Reconciliation
Grade: D
Gen. Petraeus and President Bush have recently turned to local reconciliation as a sign of political progress resulting from the surge. This was not a part of the surge when it was announced however. The U.S. is hoping that its??? new found Sunni allies in Anbar and Baghdad can be eventually recognized by the central government and provide a means of reconciliation between the sides. However in interview after interview with Sunnis they repeatedly say that they want to fight the Shiites and see the central government as controlled by Iran. The Shiite government and security forces have also been hostile to the Sunni groups. Given the fact that U.S. units have to draw down in 2008 it???s an open question if the Sunni policy can be maintained at the same levels. In Anbar the tribes can probably do what they want because they are so removed from the Shiites. If trends continue in Baghdad however, many Sunni units and their neighborhoods might be wiped out by ethnic cleansing. Given this limited time frame and extenuating circumstances, its probably unlikely that the Shiite led government will reconcile with the Sunnis anytime soon.
More importantly, as the U.S. is only working with Sunnis they might be increasing the sectarian divide in the country, rather than working to end them. Anbar for example, might become a largely autonomous Sunni region.
National Reconciliation
Grade: F
During the surge the Iraqi parliament has passed no major legislation, and can???t be expected to anytime soon. Even if it did, it???s an open question whether the laws would be followed or equally enforced. The Maliki government has promised five times to deal with new laws since the surge began in January 2007, but at the most, they have only been drafted, and sent to parliament where nothing has happened. When parliament recently reconvened in September 2007 they had no reconciliation laws on its agenda. The different factions that make up the government are so divided that they can???t be expected to make any major moves. Maliki???s government has actually fallen apart during the surge with almost half of his cabinet boycotting. Because Maliki holds very little power, and each ministry is almost an independent fiefdom run by the political party that controls it, there???s no telling whether a law would be enforced if passed. Of equal concern is the fact that the Kurdish north, Sunni west and Shiite south are increasingly exerting their independence from the central government so the regions might not follow any laws passed anyway. The surge policy was flawed from the beginning on this count, believing that a largely military plan could get the Maliki government to make any political moves.
Politics After the Surge?
The Iraqi government can be expected to be deadlocked as ever after the surge ends in the spring of 2008. Most legislation will continue to flounder. As many point out, the Iraqi government is dysfunctional. Outside Baghdad, the country is slowly devolving into regional powers that might become autonomous not out of an act of government, but because the government doesn???t work and has little to no authority. All of the different factions have to resolve their differences on their own timetables, not one dictated by the U.S.
Sources[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Bush, President George W., ???President???s Radio Address,??? Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 8/18/07
Katzman, Kenneth, ???Iraq: Government Formatio n and Benchmarks,??? Congressional Research Service, 8/10/07
Mathews, Jessica, ???The Situation in Iraq,??? House Armed Services Committee, 7/18/07
National Intelligence Council, ???Prospects for Iraq???s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive,??? National Intelligence Estimate, August 2007
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ???Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Government,??? 7/30/07
Walker, David, ???Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,??? Government Accountability Office, 9/4/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Baker, Pauline, ???A War Out: The Union of Iraqi States,??? Fund For Peace, March 2003 to June 2007
Borden, Anthony, ???Iraqi Governance Report,??? Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Bruno, Greg, ???The Preparedness of Iraq Security Forces,??? Council On Foreign Relations, 9/4/07
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
- ???The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/6/07
National Security Network, ???Drop in Violence???? 8/30/07
Oliker, Olga, Crane, Keith, Grant, Audra, Kelly, Terrence, Rathmell, Andrew, Brannan, David, ???U.S. Policy Options for Iraq,??? RAND Project Air Force, 8/8/07
Simon, Steven, ???Prepared testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 7/17/07
Articles[/b]
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, ???Iraq Parliament Back: Weighs No Key Laws,??? Associated Press, 9/4/07
Agence France Presse, ???US political pressure on Maliki intensifies,??? 8/26/07
Attewill, Fred, and agencies, ???Iraq bombs death toll rises to 400,??? Guardian Unlimited U.K., 8/16/07
Barnes, Julian, ???Sadr???s army proves hard to beat,??? Los Angeles Times, 8/23/07
Burns, John, ???Militants Said to Flee Before U.S. Offensive,??? New York Times, 6/23/07
Burns, Robert, ???Panel: U.S. Underreported Iraq Violence,??? Associated Press, 12/6/06
Cave, Damien, ???4 Truck Bombs Kill 190 in Kurdish Area of Iraq,??? New York Times, 8/15/07
- ???Iraqi Factions??? Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress,??? New York Times, 8/25/07
- ???Iraqi Premier Stirs Discontent, Yet Hangs On,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Cloud, David, ???Panel Will Urge Broad Overhaul of Iraqi Police,??? New York Times, 8/31/07
Cole, Juan, ???The war against Iraq???s prime minister,??? Salon.com, 8/29/07
Corn, David, ???Secret Report: Corruption is ???Norm??? Within Iraqi Government,??? The Nation.com, 8/30/07
Dagher, Sam, ???As British leave Basra, militias dig in,??? Christian Science Monitor 8/28/07
- ???Crisis summit aims to save Iraq???s Maliki,??? Christian Science Monitor, 8/16/07
Dehghanpisheh, Babak and Kaplow, Larry, ???As Sunnis Flee, Shiites Now Dominate Baghdad,??? Newsweek, 9/10/07
DeYoung, Karen, ???Experts Doubt Drop In Violence In Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/6/07
- ???Pentagon seeks better grades for Iraq in GAO audit,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/31/07
DeYoung, Karen and Ricks, Thomas, ???Report Finds Little Progress On Iraq Goals,??? Washington Post, 8/30/07
Drezen, Yochi and Jaffe, Greg, ???Maliki Faces Fresh Doubts, Tests,??? Wall Street Journal, 8/21/07
Dreazen, Yochi and Shishking, Philip and Jaffe, Greg, ???U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/4/07
Economist, ???Is the surge going to fizzle???? 6/21/07
Fadel, Leila, ???Despite violence drop, officers see bleak future for Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/15/07
Farrell, Stephen, ???50 Die in Fight Between Shiite Groups in Karbala,??? New York Times, 8/29/07
Fletcher, Michael and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Bush, Advisers Make Surprise Visit to Iraq,??? Washington Post, 9/3/07
- ???In Iraq, Bush Cites Gains,??? Washington Post, 9/4/07
Glanz, James, ???Civilian Death Toll Falls in Baghdad but Rises Across Iraq,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Glanz, James, and Farrell, Stephen, ???A U.S.-Backed Plan for Sunni Neighborhood Guards Is Tested,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
- ???More Iraqis Said to Flee Since Troop Increase,??? New York Times, 8/24/07
Goldenberg Ilan, ???More Fuzziness,??? DemocracyArsenal.org, 8/30/07
Gordon, Michael, ???The Former-Insurgent-Counterinsurgency,??? New York times, 9/2/07
Greenwall, Megan, ???Iraqi Leaders Reach Accord On Prisoners, Ex-Baathists,??? Washington Post, 8/27/07
- ???Sporadic Raids South Of Baghdad Yield Little,??? Washington Post, 8/28/07
Howard, Michael, ???The struggle for Iraq???s oil flares up as Kurds open doors to foreign investors,??? Guardian U.K., 8/7/07
Hurst, Steven, ???Violence lessens in Baghdad as it grows elsewhere,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/26/07
Ignatius, David, ???Post-Iraq Strategy,??? Washington Post, 8/26/07
IraqSlogger.com, ???Ghazaliya Protests Pro-US Fighters,??? 8/21/07
Jayamaha, Buddhika, Smith, Wesley, Roebuck, Jeremy, Mora, Omar, Sandmeier, Edward, Gray, Yance, and Murphy, Jeremy, ???The War as We Saw It,??? New York Times, 8/19/07
Kaplan, Fred, ???Challenging the Generals,??? New York Times, 8/26/07
Kaplow, Larry, ???Iraq Blackouts Get Worse, Fuel Anger,??? Newsweek, 8/22/07
Murray, Shailagh, ???After Iraq Trip, Unshaken resolve,??? Washington Post, 8/26/07
Myers, Steven Lee and Shanker, Thom, ???White House to Offer Iraq Plan of Gradual Cutes,??? New York Times, 8/18/07
O???Hanlon, Michael, ???The Work Behind Our Iraq Views,??? Washington Post, 8/25/07
Oppel, Richard, ???Quieter Fallujah fears U.S. exit,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/19/07
Parker, Ned, ???Shiite militia infiltrates Iraqi forces,??? Los Angles Times, 8/16/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Iraqi Shiites, Kurds Announce New Political Alliance,??? Washington Post, 8/17/07
- ???Singing Up Sunnis With ???Insurgent??? on Their Resumes,??? Washington Post, 9/4/07
Pascual, Carlos and Cullin, Brian, ???The U.N.???s Role in Iraq,??? Washington Post, 8/23/07
Reid, Robert, ???August particularly deadly for Iraqis,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 9/2/07
San Francisco Chronicle, ???U.S. military divided on troop withdrawal,??? 8/25/07
Sanger, David, ???Bush Is Said to Approve More Aid to Iraqi Sunnis Battling Extremist Groups,??? New York Times, 9/2/07
Schoof, Renee and Strobel, Warren, ???Report: Surge hasn???t cut attacks on Iraqi civilians,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/4/07
Shanahan, Dennis, ???Surge working: top US general,??? Australian, 8/31/07
Stockman, Farah, ???US struggles to keep leader at helm Defections strike Maliki???s coalition,??? Boston Globe, 8/21/07
Sudarsan, Raghavan, ???No Relief From Fear,??? Washington Post, 9/5/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???A Deadly Clash at Donkey Island,??? Washington Post, 8/19/07
- ???New Strategy Urged in Briefing to Petraeus,??? Washington Post, 9/1/07
- ???Sunni Fighters Find Strategic Benefits in Tentative Alliance With U.S.,??? Washington Post, 8/9/07
Youssef, Nancy, ???U.S. general: Iraq ???surge??? likely to end in spring,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/17/07
Zaman, Az, ???Iraqi Papers Sat: Front of the ???Moderates,?????? IraqSlogger.com, 8/17/07
The surge is based upon using classic counterinsurgency tactics. Counterinsurgency is a combined military, economic and political doctrine that sees the public, not the enemy, as the most important factor in the conflict, and attempts to win their loyalty away from the insurgents. A poll conducted by the BBC and ABC News released on 9/10/07 shows that the U.S. effort has failed to gain popular support amongst Iraqis. The poll was conducted amongst 2,000 Iraqis and on every question there was a sense that things were getting worse under the surge rather than better. 70% said security and political reconciliation had gotten worse during the surge and 57% said it was okay to attack U.S. forces. Sentiment has gotten worse since the last time the BBC and ABC released such a poll in March 2007. The only positives were the fact that Sunnis had reduced their negative remarks from the last poll, while still feeling the most desperate of Iraq???s three major groups, and 62% of all Iraqis believed in a unified country.
Security[/b]
If the major tactical military goal of the surge was to provide security and win hearts and minds it doesn???t appear to be working.
When asked what security was like in their area during the surge 70% said it was worse, 10% said no change, around 18% said things had gotten better.
When asked how security was in other parts of Iraq during the surge around 69% said worse, 20% said no change, around 11% said things were better.
When asked how security was broken down by region 32% said all of Iraq was very bad, 24% quite bad, 28% quite good and 15% very good. Central Iraq, which includes Baghdad, had the most negative responses with 51% saying their security was very bad, 31% saying it was quite bad, compared with only 14% saying it was quite good and 4% saying very good. Those results were largely the same as the March 2007 poll. The major change was with Sunnis. In the September poll 42% said security was very bad, down from 70% in March, 25% said quite bad up from 23% in March, 25% said it was quite good, up from 6% in March, and finally 27% said it was quite good compared with 1% in the last poll. While 67% of Sunnis still had a bad view of security, it wasn???t the horrible mark of 93% in March. That reflects the fact that the surge has concentrated on Sunni areas.
57% of Iraqis said that it was acceptable to attack Americans. 93% of Sunnis in the poll said it was okay, compared to 50% of Shiites. While the U.S. was securing Sunni areas, they still appear to be hostile to Americans.
In comparison only 7% of Iraqis said it was acceptable to attack Iraqi security forces.
During the last poll, the U.S. was seen as the leading cause of violence. That feeling has faded and now Iraqis blame Al Qaeda in Iraq, with the U.S. coming in second. That might reflect the change in attitudes amongst many Sunnis who are now working with the U.S.
When asked ???Who do you blame most for the violence that is occurring in the country???? around 21% said Al Qeada in Iraq and foreign fighters, around 19% said the U.S., around 11% said Iran, approximately 9% said the government, around 7% said Pres. Bush, around 6% said Shiite militias, 6% said Sunni insurgents, 5% said sectarian disputes, 4% said criminals, 2% said it was the Iraqi army, 2% the Iraqi police, 2% Saudi Arabia, 2% Syria, 1% Turkey.
Compared to a poll conducted in February 2007 there was a dramatic decrease in those who blamed the U.S. In that earlier poll, the U.S. was far and away seen as the leading cause of violence at 31% with Al Qaeda in Iraq coming in second at 21%. Iran saw a large increase going from 7% in February to 11% in the newer poll.
In a question that relates to ethnic cleansing, more than 70% of Iraqis say people do not have the freedom to live where they want, with almost 95% of Sunnis saying the situation is bad. That probably reflects the fact that Sunnis have continued to be forced out of Baghdad and sections of central Iraq by Shiite militias and their allies in the Iraqi security forces.
On ???freedom to live where choose??? 45% of Iraqis said the situation was very bad, 32% quite bad, 15% quite good, and 8% very good. Sunnis had the worst responses with 64% saying it was very bad, and 31% quite bad. Overall, the insecurity amongst Sunnis has not changed from September when 95% of Sunnis said the situation was bad compared to 96% in March.
Should the U.S. Withdraw or Stay?[/b]
The Iraqi public appears to be increasingly tired of the U.S. presence as more and more Iraqis want the U.S. to leave sooner rather than later.
47% said that the U.S. should leave immediately up from 35% in February 2007. Around 34% said the U.S. should remain until security is restored, down from 39% in February 2007. 10% said the U.S. should remain until the government is stronger, down from 14% in the earlier poll, and 8% said the U.S. should remain until the Iraqis security forces were capable, down from 11% in February.
Economy[/b]
Across the board, the Iraqi economy is seen as only nominally working to not providing for Iraqis at all.
On how reconstruction was going during the surge around 62% said it was worse, approximately 22% said it had no effect, and 10% said it was better.
On how the economy was doing just under 70% said it was worse, around 22% said it had not changed, and around 7% said it was better.
On the availability of jobs 43% said it was very bad, 37% said quite bad, 7% quite good, 4% very good.
On electricity 58% said it was very bad, 35% said quite bad, 6% said good, 2% very good.
On clean water 40% said very bad, 35% quite bad, 16% quite good, 9% very good.
Government[/b]
The Maliki government is widely unpopular and seen as not working. The only positive is that almost 2/3 of Iraqis believe in a unified Iraq rather than a breaking apart of the country or a loose confederation.
When asked how political reconciliation had changed during the surge 70% said things had gotten worse, 20% said no change, 10% said it was better.
When asked how the government was working during the surge around 63% said it was worse, just over 20% said it was no better, and around 11% said it was better.
When asked how the Iraqi government was doing its job overall around 47% said it was doing a very bad job, up from 26% in February 2007. 26% said quite a bad job, unchanged from the last poll, 27% said quite a good job, down from 26% in February, and 6% said very good job, down from 10% last time.
Around 62% disapproved of Prime Minister Maliki, up from around 58% in February 2007.
On their local government 28% said it was very bad, 32% said quite bad, 28% said quite good, 11% very good.
On a positive not, 61% said they supported a unified Iraqi with 95% of Sunnis agreeing, around 57% for Shiites, and only around 8% for Kurds.
Sources[/b]
BBC News, ???Iraq poll September 2007: In graphics,??? 9/10/07
- ???Iraq poll March 2007: In graphics,??? 3/19/07
Also, when is a democrat gonna stand up and say, as Colin Powell basically did this month in GQ, what are we all so afraid of??? Lets try and manage the more pressing international issues (like forming diplomatic ties with these so-called "evil countries) and tackling important domestic issues, like the fact that there are millions of people without health insurance, before we dedicate every waking moment to the possibility that another bomb could go off in a building somewhere. Moreover, terrorism is a war we can't win, its not going to ever go away. There will always be radicals.
That might be easy for you to say, but one person's "somewhere" is another person's "here."
btw, this was a point made by Colin Powell, the one-time poster boy for the gop.
Regardless of your meaningless talking points, my point was that it is a little harder for someone who lives in downtown manahattan to accept an argument that dismisses a terrorist attack as "a bomb going off somewhere."
no shit people in nyc have more of a reason to worry about terrorism than people in nebraska, but tell me some shit i dont know.
the issue is whether there is any possible justification for spending $600 billion on the iraq war if the goal (war on terror) is unattainable and largely irrelevant to us being there.
I would say you dont know that when you make an assertion like this, you should try to back it up with a few facts; placing a word in quotations doesnt give you a free pass on supporting your arguments, but i know you already know that too.
also, who in their right mind has said that we are either a) winning the war against terror, b) progressing on the war against terror since being in iraq, or better yet, c) that the greatest chance the us had at fighting this war was by going into iraq in 2003??
says you. thats what you say because you're too cheap to pony up the $600B it costs to try and fight.