This is the 5 year anniversary of the Iraq war. Here's a report on how the U.N. inspectors disproved most of America's claims about Iraq's WMD and nuclear programs, but went ahead with the war anyway.
The U.N. Inspectors Were Right: Iraq Was Not A Threat[/b]
The Bush administration claimed that U.N. inspections were the last chance for Iraq to come clean about its WMD and nuclear programs and disarm to avoid a war. The U.S. however, never saw them as a way out. Rather inspections were simply a means to achieve the goal of starting a war. They hoped that Saddam would either reject the U.N. inspectors outright or if they were allowed in, they would find enough evidence of Iraq???s weapons programs to justify a war. When U.N. inspections began anew in November 2002 they found nothing despite repeated visits to every suspected site listed by the U.S. The White House claimed that the inspectors were being played by Iraq, and the war went ahead anyway in March 2003. After the war, U.N. inspectors were proved to be right after all, Iraq had no WMD or nuclear program and was not a military threat. Iraq???s programs had been destroyed by the same inspectors the White House had been attacking as ineffective.
Iraq???s Catch-22[/b]
The U.N. first started weapons inspections of Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War with Resolutions 687 and 715. Saddam had developed WMD and started a nuclear program because he thought it was a sign of a modern and strong nation. His main targets were Iran and internal threats such as the Kurds and Shiites. He never planned on using them against the West, and refrained from deploying them during the Gulf War. Saddam found himself caught in a Catch-22 because he wanted to comply with the U.N. so that sanctions were lifted that were crippling his country, while at the same time he felt it necessary to play the defiant Arab leader standing up to the West to maintain his public image and deter his enemies. He was caught in this paradox all the way up until the 2003 U.S. invasion.
Saddam Hussein put himself in a Catch-22 situation with his stance towards U.N. inspectors. On the one hand he wanted to cooperate with them so that U.N. sanctions were lifted. At the same time he wanted to act defiantly towards them to maintain his image as a strong Arab leader standing up to the West, who also continued to possess WMD to deter his enemies such as Iran
1991 - 1st Round of U.N. Inspections[/b]
Iraq???s policy towards the U.N. and the effectiveness of the inspectors went through several stages. When they first started in 1991, Saddam tried to hide his programs and keep as many of his weapons as possible. U.N. inspectors proved to be more effective than planned however, and tracked down and destroyed much of Iraq???s stockpiles. It turned out that much of Iraq???s WMD were made in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War and had passed their expiration date and had become useless.
Cans filled with nerve agents discovered by U.N. inspectors during the 1st round of inspections 1991-1992
Just as the U.N. thought its job was over, they found evidence of Iraq???s nuclear program, which had largely been kept secret. Before the Gulf War the U.S. believed that Iraq was 5-10 years away from a bomb. Now there was evidence that it could???ve had a crude device in only 6 months to a year. Saddam was forced to admit to his secret plans, which created more suspicion and mistrust.
After this first round of inspections Saddam changed his stance. Now he ordered the head of his weapons program Gen. Hussein Kamal to destroy most of Iraq???s WMD stockpile, while maintaining the know how in the hopes of restarting them after U.N. sanctions were over. Only one WMD factory at Al-Hakam was maintained while most everything else was destroyed. The problem was that all of this was kept secret to keep the U.N. in the dark about the extent of Iraq???s programs so that it couldn???t stop them in the future. This proved to be a nagging problem for Iraq as it could never fully prove that it had gotten rid of its weapons.
1995 and the End of Iraq???s Programs[/b]
By 1992 the U.N. felt like much of their work had been done, but then in 1994 the head of Iraq???s weapons programs Gen. Hussein Kamal defected to the West and provided a whole new range of information. Hussein said that U.N. inspectors had destroyed much of Iraq???s weapons and that Saddam had ordered him to destroy the rest. Based upon Kamal???s information the U.N. went back to work in Iraq and destroyed almost everything that was left. That marked the end of Iraq???s unconventional threat. The fact that Iraq had never come clean willingly however and not cooperated made inspectors and the U.S. believe that Iraq must still have something to hide. All Iraq had left was the know how and the hope that it could re-start its programs in the future.
The End of Inspections[/b]
By 1998 Iraq???s nuclear, WMD and missile programs had been destroyed. Inspectors were largely looking for documentation of Gen. Kamal???s secret destruction of Iraq???s stockpiles. Saddam on the other hand, believed that since he had disarmed, inspections and sanctions should end, but they didn???t. He came to believe that the West knew he didn???t have any weapons, but were just using the inspectors to overthrow his government. That was partially true because the U.S. had used the U.N. to collect intelligence that went into at least one unsuccessful coup attempt. Iraq began harassing inspectors, then stopped cooperation, and made them leave in December 1998.
When the U.N. left Iraq, the U.S. faced its own quandary. The inspectors were the only real source of intelligence the U.S. had on Iraq. Afterwards they were blind about what was actually happening within the country. That forced the U.S. to rely more and more on Iraqi exiles provided by groups such as the Iraqi National Congress that were full of false stories meant to push the country towards war. The lack of inspectors also made U.S. intelligence believe that Iraq had restarted its weapons programs. This grew to be the basis for the Bush administration???s claims against Iraq in the lead up to the 2003 invasion.
The Bush Administration: Inspections As Pretext To War[/b]
By 2002 the new Bush administration decided on war with Iraq. One of the problems they were faced with was how to justify it. In March 2002 British Prime Minister Tony Blair???s office suggested to the White House that a new round of U.N. inspectors could be the way to provoke a war. England believed that Iraq would refuse inspections and that could not only provide the legal justification for war, but also help build public support. Vice President Cheney and the neoconservatives in the administration such as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz were deeply skeptical of the U.N. and didn???t believe the U.S. needed any legal justification, while Secretary of State Colin Powell was supportive. The administration remained divided until Powell was able to convince Bush of the U.N. route in September, and Bush gave a speech to the Security Council asking for new inspectors.
In early 2002 it was Prime Minister Tony Blair that put forth the idea to President Bush of using United Nations inspectors as a way to justify a war with Iraq
American Claims and U.N. Findings[/b]
In the beginning of October 2002 U.S. intelligence laid out its claims against Iraq in a secret National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and a public White Paper. They claimed that Iraq had restarted its WMD production, that it was larger than before the Gulf War, had research and develo
pment, dual use equipment, mobile labs, several tons of WMD, and an unaccounted for stock of weapons left over from the Iran-Iraq War. They claimed Saddam had also renewed his nuclear program, tried to buy uranium from Niger, and aluminum tubes for centrifuges. The two reports were quickly put together and reflected all of the fears and problems U.S. intelligence had with Iraq, namely suspicions of Iraq???s activities based upon no hard evidence.
In November 2002, U.N. inspections began anew under Resolution 1441. Initially the inspections followed the same script as the past, with Iraq trying to limit access to sites, arguing over interviews with scientists and whether to allow intelligence flights. By February 2003 all of those issued had been resolved. More importantly, Saddam agreed to cooperate in the hopes of avoiding war.
Dr. Hans Blix and Mohamad El-Baradei were in charge of the WMD and nuclear inspections of Iraq. They repeatedly reported that while Iraq was not fully cooperating until March 2003, they found no evidence of any active weapons programs
The inspectors had a list of 550 sites. At the top were the main WMD, nuclear and missiles sites listed by the U.S. in the NIE and White Paper. After repeated visits, installation of surveillance cameras, and aerial intelligence flights, nothing was found at any of them. The Al Dawrah WMD site was abandoned and in ruins. The Al Furat nuclear site turned out to have commercial chemicals, while Al Taramiyah was destroyed in a U.S. attack in the 1990s and never rebuilt. The aluminum tubes that were suppose to be for centrifuges to enrich uranium proved to be for conventional rockets. There was no evidence of mobile labs, and the story about buying uranium from Niger proved to be based upon forged documents. As early as December, the inspectors said they found no active WMD or nuclear programs. The only WMD found were 32 old artillery shells, and papers about enriching uranium that proved to be old and irrelevant. The one actual violation of U.N. resolutions that was discovered were long range missiles that the U.N. destroyed. The only real question was accounting for Gen. Kamal???s unilateral destruction of Iraq???s stockpile in the 1990s, and even then Iraq was trying to provide documentation on the matter.
At the same time, the U.S. was trying to undermine the inspections. In December 2002 Pres. Bush said he doubted that Iraq was cooperating with the U.N. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said that the U.S. knew Iraq had WMD regardless of what the U.N. found, and that Iraq was in a no-win situation. If the U.N. found WMD, Saddam was guilty, and if they didn???t find anything that proved Iraq was guilty as well because it was hiding its weapons. The U.S. also didn???t share all of its intelligence with the U.N. as it promised.
Powell making America???s case against Iraq in his February 2003 speech to the United Nations. After the war almost everything he said was proven to be false
By January 2003 time was up on Iraq and the inspectors, but the public didn???t know. President Bush was frustrated with the lack of evidence the inspectors were turning up and told Condoleeza Rice and Karl Rove separately that the U.S. was going to go to war no matter what the U.N. found. On January 31, 2003, Bush met with Tony Blair and they agreed upon invading Iraq. Secretary Powell made the public case in his speech to the United Nations on February 5, 2003. He claimed that Iraq was not cooperating with inspectors and had not disarmed. He played tapes of Iraqi soldiers talking, which after the war turned out to be orders to cooperate with U.N. inspectors, not hide WMD. He showed satellite pictures of at truck that was suppose to be used as part of a WMD team, but turned out to be conventional fire trucks when investigated by the U.N. Powell claimed that the U.S. had sources within Iraq telling them that papers were being hidden and material was being moved around, even though the U.S. had no such sources. He said that Iraq was not allowing U2 spy plane flights, but those were agreed upon two weeks later. He showed diagrams of mobile WMD labs even though inspectors had found no evidence of them, and the CIA itself was divided over whether the stories were legitimate or not. Powell said that Iraq had bought aluminum tubes for centrifuges, although he added the caveat that not all U.S. experts agreed upon that, while the U.N. had already largely disproved the story. After the war was over the Senate Intelligence Committee investigated U.S. claims about Iraq???s weapons and found that, ???Much of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency for inclusion in Secretary Powell???s speech was overstated, misleading or incorrect.???
The bombing of Baghdad and the beginning of the U.S. invasion of Iraq
By March 2003, all of Iraq???s major WMD, nuclear and missile sites listed by the U.S. had been checked several times over. Iraqi scientists were conducting interviews, surveillance flights were being made, and Iraq was providing evidence to back up General Kamal???s story that he had destroyed Iraq???s stockpile. All of America???s major claims had been investigated and found to be wanting. The U.S. acted like none of this mattered and launched the invasion of Iraq in the middle of March. After all, as the U.S. and England had discussed a year earlier, the U.N. inspections were never meant to stave off a war, but to provoke one.
SOURCES[/b]
Books
Isikoff, Michael and Corn, David, Hubris, Crown, 2006
Prados, John, Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War, New Press, 2004
Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, The American Military Adventure In Iraq, Penguin Press, 2006
Woodward, Bob, Bush At War, Simon & Schuster, 2002
Government and U.N. Reports
British Government, Confidential And Personal, 6/16/05
British Government, Confidential And Personal, PR. 121, 6/16/05
British Government, PM/02/019, 6/16/05
British Government, Secret ??? Strictly Personal, 6/16/05
British Government, Text of Downing Street Memo, PBS??? Newshour, 6/16/05
Director General International Atomic Energy Agency, S/1997/779, International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/8/97
El Baradei, Dr. Mohamed, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2/14/03
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, UNSCOM/IAEA SECRET, UNSCOME/IAEA, 8/22/95
IAEA Media Advisory, News Update on Iraq Inspections, International Atomic Energy Agency, 12/19/02
Iraq Nuclear Verification Office, Fact Sheet: Iraq???s Nuclear Weapon Programme, International Atomic Energy Agency, 4/25/02
Robb, Senator Charles and Silberman, Judge Laurence, Robb-Silberman Report, 3/31/05
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs And Links To Terrorism And How They Compare To Prewar Assessments, U.S. Senate, 9/8/06 - Report On The U.S. Intelligence Community???s Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq, United States Senate, 7/7/04
Think Tank Reports
Cirincione, Joseph, Mathews, Jessica, Perkovich, George, and Orton, Alexis, WMD in Iraq evidence and implications, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2004
Cordesman, Anthony, Intelligence, Iraq, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Center for International and Security Studies, 1/26/04
Cortright, David, Millar
, Alistair, Gerber, Linda, Unproven: The Controversy over Justifying War in Iraq, Fourth Freedom Forum, June 2003
Ritter, Scott, The Case of Iraq???s Qualitative Disarmament, Arms Control Association, June 2000
Articles and Think Tank Reports
BBC News, Iraqi documents: Saddam's delusions, 3/25/06
Burrough, Bryan, Peretz, Evgenia, Rose, David, and Wise, David, Path To War, Vanity Fair, May 2004
Cockburn, Andrew, The Truth About Ahmad Chalabi, CounterPunch.org, 5/20/04
Collier, Robert, Repeated inspections but no hard evidence, San Francisco Chronicle, 12/30/02
Danner, Mark, Secret Way to War, New York Review Of Books, 6/9/05
De Young, Karen and Pincus, Walter, U.S. Discounts Iraq Move to Destroy Missiles, Washington Post, 3/1/03
Drogin, Bob, The Vanishing, New Republic, 7/14/03
Drogin, Bob and Goetz, John, How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of ???Curveball???, Los Angeles Times, 11/20/05
Frontline, Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine, The War Behind Closed Doors, PBS.org, 2/20/03
Gellman, Barton and Pincus, Walter, Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence, Washington Post, 8/10/03
Gordon, Michael, Agency Challenges Evidence Against Iraq Cited by Bush, New York Times, 1/10/03
Gordon, Michael and Risen, James, Report's Findings Undercut U.S. Argument, New York Times, 1/28/03
Hamilton, William, Bush began to plan war three months after 9/11, Washington Post, 4/16/04
Hanley, Charles, Inspectors Have Covered CIA???s Sites of ???concern??? and Reported No Iraqi Violations, Associated Press, 1/18/03 - Powell???s ???think file??? looking thing, Associated Press, 8/9/03
Hersh, Seymour, Who Lied To Whom? New Yorker, 3/26/03
Jansen, Michael, Inspector states no banned weapons found in Iraq so far, Irish Times, 1/2/03
Kaufmann, Chaim, Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas, International Security, Summer 2004
Kemper, Bob, Experts review, poke holes in case for war, Chicago Tribune, 8/10/03
Lemann, Nicholas, The Next World Order, New Yorker, 4/1/02
Linzer, Dafna, No unconventional arms, Iraqi scientists still insist, San Francisco Chronicle, 5/4/03
Lopez, George and Cortright, David, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004
Lynch, Colum, Blix Downgrades Prewar Assessment of Iraq Weapons, Washington Post, 6/22/03
Mazzetti, Mark, Senate committee disputes claims of Iraq-al Qaeda link, San Francisco Chronicle, 9/8/06
McGeary, Johanna, The Trouble With Inspections, Time, 12/8/02 - What Does Saddam Have? Time, 9/16/02 - What Saddam Was Really Thinking, Time, 10/18/04
Meacher, Michael, The very secret service, Guardian, 11/21/03
Michaels, Marge, Q&A with the Top Sleuth, Time, 1/12/03
Milbank, Dana, U.S. Voices Doubts on Iraq Search, Washington Post, 12/3/02
Miller, Judith, Defectors Bolster U.S. Case Against Iraq, Officials Say, New York Times, 1/24/03
Moyers', Bill Journal, Buying The War Timeline, Buying The War, PBS.org, 4/25/07
Norton-Taylor, Richard, Blair-Bush deal before Iraq war revealed in secret memo, Guardian, 2/3/06
Pincus, Walter and Lynch, Colum, Wolfowitz Had CIA Probe UN Diplomat in Charge, Washington Post, 4/15/02
Pollack, Kenneth, Spies, Lies, and Weapons, Atlantic Monthly, January/February, 2004
Rangwala, Glen, Claims and evaluations of Iraq???s proscribed weapons, University of Cambridge, 3/18/03
Rangwala, Glen, Hurd, Nathaniel and Millar, Alistair, A Case For Concern, Not A Case For War, Middle East Report Online, 1/28/03
Shelburne, Elizabeth, Weapons of Misperception, Atlantic Monthly, 1/13/04
Simpson, Alan and Rangwala, Dr Glen, The Dishonest Case For War On Iraq, Labour Against The War, 9/16/02
Smith, Michael, ???Failure is not an option, but it doesn???t mean they will avoid it,??? Telegraph, 9/18/04
Strobel, Warren, Data didn???t back Bush claims on Iraqi weapons, officials say, Knight Ridder, 6/6/03
Strobel, Warren and Landay, Jonathan, White House Maintains Its Case Against Iraq, Knight Ridder, 12/6/02
Strobel, Warren and Walcott, John, Bush has decided to overthrow Hussein, Knight Ridder, 2/13/02
Woods, Kevin, Lacey, James, and Murray, Williamson, Saddam???s Delusions: The View From The Inside, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006
In the last couple reports I've been trying to cover the major changes in Iraq in 2007 that have created a new status quo. Those include the Sunnis turning on AL Qaeda in Iraq and the opportunities and problems with the Awakening/Concerned Local Citizen movement, the Sadr cease-fire, the deadlocked government of Prime Minister Maliki, the growth of a patchwork of new centers of local power, and how the Democrats screwed up their opposition to the war. Now I'm trying to cover what will be the major issues in 2008 and the near future. The first is on Iran's power in Iraq.
Iran???s Growing Influence In Iraq[/b]
It???s a common saying these days that Iran was the winner of the Iraq war. While not quite true, it is very apparent that Iran has wide ranging influence and power in Iraq that it never had before. Most of the media focuses upon Iran???s support of violence in Iraq, but it also has extensive political, economic and cultural ties as well. Together they form a multi-faceted approach towards Iraq. On the one hand they want a Shiite led government that is friendly to Iran and hope to build up its economic ties, on the other, they want to ensure that the Sunnis never return to power and hope to make the U.S. pay for its occupation of Iraq.
Iran???s Policy Towards Post-Saddam Iraq[/b]
Iranian President Khatami, on the right, originally offered to work with the U.S. in Iraq, but was rejected by the White House. The succeeding President Ahmadinejad, on the left, believes that Iran should confront the U.S.
Saddam Hussein was Iran???s long-term rival, and his removal in 2003 opened up new opportunities for Iran. At first, Iranian President Khatami offered to work with the U.S. in Iraq just as it had done with the invasion of Afghanistan. The Bush Administration however, rejected the idea, believing that it could go it alone in Iraq and saw Iran as another country that needed regime change. Under President Ahmadinejad, Iranian policy has become more ideological. He believes that the U.S. can be defeated in Iraq. Either way, the U.S. invasion was seen as an opportunity to expand Iranian influence.
The policy had two facets. On the one hand they wanted a Shiite friendly government to come to power that would open up the economy and cultural sites to Iran. On the other, they wanted to tie down U.S. forces and have the ability to retaliate if Iran was ever attacked.
Iran???s Military Stance Towards Iraq[/b]
Most reports focus only upon Iran???s military policy because it has a direct impact upon U.S. forces. Right after the U.S. invasion, dozens of Iranian intelligence and Revolutionary Guards Qods Force operatives flooded the country. They also sent in the Badr Brigade, the militia of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) that was formed by the Revolutionary Guards during the Iran-Iraq War made up of Iraqi exiles and Iraqi POWs. Together, these forces carried out a wave of assassinations of Iraqi intelligence and military officers, and Baathists that were opponents of Iran.
A map of Iran???s supply lines to Iraq. Iranian operations are run by the Ramazan Corps of the Revolutionary Guards Qods force out of Tehran. They have divided Iraq up into 3 commands (north, central and south) that operate out of 3 bases in Iran: Mehran, Marivan and Ahvaz. From those cities they have forward operating bases on the Iranian border and within Iraq to ferry weapons, money and supplies to Special Groups that carry out attacks on U.S. forces
By 2004, Iran had established its long-term military stance. It continued to support the Badr Brigade that took over much of the Interior Ministry and police after the 2005 elections. It also began recruiting Iraqi Shiites, who increasingly came from Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army, and organized them into what became known as Special Groups by the U.S. military. A special unit of the Revolutionary Guards Qods Force called the Ramazan Corps, carried out training and financing in both Iran and Iraq. Iran also used Hazbollah for assistance, sending hundreds of Mahdi Army fighters to Lebanon for training. They were provided RPGs, mortars, Katyusha rockets, anti-aircraft missiles, and the most deadly device, Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFPs) bombs that were capable of destroying any Coalition vehicle. The Special Groups were then used to carry out harassing attacks on U.S. forces in Baghdad and British troops in Basra. Beginning in 2008 they had a new target, the Sunni Awakening/Concerned Local Citizen groups that the U.S. had organized to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq, probably in an attempt to stop the Sunnis from ever regaining power.
Iran???s Political Connections[/b]
SIIC leader Ayatollah Hakim with Badr Brigade recruits in Iran years before the U.S. invasion
Before the 2003 invasion, Iran had extensive ties with the anti-Saddam forces, all of which have gained influence since then. The Shiite SIIC and Badr Brigade were formed in Iran in the 1980s. Iraqi President Talabani and his Kurdish party fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War. Both are the backbones of Prime Minister Maliki???s ruling coalition. Many members of Maliki???s Dawa Party including the first post-invasion prime minister Jaafari, went into exile in Iran during Saddam???s rule. Since 2006 Iran has also built up close ties with Moqtada al-Sadr who is currently doing his religious training in Iran. All of these parties gained seats in parliament and positions of power after the 2005 elections that were supported by Iran.
Iran???s Growing Economic Role In Iraq[/b]
Iranian goods outside a Baghdad shop
Iran has also been able to build up large economic ties with Iraq since the war. Iraq is the Number 1 trade partner for Iran???s non-oil goods. In 2006 it was estimated that Iraq imported $20.8 billion in imports from its neighbor. Iranian products are everywhere in Iraqi markets except for Sunni areas. Iran also supplies electricity to the South and Diyala province in the north and has plans to build new power plants in Iraq. It also imports fuel, which is always in short supply. Iran is also paying for reconstruction projects, especially in the south. A huge tourism industry has also emerged with Iranian pilgrims going to the holy Shiite cities of Najaf and Karbala that is estimated to earn up to $25 million a year for Iraq.
U.S. Policy: Attempting to Contain Iran[/b]
The U.S. has become increasingly worried about Iran???s role in Iraq. That comes with fears that Iran is expanding its power in the Middle East, supports terrorism, and is building up its nuclear program. Some in the administrations such as Vice President Cheney are known to support regime change in Iran. The general policy has been to contain Iran with Iraq proving to be the main battlefield.
The first meeting of U.S. and Iranian diplomats happened at a regional conference on Iraq where the two sides sat at opposite ends of the table in 2007
On the diplomatic side U.S. policy has appeared to be haphazard. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalizad was twice given permission to hold discussions with Iran, but was then stopped by the White House. It wasn???t until 2007 that the U.S. finally met with Iran, the first time in 28 years since the Iranian Revolution. The talks haven???t produced much with the U.S. continually accusing Iran of supporting militias, and Iran denying it, with not much else happening.
The military side ha
s seen much more action. Beginning in 2006 the U.S. launched a military campaign to arrest Iranian agents and kill or capture Special Groups in Iraq. They currently hold several Iranian operatives in jail. In 2007, when the surge started, the number of raids increased with hundreds of Special Group members either detained or killed. There has been no real change in the number of attacks or the flow of weapons however.
Conclusion: Iran???s Opportunity and America???s Pardox[/b]
Iran was able to take advantage of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Initially, from 2002-2005 Iran and the U.S. had the same goals, overthrowing Saddam, holding elections, and empowering the Shiites and Kurds. Since then, Iran has been maintaining military pressure on the U.S. with attacks by the Special Groups. At the same time, it has increased its ties with the Iraqi government and expanded its economic influence. The U.S. originally claimed that overthrowing Saddam would make dealing with Iran easier because it would be intimidated by U.S. power. It has had the opposite affect.
The U.S. now finds itself in a paradox. It wants to diminish Iran???s role in Iraq, while supporting a government that is made up of two Iranian allies, the SIIC and Kurds that the U.S. also sees as its best friends. If Maliki was ever forced out, a member of the SIIC would probably fill his spot, and if the ruling coalition was ever replaced, the Sadrists would probably play a large role in the new cabinet. The SIIC and Kurds also greatly benefit from U.S. aid to Iraq, while U.S. military actions have not diminished the work of the Special Groups.
At the same time, Iran has not won the war. It now has the U.S. military right on its doorstep. That being said, Iran has been able to benefit from the situation in Iraq with little cost to itself. Pres. Ahmadinejad believes that the U.S. is on the verge of defeat, and Iran is able to play a role in its humiliation. The only real barrier to the continuing growth of Iran in Iraq is Iraqi nationalism. Currently the nationalists, although represented in parliament, have no real say in Maliki???s government or the military. That means while the U.S. is the dominant power in Iraq, it will continue to have to deal with the influence of Iran.
I changed the end of the report because I think it overstated Iran's influence in Iraq[/b]
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? September 2007
Katzman, Kenneth, ???Iran???s Activities and Influence in Iraq,??? Congressional Research Service, 12/26/07
MNF-1, ???Iranian Support for Lethal Activities in Iraq,??? 2/11/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Beehner, Lionel, ???Iran???s Goals in Iraq,??? Council on Foreign Relatoins, 2/23/06
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Cordesman: U.S.-Iran Talks on Iraq Useful, But Unlikely to Produce Immediate Results,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 5/14/07 - ???Sewer: Iraqis Beginning to Show Signs of Political Compromise,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 3/14/08
International Crisis Group, ???Iraq???s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,??? 2/7/08
Rahimi, Babak, ???The Hakim-Sadr Pact: A New Era in Shiite Politics???? Jamestown Foundation, 10/25/07 - ???Moqtada al-Sadr???s New Alliance with Tehrn,??? Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 3/1/07
Articles[/b]
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, ???U.S.-Iran Talks Resume in Baghdad,??? ABC News.com, 7/24/07
Cooper, Helene, ???In Bush Speech, Signs of Split on Iran Policy,??? New York Times, 9/16/07
Dagher, Sam, ???Iran???s growing presence in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 7/25/07 - ???U.S., Iran dial down tensions in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/7/07
Daragahi, Borzou and Gerstenzang, James, ???Tehran???s Iraq role unclear, U.S. now says,??? Los Angeles Times, 2/15/07
Deshmukh, Jay, ???Qaeda losing support but Iranians arms still problem in Iraq: US military,??? Agence France Presse, 11/11/07
DeYoung, Karen, ???Iran Cited In Iraq???s Decline in Violence,??? Washington Post, 12/23/07 - ???The Iraq Report???s Other Voice,??? Washington Post, 9/10/07 - ???Iraqi Prime Minister Says That Civil War Has Been Prevented,??? Washington Post, 9/25/07
Dreyfuss, Robert, ???Is Iran Winning the War in Iraq???? The Nation, 2/26/08
Fadel, Leila, ???U.S.: Iran reneged on pledge to quit supporting Iraqi militias,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/5/08
Frayer, Lauren, ???US general: Roadside bombs down in Iraq,??? Associated Press, 11/15/07
Fresh Air, ???'Fiasco' Author Reports On the Petraeus Report,??? NPR, 9/12/07
Gerstenzang, James, ???Bush says Iraq exit would bolster Iran,??? Los Angeles Times, 10/4/07
Glanz, James, ???Iranian Reveals Plan to Expand Role in Iraq,??? New York Times, 1/29/07
Glanz, James and Oppel, Richard, ???U.S. Says Raid in Iraq Supports Claim on Iran,??? New York Times, 2/26/07
Gordon, Michael, ???Deadliest Bomb in Iraq Is Made by Iran, U.S. Says,??? New York Times, 2/10/07 - ???U.S. says Iran ??? supplied bomb is killing more troops in Iraq,??? New York Times, 8/7/07
Gordon, Michael, Filkins, Dexter, ???Hezbollah may be helping militias,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 11/28/06
Gordon, Michael, Shane, Scott, ???U.S. Long Worried That Iran Supplied Arms in Iraq,??? New York Times, 3/27/07
Guardian, ???Smbolic shift for the doves,??? 5/29/07
Gulf News, ???Al Sadr aiming for Ayatollah degree,??? 3/10/08
Hersh, Seymour, ???Shifting Targets,??? New Yorker, 10/8/07
Ignatius, David, ???Post-Iraq Strategy,??? Washington Post, 8/26/07
IraqSlogger.com, ???Casualties Attributed to EFPs,??? 2/17/07
Jelinek, Pauline, ???General: Iraq groups supported by Iran,??? Associated Press, 11/26/07
Kukis, Mark, ???Has US Ceded Southern Iraq???? Time, 10/8/07
LaFranchi, Howard, ???After historic talks, US seeks action by iran,??? Christian Science Monitor, 5/29/07
Levinson, Charles, ???Iran may now be cooperating with U.S. in Iraq,??? USA Today, 12/16/07
Linzer, Dafna, ???Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,??? Washington Post, 1/26/07
Mazzetti, Mark, ???U.S. Says Powerful Iraqi Cleric Is Living in Iraq,??? New York Times, 2/14/07
Mehr News, ???Iran, Iraq sign seven pacts,??? 3/3/08
Michael, Jim, ???General says U.S. has proof Iran arming Iraqi militias,??? USA Today, 1/31/07
Monsters and Critics.com, ???Basra security worsened by uncontrolled border, say Iraqi officials,??? 3/9/08
Murphy, Kim, ???Iran seen as key to untangling Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 2/13/07
Oppel, Richard, ???Iran to Join Iraq Talks in Highest Contact With U.S. in 2 Years,??? New York Times, 3/1/07
Parker, Ned, ???Iraqi militia leader???s death shatters truce,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/23/07
Peterson, Scott, ???Could Iran Help The US Stabilize Iraq???? Christian Science Monitor, 12/15/06 - ???For Iran, Iraq is a two-edged sword,??? Christian Science Monitor, 3/18/08 - ???US and Iran spar ahead of Iraq report,??? Christian Science Monitor, 8/31/07
Peterson, Scott and Blanford, Nicholas, ???A gauge of Iran???s hand in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 7/5/07
Porter, Gareth, ???US Briefing on Iran Discredits the Official Line,??? Inter Press Service, 2/14/07 - ???US Military Ignored Evidence of Iraq-Made EFPs,??? AntiWar.com, 10/26/07
Pound, Edward, ???The Iran Connection,??? U.S. News & World Report, 11/22/04
Price, Jay and Taha, Yaseen, ???Kurds denounce U.S. detention of Iranian,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/20/07
Rahima, Ahmad, ???Iraq urges Iranian firms to help ???modernize??? Baghdad,??? Azzaman, 2/29/08
Reuters, ???Iran Offers $1 Billion Loan for Iraq Projects,??? New York Times, 3/1/08
Reynolds, Paul, ???Iran bombs link: retraction or non-retraction???? BBC News, 1/10/06
Richter, Paul and Spiegel, Peter, ???Wider Iranian threat is feared,??? Los Angeles Times, 10/31/07
Roggio, Bill, ???Captured Iranian agent identified, 15 Special Groups operatives captured in Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 9/30/07 - ???Iran???s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 12/5/07 - ???Iranian involvement in Iraq: an old or a new case???? Long War Journal.org, 10/15/07 - ???Mahdi Army trains with Hezbollah,??? Long War Journal.org, 8/20/07
Roug, Louise and Daragahi, Borzou, ???Iraq Edges Closer to Iran, With or Without the US,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/16/07
Sands, Phil, ???Claims of training insurgents inside Iran,??? San Frnacisco Chronicle, 4/15/07
Sanger, David, ???Opening a New Front in the War, Against Iranians in Iraq,??? New York Times, 1/15/07
Schmitt, Eric, ???Some Bombs Used in Iraq Are Made in Iran, U.S. Says,??? New York Times, 8/6/05
Simon, Steven and Takeyh, Ray, ???Iran???s Iraq Strategy,??? Washington Post, 5/21/06
Sly, Liz, ???
Iranian influence soaring in Iraq,??? Chicago Tribune, 3/8/07 - ???U.S. wary of Iran???s growing activity in Iraq,??? Chicago Tribune, 2/29/08
Spiegel, Peter and Barnes, Julian, ???Iran still fuels Iraq violence, U.S. says,??? Los Angeles Times, 3/5/08
Stolberg, Sheryl Gay and Santora, Marc, ???Bush declares Iran???s arms role in Iraq is certain,??? New York Times, 2/15/07
Tavernise, Sabrina, ???Cleric Said to Lose Reins of Parts of Iraqi Militia,??? New York Times, 9/28/06
Ware, Michael, ???Inside Iran???s Secret War for Iraq,??? Time, 8/15/05
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Wright, Robin, ???As U.S. Steps Up Pressure on Iran, Aftereffects Worry Allies,??? Washington Post, 8/16/07 - ???Iranian Flow Of Weapons Increasing, Officials Say,??? Washington Post, 6/3/07
Wright, Robin and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Iraqi official: Iran supplying arms to insurgents attacking U.S. forces,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 10/6/07
In February 2008 Moqtada al-Sadr renewed his cease-fire that has widely been seen as one of the main causes of the reduction in violence in Iraq. He claimed he wanted to transform his movement into a social and political one. However, the following month, Sadr made an announcement that his forces could protect themselves if attacked. This opened the door to renewed clashes between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi forces in both northern and southern Iraq that have intensified in recent weeks.
Internal Arguments Over the Cease-Fire[/b]
Moqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire has been credited for reducing violence in Iraq, but in March 2008 he said that his followers had the right to defend themselves from attack
Many Sadrists were shocked when their leader renewed his stand down orders in the beginning of 2008. They felt that the Iraqi government, the U.S., and their main rival, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) were persecuting them. In Diwaniyah, for example, the Sadrists claimed the SIIC controlled security forces were not only arresting its followers, but also destroying their houses and forcing their families out of the area. Similar accusations were made in al-Kut and Basra, as increasing military pressure was placed on the Sadrists during the surge. These dissenters were given a ray of hope however, when in March, Sadr said that the Mahdi Army had the right to defend itself.
New Battles For The Sadrists[/b]
Fighting between Sadrists and Iraqi forces has taken place in Basrah, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Babil and Wasit provinces since February 2008
Since then Mahdi Army members have increasingly come into conflict with Iraqi forces. On February 21 fighting erupted for one day in Basra, Iraq’s second largest city, between militia members and the Iraqi army. On March 1, 10 were killed and 60 wounded in clashes in Nassiriyah, the capital of Dhi Qar province. Those were followed by one day of fighting around Baquba in northern Diyala province, and raids on Sadrists in Babil province.
Map of al-Kut where fighting has occurred between Sadrists and Iraqi police over the last week
The most intense fighting has happened in al-Kut, the capital of Wasit. It started when Iraqi police went into Sadrist neighborhoods with arrest warrants and shooting erupted. The Mahdi Army was initially able to force the police out of the city, and captured up to 18 officers who were later released. On March 17, the conflict seemed to be coming to an end when representatives of the SIIC and Dawa parties met with the Sadrists and brokered a cease-fire. Two days later, fighting started again. Iraqi police now claim that they control most of the city and are looking to arrest several hundred Mahdi Army members. The local Sadrist office denies any of the fighters are theirs, and say the whole incident is another case of the government trying to eliminate them.
Aftermath of the fighting in al-Kut
Conclusion[/b]
The new round of fighting in Iraq is a troubling occurrence. It’s especially so since it is across a number of provinces, and as of now, doesn’t seem to be ending in al-Kut. Violence is already up in the rest of Iraq since the beginning of 2008. If the Mahdi Army were to return to the streets throughout Iraq, it would only make the situation worse, although Iraqi forces, with the backing of the U.S. would eventually win. The problems could increase as Iraqis gear up for local elections at the end of 2008. Currently, the SIIC controls most of the South because the Sadrists boycotted the first round of elections in 2005. As they gear up for new polling, the fighting could intensify between these two rival Shiite factions.
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Zair, Kareem, “Security worsens in south as Mahdi army resorts to arms,” Azzaman, 3/12/08
Conflicts between the Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Iraqi government have increased in just the last two days. Many rank and file members as well as leaders of the Sadrist movement have become increasingly angry with the stand down order that was renewed in February 2008, believing that the Maliki government, their rival the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and U.S. forces are taking advantage of it to arrest and kill their followers. They claim that between 2,000-2,500 Mahdi Army members have been arrested since the cease-fire was first announced in August 2007. The recent spat of clashes, which began in the southern city of Kut in Wasit province, came after Sadr commented that his followers had the right to defend themselves if attacked in March 2008. Since then, fighting and confrontations have erupted in almost half of Iraq in the last two days, raising the question of whether the militia???s cease-fire is coming to an end.
Overview of Clashes[/b]
The recent events involving the Mahdi Army are concentrated in central and southern Iraq. Militia leaders told the Associated Press that they are ready to fight haven gotten money, weapons and support from Iran. Not all members of the movement however are turning to towards the gun. Sadr offices in Baghdad and Iraq???s second city, Basra in the south, have said they are willing to negotiate with the government, while Sadr has called on a nationwide general strike until the government stops its crackdown. In the meantime, many members of the Mahdi Army seem to be returning to the streets and violence has ensued in many areas.
Fighting and confrontations between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi forces have occurred in Baghdad (1), Wasit (4), Basrah (6), Qadissiya (9), and Dhi Qar (7) provinces in the last two days. Sadrists have also protested in Muthanna (8) and Najaf (12). Earlier clashes also occurred in Diyala (3) and Babil (10)
Baghdad[/b]
Sadrists rallying in Baghdad as part of the general strike that has been called to protest the government???s arrests and attacks on the movement
In the capital Baghdad, Sadrists have used both civil disobedience and the use of force recently. Sadr???s office called for a strike across the city, then extended it to countrywide, until the government releases its members from jail and stops what it considers a crackdown against its followers. Several neighborhoods in southwest Baghdad were shut down as a result. They also said that they are willing to negotiate with the government to end the stand off. That didn???t stop violence from erupting in the city however. First, from March 23-24 the Green Zone was rocketed with at least twelve killed. The U.S. blamed Iranian backed Special Groups that usually come from the Mahdi Army. This is a common occurrence however. More ominous were reports of street battles. These included clashes in five eastern neighborhoods, an attack on a police checkpoint outside of Sadr City in the west, the offices of Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the Dawa Party being burned down, and fighting between the Mahdi Army and SIIC???s Badr Brigade militia. In one instance, Sadrists allegedly kidnapped police officers they say belong to the Badr Organization. In response, U.S. and Iraqi forces have attempted to surround Sadr City to contain the situation.
Clashes and Confrontations Across Southern Iraq[/b]
In the Shiite South, Sadrists have come out in force as well. In the southern cities of Samawa in Muthanna province, Najaf, and two towns south of Baghdad the Mahdi Army has returned to the streets after being absent for the last seven months under the cease-fire. The Iraqi police have imposed curfews in many of these cities to deter confrontations. In Kut, Wasit province, fighting continues for another week and has spread to Nasariyah in Dhi Qar. In Kut, the Mahdi Army is reported to have taken back 5 of the city???s eighteen districts after earlier having expelled the police from the entire city, and then having to retreat back to their own neighborhoods. In Diwaniya, Qadissiya province, the Iraqi police raided Sadrist offices twice and arrested followers. The city has been hotly contested between the Mahdi Army and SIIC since 2007.
Sadrists protesting in the holy city of Najaf in the south
Basra[/b]
Iraqi police in Basra as part of the new crackdown in the city personally led by Prime Minister Maliki
The most important events are happening in Iraq???s second largest city, Basra. There, large scale urban fighting is going on. It began when Prime Minister Maliki arrived on March 24 to take personal control over what the government had been warning was a major offensive to retake the city from Shiite militias and criminals. The city is split between three rival parties and their armed bands, the Fadhila Party, the SIIC and the Sadrists. The Iraqi army imposed a curfew and banned car traffic in the entire province and moved into the city in force, concentrating just on the eastern and central neighborhoods were the Mahdi Army is based. Dozens have been killed and wounded in the fighting that raged all night from the 24th to the 25th. The Sadrists have said they want to negotiate a cease-fire, but will defend themselves until one is worked out. Maliki initiated the campaign, which is suppose to last for three days because he thinks the Sunni insurgency is largely contained. He also wants to prove that Baghdad can impose security not just the Americans. The Iraqi forces are concentrating on the Sadrists because the Fadhila party controls the provincial government, and the SIIC is one of Maliki???s main backers. The events in Basra re-enforce the Sadrists??? belief that the government is singling them out for persecution.
Conclusion[/b]
In just the last week Sadr???s seven-month long cease-fire that has been credited with reducing violence in Iraq has been brought under increasing pressure. When he renewed it in February there were many reports that his followers were unhappy and internal dissent was growing. That probably led to his March 2008 statement that the Mahdi Army had the right to defend itself. Whether he thought his words would lead to clashes across almost half of Iraq immediately afterwards are impossible to know, but they only add to the overall increase in violence that has been occurring since the beginning of the year. The recent events could mark the collapse of Sadr???s stand down orders unless negotiations are quickly worked out with the government. Either way, the recent clashes will leave a bad taste in the mouths of the Sadrists who seem to be gnawing at the bit to reassert themselves as a major player on the Iraqi scene.
SOURCES[/b]
Aswat Aliraq, ???4 Sadrists arrested in Diwaniya,??? 3/24/08 - ???Curfew clamped on Basra,??? 3/25/08 - ???Gunmen set fire to party office in Sadr City,??? 3/25/08 - ???Sadr???s office rejects security plan if hunting Sadrists included,??? 3/24/08 - ???Sadrists expand civil disobedience to all provinces,??? 3/25/08 - ???U.S. army say skilled 5 gunmen in Basra,??? 3/25/08
One of the most baffaling yet predictable aspects of this endless quagmire is that the so called "archetects" of this war have yet to reap the rewards of the SECOND LAREST OIL Field on the planet.
After 5 years,4,000 US deaths 70,000 wounded and most importantly at least half a million Iraqi people wasted and millions displaced there is still no oil being pumped.
The world petrol markets teeter and fluxuate on the daily politics of places like Caracas and Lagos,yet companies like HALIBURTON,ROOT BROWN,KELLOG able to roam free as they please,unhindered in Iraq with no bid contracts and 151,000 troops at their back Private security firms such as BLACKWATER and WACKENHUT provide "security" for this erroneus mission,yet these PIGS of war are still unable to satiate the immediate need for oil within IRAQ let alone the rest of the planet[mainly the united states]
These foul subhuman neocons failed to produce anything after spending billions of taxpayer dollars and wasting countless human lives.
The one thing I thought we could count on Dick Cheney for besides treason,lies,corruption,gluttony,murder,death,torture and merciless mayhem and chaos was an increase in petrol output from Iraq oil'fields.
So far we have only gained grisly murder,death,torture,instututionalized terror,constitutional erosion, a major loss of civil freedoms and privacy,the empowerment of IRAN,and piles of poorly scripted dis honest boulderdash.
the only quantifiable results have been empty scripted banal exhortations about "democracy" and "we can win the war" and my fave.."Mission Accomplished".
ok....and a nice friendly old white man lives in heaven wearing a white gown sporting a long white beard..up in the clouds...and his son jesus ....saves......OK
At a bare minimum any uninformed/uninterested apolitical commoner would thnk that the oil would be a front burner issue and one which would have been secured and rectified in 03-04.
But now as gas edges towards 4 dollars a gallon in the US and the dollar continues to decline against the euro with the end not even in sight,all we hear is "we can win".
While I can appreciate the pictured strategic placement of a US police station on top of this huge oil supply specifically designed to control and profit from it and more importantly keeping China and Russia at bay in the process,it seems as though the original intent and means have gone askew.
Wow,what an incredibly amazing pile of horseshit the people have been fed.... and swallowed. Its a testament to stupidity and the power of murdoch/big media propaganda that some folks are still supporting these monsters. How could semi literate being in their right mind still support the BUSH reich after all this time..all the while supporting and BEGGING for another 4 years+ with the slanderous racist reactionary pea brained war monger known as John McCain.
So my question to all of those morons who support the "war"-Where is the oil?
Is it being secretly pumped into tankers and being sent to any and all empty US wells/surplus containment in texas?
VIENNA (AP) ??? Oil prices rose by more than a dollar Thursday, as the bombing of a key Iraqi pipeline extended a buying spree spurred by an anemic dollar and lower U.S. fuel inventories.
Crude prices, which already spiked by nearly $5 on Thursday, were propelled higher by the second bombing in a week in Basra, where Iraqi security forces have been clashing with Shiite militia fighters.
Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani said that ongoing clashes would not affect oil exports and drilling operations. But with an average of 1.54 million barrels a day transiting the southern city last month, an official, who demanded anonymity because he was not authorized to comment, acknowledged that the blast could impact crude sales.
Iraq's average production for February was 2.4 million barrels per day. Exports averaged 1.93 million barrels per day during that month. The huge portion of oil output comes from Basra Rumaila South and North oil fields that produce around 1.3 million barrels per day.
The bomb exploded underneath the Zubair-1 pipeline that sends crude oil from the Basra Zubair oil field to tanks for Iraq's two exporting terminals on the Gulf: al-Umaiya and Basra, according to an official in Basra.
On Tuesday night, a bomb damaged a domestic oil pipeline that links the Noor oil field in the southern Maysan province to the refinery in Basra. It was expected to take several days to repair the damage.
Basra is home to one of Iraq's three largest oil refineries, the Shuaiba refinery which has a capacity of 160,000 barrels a day but has been functioning below capacity at about 100,000 barrels per day.
Light, sweet crude for May delivery added $1.11 to fetch $107.01 a barrel by noon in Europe in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The contract rose $4.68 to settle at $105.90 a barrel Wednesday.
Wednesday's spike followed the release of data by the U.S. Energy Department's Energy Information Administration, showing that U.S. stockpiles of gasoline, heating oil and diesel fuel fell more than forecast last week.
Levels are still higher than in pat years. But the inventory report stoked worries that stockpiles of gasoline are falling right when analysts would like to see them rising ??? before the peak summer driving season. Gasoline inventories slid 3.3 million barrels last week, more than four times the decline analysts had expected.
"The gasoline stock movement was probably quite supportive, it's the second week in a row now we've seen a larger than expected drop in U.S. gasoline stocks," said Mark Pervan, a commodity strategist at ANZ Bank in Melbourne, Australia.
The EIA reported that U.S. refinery activity also dropped, which analysts attributed to some refiners cutting gasoline production due to low profit margins. Despite the most recent declines, gasoline inventories are 9% higher than a year ago.
"Refinery runs are now at the lowest level since the end of October 2005," noted Vienna's JBC Energy, in its daily newsletter.
Crude oil inventories, meanwhile, were unchanged. Analysts surveyed by Dow Jones Newswires had expected crude supplies to rise 1.7 million barrels.
Pervan warned that the steadiness in crude oil inventories despite a decline in refinery utilization was an indication that U.S. crude demand was falling, which could lead to a drop in oil prices in the weeks ahead.
"What the U.S. is doing is to try to match their crude oil stocks to the low refinery capacity by pulling back on their imports," Pervan said. "That should start to manifest itself in lower oil prices in the near term."
Oil prices were also supported by U.S. economic news. The Commerce Department said new-home sales fell last month to a 13-year low, and that orders for durable goods fell in February when analysts had expected an increase.
In other Nymex trading, heating oil futures rose by close to 3 cents to $3.07 a gallon while gasoline prices corrected by just over a penny to $2.7313 a gallon. Natural gas futures dropped by more than a penny to $9.558 per 1,000 cubic feet.
In London, Brent crude gained 87 cents to $104.86 a barrel on the ICE Futures exchange. Copyright 2008 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
If you think the U.S. went into Iraq to "get their oil" you've got a 70s leftist perspective that's out of date. Oil was obviously a strategic concern of the U.S. for the invasion, but it's not about U.S. oil companies going in and exploiting the hell out of a given country. It's about the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the Western world that will continue the economic growth that the U.S. depends and profits from on a strategic level.
The problem with Iraq is that there's still a lack of security, no new oil law to govern any new oil business because of political disputes, an Iraqi governmet that finds it hard to operate and massive oil smuggling.
Attacks are way down on oil infrastructure, but there's enough threat to make many companies weary of going into Iraq. Different factions have different visions of how to run the country's oil industry from the Kurds that want regional control to the Sadrists and Sunnis that want nationalized oil and central control in Baghdad, to a mix in the middle. That's holding up a new oil law. The Baghdad governmet is also a mess and hasn't allocated enough money to renovate the infrastructure to boost production on what the country already has, and since everythins is done by paper and many parts of the government are staffed with inexerpeienced people and conflicting loyaties it's hard to get anything done. One person wrote that the Iraqi government works on an old Soviet model of a massive bureaucracy that does litte but push paper. Finally there's massive corruption and smuggling going on that doesn't appear to be ending any time soon. It might cost the country up to half of its current production and revenues. Gangs, tribes, insurgents, and political parties are all behind it.
The one point you've gotte right is that some neocons did think that overthrowing Saddam would ease the flow of oil to the West, and even some had dreams of having a pro-western Iraq breaking up OPEC. Those, like most of the neocons dreams for the Middle East proved to be dead wrong.
Gen. Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are due to testify again to the U.S. Congress on the state of Iraq and the future of the surge beginning on April 8. This is actually a pivotal moment in post-Saddam Iraqi history. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote that the surge has brought down the level of violence in Iraq to an ???irreducible minimum.??? Retired General Scales told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 2 that the country is at a ???culminating point??? where the military balance has shifted to one side and progress can only be achieved now through political progress. At the same hearing Gen. Scales and Retired General McCaffrey also said that the number of U.S. troops in Iraq will have to come down no matter what in 2009. This goes along with the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen???s and Army Chief of Staff General Casey???s urging that tours for U.S. units be reduced from the current 15 month down to 12. What happens next will most likely shape Iraq for the foreseeable future.
Iraq Today: Military Success, But Political Stalemate[/b]
Awakening fighters like this one operating with U.S. forces near Salman Pak outside of Baghdad who turned on Al Qaeda in Iraq are one of the major reasons security has improved since 2007
Iraq has seen a dramatic turn around on the military front due to one part change in strategy, and three parts luck. The increase in U.S. troops with the surge along with a shift from conventional war planning to counterinsurgency occurred just as the Sunni and Shiite sectarian war was changing. Gen. Petraeus had U.S. troops attempt to secure and control the population to decrease support for the insurgency and Shiite militias. At the same time, the Sunnis realized that they had lost the war for Baghdad to the Shiites, and grew sick of the excesses of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Half way through 2008 Moqtada Al-Sadr also decided to call off his militia the Mahdi Army because it had over stretched and turned against the people that it was suppose to stand up for. This confluence of events led to a 60% drop in attacks from June 2007 to March 2008, and a 72% drop in civilian casualties from July 2007 to March 2008. At the same time the U.S. military has always said that these military gains are tenuous. Former Sunni insurgents have signed local peace treaties with the U.S., not Baghdad, which has not shown the willingness to integrate many of them into the government. The Awakening/Concerned Local Citizen movement has also had mixed results in northern Iraq where sectarian tensions are still high and most of the violence now takes place. The Sadrist cease-fire might be ending as Prime Minister Maliki has decided to challenge them as recently happened in Basra, Baghdad and much of the south.
A destroyed police vehicles in Basra during the fighting between the government and Mahdi Army in March 2008 shows how fragile the existing security situation is in Iraq
While the military side has been very successful, the political side has faltered, which was the ultimate gain of the surge. In early 2008 the Iraqi parliament finally passed its first set of reconciliation laws, but they have not been applied equitably. There has been no noticeable increase in former Baathists joining the government despite a new deBaathification law. A new amnesty law was suppose to keep terrorist suspects behind bars, the main reason why Iraq holds 24,000 prisoners, but in practice almost everyone is being released. Progress on a set of oil laws, amending the constitution, and dealing with the fate of Kirkuk is deadlocked because of disputes between Arabs and Kurds.
Maliki???s cabinet is made up mostly of political parties that have no real base amongst the population
The laws aren???t really the main point of contention in Iraqi politics however, it???s over which parties will rule the country. Outside of the Kurdish alliance and the Sadrists, few of the political parties in parliament really have any popular base in the country. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) is a middle and business class Shiite party that rules most of the southern provinces, but hasn???t been able to provide basic services while most of the economy there is collapsing. Prime Minister Maliki???s Dawa party never had a strong base and is divided into two factions. Anbar is ruled by the Iraqi Islamic Party, but much of the province now sides with the tribal coalition that turned on Al Qaeda in Iraq and cooperated with the U.S. the Anbar Salvation Council. They are trying to shape themselves into a new political party to take over the province. The two Kurdish parties in the north have a mass base, but have also shut out any opposition. The Sadrists have a lot of support in the Shiite sections of Baghdad, but probably mixed popularity in the south.
These differences will come to a head on October 1, 2008 when Iraq is set for provincial elections. Under current law voters pick parties rather than individual politicians. This means that even though most of the major parties are not popular, voters will have no real alternatives to pick from. The fact that the ruling groups will also control the election committees in each province will probably mean they will keep the system the way it is and use patronage to ensure their victories.
Conclusion[/b]
This marks the real limit of reconciliation in Iraq as of now. President Bush has talked a lot about ???bottom up??? reconciliation, but new local forces will have little say and be kept out of much of the political process with the exception of the Awakening Council in Anbar in the upcoming elections. From the ???top down??? the same political parties will continue to hold onto power, some laws will go nowhere, while those that are passed will not be enforced consistently. This is the ???irreducible minimum??? and ???culminating point??? that Cordesman and Gen. Scales talked about. Violence is down, but any more progress can only be achieved through real political change. This will be made more difficult by the fact that the surge is ending, the U.S. will be forced to draw down its troop levels in 2009, and a new administration will be in office in Washington.
The future is up in the air. In the near term the current status quo will probably be maintained with occasional flashes of violence. The October 2008 provincial elections are probably already determined, but in 2009 or 2010 a new set of national elections for parliament are planned. This could be the first opportunity to change the political equation in the country if new political parties are able to be formed at the grass roots level. There???s also the chance that the process could be derailed. In April 2008 the provinces are eligible to become independent federal regions that can set their own laws, budgets, etc. with minimal connections to Baghdad. The Kurds already run a de facto autonomous region and only need to go through the legal steps now available to them to make it permanent. The SIIC also wants to create a Shiite super region of all of the southern provinces. This is widely unpopular with the public, but since the SIIC controls the local governments, it???s unclear whether the people???s opinions will really matter. If federalism becomes a reality, that will create a weak central government with two autonomous regions that will control most of Iraq???s resources, and ensure that the SIIC and Kurds of their power. Either way U.S. forces can be expected to stay in Iraq for the next 5 to 10 years no matter who bec
omes president, because the military is necessary to keep a damper on violence and diplomats are needed to push Baghdad towards change. One of the lasting effects of the surge maybe that it has created an acceptable level of violence that U.S. politicians can live with, and thus ensure this long-term presence. Ultimately, the lesson of 2007 however, is that it will be the Iraqis, not the U.S. that will decide the path their country follows. Sunni tribes and insurgents decided that they had enough of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Sadr decided to call off his militia, etc. It is up to the same kinds of Iraqis to create their own political parties. If not the existing ones will continue to run a state that doesn???t really stand for its citizens.
SOURCES[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Biddle, Stephen, ???Iraq after the Surge,??? Committee on Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, 1/23/08
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? March 2008 - ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? September 2007
Said, Yahia Khairi, ???Political Dynamics in Iraq within the Context of the ???Surge,?????? Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
Scales, MG (Ret) Robert, Jr., ???Statement for the Record,??? Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
U.N. Reports[/b]
United Nations Security Council, ???Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1770 (2007),??? 1/14/08
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Baker, Pauline, ???A War Out: The Union of Iraqi States,??? Fund For Peace, March 2003 to June 2007
Biddle, Stephen McMahon, Robert, ???Stephen Biddle: Teleconference with CFR,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 11/20/07
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Victory And Violence In Iraq: Reducing the ???Irreducible Minimum,?????? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2/25/08
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Biddle: Security, Political Improvements Seen in Iraq in Recent Months,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 11/15/07
Serwer, Daniel and al-Rahim, Rend, ???Iraq: Politics Unfrozen, Direction Still Unclear,??? United States Institute of Peace, January 2008
Tosh, Caroline and Ahmed Zaineb, ???Kirkuk Dispute Close to Boiling Point,??? Institute For War & Peace Reporting, 3/18/08
Alsumaria, ???Iraq Amnesty Law forging ahead,??? 2/19/08 - ???Iraq Awakening Councils in Diyala end strike,??? 3/4/08
Ardolino, Bill, ???Inside Iraqi politics ??? Part 1. Examining the executive branch,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/6/08 - ???Inside Iraqi politics ??? Part 3. Examining the legislative branch,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/13/08 -???Inside Iraqi Politics ??? Part 4. A look at legislative progress: Reconciliation via wealth distribution,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/25/08 - ???Inside Iraqi politics ??? Part 5. A look at legislative progress: Sunnis??? and states??? rights,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/28/08
Associated Press, ???Former Baathists don???t trust job plan,??? 1/14/08 - ???Pentagon Assesses Strain on Military,??? New York Times, 2/9/08
Aswat Aliraq, ???5 points in constitution still bones of contention ??? MP,??? 2/8/08 - ???3245 prisoners released under pardon law ??? source,??? 3/17/08 - ???8229 detainees released ??? judicial source,??? 3/20/08
Azzaman, ???Opposition to Kurdish move to annex Kirkuk grows,??? 3/17/08
Barnes, Julian, ???Pentagon divided on Iraq strategy,??? Los Angeles Times, 3/20/08
Barnes, Julian and Levey, Noam, ???Army plans to cut length of combat tours in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 2/27/08
Barr, Cameron, ???Petraeus: Iraqi Leaders Not Making ???Sufficient Progress,?????? Washington Post, 3/14/08
Bennett, Brian, ???The Perils of Iraqi Lawmaking,??? Time, 3/1/08 - ???Underestimating al-Sadr ??? Again,??? Time, 2/12/08
Biddle, Stephen, ???Patient Stabilized???? National Interest, 2/29/08
Burns, Robert, ???US commanders: Al-Qaida in Iraq to stay,??? Associated Press, 3/14/08
Dagher, Sam, ???Sadr reins in Shiite militiamen, sends mixed signals,??? Christian Science Monitor, 3/31/08
Dreazen, Yochi and Shishking, Philip and Jaffe, Greg, ???U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/4/07
James, Frank, ???Expert: Current Iraq fighting not good guys vs bad,??? Baltimore Sun, 3/26/08
Gamel, Kim, ???US Commanders Welcome Fallujah Revival,??? Associated Press, 2/9/08
Ghosh, Bobby, ???Maliki???s Moment of Truth in Basra,??? Time, 3/25/08
Glanz, James, ???Compromise on Oil Law in Iraq Seems to Be Collapsing,??? New York Times, 9/13/07
Glanz, James and Schmitt, Eric, ???Iraq Attacks Lower, but Steady, New Figures Show,??? New York times, 3/12/08
Hama-Tahir, Wrya, ???Iraqi Kurds frustrated with own leaders, security forces,??? Middle East Online, 2/18/08
Igoldenberg, ???Sunni Infighting Threatens Iraq???s Stability,??? National Security Network, 2/12/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Mosul situation veers from ???Baghdad model,?????? USA Today, 2/6/08
Moore, Solomon, ???Ex-Baathists Get a Break. Or Do They???? New York Times, 1/14/08
Myers, Steven Lee and Shanker, Thom, ???Bush Given Iraq War Plan With a Steady Troop Level,??? New York Times, 3/25/08
O???Hanlon, Michael, Taspinar, Omer, ???Time for Kurdish Realism,??? Washinogton Post, 2/9/08
Oppel, Richard, ???Quieter Fallujah fears U.S. exit,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/19/07
Oppel, Richard and Myers, Steven Lee, ???Iraq Eases Curb for Former Officials of Hussein???s Party,??? New York Times, 1/13/08
Parker, Ned, ???Iraq votes to lift ban on ex-Baathists,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/13/08 - ???Ruthless, shadowy ??? and a U.S. ally,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/22/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Missteps and Mistrust Mark the Push for Legislation,??? Washington Post, 9/5/07
Partlow, Joshua and Abramowitz, Michael, ???Iraq Passes Bill on Baathists,??? Washington Post, 1/13/08
PBS Frontline, ???INTERVIEWS John Burns,??? Bush???s War, 3/24/08
Senanayake, Sumedha, ???Iraq: Will Passage Of New Law Appease Sunnis???? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1/15/08
Shanker, Thom and Schmitt, Eric, ???U.S. Commander Wants Brief Pause in Troop Cuts,??? New York Times, 2/28/08
Susman, Tina and Ahmed, Asso, ???Iraqi Kurds delay Kirkuk vote,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/27/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Army Chie May Shorten Tours In Iraq, Afghanistan by Summer,??? Washington Post, 1/17/08
Visser, Reidar, ???Debating Devolution in Iraq,??? Middle East Report Online, 3/10/08 - ???The Law on the Powers of Governorates Not Organised in a Region: Washington???s ???Moderate??? Allies Show Some Not-So-Moderate Tendencies,???
Youssef, Nancy, ???Despite dropping violence, Gates calls for extended U.S. presence in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 1/17/08
Zavis, Alexandra, ???In Iraq, U.S. seeks jobs for surplus hired guns,??? Los Angeles Times, 3/21/08
Baghdad???s Gamble Against The Sadrist Mahdi Army[/b]
On March 25, 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki decided to take on Moqtada al-Sadr and his militia the Mahdi Army. On that day Maliki traveled to Basra, Iraq???s second largest city and main port and launched Operation Knights??? Charge. Fighting quickly spread across the south and in Baghdad between government forces and the Sadrists. As quickly as it had begun, Sadr announced a unilateral cease-fire. Maliki wasn???t done yet however. He then announced that he would continue his effort in Sadr???s own front yard, the Shiite slums of Baghdad. Maliki then threw down the gauntlet threatening to ban the Sadrists from politics if they did not disarm. The struggle that continues today is the biggest gamble the Iraqi government has taken part in since the U.S. invasion in 2003.
Operation Knights??? Charge[/b]
When Maliki announced the beginning of Operation Knights??? Charge he claimed that it was aimed at clearing out the many criminal militias that controlled the important city of Basra. It quickly became apparent that the government was only focusing upon the Sadrists however as Iraqi forces moved into their strongholds. The Mahdi Army took up arms in response in Hilla, Nassiriya, Diwaniya, Karbala, Ammara, and Baghdad, while a civil disobedience campaign was begun in several Shiites districts of the capital and the holy city of Najaf as well.
Hundreds of Sadrists were arrested in operations across southern Iraq and Baghdad
Despite a chaotic start, the Mahdi Army was mostly defeated in the South. At first, many local police officers in Basra refused to fight, while a brand new Iraqi army unit broke under the pressure. With the help of the U.S., two Iraqi army brigades were sent in as reinforcements, and American and British air power and artillery became involved. The Mahdi Army took heavy casualties, but fought the Coalition forces to a standstill. They were not as successful in the rest of the South with militiamen being rounded up or killed en masse. In Baghdad, U.S. and Iraqi forces set up a cordon around Sadrist areas, while a reign of missiles landed on the Green Zone. On March 30, Sadr declared a cease-fire after negotiations with a delegation from Iraq???s parliament and the Iranian general in charge of the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force. That move could???ve been expected as he had followed the same tactic before when faced with a large-scale offensive. By then, the Mahdi Army had lost hundreds of fighters that it could not easily replace, while 1300 Iraqi soldiers and police were eventually dismissed for not fighting, or switching sides to the Sadrists.
The Battle Moves To Baghdad[/b]
Iraqi forces began a new counterinsurgency operation aimed at clearing Mahdi Army strongholds in Baghdad beginning in early April
After Basra, the struggle switched to Baghdad in April. There Maliki announced that Sadr would be banned from the October 2008 provincial elections if he did not disarm his militia. The Iraqi cabinet sent a bill to parliament to make the threat legal. Next U.S. and Iraqi forces began moving into Sadr City, the one part of the capital that had gone mostly untouched during the 2007 surge. Together they set up checkpoints and forward operating bases, while trying to assist the local population in a counterinsurgency campaign meant to lesson the support for the Mahdi Army. The prime minister???s office said they would not stop until the area was cleared of Sadr???s militiamen.
Motivations And Implications Of Maliki???s Actions[/b]
Sadr originally helped Maliki become the prime minister of Iraq in 2006. Now Maliki is using Sadr to prove his leadership capabilities
There are many interpretations of why Maliki made his move at this time. The most popular one amongst the Western media is that Maliki is attempting to weaken his main opponent the Sadrists before the October 2008 elections. This could be part of Maliki???s motivation, but why then did he offer Sadr a way to take part in them if he disarmed? Maliki???s own Dawa Party is also divided and has little popular support and influence in the Shiite South, leaving only his allies the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) to benefit in the upcoming voting. The Dawa Party and the SIIC haven???t been agreeing on many issues lately though.
What really seems to be behind Maliki is the desire to prove himself as the true leader of Iraq. In the last year, it has been the Americans and the surge that have been given all the credit for improved security in the country. Now it appears that Maliki wants to show that he too can secure his own nation. Since taking office in 2006, the U.S. has always complained that Maliki has been too sectarian and refused to move against Sadr. Now he is doing just that. The Iraqi security forces are also proving that they can carry out their own independent operations for the first time. Maliki is also gaining political support to make up for his fractured government with the SIIC, Kurds and even the Sunni parties that have been boycotting his cabinet, all standing behind the Prime Minister, leaving Sadr politically isolated. There are internal divisions however as the SIIC and Maliki want to destroy the Sadrists militarily, while the Kurds and Sunnis would like negotiations to ultimately diffuse the situation.
On the problematic side, there does appear to be a slight difference of opinion between the U.S. and Maliki on how to proceed. Maliki has only offered sticks to Sadr saying that Iraqi forces will not stop until they have cleared all of Sadr City of the Mahdi Army. American defense officials on the other hand, are also offering carrots in the hopes that the situation can be resolved politically. This can be seen in statements by Defense Secretary Gates and Gen. Petraeus that Sadr is a legitimate political leader that shouldn???t be cornered so that violence is his only option. The current security situation in Iraq is held together by a series of local and unilateral cease-fires that are mostly arbitrated by the U.S. American forces may be worried that Maliki may not be able to fulfill his threat to destroy Sadr???s militia while undermining the new status quo.
Conclusion[/b]
Prime Minister Maliki is making a calculated gamble in his move against Sadr and his militia. He could be breaking the military power of one of the strongest militias in Iraq that has been responsible for numerous attacks on U.S. forces, the deaths of thousands of Sunnis in the sectarian civil war of 2006-2007, and that has exploited the same Shiite poor that Sadr claims to be representing. On the other hand, Maliki could be undermining the cease-fires that are holding the country together by giving Sadr no other options than to fight in a war that the Iraqi forces may not be able to win. Counterinsurgency operations are long term affairs, so whether Baghdad has the wherewithal to carry this through to a conclusion, or whether there will be a political deal to end it is yet to be seen. What is for sure is that this is the most important on-going confrontation now occurring in Iraq.
Dagher, Sam, ???Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army fought US, Iraqi forces in Baghdad and Basra on Tuesday,??? Christian Science Monitor, 3/26/08 - ???Sadr reins in Shiite militiamen, sends mixed signals,??? Christian Science Monitor, 3/31/08
DeYoung, Karen, ???U.S. Has Little Influence, Few Options in Iraq???s Violatile South,??? Washington Post, 3/29/08
Fadel, Leila, ???Shiite cleric offers truce to ease clashes in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/31/08 - ???With calm restored in Basra, Iraqis ask ???Who won??????? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/31/08
Fadel, Leila and Al Basri, Ali, ???Battles wrack Basra, threatening success of U.S. surge,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/25/08
Farrell, Stephen and Glanz, James, ???More Than 1,000 in Iraq???s Forces Quit Basra Fight,??? New York Times, 4/4/08
Ghosh, Bobby, ???Maliki???s Moment of Truth in Basra,??? Time, 3/25/08 - ???Will Maliki Go the Distance???? Time, 3/26/08
Glanz, James, ???Iraqi Army???s Assault on Militias in Basra Stalls,??? New York Times, 3/27/08
Glanz, James and Farrell, Stephen, ???Crackdown on Militias Raises Stability Concerns,??? New York Times, 4/8/08
Glanz, James and Kamber, Michael, ???Shiite Militias Cling to Swaths of Basra and Stage Raids,??? New York Times, 3/30/08
Glanz, James and Myers, Steven Lee, ???Assault by Iraq on Shiite Forces Stalls in Basra,??? New York times, 3/28/08
Gordon, Michael, Schmitt, Eric and Farrell, Stephen, ???U.S. Cites Gaps in Planning of Iraqi Assault on Basra,??? New York Times, 4/3/08
Graff, Peter, ???Death toll rises in Baghdad fighting,??? Reuters, 3/29/08 - ???U.S. forces drawn deeper into Iraq crackdown,??? Reuters, 3/28/08
Hider, James, ???Areas of Baghdad fall to militias as Iraqi Army falters in Basra,??? The Times of London, 3/27/08 - ???British accused of appeasing Shia militia in Basra,??? The Times of London, 4/12/08 - ???Iraqi police in Basra shed their uniforms, kept their rifles and switched sides,??? The Times of London, 3/28/08 - ???Iraqi troops take on Shia militia in Basra clash,??? The Times of London, 3/25/08
James, Frank, ???Expert: Current Iraq fighting not good guys vs bad,??? Baltimore Sun, 3/26/08
LaFranchi, Howard, ???U.S. hopes to counter Mahdi Army???s clout in Baghdad,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/15/08
Lenz, Ryan, ???Iraq: More US airstrikes on Basra,??? Associated Press, 3/29/08 - ???US jets drop bombs in Basra,??? Associated Press, 3/28/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Iraq, al-Sadr showdown tests loyalties,??? USA Today, 4/1/08
Middle East Online, ???Maliki threatens to Bar Sadr party rom politics,??? 4/7/08
Mohammed, Aref, ???Iraqi forces fight Mehdi Army in Basra,??? Reuters, 3/25/08
Mohammed, Wisam, ???Battles kill 13 in Sadr City, blockade eased,??? Reuters, 4/12/08
Morning Edition, ???Assessing Iraq???s Security Forces,??? National Public Radio, 4/10/08 - ???Gen. Keane: Iraqi Military Not Ready to Stand Alone,??? National Public Radio, 3/28/08
Negus, Steve, ???Maliki risks open Sadrist insurrection,??? Financial Times, 3/27/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???Attacks on U.S. Forces Soard at End of March,??? Washington Post, 4/2/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Freeman, Sholnn, ???Sadr Followers Protest Security Crackdown,??? Washington Post, 3/27/08 - ???U.S. Appears to Take Lead in Fighting in Baghdad,??? Washington Post, 4/1/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto, ???Basra Assault Exosed U.S., Iraqi Limits,??? Washington Post, 4/4/08
Rahimi, Babk, ???What Direction for the al-Mahdi Army after the Basra Offensive???? Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 4/1/08
Reid, Robert, ???Iraq to expand crackdown,??? Associated Press, 4/3/08
Reuters, ???Aide to Iraq???s Sadr says truce still in place,??? 3/26/08 - ???FACTBOX ??? Security developments in Iraq, March 30,??? 3/30/08
Roggio, Bill, ???A look at Operation Knights??? Assault,??? Long War Journal.org, 4/4/08 - ???Mahdi Army taking significant casualties in Baghdad, South,??? Long War Journal.org, 3/29/08 - ???Maliki: ???Security operations in Basra will continue,?????? Long War Journal.org, 3/31/08
Scales, MG (Ret) Robert H., Jr., ???Statement for the Record,??? Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
Strobel, Warren and Fadel, Leila, ???Iranian who brokered Iraqi peace is on U.S. terrorist watch list,??? McClatchy Newspaper, 3/31/08
Susman, Tina, ???Can Iraq???s soldiers fight???? Los Angeles Times, 4/3/08
Tavernise, Sabrina, and Moore, Solomon, ???In This Shiite Battle, a Marked Shift From the Past,??? New York Times, 3/30/08
Visser, Reidar, ???The Enigmatic Second Battle of Basra,??? Historiae.org, 3/26/08 - ???Maliki, Hakim, and Iran???s Role in the Basra Fighting,??? Historiae.org, 4/9/08
Yacoub, Sameer, ???Iraq Orders Gas Station Crackdown,??? Associated Press, 4/13/08
On March 25, 2008 Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki launched a military operation to clear Basra, Iraq???s second largest city, of Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army. Despite poor planning by Maliki and some initial stumbles, Iraqi forces, backed by the U.S. and Britain, were able to take back the city from the Sadrists and other Shiite militias that had been running the city. Afterwards, Maliki took on Sadr in his stronghold, Sadr City in Baghdad. Maliki has been able to play both the military and political card against Sadr, and has effectively cornered the man behind one of Iraq???s largest and most deadly militias.
Military Operations Against Sadr[/b]
Maliki???s campaign against Sadr started with military operations in Basra that quickly spread across southern Iraq and into Baghdad. Fighting in the south ended when Sadr said he had negotiated a deal with Iraqi politicians and Iran at the end of March. The Prime Minister however, wasn???t involved and Iraqi forces continued to clear Sadrist neighborhoods in Basra. By April 25, government forces claimed they had military control of the city, and hoped to clear it of all militias within the next two months. Hundreds of Mahdi Army members were either killed or jailed in the process, dealing a sever blow to the militia because it can???t hope to replace these fighters any time soon.
By mid-April, Iraqi forces announced they were in control of Basra, Iraq???s second largest city
The population of Basra seems to be supportive of the crackdown. The city was under a harsh form of Islamic law by the various Shiite militias, including the Mahdi Army. Music was banned, women were forced to wear head-scarves and they couldn???t wear jeans or bright colors. Hundreds of women were assassinated for breaking these rules. By late April, people were cautiously returning to the streets, schools and businesses.
There have been almost 300 rocket and mortar attacks on the Green Zone, mostly from Sadr City, since the Iraqi government began its operations against the Mahdi Army
Baghdad is now the center of the crackdown on Sadr. Initially, the Mahdi Army was attempting to take pressure off their brethren in Basra by harassing Iraqi and U.S. forces, and shelling the Green Zone. That tactic seemed to backfire as it provoked the U.S. to move into the southern section of Sadr City called Jameela to stop the mortar and rocket fire. The U.S. ended up constructing a wall around the entire section as they had in other parts of Baghdad during the surge. At the same time, the U.S. is attempting to improve services in the district such as garbage pick up and a medical clinic. The ultimate goal is to win over the local population so that they support the government. Most of these projects are funded by the U.S. however, while the Maliki government has either been absent or said they will not start any work until security improves.
Map of the wall built by U.S. forces around Jameela, the southern section of Sadr City, Baghdad
Political Isolation of Sadr[/b]
Maliki has also been able to move deftly on the political front to isolate Sadr. Maliki has delivered a much clearer and effective message calling on Sadr to disarm, turn over members of his militia that have carried out attacks, and recognize the authority of the government if he wants to continue to play a role in the country???s politics. Sadr on the other hand, has gone back and forth from threatening an end to his cease-fire and carrying out an all out war, to calling on his followers to continue their stand down, and asking for a peaceful resolution to the problem. These contradictory statements reflect the internal divisions with the Sadrist movement between those that want to go out fighting, and others that want a peaceful resolution.
While a few leading politicians such as Vice President Hashemi, the Speaker of Parliament al-Mashahadani, and former Prime Ministers Allawi and Jaafari, have called for negotiations, the majority of political parties and leading Shiite clerics are standing behind Maliki against Sadr. The Sunni parties that have been boycotting Maliki???s cabinet may even return to the government, in part because they have been impressed that Maliki has been willing to crackdown on his fellow Shiites. A Sadrist spokesman said that the movement was shocked at how isolated they had become. This further corners Sadr because he hasn???t been able to back out of his confrontation with the government like he did in the past. Maliki???s government on the other hand is emboldened and setting the conditions for any peace between the two sides.
Most political factions in Iraq???s parliament support the Prime Minister???s crackdown on the Sadrists
Conclusion[/b]
By the time the Maliki government ends its crackdown, Sadr may have to surrender his militia, or see much of it destroyed
This may be the last stand for Moqtada al-Sadr???s militia. Maliki is outmaneuvering Sadr on the political front so far. That may force Sadr into a military battle that he cannot win. If successful, this could be a coup for Maliki. It would be the first time that he proves that he is a competent leader. It also might lead to a new political coalition behind him if the Sunnis choose to rejoin his cabinet. Just as important, Maliki may be able to severely weaken his main political opponent Sadr. The Mahdi Army needed to be dealt with one way or another. Sadr???s plan was to build up a Hezbollah like party with strong backing from Iran that provided basic services to poor Shiites, ran candidates for office, and hoped to eventually rule the government, while also operating a large and powerful militia. Sadrists are also responsible for hundreds of attacks on U.S. forces and the deaths of thousands of Sunnis during the sectarian war for Baghdad that took place from 2006-2007. Sadr has proven to be a survivor and will most likely back down, but on Maliki???s terms. It will probably cost him his militia if he hopes to continue to play a role in Iraq???s politics.
Agence France Presse, ???Iraqi forces seize last Sadr bastion in Basra: US,??? 4/26/08
Al-Gharafi, Abdulhussein, ???Sadr???s Mahdi Army refuses to disarm,??? Azzaman, 4/7/08
Al-Ansary, Khalid, ???Iraqi PM seeks to ease tensions with militia,??? Reuters, 4/4/08
Alsumaria, ???Wall under construction in Sadr City limited,??? 4/26/08
Associated Press, ???Iraq PM sets conditions to end crackdown,??? 4/25/08 - ???Iraqi Cabinet approves measure barring parties with militias from elections,??? 4/13/08
Aswat Aliraq, ???Al-Sadr consulted clergy, they ???rejected??? dissolving Mahdi Army,??? 4/9/08 - ???Gov???t???s disarming campaign must include all militias ??? Sadr,??? 4/10/08 - ???Iraqi authorities lift anti-US cleric???s loyalist facility in Basra,??? 4/25/08 - ???Negotiations with Americans ???red line??? ??? Sadrist lawmaker,??? 4/22/08 - ???Negotiations with U.S. troops end Sadr city crisis ??? Former PM,??? 4/22/08 - ??????Open war against occupiers only,??? Sadr tells followers,??? 4/25/08 - ???Parliamentary bloc
s grant mandate to security measures taken by gov???t ??? PM,??? 4/25/08 - ???Sadrist leaders refuse to lay down weapons,??? 4/17/08 - ???Sadrist MP links militia disbanding to Badr end,??? 4/18/08 - ???Talabani and al-Mashahadani stress peaceful solutions to crises,??? 4/27/08
Brookes, Adam, ???Rival claims over Basra battle,??? BBC News, 4/4/08
Cordesman, Anthony, ???The Shi???ite Gamble: Rolling the Dice for Iraq???s Future,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/21/08
Dagher, Sam, ???Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08
Deshmukh, Jay, ???US troops plan to stay put in Sadr City,??? Middle East Online, 4/15/08
Glanz, James and Farrell, Stephen, ???Crackdown on Militias Raises Stability Concerns,??? New York Times, 4/8/08
Gordon, Michael, ???In Sadr City, Basic Services Are Faltering,??? New York Times, 4/22/08 - ???U.S. Begins Erecting Wall in Sadr City,??? New York Times, 4/18/08
Haynes, Deborah, ???The men in black vanish and Basra comes to life,??? Times of London, 4/25/08
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, ???Al-Sadr shift: away from politics and favoring fight,??? Associated Press, 4/24/08
Hider, James, ???British accused of appeasing Shia militia in Basra,??? Times, 4/12/08
Ismail, Raviya, ???Sadr threatens unending ???war??? in Iraq if attacks don???t end,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 4/20/08
Jamil, Karim, ???Iraq army claims in full sway of Basra,??? Midle East Online, 4/25/08
Middle East Online, ???Maliki threatens to Bar Sadr party rom politics,??? 4/7/08
Mohammed, Aref, ???Show of force as Iraqi forces advance in Basra,??? Reuters, 4/19/08
Parker, Nd, Salman, Raheem, and Fakhrildeen, Saad, ???Fear and dread in Iraq???s holy city of Najaf,??? Los Angeles Times, 4/19/08
Rasheed, Ahmed, ???Iraqi cleric threatens end to ceasefire,??? Reuters, 4/8/08
Roggio, Bill, ???A look at Operation Knights??? Assault,??? Long War Journal.org, 4/4/08 - ???Ayatollah Sistani on the Mahdi Army: ???the law is the only authority in the country,?????? Long War Journal.org, 4/9/08
Westervelt, Eric, ???U.S. Bids to Bring Basic Services to Sadr City,??? Weekend Edition, National Public Radio, 4/27/08
Basra Before and After Operation Knights??? Charge[/b]
In March 2008, the Iraqi government launched a campaign called Operation Knight???s Charge to take back control of Basra, the country???s second largest city. Prime Minister Maliki said he was going to expel the criminals that had taken over there. While the offensive was initially focused solely upon Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army, since then the government has also cracked down on other Shiite parties that ran parts of the city. As a result, life has slowly but surely returned to the streets. Who the population will ultimately give their loyalties to however, is yet to be seen.
Before: Political, Militia and Criminal Control of Basra[/b]
Members of the Fadhila Party holding a press conference in 2007. They were previously in charge of Basra province and city government
Before Baghdad decided to take action in Basra, the city was controlled by a variety of different Shiite political parties that controlled different parts of the city. The Fadhila Party ran the provincial and city government, and also controlled the Oil Protection Service and the dockworkers??? union. The Sadrists were also prominent in the city, especially when the surge started in 2007 and many Mahdi Army fighters fled south to cities like Basra to avoid the increased U.S. military operations. Sadr???s followers controlled the Facilities Protection Service, much of the local police, the port authority, hospitals, and electrical plants. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) ran the local intelligence service, the commandos, and the border crossings into Iran and Kuwait. There were also many smaller Shiite parties such as Iraqi Hezbollah and the Thurallah Party. Hezbollah controlled the customs police.
The British were nominally in charge of the city and province until the end of 2007, but their policies played into the hands of the Shiite parties. Instead of recruiting a brand new police force, the English integrated many of the local militias. Several attempts were later made to vet the police, but they all failed. By the end of 2007, the British withdrew to the city???s airport, ensuring that the militias would have full sway over the city.
In the fall of 2007 the British withdrew from Basra proper to the city???s airport, thus ensuring that the local Shiite parties of their rule
Many of the ruling parties imposed their form of Islamic law, and took part in the massive oil smuggling trade. Women were banned from wearing bright colors or jeans, were forced to cover their hair, and were not allowed to sit next to men in the city???s universities. Over 100 women were killed for breaking these rules. The militias also outlawed music, selling alcohol, and public parties, and persecuted the local Christian population. Smuggling oil also provided the main means of financing for all of the parties in the city. There was plenty of oil to take as Basra is Iraq???s only major seaport and handles up to 2/3 of the country???s oil exports. The Shiite parties also stole from the security forces and government offices including 250 police cars and 5,000 pistols. By December 2007, the police chief claimed that up to $64 billion had been stolen through corruption and smuggling in the city since the 2003 invasion.
There were often shootouts between the rival factions over control of illegal activities or the police. Iran was also playing a role supplying many of the different Shiite parties with weapons, and supporting attacks upon the British, adding to the violence. In 2007 alone, there were 848 deaths and 383 kidnappings in a city that the British claimed to be secure.
A Hasty Military Offensive[/b]
Prime Minister Maliki grew tired of the slow pace of securing Basra and wanted to prove his leadership skills. This led to Operation Knights??? Charge in March 2008
Operation Knights??? Charge was a hastily conceived military operation that proved far more effective than expected. Maliki originally appointed a new military and police chief for Basra in late 2007. They formulated a long-term plan to vet the security forces, clear out criminal gangs, reach out to those parties that were willing to work within the political system, and then use force against those that didn???t. These goals were suppose to be completed by the fall of 2008 before the planned provincial elections. City residents and Maliki seemed to be unhappy with the state of affairs however as there were large protests about the lack of security, and the prime minister warned Basra???s governor needed to take control of the city and port and be cut off by Baghdad in March 2008. Maliki grew impatient and decided to launch his own offensive, which became Knights??? Charge later that month. This was the first time the Iraqi government planned and carried out its own military operation.
The Mahdi Army had a short battle with the government for control of the city at the end of March. Since then they have been largely cleared from the city
Maliki said that the government would clear the city of criminals, but the only group that initially was targeted was the Mahdi Army. Despite some defections and AWOL soldiers, the government???s forces were able to move into the center of the city and battle the Mahdi Army to a standstill. Sadr eventually agreed to a cease-fire, but Maliki did not. While the Sadrists stopped fighting, the security forces continued to secure neighborhoods. By early May, they had cleared many of the strongholds of Sadr???s followers. Maliki was not done however. He also put the Fadhila governor under house arrest and went after his brother who was allegedly the largest oil smuggler in Iraq. The Thurallah party had its office shut and its main mosque destroyed. By the end of April, the government said it had cleared the port of criminals and smugglers, and arrested over 300 militiamen and criminals. Baghdad also set about creating new security forces that would be loyal to it, rather than the local political parties.
Iraqi forces continue to conduct raids and arrests to clear Basra of militias. These are weapons seized in the city
Conclusion: Afterwards, A Possible Rebirth of Basra[/b]
Women in Basra feel more free to walk the streets now that many of the militias have been subdued
Since the major military operations ended, life has slowly returned to Basra. Shops are beginning to sell alcohol and music again, bands are performing at weddings, and women are walking the streets again and attending classes at the Basra University. These all give the outward appearance of a city coming out from under the boot of Islamic Shiite parties. Maliki also promised $100 million to rebuild the city???s services to try to win over more hearts and minds.
Bands in Basra are once again allowed to perform in public, something that was banned under militia rule before
What will happen next is unknown. Prime Minister Maliki is hoping that his security moves and promises of rebuilding will win Basra???s loyalty. Given its history, that???s not a given. Basra is known for its indepen
dence from the rest of Iraq, while being resentful of Baghdad. Even before the U.S. invasion, the city claimed that the capital had always ignored them despite being the most important economic center in the country. These feelings were reinforced after the U.S. invasion as the local parties, militias and gangs took over the city and the central government did nothing. Maliki is hoping that he can prove himself to be a leader. Whether he can follow up his military moves with real governance that means a better life and jobs for common Iraqis is the real question that follows.
SOURCES[/b]
Abedzair, Kareem, ???Fear grips Basra and Najaf in wake of murder of 40 women,??? Azzaman, 12/8/07
Agence France Presse, ???Iraqi forces seize last Sadr bastion in Basra: US,??? 4/26/08
Aswat Aliraq, ???Basra Operations Commander: 324 wanted, suspects arrested in Basra,??? 4/29/08 - ???Basra operations commander: ultimatum ended,??? 4/8/08 - ???Curfew clamped on Basra,??? 3/25/08 - ???Emergency plan implemented in Basra,??? 3/5/08 - ???Iraqi authorities lift anti-US cleric???s loyalist facility in Basra,??? 4/25/08 - ???Maliki urges improvement of services in Basra,??? 4/1/08 - ???Party???s leader, 3 brothers detained in Basra,??? 4/3/08
Azzaman, ???Thousands of police officers who refused to fight Sadr are given the sack,??? 3/31/08
Battat, Abed, ???Militias stronger than police in Basra, police chief says,??? Azzaman, 12/27/07 - ???Police chief purges force in Basra,??? Azzaman, 1/6/08
Borden, Anthony, ???Iraqi Governance Report,??? Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Brookes, Adam, ???Rival claims over Basra battle,??? BBC News, 4/4/08
Dagher, Sam, ???As British leave Basra, militias dig in,??? Christian Science Monitor 8/28/07 - ???As British troops exit Basra, Shiites vie to fill power vacuum,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/17/07 - ???Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08 - ???British hand over Basra in disarray,??? Christian Science Monitor, 12/17/07 - ??????Shiite Taliban??? rises as British depart Basra,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/18/07
DeYoung, Karen and Ricks, Thomas, ???As British Leave, Basra Deteriorates,??? Washington Post, 8/7/07
DPA, ???5 US soldiers killed, Shia mosque blown up by army,??? 5/4/08
Fadel, Leila, ???Shiite cleric offers truce to ease clashes in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/31/08 - ???With calm restored in Basra, Iraqis ask ???Who won??????? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/31/08
Fresh Air, ???'Fiasco' Author Reports On the Petraeus Report,??? NPR, 9/12/07
Ghosh, Bobby, ???Maliki???s Moment of Truth in Basra,??? Time, 3/25/08
Glanz, James, ???Iraqi Troops May Move to Reclaim Basra???s Port,??? New York Times, 3/13/08
Haynes, Deborah, ???The men in black vanish and Basra comes to life,??? Times of London, 4/25/08
Hider, James, ???British accused of appeasing Shia militia in Basra,??? Times of London, 4/12/08 - ???Iraq: an accidential battle that no one can afford to lose,??? Times of London, 3/31/08 - ???Iraqi police in Basra shed their uniforms, kept their rifles and switched sides,??? Times, of London 3/28/08
Institute For War & Peace Reporting, ???Battling for Power in Basra,??? 8/7/07
Jamil, Karim, ???Iraq army claims in full sway of Basra,??? Midle East Online, 4/25/08
Lenz, Ryan, ???Iraq: More US airstrikes on Basra,??? Associated Press, 3/29/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Iraq, al-Sadr showdown tests loyalties,??? USA Today, 4/1/08
Mohammed, Aref, ???Show of force as Iraqi forces advance in Basra,??? Reuters, 4/19/08
Monsters and Critics.com, ???Basra security worsened by uncontrolled border, say Iraqi officials,??? 3/9/08
Moore, Solomon, ???Ominous Signs Remain in City Run by Iraqis,??? New York Times, 2/23/08
Morning Edition, ???Gen. Keane: Iraqi Military Not Ready to Stand Alone,??? National Public Radio, 3/28/08
Price, Jay and Basri, Ali Omar al, ???In Basra, vigilantes wage deadly campaign against women,??? McClatchy Newspaper, 10/4/07
Everyday Iraqi and U.S. forces are battling members of Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army, also known by its Arabic name and abbreviation Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM). The fighting is centered in the eastern Baghdad district called Sadr City that holds up to two million inhabitants, mostly poor Shiites. Clashes began there in late March 2008 when Prime Minister Maliki launched a crack down on Sadrists in the southern port city of Basra. Immediately, JAM elements throughout the South and Baghdad rose up in both peaceful and violent protests against the government???s actions. Since then the focus of Maliki???s operation has shifted to Baghdad and Sadr City specifically. The U.S. is now focusing upon building a wall around the southern section of district known as Jamilla. The Mahdi Army is desperately throwing themselves against the U.S. soldiers trying to construct the wall. This could be a make or break it fight for Sadr???s followers.
Sadr City Wall and Operations[/b]
U.S. engineers have spent the last month construction a large blast wall around the southern district of Sadr City. It???s meant to secure the area within rocket and mortar range of the Green Zone, but it is also the first step in pacifying Sadr???s stronghold.
The U.S. originally moved into the southern section of Sadr City trying to stop rocket and mortar attacks on the Green Zone where the U.S. Embassy, Iraq???s parliament and other important offices are located. By entering Tharwa and Jamilla, and other neighborhoods, the U.S. hoped to push the Sadrists out of range of the international zone. As the U.S. had done in other areas of the capital during the surge, they decided to construct a large blast wall around the area to keep out JAM fighters and eventually pacify the population and win them over to the government???s side.
Building the wall has been slow but steady, and the fighting over it is taking a toll on JAM. Over 500 Mahdi Army fighters have died in the fighting since late March. This is a devastating number for Sadr???s militia militia. During the battle for Baghdad in 2006-2007, the Sadrists virtually reigned supreme over the capital. Since then however, the movement has fractured during Sadr???s cease-fire. Many Shiites simply joined to gain spoils from the expulsion of Sunnis, others were criminal elements, while others were just Shiites fighting for survival in mixed neighborhoods. Since that battle was won, many of these opportunists have fallen by the wayside. The Mahdi Army was never very organized to begin with consisting of many independent cells. No insurgent force can win in a direct battle with conventional forces, but that is what the wall is forcing the Sadrists into. Everyday they launch rocket and mortar attacks as well as hit and run raids on construction units. They are suffering casualties, which they can not easily replace in the process. If this war of attrition continues, much of the Sadr???s armed wing in Baghdad may be destroyed.
Map of the area being walled off in Sadr City by U.S. forces. To the south is the Green Zone, which was being shelled daily by Sadrists from the southern part of Sadr City now being enclosed.
There have also been some controversial moves by the U.S. in the fighting as well. One was the destruction of a building next to a hospital in Sadr City in the beginning of May. The building was the headquarters for a unit of the Mahdi Army that operated with Iranian weapons and support known as a Special Group. The Ministry of Health, which runs the country???s hospitals is under the control of Sadrists who took control of the ministership when they originally joined the government in 2006. During the sectarian fighting from 2006-2007 the Sadrists used ambulances to ferry weapons, held captured Sunnis in hospitals, and tortured and killed them there and in the capital???s morgues.
Damage to the area around the hospital that housed the Sadrist Special Groups headquarters destroyed by U.S. missiles
Conclusion[/b]
If fighting continues at the current rate Sadr could lose most of his fighters by the end of the summer. This would be a devastating blow to one of the country???s largest and most notorious militias that once seemed like it was on the brink of conquering the capital. What comes next might be more important. What Sadr decides to do, continue to fight or negotiate his way out of the crisis is the looming question. The Iraqi government has also been unable to provide basic services to much of the population since its inception in 2006. Maliki has promised reconstruction funds for Sadr City, but none of that money has really been spent as the fighting continues. Actually allocating that money and using it effectively might prove to be more difficult than the current battle. These political and economic issues are the more important ones to consider as the clashes in Baghdad continue.
SOURCES[/b]
Al-Ansary, Khalid, ???Iraqi PM seeks to ease tensions with militia,??? Reuters, 4/4/08
CBS, ???CBS: Death Squads In Iraqi Hospitals,??? 10/4/06
Deshmukh, Jay, ???US troops plan to stay put in Sadr City,??? Middle East Online, 4/15/08
Fayad, Ma???ad, ???Iran Ordered Muqtada al-Sadr to Return to Al-Najaf ??? Iraqi Sources,??? Asharq Alawsat, 4/14/08
Glantz, Aaron, ???Iraqi Health Ministry Severs Ties With US Over Raid,??? AntiWar.com, 8/15/06
Gordon, Michael, ???In Sadr City, Basic Services Are Faltering,??? New York Times, 4/22/08 - ???U.S. Begins Erecting Wall in Sadr City,??? New York Times, 4/18/08
International Crisis Group, ???Iraq???s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,??? 2/7/08
LaFranchi, Howard, ???U.S. hopes to counter Mahdi Army???s clout in Baghdad,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/15/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Sadrists??? grip on Iraqis??? health care takes toll,??? USA Today, 3/26/08
Paley, Amit, ???Iraqi Hospitals Are War???s New ???Killing Fields,?????? Washington Post, 8/30/06
Roggio, Bill, ???19 Mahdi Army fighters killed during Baghdad battles,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/8/08 - ???GMLRS strike knocks out Special Groups command center in Sadr City,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/3/08
Tomkins, Richard, ???Iraq: U.S. Troops, Shi???ite Gunmen Battle Daily In Al-Sadr City,??? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 5/7/08
Westervelt, Eric, ???U.S. Bids to Bring Basic Services to Sadr City,??? Weekend Edition, National Public Radio, 4/27/08
Comments
The U.N. Inspectors Were Right: Iraq Was Not A Threat[/b]
The Bush administration claimed that U.N. inspections were the last chance for Iraq to come clean about its WMD and nuclear programs and disarm to avoid a war. The U.S. however, never saw them as a way out. Rather inspections were simply a means to achieve the goal of starting a war. They hoped that Saddam would either reject the U.N. inspectors outright or if they were allowed in, they would find enough evidence of Iraq???s weapons programs to justify a war. When U.N. inspections began anew in November 2002 they found nothing despite repeated visits to every suspected site listed by the U.S. The White House claimed that the inspectors were being played by Iraq, and the war went ahead anyway in March 2003. After the war, U.N. inspectors were proved to be right after all, Iraq had no WMD or nuclear program and was not a military threat. Iraq???s programs had been destroyed by the same inspectors the White House had been attacking as ineffective.
Iraq???s Catch-22[/b]
The U.N. first started weapons inspections of Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War with Resolutions 687 and 715. Saddam had developed WMD and started a nuclear program because he thought it was a sign of a modern and strong nation. His main targets were Iran and internal threats such as the Kurds and Shiites. He never planned on using them against the West, and refrained from deploying them during the Gulf War. Saddam found himself caught in a Catch-22 because he wanted to comply with the U.N. so that sanctions were lifted that were crippling his country, while at the same time he felt it necessary to play the defiant Arab leader standing up to the West to maintain his public image and deter his enemies. He was caught in this paradox all the way up until the 2003 U.S. invasion.
Saddam Hussein put himself in a Catch-22 situation with his stance towards U.N. inspectors. On the one hand he wanted to cooperate with them so that U.N. sanctions were lifted. At the same time he wanted to act defiantly towards them to maintain his image as a strong Arab leader standing up to the West, who also continued to possess WMD to deter his enemies such as Iran
1991 - 1st Round of U.N. Inspections[/b]
Iraq???s policy towards the U.N. and the effectiveness of the inspectors went through several stages. When they first started in 1991, Saddam tried to hide his programs and keep as many of his weapons as possible. U.N. inspectors proved to be more effective than planned however, and tracked down and destroyed much of Iraq???s stockpiles. It turned out that much of Iraq???s WMD were made in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War and had passed their expiration date and had become useless.
Cans filled with nerve agents discovered by U.N. inspectors during the 1st round of inspections 1991-1992
Just as the U.N. thought its job was over, they found evidence of Iraq???s nuclear program, which had largely been kept secret. Before the Gulf War the U.S. believed that Iraq was 5-10 years away from a bomb. Now there was evidence that it could???ve had a crude device in only 6 months to a year. Saddam was forced to admit to his secret plans, which created more suspicion and mistrust.
After this first round of inspections Saddam changed his stance. Now he ordered the head of his weapons program Gen. Hussein Kamal to destroy most of Iraq???s WMD stockpile, while maintaining the know how in the hopes of restarting them after U.N. sanctions were over. Only one WMD factory at Al-Hakam was maintained while most everything else was destroyed. The problem was that all of this was kept secret to keep the U.N. in the dark about the extent of Iraq???s programs so that it couldn???t stop them in the future. This proved to be a nagging problem for Iraq as it could never fully prove that it had gotten rid of its weapons.
1995 and the End of Iraq???s Programs[/b]
By 1992 the U.N. felt like much of their work had been done, but then in 1994 the head of Iraq???s weapons programs Gen. Hussein Kamal defected to the West and provided a whole new range of information. Hussein said that U.N. inspectors had destroyed much of Iraq???s weapons and that Saddam had ordered him to destroy the rest. Based upon Kamal???s information the U.N. went back to work in Iraq and destroyed almost everything that was left. That marked the end of Iraq???s unconventional threat. The fact that Iraq had never come clean willingly however and not cooperated made inspectors and the U.S. believe that Iraq must still have something to hide. All Iraq had left was the know how and the hope that it could re-start its programs in the future.
The End of Inspections[/b]
By 1998 Iraq???s nuclear, WMD and missile programs had been destroyed. Inspectors were largely looking for documentation of Gen. Kamal???s secret destruction of Iraq???s stockpiles. Saddam on the other hand, believed that since he had disarmed, inspections and sanctions should end, but they didn???t. He came to believe that the West knew he didn???t have any weapons, but were just using the inspectors to overthrow his government. That was partially true because the U.S. had used the U.N. to collect intelligence that went into at least one unsuccessful coup attempt. Iraq began harassing inspectors, then stopped cooperation, and made them leave in December 1998.
When the U.N. left Iraq, the U.S. faced its own quandary. The inspectors were the only real source of intelligence the U.S. had on Iraq. Afterwards they were blind about what was actually happening within the country. That forced the U.S. to rely more and more on Iraqi exiles provided by groups such as the Iraqi National Congress that were full of false stories meant to push the country towards war. The lack of inspectors also made U.S. intelligence believe that Iraq had restarted its weapons programs. This grew to be the basis for the Bush administration???s claims against Iraq in the lead up to the 2003 invasion.
The Bush Administration: Inspections As Pretext To War[/b]
By 2002 the new Bush administration decided on war with Iraq. One of the problems they were faced with was how to justify it. In March 2002 British Prime Minister Tony Blair???s office suggested to the White House that a new round of U.N. inspectors could be the way to provoke a war. England believed that Iraq would refuse inspections and that could not only provide the legal justification for war, but also help build public support. Vice President Cheney and the neoconservatives in the administration such as Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz were deeply skeptical of the U.N. and didn???t believe the U.S. needed any legal justification, while Secretary of State Colin Powell was supportive. The administration remained divided until Powell was able to convince Bush of the U.N. route in September, and Bush gave a speech to the Security Council asking for new inspectors.
In early 2002 it was Prime Minister Tony Blair that put forth the idea to President Bush of using United Nations inspectors as a way to justify a war with Iraq
American Claims and U.N. Findings[/b]
In the beginning of October 2002 U.S. intelligence laid out its claims against Iraq in a secret National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and a public White Paper. They claimed that Iraq had restarted its WMD production, that it was larger than before the Gulf War, had research and develo pment, dual use equipment, mobile labs, several tons of WMD, and an unaccounted for stock of weapons left over from the Iran-Iraq War. They claimed Saddam had also renewed his nuclear program, tried to buy uranium from Niger, and aluminum tubes for centrifuges. The two reports were quickly put together and reflected all of the fears and problems U.S. intelligence had with Iraq, namely suspicions of Iraq???s activities based upon no hard evidence.
In November 2002, U.N. inspections began anew under Resolution 1441. Initially the inspections followed the same script as the past, with Iraq trying to limit access to sites, arguing over interviews with scientists and whether to allow intelligence flights. By February 2003 all of those issued had been resolved. More importantly, Saddam agreed to cooperate in the hopes of avoiding war.
Dr. Hans Blix and Mohamad El-Baradei were in charge of the WMD and nuclear inspections of Iraq. They repeatedly reported that while Iraq was not fully cooperating until March 2003, they found no evidence of any active weapons programs
The inspectors had a list of 550 sites. At the top were the main WMD, nuclear and missiles sites listed by the U.S. in the NIE and White Paper. After repeated visits, installation of surveillance cameras, and aerial intelligence flights, nothing was found at any of them. The Al Dawrah WMD site was abandoned and in ruins. The Al Furat nuclear site turned out to have commercial chemicals, while Al Taramiyah was destroyed in a U.S. attack in the 1990s and never rebuilt. The aluminum tubes that were suppose to be for centrifuges to enrich uranium proved to be for conventional rockets. There was no evidence of mobile labs, and the story about buying uranium from Niger proved to be based upon forged documents. As early as December, the inspectors said they found no active WMD or nuclear programs. The only WMD found were 32 old artillery shells, and papers about enriching uranium that proved to be old and irrelevant. The one actual violation of U.N. resolutions that was discovered were long range missiles that the U.N. destroyed. The only real question was accounting for Gen. Kamal???s unilateral destruction of Iraq???s stockpile in the 1990s, and even then Iraq was trying to provide documentation on the matter.
At the same time, the U.S. was trying to undermine the inspections. In December 2002 Pres. Bush said he doubted that Iraq was cooperating with the U.N. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said that the U.S. knew Iraq had WMD regardless of what the U.N. found, and that Iraq was in a no-win situation. If the U.N. found WMD, Saddam was guilty, and if they didn???t find anything that proved Iraq was guilty as well because it was hiding its weapons. The U.S. also didn???t share all of its intelligence with the U.N. as it promised.
Powell making America???s case against Iraq in his February 2003 speech to the United Nations. After the war almost everything he said was proven to be false
By January 2003 time was up on Iraq and the inspectors, but the public didn???t know. President Bush was frustrated with the lack of evidence the inspectors were turning up and told Condoleeza Rice and Karl Rove separately that the U.S. was going to go to war no matter what the U.N. found. On January 31, 2003, Bush met with Tony Blair and they agreed upon invading Iraq. Secretary Powell made the public case in his speech to the United Nations on February 5, 2003. He claimed that Iraq was not cooperating with inspectors and had not disarmed. He played tapes of Iraqi soldiers talking, which after the war turned out to be orders to cooperate with U.N. inspectors, not hide WMD. He showed satellite pictures of at truck that was suppose to be used as part of a WMD team, but turned out to be conventional fire trucks when investigated by the U.N. Powell claimed that the U.S. had sources within Iraq telling them that papers were being hidden and material was being moved around, even though the U.S. had no such sources. He said that Iraq was not allowing U2 spy plane flights, but those were agreed upon two weeks later. He showed diagrams of mobile WMD labs even though inspectors had found no evidence of them, and the CIA itself was divided over whether the stories were legitimate or not. Powell said that Iraq had bought aluminum tubes for centrifuges, although he added the caveat that not all U.S. experts agreed upon that, while the U.N. had already largely disproved the story. After the war was over the Senate Intelligence Committee investigated U.S. claims about Iraq???s weapons and found that, ???Much of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency for inclusion in Secretary Powell???s speech was overstated, misleading or incorrect.???
The bombing of Baghdad and the beginning of the U.S. invasion of Iraq
By March 2003, all of Iraq???s major WMD, nuclear and missile sites listed by the U.S. had been checked several times over. Iraqi scientists were conducting interviews, surveillance flights were being made, and Iraq was providing evidence to back up General Kamal???s story that he had destroyed Iraq???s stockpile. All of America???s major claims had been investigated and found to be wanting. The U.S. acted like none of this mattered and launched the invasion of Iraq in the middle of March. After all, as the U.S. and England had discussed a year earlier, the U.N. inspections were never meant to stave off a war, but to provoke one.
SOURCES[/b]
Books
Isikoff, Michael and Corn, David, Hubris, Crown, 2006
Prados, John, Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War, New Press, 2004
Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, The American Military Adventure In Iraq, Penguin Press, 2006
Woodward, Bob, Bush At War, Simon & Schuster, 2002
Government and U.N. Reports
British Government, Confidential And Personal, 6/16/05
British Government, Confidential And Personal, PR. 121, 6/16/05
British Government, PM/02/019, 6/16/05
British Government, Secret ??? Strictly Personal, 6/16/05
British Government, Text of Downing Street Memo, PBS??? Newshour, 6/16/05
Director General International Atomic Energy Agency, S/1997/779, International Atomic Energy Agency, 10/8/97
El Baradei, Dr. Mohamed, The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2/14/03
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, UNSCOM/IAEA SECRET, UNSCOME/IAEA, 8/22/95
IAEA Media Advisory, News Update on Iraq Inspections, International Atomic Energy Agency, 12/19/02
Iraq Nuclear Verification Office, Fact Sheet: Iraq???s Nuclear Weapon Programme, International Atomic Energy Agency, 4/25/02
Robb, Senator Charles and Silberman, Judge Laurence, Robb-Silberman Report, 3/31/05
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs And Links To Terrorism And How They Compare To Prewar Assessments, U.S. Senate, 9/8/06
- Report On The U.S. Intelligence Community???s Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq, United States Senate, 7/7/04
Think Tank Reports
Cirincione, Joseph, Mathews, Jessica, Perkovich, George, and Orton, Alexis, WMD in Iraq evidence and implications, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2004
Cordesman, Anthony, Intelligence, Iraq, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Center for International and Security Studies, 1/26/04
Cortright, David, Millar , Alistair, Gerber, Linda, Unproven: The Controversy over Justifying War in Iraq, Fourth Freedom Forum, June 2003
Ritter, Scott, The Case of Iraq???s Qualitative Disarmament, Arms Control Association, June 2000
Articles and Think Tank Reports
BBC News, Iraqi documents: Saddam's delusions, 3/25/06
Burrough, Bryan, Peretz, Evgenia, Rose, David, and Wise, David, Path To War, Vanity Fair, May 2004
Cockburn, Andrew, The Truth About Ahmad Chalabi, CounterPunch.org, 5/20/04
Collier, Robert, Repeated inspections but no hard evidence, San Francisco Chronicle, 12/30/02
Danner, Mark, Secret Way to War, New York Review Of Books, 6/9/05
De Young, Karen and Pincus, Walter, U.S. Discounts Iraq Move to Destroy Missiles, Washington Post, 3/1/03
Drogin, Bob, The Vanishing, New Republic, 7/14/03
Drogin, Bob and Goetz, John, How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of ???Curveball???, Los Angeles Times, 11/20/05
Frontline, Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine, The War Behind Closed Doors, PBS.org, 2/20/03
Gellman, Barton and Pincus, Walter, Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence, Washington Post, 8/10/03
Gordon, Michael, Agency Challenges Evidence Against Iraq Cited by Bush, New York Times, 1/10/03
Gordon, Michael and Risen, James, Report's Findings Undercut U.S. Argument, New York Times, 1/28/03
Hamilton, William, Bush began to plan war three months after 9/11, Washington Post, 4/16/04
Hanley, Charles, Inspectors Have Covered CIA???s Sites of ???concern??? and Reported No Iraqi Violations, Associated Press, 1/18/03
- Powell???s ???think file??? looking thing, Associated Press, 8/9/03
Hersh, Seymour, Who Lied To Whom? New Yorker, 3/26/03
Jansen, Michael, Inspector states no banned weapons found in Iraq so far, Irish Times, 1/2/03
Kaufmann, Chaim, Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas, International Security, Summer 2004
Kemper, Bob, Experts review, poke holes in case for war, Chicago Tribune, 8/10/03
Lemann, Nicholas, The Next World Order, New Yorker, 4/1/02
Linzer, Dafna, No unconventional arms, Iraqi scientists still insist, San Francisco Chronicle, 5/4/03
Lopez, George and Cortright, David, Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004
Lynch, Colum, Blix Downgrades Prewar Assessment of Iraq Weapons, Washington Post, 6/22/03
Mazzetti, Mark, Senate committee disputes claims of Iraq-al Qaeda link, San Francisco Chronicle, 9/8/06
McGeary, Johanna, The Trouble With Inspections, Time, 12/8/02
- What Does Saddam Have? Time, 9/16/02
- What Saddam Was Really Thinking, Time, 10/18/04
Meacher, Michael, The very secret service, Guardian, 11/21/03
Michaels, Marge, Q&A with the Top Sleuth, Time, 1/12/03
Milbank, Dana, U.S. Voices Doubts on Iraq Search, Washington Post, 12/3/02
Miller, Judith, Defectors Bolster U.S. Case Against Iraq, Officials Say, New York Times, 1/24/03
Moyers', Bill Journal, Buying The War Timeline, Buying The War, PBS.org, 4/25/07
Norton-Taylor, Richard, Blair-Bush deal before Iraq war revealed in secret memo, Guardian, 2/3/06
Pincus, Walter and Lynch, Colum, Wolfowitz Had CIA Probe UN Diplomat in Charge, Washington Post, 4/15/02
Pollack, Kenneth, Spies, Lies, and Weapons, Atlantic Monthly, January/February, 2004
Rangwala, Glen, Claims and evaluations of Iraq???s proscribed weapons, University of Cambridge, 3/18/03
Rangwala, Glen, Hurd, Nathaniel and Millar, Alistair, A Case For Concern, Not A Case For War, Middle East Report Online, 1/28/03
Shelburne, Elizabeth, Weapons of Misperception, Atlantic Monthly, 1/13/04
Simpson, Alan and Rangwala, Dr Glen, The Dishonest Case For War On Iraq, Labour Against The War, 9/16/02
Smith, Michael, ???Failure is not an option, but it doesn???t mean they will avoid it,??? Telegraph, 9/18/04
Strobel, Warren, Data didn???t back Bush claims on Iraqi weapons, officials say, Knight Ridder, 6/6/03
Strobel, Warren and Landay, Jonathan, White House Maintains Its Case Against Iraq, Knight Ridder, 12/6/02
Strobel, Warren and Walcott, John, Bush has decided to overthrow Hussein, Knight Ridder, 2/13/02
Woods, Kevin, Lacey, James, and Murray, Williamson, Saddam???s Delusions: The View From The Inside, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006
Iran???s Growing Influence In Iraq[/b]
It???s a common saying these days that Iran was the winner of the Iraq war. While not quite true, it is very apparent that Iran has wide ranging influence and power in Iraq that it never had before. Most of the media focuses upon Iran???s support of violence in Iraq, but it also has extensive political, economic and cultural ties as well. Together they form a multi-faceted approach towards Iraq. On the one hand they want a Shiite led government that is friendly to Iran and hope to build up its economic ties, on the other, they want to ensure that the Sunnis never return to power and hope to make the U.S. pay for its occupation of Iraq.
Iran???s Policy Towards Post-Saddam Iraq[/b]
Iranian President Khatami, on the right, originally offered to work with the U.S. in Iraq, but was rejected by the White House. The succeeding President Ahmadinejad, on the left, believes that Iran should confront the U.S.
Saddam Hussein was Iran???s long-term rival, and his removal in 2003 opened up new opportunities for Iran. At first, Iranian President Khatami offered to work with the U.S. in Iraq just as it had done with the invasion of Afghanistan. The Bush Administration however, rejected the idea, believing that it could go it alone in Iraq and saw Iran as another country that needed regime change. Under President Ahmadinejad, Iranian policy has become more ideological. He believes that the U.S. can be defeated in Iraq. Either way, the U.S. invasion was seen as an opportunity to expand Iranian influence.
The policy had two facets. On the one hand they wanted a Shiite friendly government to come to power that would open up the economy and cultural sites to Iran. On the other, they wanted to tie down U.S. forces and have the ability to retaliate if Iran was ever attacked.
Iran???s Military Stance Towards Iraq[/b]
Most reports focus only upon Iran???s military policy because it has a direct impact upon U.S. forces. Right after the U.S. invasion, dozens of Iranian intelligence and Revolutionary Guards Qods Force operatives flooded the country. They also sent in the Badr Brigade, the militia of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) that was formed by the Revolutionary Guards during the Iran-Iraq War made up of Iraqi exiles and Iraqi POWs. Together, these forces carried out a wave of assassinations of Iraqi intelligence and military officers, and Baathists that were opponents of Iran.
A map of Iran???s supply lines to Iraq. Iranian operations are run by the Ramazan Corps of the Revolutionary Guards Qods force out of Tehran. They have divided Iraq up into 3 commands (north, central and south) that operate out of 3 bases in Iran: Mehran, Marivan and Ahvaz. From those cities they have forward operating bases on the Iranian border and within Iraq to ferry weapons, money and supplies to Special Groups that carry out attacks on U.S. forces
By 2004, Iran had established its long-term military stance. It continued to support the Badr Brigade that took over much of the Interior Ministry and police after the 2005 elections. It also began recruiting Iraqi Shiites, who increasingly came from Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army, and organized them into what became known as Special Groups by the U.S. military. A special unit of the Revolutionary Guards Qods Force called the Ramazan Corps, carried out training and financing in both Iran and Iraq. Iran also used Hazbollah for assistance, sending hundreds of Mahdi Army fighters to Lebanon for training. They were provided RPGs, mortars, Katyusha rockets, anti-aircraft missiles, and the most deadly device, Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFPs) bombs that were capable of destroying any Coalition vehicle. The Special Groups were then used to carry out harassing attacks on U.S. forces in Baghdad and British troops in Basra. Beginning in 2008 they had a new target, the Sunni Awakening/Concerned Local Citizen groups that the U.S. had organized to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq, probably in an attempt to stop the Sunnis from ever regaining power.
Iran???s Political Connections[/b]
SIIC leader Ayatollah Hakim with Badr Brigade recruits in Iran years before the U.S. invasion
Before the 2003 invasion, Iran had extensive ties with the anti-Saddam forces, all of which have gained influence since then. The Shiite SIIC and Badr Brigade were formed in Iran in the 1980s. Iraqi President Talabani and his Kurdish party fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War. Both are the backbones of Prime Minister Maliki???s ruling coalition. Many members of Maliki???s Dawa Party including the first post-invasion prime minister Jaafari, went into exile in Iran during Saddam???s rule. Since 2006 Iran has also built up close ties with Moqtada al-Sadr who is currently doing his religious training in Iran. All of these parties gained seats in parliament and positions of power after the 2005 elections that were supported by Iran.
Iran???s Growing Economic Role In Iraq[/b]
Iranian goods outside a Baghdad shop
Iran has also been able to build up large economic ties with Iraq since the war. Iraq is the Number 1 trade partner for Iran???s non-oil goods. In 2006 it was estimated that Iraq imported $20.8 billion in imports from its neighbor. Iranian products are everywhere in Iraqi markets except for Sunni areas. Iran also supplies electricity to the South and Diyala province in the north and has plans to build new power plants in Iraq. It also imports fuel, which is always in short supply. Iran is also paying for reconstruction projects, especially in the south. A huge tourism industry has also emerged with Iranian pilgrims going to the holy Shiite cities of Najaf and Karbala that is estimated to earn up to $25 million a year for Iraq.
U.S. Policy: Attempting to Contain Iran[/b]
The U.S. has become increasingly worried about Iran???s role in Iraq. That comes with fears that Iran is expanding its power in the Middle East, supports terrorism, and is building up its nuclear program. Some in the administrations such as Vice President Cheney are known to support regime change in Iran. The general policy has been to contain Iran with Iraq proving to be the main battlefield.
The first meeting of U.S. and Iranian diplomats happened at a regional conference on Iraq where the two sides sat at opposite ends of the table in 2007
On the diplomatic side U.S. policy has appeared to be haphazard. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalizad was twice given permission to hold discussions with Iran, but was then stopped by the White House. It wasn???t until 2007 that the U.S. finally met with Iran, the first time in 28 years since the Iranian Revolution. The talks haven???t produced much with the U.S. continually accusing Iran of supporting militias, and Iran denying it, with not much else happening.
The military side ha s seen much more action. Beginning in 2006 the U.S. launched a military campaign to arrest Iranian agents and kill or capture Special Groups in Iraq. They currently hold several Iranian operatives in jail. In 2007, when the surge started, the number of raids increased with hundreds of Special Group members either detained or killed. There has been no real change in the number of attacks or the flow of weapons however.
Conclusion: Iran???s Opportunity and America???s Pardox[/b]
Iran was able to take advantage of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Initially, from 2002-2005 Iran and the U.S. had the same goals, overthrowing Saddam, holding elections, and empowering the Shiites and Kurds. Since then, Iran has been maintaining military pressure on the U.S. with attacks by the Special Groups. At the same time, it has increased its ties with the Iraqi government and expanded its economic influence. The U.S. originally claimed that overthrowing Saddam would make dealing with Iran easier because it would be intimidated by U.S. power. It has had the opposite affect.
The U.S. now finds itself in a paradox. It wants to diminish Iran???s role in Iraq, while supporting a government that is made up of two Iranian allies, the SIIC and Kurds that the U.S. also sees as its best friends. If Maliki was ever forced out, a member of the SIIC would probably fill his spot, and if the ruling coalition was ever replaced, the Sadrists would probably play a large role in the new cabinet. The SIIC and Kurds also greatly benefit from U.S. aid to Iraq, while U.S. military actions have not diminished the work of the Special Groups.
At the same time, Iran has not won the war. It now has the U.S. military right on its doorstep. That being said, Iran has been able to benefit from the situation in Iraq with little cost to itself. Pres. Ahmadinejad believes that the U.S. is on the verge of defeat, and Iran is able to play a role in its humiliation. The only real barrier to the continuing growth of Iran in Iraq is Iraqi nationalism. Currently the nationalists, although represented in parliament, have no real say in Maliki???s government or the military. That means while the U.S. is the dominant power in Iraq, it will continue to have to deal with the influence of Iran.
I changed the end of the report because I think it overstated Iran's influence in Iraq[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? September 2007
Katzman, Kenneth, ???Iran???s Activities and Influence in Iraq,??? Congressional Research Service, 12/26/07
MNF-1, ???Iranian Support for Lethal Activities in Iraq,??? 2/11/07
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Beehner, Lionel, ???Iran???s Goals in Iraq,??? Council on Foreign Relatoins, 2/23/06
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Iraq???s Insurgency and Civil Violence,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8/22/07
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Cordesman: U.S.-Iran Talks on Iraq Useful, But Unlikely to Produce Immediate Results,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 5/14/07
- ???Sewer: Iraqis Beginning to Show Signs of Political Compromise,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 3/14/08
International Crisis Group, ???Iraq???s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,??? 2/7/08
Rahimi, Babak, ???The Hakim-Sadr Pact: A New Era in Shiite Politics???? Jamestown Foundation, 10/25/07
- ???Moqtada al-Sadr???s New Alliance with Tehrn,??? Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 3/1/07
Articles[/b]
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, ???U.S.-Iran Talks Resume in Baghdad,??? ABC News.com, 7/24/07
Agence France Presse, ???Bush Iraq strategy shifts towards containing Iran,??? 2/4/07
- ???Iran agents ???sabotaging??? anti-Qaeda groups: Iraq intel chief,??? 2/27/08
- ???Rare US-Iran talks ???positive,?????? 5/28/07
Alani, Dr. Mustafa, ???Iran???s presence in Iraq,??? Khaleej Times, 10/24/06
Alsumaria, ???US: Iranian-backed attacks increase in Iraq,??? 2/8/08
Associated Press, ???Shiite militia may be disintegrating,??? 3/21/07
Aswat Aliraq, ???Iranian power station in Najaf,??? 3/3/08
- "U.S. official: Attacks against joint forces down by 60%," 2/17/08
Badkhen, Anna, ???The Iranian factor in Iraq insurgency,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/21/05
Carter, Sara, ???Iran no longer aids Iraq militants,??? Washington Times, 1/3/08
Cockburn, Andrew, ???In Iraq, anyone can make a bomb,??? Los Angeles Times, 2/16/07
Collins, Chris, ???U.S. says Iranians train Iraqi insurgents,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 8/19/07
Cooper, Helene, ???In Bush Speech, Signs of Split on Iran Policy,??? New York Times, 9/16/07
Dagher, Sam, ???Iran???s growing presence in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 7/25/07
- ???U.S., Iran dial down tensions in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 11/7/07
Daragahi, Borzou and Gerstenzang, James, ???Tehran???s Iraq role unclear, U.S. now says,??? Los Angeles Times, 2/15/07
Deshmukh, Jay, ???Qaeda losing support but Iranians arms still problem in Iraq: US military,??? Agence France Presse, 11/11/07
DeYoung, Karen, ???Iran Cited In Iraq???s Decline in Violence,??? Washington Post, 12/23/07
- ???The Iraq Report???s Other Voice,??? Washington Post, 9/10/07
- ???Iraqi Prime Minister Says That Civil War Has Been Prevented,??? Washington Post, 9/25/07
Dreyfuss, Robert, ???Is Iran Winning the War in Iraq???? The Nation, 2/26/08
Fadel, Leila, ???U.S.: Iran reneged on pledge to quit supporting Iraqi militias,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/5/08
Frayer, Lauren, ???US general: Roadside bombs down in Iraq,??? Associated Press, 11/15/07
Fresh Air, ???'Fiasco' Author Reports On the Petraeus Report,??? NPR, 9/12/07
Gerstenzang, James, ???Bush says Iraq exit would bolster Iran,??? Los Angeles Times, 10/4/07
Glanz, James, ???Iranian Reveals Plan to Expand Role in Iraq,??? New York Times, 1/29/07
Glanz, James and Oppel, Richard, ???U.S. Says Raid in Iraq Supports Claim on Iran,??? New York Times, 2/26/07
Gordon, Michael, ???Deadliest Bomb in Iraq Is Made by Iran, U.S. Says,??? New York Times, 2/10/07
- ???U.S. says Iran ??? supplied bomb is killing more troops in Iraq,??? New York Times, 8/7/07
Gordon, Michael, Filkins, Dexter, ???Hezbollah may be helping militias,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 11/28/06
Gordon, Michael, Shane, Scott, ???U.S. Long Worried That Iran Supplied Arms in Iraq,??? New York Times, 3/27/07
Guardian, ???Smbolic shift for the doves,??? 5/29/07
Gulf News, ???Al Sadr aiming for Ayatollah degree,??? 3/10/08
Hersh, Seymour, ???Shifting Targets,??? New Yorker, 10/8/07
Ignatius, David, ???Post-Iraq Strategy,??? Washington Post, 8/26/07
IraqSlogger.com, ???Casualties Attributed to EFPs,??? 2/17/07
Jelinek, Pauline, ???General: Iraq groups supported by Iran,??? Associated Press, 11/26/07
Kukis, Mark, ???Has US Ceded Southern Iraq???? Time, 10/8/07
LaFranchi, Howard, ???After historic talks, US seeks action by iran,??? Christian Science Monitor, 5/29/07
Levinson, Charles, ???Iran may now be cooperating with U.S. in Iraq,??? USA Today, 12/16/07
Linzer, Dafna, ???Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq,??? Washington Post, 1/26/07
Mazzetti, Mark, ???U.S. Says Powerful Iraqi Cleric Is Living in Iraq,??? New York Times, 2/14/07
Mehr News, ???Iran, Iraq sign seven pacts,??? 3/3/08
Michael, Jim, ???General says U.S. has proof Iran arming Iraqi militias,??? USA Today, 1/31/07
Monsters and Critics.com, ???Basra security worsened by uncontrolled border, say Iraqi officials,??? 3/9/08
Murphy, Kim, ???Iran seen as key to untangling Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 2/13/07
Oppel, Richard, ???Iran to Join Iraq Talks in Highest Contact With U.S. in 2 Years,??? New York Times, 3/1/07
Parker, Ned, ???Iraqi militia leader???s death shatters truce,??? Los Angeles Times, 9/23/07
Peterson, Scott, ???Could Iran Help The US Stabilize Iraq???? Christian Science Monitor, 12/15/06
- ???For Iran, Iraq is a two-edged sword,??? Christian Science Monitor, 3/18/08
- ???US and Iran spar ahead of Iraq report,??? Christian Science Monitor, 8/31/07
Peterson, Scott and Blanford, Nicholas, ???A gauge of Iran???s hand in Iraq,??? Christian Science Monitor, 7/5/07
Porter, Gareth, ???US Briefing on Iran Discredits the Official Line,??? Inter Press Service, 2/14/07
- ???US Military Ignored Evidence of Iraq-Made EFPs,??? AntiWar.com, 10/26/07
Pound, Edward, ???The Iran Connection,??? U.S. News & World Report, 11/22/04
Price, Jay and Taha, Yaseen, ???Kurds denounce U.S. detention of Iranian,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 9/20/07
Rahima, Ahmad, ???Iraq urges Iranian firms to help ???modernize??? Baghdad,??? Azzaman, 2/29/08
Reuters, ???Iran Offers $1 Billion Loan for Iraq Projects,??? New York Times, 3/1/08
Reynolds, Paul, ???Iran bombs link: retraction or non-retraction???? BBC News, 1/10/06
Richter, Paul and Spiegel, Peter, ???Wider Iranian threat is feared,??? Los Angeles Times, 10/31/07
Roggio, Bill, ???Captured Iranian agent identified, 15 Special Groups operatives captured in Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 9/30/07
- ???Iran???s Ramazan Corps and the ratlines into Iraq,??? Long War Journal.org, 12/5/07
- ???Iranian involvement in Iraq: an old or a new case???? Long War Journal.org, 10/15/07
- ???Mahdi Army trains with Hezbollah,??? Long War Journal.org, 8/20/07
Roug, Louise and Daragahi, Borzou, ???Iraq Edges Closer to Iran, With or Without the US,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/16/07
Sands, Phil, ???Claims of training insurgents inside Iran,??? San Frnacisco Chronicle, 4/15/07
Sanger, David, ???Opening a New Front in the War, Against Iranians in Iraq,??? New York Times, 1/15/07
Schmitt, Eric, ???Some Bombs Used in Iraq Are Made in Iran, U.S. Says,??? New York Times, 8/6/05
Simon, Steven and Takeyh, Ray, ???Iran???s Iraq Strategy,??? Washington Post, 5/21/06
Sly, Liz, ??? Iranian influence soaring in Iraq,??? Chicago Tribune, 3/8/07
- ???U.S. wary of Iran???s growing activity in Iraq,??? Chicago Tribune, 2/29/08
Spiegel, Peter and Barnes, Julian, ???Iran still fuels Iraq violence, U.S. says,??? Los Angeles Times, 3/5/08
Stolberg, Sheryl Gay and Santora, Marc, ???Bush declares Iran???s arms role in Iraq is certain,??? New York Times, 2/15/07
Tavernise, Sabrina, ???Cleric Said to Lose Reins of Parts of Iraqi Militia,??? New York Times, 9/28/06
Ware, Michael, ???Inside Iran???s Secret War for Iraq,??? Time, 8/15/05
Wong, Edward, ???Iran Is Playing a Growing Role in Iraq Economy,??? New York Times, 3/17/07
- ???Iraq Dances With Iran, While America Seethes,??? New York Times, 7/31/05
Wright, Robin, ???As U.S. Steps Up Pressure on Iran, Aftereffects Worry Allies,??? Washington Post, 8/16/07
- ???Iranian Flow Of Weapons Increasing, Officials Say,??? Washington Post, 6/3/07
Wright, Robin and Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Iraqi official: Iran supplying arms to insurgents attacking U.S. forces,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 10/6/07
Yates, Dean, ???Petraeus says Iran stoking Iraq violence,??? Reuters, 10/7/07
Zavis, Alexandra, ???Al-Maliki says Iran has vowed to halt weapons,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 9/30/07
In February 2008 Moqtada al-Sadr renewed his cease-fire that has widely been seen as one of the main causes of the reduction in violence in Iraq. He claimed he wanted to transform his movement into a social and political one. However, the following month, Sadr made an announcement that his forces could protect themselves if attacked. This opened the door to renewed clashes between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi forces in both northern and southern Iraq that have intensified in recent weeks.
Internal Arguments Over the Cease-Fire[/b]
Moqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire has been credited for reducing violence in Iraq, but in March 2008 he said that his followers had the right to defend themselves from attack
Many Sadrists were shocked when their leader renewed his stand down orders in the beginning of 2008. They felt that the Iraqi government, the U.S., and their main rival, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) were persecuting them. In Diwaniyah, for example, the Sadrists claimed the SIIC controlled security forces were not only arresting its followers, but also destroying their houses and forcing their families out of the area. Similar accusations were made in al-Kut and Basra, as increasing military pressure was placed on the Sadrists during the surge. These dissenters were given a ray of hope however, when in March, Sadr said that the Mahdi Army had the right to defend itself.
New Battles For The Sadrists[/b]
Fighting between Sadrists and Iraqi forces has taken place in Basrah, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Babil and Wasit provinces since February 2008
Since then Mahdi Army members have increasingly come into conflict with Iraqi forces. On February 21 fighting erupted for one day in Basra, Iraq’s second largest city, between militia members and the Iraqi army. On March 1, 10 were killed and 60 wounded in clashes in Nassiriyah, the capital of Dhi Qar province. Those were followed by one day of fighting around Baquba in northern Diyala province, and raids on Sadrists in Babil province.
Map of al-Kut where fighting has occurred between Sadrists and Iraqi police over the last week
The most intense fighting has happened in al-Kut, the capital of Wasit. It started when Iraqi police went into Sadrist neighborhoods with arrest warrants and shooting erupted. The Mahdi Army was initially able to force the police out of the city, and captured up to 18 officers who were later released. On March 17, the conflict seemed to be coming to an end when representatives of the SIIC and Dawa parties met with the Sadrists and brokered a cease-fire. Two days later, fighting started again. Iraqi police now claim that they control most of the city and are looking to arrest several hundred Mahdi Army members. The local Sadrist office denies any of the fighters are theirs, and say the whole incident is another case of the government trying to eliminate them.
Aftermath of the fighting in al-Kut
Conclusion[/b]
The new round of fighting in Iraq is a troubling occurrence. It’s especially so since it is across a number of provinces, and as of now, doesn’t seem to be ending in al-Kut. Violence is already up in the rest of Iraq since the beginning of 2008. If the Mahdi Army were to return to the streets throughout Iraq, it would only make the situation worse, although Iraqi forces, with the backing of the U.S. would eventually win. The problems could increase as Iraqis gear up for local elections at the end of 2008. Currently, the SIIC controls most of the South because the Sadrists boycotted the first round of elections in 2005. As they gear up for new polling, the fighting could intensify between these two rival Shiite factions.
Sources[/b]
Agence France Presse, “Seven killed as Shiite militants clash with Iraqi police,” 3/16/08
Al-Taie, Jaafar, “Police arrest dozens after clashes in Iraqi city,” Reuters, 3/15/08
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Alsumaria, “Al Sadr calls to stop attack on followers,” 3/22/08
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Aswat Aliraq, “12 Sadrists detained in Diwaniya,” 3/23/08
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Cockburn, Patrick, “Shia call on Mehdi Army to take up arms again in Iraq,” Independent, 2/7/08
Cole, Juan, “Turkish-Kurd Military Confrontation,” Informed Comment.com, 2/22/08
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- “Report: Sadr to extend cease-fire,” Long War Journal.org, 2/21/08
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TurkishPress.com, “Clashes kill five in Iraq Shiite city,” 3/11/08
Zair, Kareem, “Security worsens in south as Mahdi army resorts to arms,” Azzaman, 3/12/08
Conflicts between the Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Iraqi government have increased in just the last two days. Many rank and file members as well as leaders of the Sadrist movement have become increasingly angry with the stand down order that was renewed in February 2008, believing that the Maliki government, their rival the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and U.S. forces are taking advantage of it to arrest and kill their followers. They claim that between 2,000-2,500 Mahdi Army members have been arrested since the cease-fire was first announced in August 2007. The recent spat of clashes, which began in the southern city of Kut in Wasit province, came after Sadr commented that his followers had the right to defend themselves if attacked in March 2008. Since then, fighting and confrontations have erupted in almost half of Iraq in the last two days, raising the question of whether the militia???s cease-fire is coming to an end.
Overview of Clashes[/b]
The recent events involving the Mahdi Army are concentrated in central and southern Iraq. Militia leaders told the Associated Press that they are ready to fight haven gotten money, weapons and support from Iran. Not all members of the movement however are turning to towards the gun. Sadr offices in Baghdad and Iraq???s second city, Basra in the south, have said they are willing to negotiate with the government, while Sadr has called on a nationwide general strike until the government stops its crackdown. In the meantime, many members of the Mahdi Army seem to be returning to the streets and violence has ensued in many areas.
Fighting and confrontations between the Mahdi Army and Iraqi forces have occurred in Baghdad (1), Wasit (4), Basrah (6), Qadissiya (9), and Dhi Qar (7) provinces in the last two days. Sadrists have also protested in Muthanna (8) and Najaf (12). Earlier clashes also occurred in Diyala (3) and Babil (10)
Baghdad[/b]
Sadrists rallying in Baghdad as part of the general strike that has been called to protest the government???s arrests and attacks on the movement
In the capital Baghdad, Sadrists have used both civil disobedience and the use of force recently. Sadr???s office called for a strike across the city, then extended it to countrywide, until the government releases its members from jail and stops what it considers a crackdown against its followers. Several neighborhoods in southwest Baghdad were shut down as a result. They also said that they are willing to negotiate with the government to end the stand off. That didn???t stop violence from erupting in the city however. First, from March 23-24 the Green Zone was rocketed with at least twelve killed. The U.S. blamed Iranian backed Special Groups that usually come from the Mahdi Army. This is a common occurrence however. More ominous were reports of street battles. These included clashes in five eastern neighborhoods, an attack on a police checkpoint outside of Sadr City in the west, the offices of Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the Dawa Party being burned down, and fighting between the Mahdi Army and SIIC???s Badr Brigade militia. In one instance, Sadrists allegedly kidnapped police officers they say belong to the Badr Organization. In response, U.S. and Iraqi forces have attempted to surround Sadr City to contain the situation.
Clashes and Confrontations Across Southern Iraq[/b]
In the Shiite South, Sadrists have come out in force as well. In the southern cities of Samawa in Muthanna province, Najaf, and two towns south of Baghdad the Mahdi Army has returned to the streets after being absent for the last seven months under the cease-fire. The Iraqi police have imposed curfews in many of these cities to deter confrontations. In Kut, Wasit province, fighting continues for another week and has spread to Nasariyah in Dhi Qar. In Kut, the Mahdi Army is reported to have taken back 5 of the city???s eighteen districts after earlier having expelled the police from the entire city, and then having to retreat back to their own neighborhoods. In Diwaniya, Qadissiya province, the Iraqi police raided Sadrist offices twice and arrested followers. The city has been hotly contested between the Mahdi Army and SIIC since 2007.
Sadrists protesting in the holy city of Najaf in the south
Basra[/b]
Iraqi police in Basra as part of the new crackdown in the city personally led by Prime Minister Maliki
The most important events are happening in Iraq???s second largest city, Basra. There, large scale urban fighting is going on. It began when Prime Minister Maliki arrived on March 24 to take personal control over what the government had been warning was a major offensive to retake the city from Shiite militias and criminals. The city is split between three rival parties and their armed bands, the Fadhila Party, the SIIC and the Sadrists. The Iraqi army imposed a curfew and banned car traffic in the entire province and moved into the city in force, concentrating just on the eastern and central neighborhoods were the Mahdi Army is based. Dozens have been killed and wounded in the fighting that raged all night from the 24th to the 25th. The Sadrists have said they want to negotiate a cease-fire, but will defend themselves until one is worked out. Maliki initiated the campaign, which is suppose to last for three days because he thinks the Sunni insurgency is largely contained. He also wants to prove that Baghdad can impose security not just the Americans. The Iraqi forces are concentrating on the Sadrists because the Fadhila party controls the provincial government, and the SIIC is one of Maliki???s main backers. The events in Basra re-enforce the Sadrists??? belief that the government is singling them out for persecution.
Conclusion[/b]
In just the last week Sadr???s seven-month long cease-fire that has been credited with reducing violence in Iraq has been brought under increasing pressure. When he renewed it in February there were many reports that his followers were unhappy and internal dissent was growing. That probably led to his March 2008 statement that the Mahdi Army had the right to defend itself. Whether he thought his words would lead to clashes across almost half of Iraq immediately afterwards are impossible to know, but they only add to the overall increase in violence that has been occurring since the beginning of the year. The recent events could mark the collapse of Sadr???s stand down orders unless negotiations are quickly worked out with the government. Either way, the recent clashes will leave a bad taste in the mouths of the Sadrists who seem to be gnawing at the bit to reassert themselves as a major player on the Iraqi scene.
SOURCES[/b]
Aswat Aliraq, ???4 Sadrists arrested in Diwaniya,??? 3/24/08
- ???Curfew clamped on Basra,??? 3/25/08
- ???Gunmen set fire to party office in Sadr City,??? 3/25/08
- ???Sadr???s office rejects security plan if hunting Sadrists included,??? 3/24/08
- ???Sadrists expand civil disobedience to all provinces,??? 3/25/08
- ???U.S. army say skilled 5 gunmen in Basra,??? 3/25/08
CNN, ???Iraqi raids anger Shiite militia,??? 3/25/08
Fadel, Leila and Youssef, Nancy, ???Is ???success??? of U.S. surge in Iraq about to unravel???? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/24/08
Freeman, Sholnn and Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???Iraqi orces Battle Gunmen in Basra,??? Washington Post, 3/25/08
Ghosh, Bobby, ???Mali ki???s Moment o Truth in Basra,??? Time, 3/25/08
Glanz, James, ???Iraqi Troops May Move to Reclaim Basra???s Port,??? New York Times, 3/13/08
Hider, James, ???Iraqi troops take on Shia militia in Basra clash,??? Times, 3/25/08
Lenz, Ryan, ???Iraqi Troops, Militias Clash in Basra,??? Associated Press, 3/25/08
Mohammed, Aref, ???Iraqi forces fight Mehdi Army in Basra,??? Reuters, 3/25/08
Mohsen, Amer, ???Iraq Papers Tue: Sadr Threatens,??? IraqSlogger.com, 3/24/08
Reuters, ???Sadr militia seizes parts of S.Iraq town-police,??? 3/25/08
Sengupta, Kim, ???The final battle for Basra is near, says Iraqi general,??? Independent, 3/20/08
I've come across one or two of his reports before but that's about it. I don't really read blogs that much, not even music ones these days.
After 5 years,4,000 US deaths 70,000 wounded and most importantly at least half a million Iraqi people wasted and millions displaced there is still no oil being pumped.
The world petrol markets teeter and fluxuate on the daily politics of places like Caracas and Lagos,yet companies like HALIBURTON,ROOT BROWN,KELLOG able to roam free as they please,unhindered in Iraq with no bid contracts and 151,000 troops at their back
Private security firms such as BLACKWATER and WACKENHUT provide "security" for this erroneus mission,yet these PIGS of war are still unable to satiate the immediate need for oil within IRAQ let alone the rest of the planet[mainly the united states]
These foul subhuman neocons failed to produce anything after spending billions of taxpayer dollars and wasting countless human lives.
The one thing I thought we could count on Dick Cheney for besides treason,lies,corruption,gluttony,murder,death,torture and merciless mayhem and chaos was an increase in petrol output from Iraq oil'fields.
So far we have only gained grisly murder,death,torture,instututionalized terror,constitutional erosion, a major loss of civil freedoms and privacy,the empowerment of IRAN,and piles of poorly scripted dis honest boulderdash.
the only quantifiable results have been empty scripted banal exhortations about "democracy" and "we can win the war" and my fave.."Mission Accomplished".
ok....and a nice friendly old white man lives in heaven wearing a white gown sporting a long white beard..up in the clouds...and his son jesus ....saves......OK
At a bare minimum any uninformed/uninterested apolitical commoner would thnk that the oil would be a front burner issue and one which would have been secured and rectified in 03-04.
But now as gas edges towards 4 dollars a gallon in the US and the dollar continues to decline against the euro with the end not even in sight,all we hear is "we can win".
While I can appreciate the pictured strategic placement of a US police station on top of this huge oil supply specifically designed to control and profit from it and more importantly keeping China and Russia at bay in the process,it seems as though the original intent and means have gone askew.
Wow,what an incredibly amazing pile of horseshit the people have been fed.... and swallowed.
Its a testament to stupidity and the power of murdoch/big media propaganda that some folks are still supporting these monsters.
How could semi literate being in their right mind still support the BUSH reich after all this time..all the while supporting and BEGGING for another 4 years+ with the slanderous racist reactionary pea brained war monger known as John McCain.
So my question to all of those morons who support the "war"-Where is the oil?
Is it being secretly pumped into tankers and being sent to any and all empty US wells/surplus containment in texas?
I just don't get it
VIENNA (AP) ??? Oil prices rose by more than a dollar Thursday, as the bombing of a key Iraqi pipeline extended a buying spree spurred by an anemic dollar and lower U.S. fuel inventories.
Crude prices, which already spiked by nearly $5 on Thursday, were propelled higher by the second bombing in a week in Basra, where Iraqi security forces have been clashing with Shiite militia fighters.
Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani said that ongoing clashes would not affect oil exports and drilling operations. But with an average of 1.54 million barrels a day transiting the southern city last month, an official, who demanded anonymity because he was not authorized to comment, acknowledged that the blast could impact crude sales.
Iraq's average production for February was 2.4 million barrels per day. Exports averaged 1.93 million barrels per day during that month. The huge portion of oil output comes from Basra Rumaila South and North oil fields that produce around 1.3 million barrels per day.
The bomb exploded underneath the Zubair-1 pipeline that sends crude oil from the Basra Zubair oil field to tanks for Iraq's two exporting terminals on the Gulf: al-Umaiya and Basra, according to an official in Basra.
On Tuesday night, a bomb damaged a domestic oil pipeline that links the Noor oil field in the southern Maysan province to the refinery in Basra. It was expected to take several days to repair the damage.
Basra is home to one of Iraq's three largest oil refineries, the Shuaiba refinery which has a capacity of 160,000 barrels a day but has been functioning below capacity at about 100,000 barrels per day.
Light, sweet crude for May delivery added $1.11 to fetch $107.01 a barrel by noon in Europe in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The contract rose $4.68 to settle at $105.90 a barrel Wednesday.
Wednesday's spike followed the release of data by the U.S. Energy Department's Energy Information Administration, showing that U.S. stockpiles of gasoline, heating oil and diesel fuel fell more than forecast last week.
Levels are still higher than in pat years. But the inventory report stoked worries that stockpiles of gasoline are falling right when analysts would like to see them rising ??? before the peak summer driving season. Gasoline inventories slid 3.3 million barrels last week, more than four times the decline analysts had expected.
"The gasoline stock movement was probably quite supportive, it's the second week in a row now we've seen a larger than expected drop in U.S. gasoline stocks," said Mark Pervan, a commodity strategist at ANZ Bank in Melbourne, Australia.
The EIA reported that U.S. refinery activity also dropped, which analysts attributed to some refiners cutting gasoline production due to low profit margins. Despite the most recent declines, gasoline inventories are 9% higher than a year ago.
"Refinery runs are now at the lowest level since the end of October 2005," noted Vienna's JBC Energy, in its daily newsletter.
Crude oil inventories, meanwhile, were unchanged. Analysts surveyed by Dow Jones Newswires had expected crude supplies to rise 1.7 million barrels.
Pervan warned that the steadiness in crude oil inventories despite a decline in refinery utilization was an indication that U.S. crude demand was falling, which could lead to a drop in oil prices in the weeks ahead.
"What the U.S. is doing is to try to match their crude oil stocks to the low refinery capacity by pulling back on their imports," Pervan said. "That should start to manifest itself in lower oil prices in the near term."
Oil prices were also supported by U.S. economic news. The Commerce Department said new-home sales fell last month to a 13-year low, and that orders for durable goods fell in February when analysts had expected an increase.
In other Nymex trading, heating oil futures rose by close to 3 cents to $3.07 a gallon while gasoline prices corrected by just over a penny to $2.7313 a gallon. Natural gas futures dropped by more than a penny to $9.558 per 1,000 cubic feet.
In London, Brent crude gained 87 cents to $104.86 a barrel on the ICE Futures exchange.
Copyright 2008 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
The problem with Iraq is that there's still a lack of security, no new oil law to govern any new oil business because of political disputes, an Iraqi governmet that finds it hard to operate and massive oil smuggling.
Attacks are way down on oil infrastructure, but there's enough threat to make many companies weary of going into Iraq. Different factions have different visions of how to run the country's oil industry from the Kurds that want regional control to the Sadrists and Sunnis that want nationalized oil and central control in Baghdad, to a mix in the middle. That's holding up a new oil law. The Baghdad governmet is also a mess and hasn't allocated enough money to renovate the infrastructure to boost production on what the country already has, and since everythins is done by paper and many parts of the government are staffed with inexerpeienced people and conflicting loyaties it's hard to get anything done. One person wrote that the Iraqi government works on an old Soviet model of a massive bureaucracy that does litte but push paper. Finally there's massive corruption and smuggling going on that doesn't appear to be ending any time soon. It might cost the country up to half of its current production and revenues. Gangs, tribes, insurgents, and political parties are all behind it.
The one point you've gotte right is that some neocons did think that overthrowing Saddam would ease the flow of oil to the West, and even some had dreams of having a pro-western Iraq breaking up OPEC. Those, like most of the neocons dreams for the Middle East proved to be dead wrong.
Gen. Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are due to testify again to the U.S. Congress on the state of Iraq and the future of the surge beginning on April 8. This is actually a pivotal moment in post-Saddam Iraqi history. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote that the surge has brought down the level of violence in Iraq to an ???irreducible minimum.??? Retired General Scales told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 2 that the country is at a ???culminating point??? where the military balance has shifted to one side and progress can only be achieved now through political progress. At the same hearing Gen. Scales and Retired General McCaffrey also said that the number of U.S. troops in Iraq will have to come down no matter what in 2009. This goes along with the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen???s and Army Chief of Staff General Casey???s urging that tours for U.S. units be reduced from the current 15 month down to 12. What happens next will most likely shape Iraq for the foreseeable future.
Iraq Today: Military Success, But Political Stalemate[/b]
Awakening fighters like this one operating with U.S. forces near Salman Pak outside of Baghdad who turned on Al Qaeda in Iraq are one of the major reasons security has improved since 2007
Iraq has seen a dramatic turn around on the military front due to one part change in strategy, and three parts luck. The increase in U.S. troops with the surge along with a shift from conventional war planning to counterinsurgency occurred just as the Sunni and Shiite sectarian war was changing. Gen. Petraeus had U.S. troops attempt to secure and control the population to decrease support for the insurgency and Shiite militias. At the same time, the Sunnis realized that they had lost the war for Baghdad to the Shiites, and grew sick of the excesses of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Half way through 2008 Moqtada Al-Sadr also decided to call off his militia the Mahdi Army because it had over stretched and turned against the people that it was suppose to stand up for. This confluence of events led to a 60% drop in attacks from June 2007 to March 2008, and a 72% drop in civilian casualties from July 2007 to March 2008. At the same time the U.S. military has always said that these military gains are tenuous. Former Sunni insurgents have signed local peace treaties with the U.S., not Baghdad, which has not shown the willingness to integrate many of them into the government. The Awakening/Concerned Local Citizen movement has also had mixed results in northern Iraq where sectarian tensions are still high and most of the violence now takes place. The Sadrist cease-fire might be ending as Prime Minister Maliki has decided to challenge them as recently happened in Basra, Baghdad and much of the south.
A destroyed police vehicles in Basra during the fighting between the government and Mahdi Army in March 2008 shows how fragile the existing security situation is in Iraq
While the military side has been very successful, the political side has faltered, which was the ultimate gain of the surge. In early 2008 the Iraqi parliament finally passed its first set of reconciliation laws, but they have not been applied equitably. There has been no noticeable increase in former Baathists joining the government despite a new deBaathification law. A new amnesty law was suppose to keep terrorist suspects behind bars, the main reason why Iraq holds 24,000 prisoners, but in practice almost everyone is being released. Progress on a set of oil laws, amending the constitution, and dealing with the fate of Kirkuk is deadlocked because of disputes between Arabs and Kurds.
Maliki???s cabinet is made up mostly of political parties that have no real base amongst the population
The laws aren???t really the main point of contention in Iraqi politics however, it???s over which parties will rule the country. Outside of the Kurdish alliance and the Sadrists, few of the political parties in parliament really have any popular base in the country. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) is a middle and business class Shiite party that rules most of the southern provinces, but hasn???t been able to provide basic services while most of the economy there is collapsing. Prime Minister Maliki???s Dawa party never had a strong base and is divided into two factions. Anbar is ruled by the Iraqi Islamic Party, but much of the province now sides with the tribal coalition that turned on Al Qaeda in Iraq and cooperated with the U.S. the Anbar Salvation Council. They are trying to shape themselves into a new political party to take over the province. The two Kurdish parties in the north have a mass base, but have also shut out any opposition. The Sadrists have a lot of support in the Shiite sections of Baghdad, but probably mixed popularity in the south.
These differences will come to a head on October 1, 2008 when Iraq is set for provincial elections. Under current law voters pick parties rather than individual politicians. This means that even though most of the major parties are not popular, voters will have no real alternatives to pick from. The fact that the ruling groups will also control the election committees in each province will probably mean they will keep the system the way it is and use patronage to ensure their victories.
Conclusion[/b]
This marks the real limit of reconciliation in Iraq as of now. President Bush has talked a lot about ???bottom up??? reconciliation, but new local forces will have little say and be kept out of much of the political process with the exception of the Awakening Council in Anbar in the upcoming elections. From the ???top down??? the same political parties will continue to hold onto power, some laws will go nowhere, while those that are passed will not be enforced consistently. This is the ???irreducible minimum??? and ???culminating point??? that Cordesman and Gen. Scales talked about. Violence is down, but any more progress can only be achieved through real political change. This will be made more difficult by the fact that the surge is ending, the U.S. will be forced to draw down its troop levels in 2009, and a new administration will be in office in Washington.
The future is up in the air. In the near term the current status quo will probably be maintained with occasional flashes of violence. The October 2008 provincial elections are probably already determined, but in 2009 or 2010 a new set of national elections for parliament are planned. This could be the first opportunity to change the political equation in the country if new political parties are able to be formed at the grass roots level. There???s also the chance that the process could be derailed. In April 2008 the provinces are eligible to become independent federal regions that can set their own laws, budgets, etc. with minimal connections to Baghdad. The Kurds already run a de facto autonomous region and only need to go through the legal steps now available to them to make it permanent. The SIIC also wants to create a Shiite super region of all of the southern provinces. This is widely unpopular with the public, but since the SIIC controls the local governments, it???s unclear whether the people???s opinions will really matter. If federalism becomes a reality, that will create a weak central government with two autonomous regions that will control most of Iraq???s resources, and ensure that the SIIC and Kurds of their power. Either way U.S. forces can be expected to stay in Iraq for the next 5 to 10 years no matter who bec omes president, because the military is necessary to keep a damper on violence and diplomats are needed to push Baghdad towards change. One of the lasting effects of the surge maybe that it has created an acceptable level of violence that U.S. politicians can live with, and thus ensure this long-term presence. Ultimately, the lesson of 2007 however, is that it will be the Iraqis, not the U.S. that will decide the path their country follows. Sunni tribes and insurgents decided that they had enough of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Sadr decided to call off his militia, etc. It is up to the same kinds of Iraqis to create their own political parties. If not the existing ones will continue to run a state that doesn???t really stand for its citizens.
SOURCES[/b]
Government Reports[/b]
Biddle, Stephen, ???Iraq after the Surge,??? Committee on Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, United States House of Representatives, 1/23/08
Department of Defense, ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? March 2008
- ???Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,??? September 2007
McCaffrey, General Barry, (Ret.), ???Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing,??? Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
Rosen, Nir, ???Prepared Testimony of Nir Rosen,??? Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
Said, Yahia Khairi, ???Political Dynamics in Iraq within the Context of the ???Surge,?????? Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
Scales, MG (Ret) Robert, Jr., ???Statement for the Record,??? Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
U.N. Reports[/b]
United Nations Security Council, ???Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1770 (2007),??? 1/14/08
Think Tank Reports[/b]
Baker, Pauline, ???A War Out: The Union of Iraqi States,??? Fund For Peace, March 2003 to June 2007
Biddle, Stephen McMahon, Robert, ???Stephen Biddle: Teleconference with CFR,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 11/20/07
Cordesman, Anthony, ???Victory And Violence In Iraq: Reducing the ???Irreducible Minimum,?????? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2/25/08
Gwertzman, Bernard, ???Biddle: Security, Political Improvements Seen in Iraq in Recent Months,??? Council on Foreign Relations, 11/15/07
Serwer, Daniel and al-Rahim, Rend, ???Iraq: Politics Unfrozen, Direction Still Unclear,??? United States Institute of Peace, January 2008
Tosh, Caroline and Ahmed Zaineb, ???Kirkuk Dispute Close to Boiling Point,??? Institute For War & Peace Reporting, 3/18/08
News Articles[/b]
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, ???Iraqi Lawmakers Pass 3 Key New Laws,??? Associated Press, 2/13/08
Alsumaria, ???Iraq Amnesty Law forging ahead,??? 2/19/08
- ???Iraq Awakening Councils in Diyala end strike,??? 3/4/08
Ardolino, Bill, ???Inside Iraqi politics ??? Part 1. Examining the executive branch,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/6/08
- ???Inside Iraqi politics ??? Part 3. Examining the legislative branch,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/13/08
-???Inside Iraqi Politics ??? Part 4. A look at legislative progress: Reconciliation via wealth distribution,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/25/08
- ???Inside Iraqi politics ??? Part 5. A look at legislative progress: Sunnis??? and states??? rights,??? Long War Journal.org, 2/28/08
Associated Press, ???Former Baathists don???t trust job plan,??? 1/14/08
- ???Pentagon Assesses Strain on Military,??? New York Times, 2/9/08
Aswat Aliraq, ???5 points in constitution still bones of contention ??? MP,??? 2/8/08
- ???3245 prisoners released under pardon law ??? source,??? 3/17/08
- ???8229 detainees released ??? judicial source,??? 3/20/08
Azzaman, ???Opposition to Kurdish move to annex Kirkuk grows,??? 3/17/08
Baldor, Lolita, ???Analysis: Pentagon brass split on troops,??? Associated Press, 2/2/08
Barnes, Julian, ???Pentagon divided on Iraq strategy,??? Los Angeles Times, 3/20/08
Barnes, Julian and Levey, Noam, ???Army plans to cut length of combat tours in Iraq,??? Los Angeles Times, 2/27/08
Barr, Cameron, ???Petraeus: Iraqi Leaders Not Making ???Sufficient Progress,?????? Washington Post, 3/14/08
Bennett, Brian, ???The Perils of Iraqi Lawmaking,??? Time, 3/1/08
- ???Underestimating al-Sadr ??? Again,??? Time, 2/12/08
Biddle, Stephen, ???Patient Stabilized???? National Interest, 2/29/08
Burns, Robert, ???US commanders: Al-Qaida in Iraq to stay,??? Associated Press, 3/14/08
Dagher, Sam, ???Sadr reins in Shiite militiamen, sends mixed signals,??? Christian Science Monitor, 3/31/08
Dreazen, Yochi and Shishking, Philip and Jaffe, Greg, ???U.S. Shifts Iraq Focus As Local Tactics Gain,??? Wall Street Journal, 9/4/07
James, Frank, ???Expert: Current Iraq fighting not good guys vs bad,??? Baltimore Sun, 3/26/08
Gamel, Kim, ???US Commanders Welcome Fallujah Revival,??? Associated Press, 2/9/08
Ghosh, Bobby, ???Maliki???s Moment of Truth in Basra,??? Time, 3/25/08
Glanz, James, ???Compromise on Oil Law in Iraq Seems to Be Collapsing,??? New York Times, 9/13/07
Glanz, James and Schmitt, Eric, ???Iraq Attacks Lower, but Steady, New Figures Show,??? New York times, 3/12/08
Hama-Tahir, Wrya, ???Iraqi Kurds frustrated with own leaders, security forces,??? Middle East Online, 2/18/08
Igoldenberg, ???Sunni Infighting Threatens Iraq???s Stability,??? National Security Network, 2/12/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Mosul situation veers from ???Baghdad model,?????? USA Today, 2/6/08
Moore, Solomon, ???Ex-Baathists Get a Break. Or Do They???? New York Times, 1/14/08
Myers, Steven Lee and Shanker, Thom, ???Bush Given Iraq War Plan With a Steady Troop Level,??? New York Times, 3/25/08
O???Hanlon, Michael, Taspinar, Omer, ???Time for Kurdish Realism,??? Washinogton Post, 2/9/08
Oppel, Richard, ???Quieter Fallujah fears U.S. exit,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 8/19/07
Oppel, Richard and Myers, Steven Lee, ???Iraq Eases Curb for Former Officials of Hussein???s Party,??? New York Times, 1/13/08
Parker, Ned, ???Iraq votes to lift ban on ex-Baathists,??? Los Angeles Times, 1/13/08
- ???Ruthless, shadowy ??? and a U.S. ally,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/22/07
Partlow, Joshua, ???Missteps and Mistrust Mark the Push for Legislation,??? Washington Post, 9/5/07
Partlow, Joshua and Abramowitz, Michael, ???Iraq Passes Bill on Baathists,??? Washington Post, 1/13/08
PBS Frontline, ???INTERVIEWS John Burns,??? Bush???s War, 3/24/08
Senanayake, Sumedha, ???Iraq: Will Passage Of New Law Appease Sunnis???? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1/15/08
Shanker, Thom and Schmitt, Eric, ???U.S. Commander Wants Brief Pause in Troop Cuts,??? New York Times, 2/28/08
Susman, Tina and Ahmed, Asso, ???Iraqi Kurds delay Kirkuk vote,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/27/07
Tyson, Ann Scott, ???Army Chie May Shorten Tours In Iraq, Afghanistan by Summer,??? Washington Post, 1/17/08
Visser, Reidar, ???Debating Devolution in Iraq,??? Middle East Report Online, 3/10/08
- ???The Law on the Powers of Governorates Not Organised in a Region: Washington???s ???Moderate??? Allies Show Some Not-So-Moderate Tendencies,???
Youssef, Nancy, ???Despite dropping violence, Gates calls for extended U.S. presence in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 1/17/08
Zavis, Alexandra, ???In Iraq, U.S. seeks jobs for surplus hired guns,??? Los Angeles Times, 3/21/08
On March 25, 2008, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki decided to take on Moqtada al-Sadr and his militia the Mahdi Army. On that day Maliki traveled to Basra, Iraq???s second largest city and main port and launched Operation Knights??? Charge. Fighting quickly spread across the south and in Baghdad between government forces and the Sadrists. As quickly as it had begun, Sadr announced a unilateral cease-fire. Maliki wasn???t done yet however. He then announced that he would continue his effort in Sadr???s own front yard, the Shiite slums of Baghdad. Maliki then threw down the gauntlet threatening to ban the Sadrists from politics if they did not disarm. The struggle that continues today is the biggest gamble the Iraqi government has taken part in since the U.S. invasion in 2003.
Operation Knights??? Charge[/b]
When Maliki announced the beginning of Operation Knights??? Charge he claimed that it was aimed at clearing out the many criminal militias that controlled the important city of Basra. It quickly became apparent that the government was only focusing upon the Sadrists however as Iraqi forces moved into their strongholds. The Mahdi Army took up arms in response in Hilla, Nassiriya, Diwaniya, Karbala, Ammara, and Baghdad, while a civil disobedience campaign was begun in several Shiites districts of the capital and the holy city of Najaf as well.
Hundreds of Sadrists were arrested in operations across southern Iraq and Baghdad
Despite a chaotic start, the Mahdi Army was mostly defeated in the South. At first, many local police officers in Basra refused to fight, while a brand new Iraqi army unit broke under the pressure. With the help of the U.S., two Iraqi army brigades were sent in as reinforcements, and American and British air power and artillery became involved. The Mahdi Army took heavy casualties, but fought the Coalition forces to a standstill. They were not as successful in the rest of the South with militiamen being rounded up or killed en masse. In Baghdad, U.S. and Iraqi forces set up a cordon around Sadrist areas, while a reign of missiles landed on the Green Zone. On March 30, Sadr declared a cease-fire after negotiations with a delegation from Iraq???s parliament and the Iranian general in charge of the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force. That move could???ve been expected as he had followed the same tactic before when faced with a large-scale offensive. By then, the Mahdi Army had lost hundreds of fighters that it could not easily replace, while 1300 Iraqi soldiers and police were eventually dismissed for not fighting, or switching sides to the Sadrists.
The Battle Moves To Baghdad[/b]
Iraqi forces began a new counterinsurgency operation aimed at clearing Mahdi Army strongholds in Baghdad beginning in early April
After Basra, the struggle switched to Baghdad in April. There Maliki announced that Sadr would be banned from the October 2008 provincial elections if he did not disarm his militia. The Iraqi cabinet sent a bill to parliament to make the threat legal. Next U.S. and Iraqi forces began moving into Sadr City, the one part of the capital that had gone mostly untouched during the 2007 surge. Together they set up checkpoints and forward operating bases, while trying to assist the local population in a counterinsurgency campaign meant to lesson the support for the Mahdi Army. The prime minister???s office said they would not stop until the area was cleared of Sadr???s militiamen.
Motivations And Implications Of Maliki???s Actions[/b]
Sadr originally helped Maliki become the prime minister of Iraq in 2006. Now Maliki is using Sadr to prove his leadership capabilities
There are many interpretations of why Maliki made his move at this time. The most popular one amongst the Western media is that Maliki is attempting to weaken his main opponent the Sadrists before the October 2008 elections. This could be part of Maliki???s motivation, but why then did he offer Sadr a way to take part in them if he disarmed? Maliki???s own Dawa Party is also divided and has little popular support and influence in the Shiite South, leaving only his allies the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) to benefit in the upcoming voting. The Dawa Party and the SIIC haven???t been agreeing on many issues lately though.
What really seems to be behind Maliki is the desire to prove himself as the true leader of Iraq. In the last year, it has been the Americans and the surge that have been given all the credit for improved security in the country. Now it appears that Maliki wants to show that he too can secure his own nation. Since taking office in 2006, the U.S. has always complained that Maliki has been too sectarian and refused to move against Sadr. Now he is doing just that. The Iraqi security forces are also proving that they can carry out their own independent operations for the first time. Maliki is also gaining political support to make up for his fractured government with the SIIC, Kurds and even the Sunni parties that have been boycotting his cabinet, all standing behind the Prime Minister, leaving Sadr politically isolated. There are internal divisions however as the SIIC and Maliki want to destroy the Sadrists militarily, while the Kurds and Sunnis would like negotiations to ultimately diffuse the situation.
On the problematic side, there does appear to be a slight difference of opinion between the U.S. and Maliki on how to proceed. Maliki has only offered sticks to Sadr saying that Iraqi forces will not stop until they have cleared all of Sadr City of the Mahdi Army. American defense officials on the other hand, are also offering carrots in the hopes that the situation can be resolved politically. This can be seen in statements by Defense Secretary Gates and Gen. Petraeus that Sadr is a legitimate political leader that shouldn???t be cornered so that violence is his only option. The current security situation in Iraq is held together by a series of local and unilateral cease-fires that are mostly arbitrated by the U.S. American forces may be worried that Maliki may not be able to fulfill his threat to destroy Sadr???s militia while undermining the new status quo.
Conclusion[/b]
Prime Minister Maliki is making a calculated gamble in his move against Sadr and his militia. He could be breaking the military power of one of the strongest militias in Iraq that has been responsible for numerous attacks on U.S. forces, the deaths of thousands of Sunnis in the sectarian civil war of 2006-2007, and that has exploited the same Shiite poor that Sadr claims to be representing. On the other hand, Maliki could be undermining the cease-fires that are holding the country together by giving Sadr no other options than to fight in a war that the Iraqi forces may not be able to win. Counterinsurgency operations are long term affairs, so whether Baghdad has the wherewithal to carry this through to a conclusion, or whether there will be a political deal to end it is yet to be seen. What is for sure is that this is the most important on-going confrontation now occurring in Iraq.
SOURCES[/b]
Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, ???al-Sadr pulls fighters off Iraq streets,??? Associated Press, 3/30/08
Adas, Basil, ???Al Sadr followers consider Al Maliki a mortal enemy,??? Gulf News, 4/2/08
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DeYoung, Karen, ???U.S. Has Little Influence, Few Options in Iraq???s Violatile South,??? Washington Post, 3/29/08
Fadel, Leila, ???Shiite cleric offers truce to ease clashes in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/31/08
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Fadel, Leila and Al Basri, Ali, ???Battles wrack Basra, threatening success of U.S. surge,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/25/08
Farrell, Stephen and Glanz, James, ???More Than 1,000 in Iraq???s Forces Quit Basra Fight,??? New York Times, 4/4/08
Ghosh, Bobby, ???Maliki???s Moment of Truth in Basra,??? Time, 3/25/08
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Glanz, James, ???Iraqi Army???s Assault on Militias in Basra Stalls,??? New York Times, 3/27/08
Glanz, James and Farrell, Stephen, ???Crackdown on Militias Raises Stability Concerns,??? New York Times, 4/8/08
Glanz, James and Kamber, Michael, ???Shiite Militias Cling to Swaths of Basra and Stage Raids,??? New York Times, 3/30/08
Glanz, James and Myers, Steven Lee, ???Assault by Iraq on Shiite Forces Stalls in Basra,??? New York times, 3/28/08
Gordon, Michael, Schmitt, Eric and Farrell, Stephen, ???U.S. Cites Gaps in Planning of Iraqi Assault on Basra,??? New York Times, 4/3/08
Graff, Peter, ???Death toll rises in Baghdad fighting,??? Reuters, 3/29/08
- ???U.S. forces drawn deeper into Iraq crackdown,??? Reuters, 3/28/08
Hider, James, ???Areas of Baghdad fall to militias as Iraqi Army falters in Basra,??? The Times of London, 3/27/08
- ???British accused of appeasing Shia militia in Basra,??? The Times of London, 4/12/08
- ???Iraqi police in Basra shed their uniforms, kept their rifles and switched sides,??? The Times of London, 3/28/08
- ???Iraqi troops take on Shia militia in Basra clash,??? The Times of London, 3/25/08
James, Frank, ???Expert: Current Iraq fighting not good guys vs bad,??? Baltimore Sun, 3/26/08
LaFranchi, Howard, ???U.S. hopes to counter Mahdi Army???s clout in Baghdad,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/15/08
Lenz, Ryan, ???Iraq: More US airstrikes on Basra,??? Associated Press, 3/29/08
- ???US jets drop bombs in Basra,??? Associated Press, 3/28/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Iraq, al-Sadr showdown tests loyalties,??? USA Today, 4/1/08
Middle East Online, ???Maliki threatens to Bar Sadr party rom politics,??? 4/7/08
Mohammed, Aref, ???Iraqi forces fight Mehdi Army in Basra,??? Reuters, 3/25/08
Mohammed, Wisam, ???Battles kill 13 in Sadr City, blockade eased,??? Reuters, 4/12/08
Morning Edition, ???Assessing Iraq???s Security Forces,??? National Public Radio, 4/10/08
- ???Gen. Keane: Iraqi Military Not Ready to Stand Alone,??? National Public Radio, 3/28/08
Negus, Steve, ???Maliki risks open Sadrist insurrection,??? Financial Times, 3/27/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan, ???Attacks on U.S. Forces Soard at End of March,??? Washington Post, 4/2/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Freeman, Sholnn, ???Sadr Followers Protest Security Crackdown,??? Washington Post, 3/27/08
- ???U.S. Appears to Take Lead in Fighting in Baghdad,??? Washington Post, 4/1/08
Raghavan, Sudarsan and Londono, Ernesto, ???Basra Assault Exosed U.S., Iraqi Limits,??? Washington Post, 4/4/08
Rahimi, Babk, ???What Direction for the al-Mahdi Army after the Basra Offensive???? Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Foundation, 4/1/08
Reid, Robert, ???Iraq to expand crackdown,??? Associated Press, 4/3/08
Reuters, ???Aide to Iraq???s Sadr says truce still in place,??? 3/26/08
- ???FACTBOX ??? Security developments in Iraq, March 30,??? 3/30/08
Roggio, Bill, ???A look at Operation Knights??? Assault,??? Long War Journal.org, 4/4/08
- ???Mahdi Army taking significant casualties in Baghdad, South,??? Long War Journal.org, 3/29/08
- ???Maliki: ???Security operations in Basra will continue,?????? Long War Journal.org, 3/31/08
Salaheddin, Sinan, ???Iraqi army, Mahdi militiamen clash,??? Associated Press, 4/8/08
Scales, MG (Ret) Robert H., Jr., ???Statement for the Record,??? Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
Strobel, Warren and Fadel, Leila, ???Iranian who brokered Iraqi peace is on U.S. terrorist watch list,??? McClatchy Newspaper, 3/31/08
Susman, Tina, ???Can Iraq???s soldiers fight???? Los Angeles Times, 4/3/08
Tavernise, Sabrina, and Moore, Solomon, ???In This Shiite Battle, a Marked Shift From the Past,??? New York Times, 3/30/08
Visser, Reidar, ???The Enigmatic Second Battle of Basra,??? Historiae.org, 3/26/08
- ???Maliki, Hakim, and Iran???s Role in the Basra Fighting,??? Historiae.org, 4/9/08
Yacoub, Sameer, ???Iraq Orders Gas Station Crackdown,??? Associated Press, 4/13/08
On March 25, 2008 Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki launched a military operation to clear Basra, Iraq???s second largest city, of Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army. Despite poor planning by Maliki and some initial stumbles, Iraqi forces, backed by the U.S. and Britain, were able to take back the city from the Sadrists and other Shiite militias that had been running the city. Afterwards, Maliki took on Sadr in his stronghold, Sadr City in Baghdad. Maliki has been able to play both the military and political card against Sadr, and has effectively cornered the man behind one of Iraq???s largest and most deadly militias.
Military Operations Against Sadr[/b]
Maliki???s campaign against Sadr started with military operations in Basra that quickly spread across southern Iraq and into Baghdad. Fighting in the south ended when Sadr said he had negotiated a deal with Iraqi politicians and Iran at the end of March. The Prime Minister however, wasn???t involved and Iraqi forces continued to clear Sadrist neighborhoods in Basra. By April 25, government forces claimed they had military control of the city, and hoped to clear it of all militias within the next two months. Hundreds of Mahdi Army members were either killed or jailed in the process, dealing a sever blow to the militia because it can???t hope to replace these fighters any time soon.
By mid-April, Iraqi forces announced they were in control of Basra, Iraq???s second largest city
The population of Basra seems to be supportive of the crackdown. The city was under a harsh form of Islamic law by the various Shiite militias, including the Mahdi Army. Music was banned, women were forced to wear head-scarves and they couldn???t wear jeans or bright colors. Hundreds of women were assassinated for breaking these rules. By late April, people were cautiously returning to the streets, schools and businesses.
There have been almost 300 rocket and mortar attacks on the Green Zone, mostly from Sadr City, since the Iraqi government began its operations against the Mahdi Army
Baghdad is now the center of the crackdown on Sadr. Initially, the Mahdi Army was attempting to take pressure off their brethren in Basra by harassing Iraqi and U.S. forces, and shelling the Green Zone. That tactic seemed to backfire as it provoked the U.S. to move into the southern section of Sadr City called Jameela to stop the mortar and rocket fire. The U.S. ended up constructing a wall around the entire section as they had in other parts of Baghdad during the surge. At the same time, the U.S. is attempting to improve services in the district such as garbage pick up and a medical clinic. The ultimate goal is to win over the local population so that they support the government. Most of these projects are funded by the U.S. however, while the Maliki government has either been absent or said they will not start any work until security improves.
Map of the wall built by U.S. forces around Jameela, the southern section of Sadr City, Baghdad
Political Isolation of Sadr[/b]
Maliki has also been able to move deftly on the political front to isolate Sadr. Maliki has delivered a much clearer and effective message calling on Sadr to disarm, turn over members of his militia that have carried out attacks, and recognize the authority of the government if he wants to continue to play a role in the country???s politics. Sadr on the other hand, has gone back and forth from threatening an end to his cease-fire and carrying out an all out war, to calling on his followers to continue their stand down, and asking for a peaceful resolution to the problem. These contradictory statements reflect the internal divisions with the Sadrist movement between those that want to go out fighting, and others that want a peaceful resolution.
While a few leading politicians such as Vice President Hashemi, the Speaker of Parliament al-Mashahadani, and former Prime Ministers Allawi and Jaafari, have called for negotiations, the majority of political parties and leading Shiite clerics are standing behind Maliki against Sadr. The Sunni parties that have been boycotting Maliki???s cabinet may even return to the government, in part because they have been impressed that Maliki has been willing to crackdown on his fellow Shiites. A Sadrist spokesman said that the movement was shocked at how isolated they had become. This further corners Sadr because he hasn???t been able to back out of his confrontation with the government like he did in the past. Maliki???s government on the other hand is emboldened and setting the conditions for any peace between the two sides.
Most political factions in Iraq???s parliament support the Prime Minister???s crackdown on the Sadrists
Conclusion[/b]
By the time the Maliki government ends its crackdown, Sadr may have to surrender his militia, or see much of it destroyed
This may be the last stand for Moqtada al-Sadr???s militia. Maliki is outmaneuvering Sadr on the political front so far. That may force Sadr into a military battle that he cannot win. If successful, this could be a coup for Maliki. It would be the first time that he proves that he is a competent leader. It also might lead to a new political coalition behind him if the Sunnis choose to rejoin his cabinet. Just as important, Maliki may be able to severely weaken his main political opponent Sadr. The Mahdi Army needed to be dealt with one way or another. Sadr???s plan was to build up a Hezbollah like party with strong backing from Iran that provided basic services to poor Shiites, ran candidates for office, and hoped to eventually rule the government, while also operating a large and powerful militia. Sadrists are also responsible for hundreds of attacks on U.S. forces and the deaths of thousands of Sunnis during the sectarian war for Baghdad that took place from 2006-2007. Sadr has proven to be a survivor and will most likely back down, but on Maliki???s terms. It will probably cost him his militia if he hopes to continue to play a role in Iraq???s politics.
SOURCES[/b]
Adas, Basil, ???Militia break-up poses questions,??? Gulf News, 4/15/08
Ahmed, Hamid, ???Iraqi PM orders freeze in raids; suicide bomber killes 15,??? Associated Press, 4/4/08
Agence France Presse, ???Iraqi forces seize last Sadr bastion in Basra: US,??? 4/26/08
Al-Gharafi, Abdulhussein, ???Sadr???s Mahdi Army refuses to disarm,??? Azzaman, 4/7/08
Al-Ansary, Khalid, ???Iraqi PM seeks to ease tensions with militia,??? Reuters, 4/4/08
Alsumaria, ???Wall under construction in Sadr City limited,??? 4/26/08
Associated Press, ???Iraq PM sets conditions to end crackdown,??? 4/25/08
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Aswat Aliraq, ???Al-Sadr consulted clergy, they ???rejected??? dissolving Mahdi Army,??? 4/9/08
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Brookes, Adam, ???Rival claims over Basra battle,??? BBC News, 4/4/08
Brooks, Bradley, ???US soldiers move into Sadr City,??? Associated Press, 4/4/08
Cordesman, Anthony, ???The Shi???ite Gamble: Rolling the Dice for Iraq???s Future,??? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/21/08
Dagher, Sam, ???Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08
Deshmukh, Jay, ???US troops plan to stay put in Sadr City,??? Middle East Online, 4/15/08
Glanz, James and Farrell, Stephen, ???Crackdown on Militias Raises Stability Concerns,??? New York Times, 4/8/08
Gordon, Michael, ???In Sadr City, Basic Services Are Faltering,??? New York Times, 4/22/08
- ???U.S. Begins Erecting Wall in Sadr City,??? New York Times, 4/18/08
Haynes, Deborah, ???The men in black vanish and Basra comes to life,??? Times of London, 4/25/08
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, ???Al-Sadr shift: away from politics and favoring fight,??? Associated Press, 4/24/08
Hider, James, ???British accused of appeasing Shia militia in Basra,??? Times, 4/12/08
Ismail, Raviya, ???Sadr threatens unending ???war??? in Iraq if attacks don???t end,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 4/20/08
Jamil, Karim, ???Iraq army claims in full sway of Basra,??? Midle East Online, 4/25/08
Middle East Online, ???Maliki threatens to Bar Sadr party rom politics,??? 4/7/08
Mohammed, Aref, ???Show of force as Iraqi forces advance in Basra,??? Reuters, 4/19/08
Parker, Nd, Salman, Raheem, and Fakhrildeen, Saad, ???Fear and dread in Iraq???s holy city of Najaf,??? Los Angeles Times, 4/19/08
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ???Iraq: Al-Sadr???s Militia ???Won???t Fight Government,?????? 4/22/08
Rasheed, Ahmed, ???Iraqi cleric threatens end to ceasefire,??? Reuters, 4/8/08
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In March 2008, the Iraqi government launched a campaign called Operation Knight???s Charge to take back control of Basra, the country???s second largest city. Prime Minister Maliki said he was going to expel the criminals that had taken over there. While the offensive was initially focused solely upon Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army, since then the government has also cracked down on other Shiite parties that ran parts of the city. As a result, life has slowly but surely returned to the streets. Who the population will ultimately give their loyalties to however, is yet to be seen.
Before: Political, Militia and Criminal Control of Basra[/b]
Members of the Fadhila Party holding a press conference in 2007. They were previously in charge of Basra province and city government
Before Baghdad decided to take action in Basra, the city was controlled by a variety of different Shiite political parties that controlled different parts of the city. The Fadhila Party ran the provincial and city government, and also controlled the Oil Protection Service and the dockworkers??? union. The Sadrists were also prominent in the city, especially when the surge started in 2007 and many Mahdi Army fighters fled south to cities like Basra to avoid the increased U.S. military operations. Sadr???s followers controlled the Facilities Protection Service, much of the local police, the port authority, hospitals, and electrical plants. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) ran the local intelligence service, the commandos, and the border crossings into Iran and Kuwait. There were also many smaller Shiite parties such as Iraqi Hezbollah and the Thurallah Party. Hezbollah controlled the customs police.
The British were nominally in charge of the city and province until the end of 2007, but their policies played into the hands of the Shiite parties. Instead of recruiting a brand new police force, the English integrated many of the local militias. Several attempts were later made to vet the police, but they all failed. By the end of 2007, the British withdrew to the city???s airport, ensuring that the militias would have full sway over the city.
In the fall of 2007 the British withdrew from Basra proper to the city???s airport, thus ensuring that the local Shiite parties of their rule
Many of the ruling parties imposed their form of Islamic law, and took part in the massive oil smuggling trade. Women were banned from wearing bright colors or jeans, were forced to cover their hair, and were not allowed to sit next to men in the city???s universities. Over 100 women were killed for breaking these rules. The militias also outlawed music, selling alcohol, and public parties, and persecuted the local Christian population. Smuggling oil also provided the main means of financing for all of the parties in the city. There was plenty of oil to take as Basra is Iraq???s only major seaport and handles up to 2/3 of the country???s oil exports. The Shiite parties also stole from the security forces and government offices including 250 police cars and 5,000 pistols. By December 2007, the police chief claimed that up to $64 billion had been stolen through corruption and smuggling in the city since the 2003 invasion.
There were often shootouts between the rival factions over control of illegal activities or the police. Iran was also playing a role supplying many of the different Shiite parties with weapons, and supporting attacks upon the British, adding to the violence. In 2007 alone, there were 848 deaths and 383 kidnappings in a city that the British claimed to be secure.
A Hasty Military Offensive[/b]
Prime Minister Maliki grew tired of the slow pace of securing Basra and wanted to prove his leadership skills. This led to Operation Knights??? Charge in March 2008
Operation Knights??? Charge was a hastily conceived military operation that proved far more effective than expected. Maliki originally appointed a new military and police chief for Basra in late 2007. They formulated a long-term plan to vet the security forces, clear out criminal gangs, reach out to those parties that were willing to work within the political system, and then use force against those that didn???t. These goals were suppose to be completed by the fall of 2008 before the planned provincial elections. City residents and Maliki seemed to be unhappy with the state of affairs however as there were large protests about the lack of security, and the prime minister warned Basra???s governor needed to take control of the city and port and be cut off by Baghdad in March 2008. Maliki grew impatient and decided to launch his own offensive, which became Knights??? Charge later that month. This was the first time the Iraqi government planned and carried out its own military operation.
The Mahdi Army had a short battle with the government for control of the city at the end of March. Since then they have been largely cleared from the city
Maliki said that the government would clear the city of criminals, but the only group that initially was targeted was the Mahdi Army. Despite some defections and AWOL soldiers, the government???s forces were able to move into the center of the city and battle the Mahdi Army to a standstill. Sadr eventually agreed to a cease-fire, but Maliki did not. While the Sadrists stopped fighting, the security forces continued to secure neighborhoods. By early May, they had cleared many of the strongholds of Sadr???s followers. Maliki was not done however. He also put the Fadhila governor under house arrest and went after his brother who was allegedly the largest oil smuggler in Iraq. The Thurallah party had its office shut and its main mosque destroyed. By the end of April, the government said it had cleared the port of criminals and smugglers, and arrested over 300 militiamen and criminals. Baghdad also set about creating new security forces that would be loyal to it, rather than the local political parties.
Iraqi forces continue to conduct raids and arrests to clear Basra of militias. These are weapons seized in the city
Conclusion: Afterwards, A Possible Rebirth of Basra[/b]
Women in Basra feel more free to walk the streets now that many of the militias have been subdued
Since the major military operations ended, life has slowly returned to Basra. Shops are beginning to sell alcohol and music again, bands are performing at weddings, and women are walking the streets again and attending classes at the Basra University. These all give the outward appearance of a city coming out from under the boot of Islamic Shiite parties. Maliki also promised $100 million to rebuild the city???s services to try to win over more hearts and minds.
Bands in Basra are once again allowed to perform in public, something that was banned under militia rule before
What will happen next is unknown. Prime Minister Maliki is hoping that his security moves and promises of rebuilding will win Basra???s loyalty. Given its history, that???s not a given. Basra is known for its indepen dence from the rest of Iraq, while being resentful of Baghdad. Even before the U.S. invasion, the city claimed that the capital had always ignored them despite being the most important economic center in the country. These feelings were reinforced after the U.S. invasion as the local parties, militias and gangs took over the city and the central government did nothing. Maliki is hoping that he can prove himself to be a leader. Whether he can follow up his military moves with real governance that means a better life and jobs for common Iraqis is the real question that follows.
SOURCES[/b]
Abedzair, Kareem, ???Fear grips Basra and Najaf in wake of murder of 40 women,??? Azzaman, 12/8/07
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Ahmed, Hamid, ???Iraqi PM orders freeze in raids; suicide bomber killes 15,??? Associated Press, 4/4/08
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Al-Shawi, Ra???ad, ???Basra Police Chief Doubts Security,??? Associated Press, 12/6/07
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- ???Police chief purges force in Basra,??? Azzaman, 1/6/08
Borden, Anthony, ???Iraqi Governance Report,??? Institute For War And Peace Reporting, August 2007
Brookes, Adam, ???Rival claims over Basra battle,??? BBC News, 4/4/08
Dagher, Sam, ???As British leave Basra, militias dig in,??? Christian Science Monitor 8/28/07
- ???As British troops exit Basra, Shiites vie to fill power vacuum,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/17/07
- ???Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08
- ???British hand over Basra in disarray,??? Christian Science Monitor, 12/17/07
- ??????Shiite Taliban??? rises as British depart Basra,??? Christian Science Monitor, 9/18/07
DeYoung, Karen and Ricks, Thomas, ???As British Leave, Basra Deteriorates,??? Washington Post, 8/7/07
DPA, ???5 US soldiers killed, Shia mosque blown up by army,??? 5/4/08
Fadel, Leila, ???Shiite cleric offers truce to ease clashes in Iraq,??? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/31/08
- ???With calm restored in Basra, Iraqis ask ???Who won??????? McClatchy Newspapers, 3/31/08
Fresh Air, ???'Fiasco' Author Reports On the Petraeus Report,??? NPR, 9/12/07
Ghosh, Bobby, ???Maliki???s Moment of Truth in Basra,??? Time, 3/25/08
Glanz, James, ???Iraqi Troops May Move to Reclaim Basra???s Port,??? New York Times, 3/13/08
Haynes, Deborah, ???The men in black vanish and Basra comes to life,??? Times of London, 4/25/08
Hider, James, ???British accused of appeasing Shia militia in Basra,??? Times of London, 4/12/08
- ???Iraq: an accidential battle that no one can afford to lose,??? Times of London, 3/31/08
- ???Iraqi police in Basra shed their uniforms, kept their rifles and switched sides,??? Times, of London 3/28/08
Institute For War & Peace Reporting, ???Battling for Power in Basra,??? 8/7/07
Jamil, Karim, ???Iraq army claims in full sway of Basra,??? Midle East Online, 4/25/08
Lenz, Ryan, ???Iraq: More US airstrikes on Basra,??? Associated Press, 3/29/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Iraq, al-Sadr showdown tests loyalties,??? USA Today, 4/1/08
Mohammed, Aref, ???Show of force as Iraqi forces advance in Basra,??? Reuters, 4/19/08
Monsters and Critics.com, ???Basra security worsened by uncontrolled border, say Iraqi officials,??? 3/9/08
Moore, Solomon, ???Ominous Signs Remain in City Run by Iraqis,??? New York Times, 2/23/08
Morning Edition, ???Gen. Keane: Iraqi Military Not Ready to Stand Alone,??? National Public Radio, 3/28/08
Price, Jay and Basri, Ali Omar al, ???In Basra, vigilantes wage deadly campaign against women,??? McClatchy Newspaper, 10/4/07
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ???Iraq: Al-Sadr???s Militia ???Won???t Fight Government,?????? 4/22/08
Reid, Robert, ???Iraq to expand crackdown,??? Associated Press, 4/3/08
Roggio, Bill, ???Maliki: ???Security operations in Basra will continue,?????? Long War Journal.org, 3/31/08
Al-Sabaah, ???Interior receive ports??? security,??? 4/29/08
Sevastopulo, Demetri, and Barker, Alex, and Fidler, Stephen, ???UK takes flak from Basra flare-up,??? Financial Times, 4/2/08
Spiegel, Peter, ???British tout Basra model,??? Los Angeles Times, 12/14/07
Wright, Robin, ???Iranian Flow Of Weapons Increasing, Officials Say,??? Washington Post, 6/3/07
Everyday Iraqi and U.S. forces are battling members of Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army, also known by its Arabic name and abbreviation Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM). The fighting is centered in the eastern Baghdad district called Sadr City that holds up to two million inhabitants, mostly poor Shiites. Clashes began there in late March 2008 when Prime Minister Maliki launched a crack down on Sadrists in the southern port city of Basra. Immediately, JAM elements throughout the South and Baghdad rose up in both peaceful and violent protests against the government???s actions. Since then the focus of Maliki???s operation has shifted to Baghdad and Sadr City specifically. The U.S. is now focusing upon building a wall around the southern section of district known as Jamilla. The Mahdi Army is desperately throwing themselves against the U.S. soldiers trying to construct the wall. This could be a make or break it fight for Sadr???s followers.
Sadr City Wall and Operations[/b]
U.S. engineers have spent the last month construction a large blast wall around the southern district of Sadr City. It???s meant to secure the area within rocket and mortar range of the Green Zone, but it is also the first step in pacifying Sadr???s stronghold.
The U.S. originally moved into the southern section of Sadr City trying to stop rocket and mortar attacks on the Green Zone where the U.S. Embassy, Iraq???s parliament and other important offices are located. By entering Tharwa and Jamilla, and other neighborhoods, the U.S. hoped to push the Sadrists out of range of the international zone. As the U.S. had done in other areas of the capital during the surge, they decided to construct a large blast wall around the area to keep out JAM fighters and eventually pacify the population and win them over to the government???s side.
Building the wall has been slow but steady, and the fighting over it is taking a toll on JAM. Over 500 Mahdi Army fighters have died in the fighting since late March. This is a devastating number for Sadr???s militia militia. During the battle for Baghdad in 2006-2007, the Sadrists virtually reigned supreme over the capital. Since then however, the movement has fractured during Sadr???s cease-fire. Many Shiites simply joined to gain spoils from the expulsion of Sunnis, others were criminal elements, while others were just Shiites fighting for survival in mixed neighborhoods. Since that battle was won, many of these opportunists have fallen by the wayside. The Mahdi Army was never very organized to begin with consisting of many independent cells. No insurgent force can win in a direct battle with conventional forces, but that is what the wall is forcing the Sadrists into. Everyday they launch rocket and mortar attacks as well as hit and run raids on construction units. They are suffering casualties, which they can not easily replace in the process. If this war of attrition continues, much of the Sadr???s armed wing in Baghdad may be destroyed.
Map of the area being walled off in Sadr City by U.S. forces. To the south is the Green Zone, which was being shelled daily by Sadrists from the southern part of Sadr City now being enclosed.
There have also been some controversial moves by the U.S. in the fighting as well. One was the destruction of a building next to a hospital in Sadr City in the beginning of May. The building was the headquarters for a unit of the Mahdi Army that operated with Iranian weapons and support known as a Special Group. The Ministry of Health, which runs the country???s hospitals is under the control of Sadrists who took control of the ministership when they originally joined the government in 2006. During the sectarian fighting from 2006-2007 the Sadrists used ambulances to ferry weapons, held captured Sunnis in hospitals, and tortured and killed them there and in the capital???s morgues.
Damage to the area around the hospital that housed the Sadrist Special Groups headquarters destroyed by U.S. missiles
Conclusion[/b]
If fighting continues at the current rate Sadr could lose most of his fighters by the end of the summer. This would be a devastating blow to one of the country???s largest and most notorious militias that once seemed like it was on the brink of conquering the capital. What comes next might be more important. What Sadr decides to do, continue to fight or negotiate his way out of the crisis is the looming question. The Iraqi government has also been unable to provide basic services to much of the population since its inception in 2006. Maliki has promised reconstruction funds for Sadr City, but none of that money has really been spent as the fighting continues. Actually allocating that money and using it effectively might prove to be more difficult than the current battle. These political and economic issues are the more important ones to consider as the clashes in Baghdad continue.
SOURCES[/b]
Al-Ansary, Khalid, ???Iraqi PM seeks to ease tensions with militia,??? Reuters, 4/4/08
CBS, ???CBS: Death Squads In Iraqi Hospitals,??? 10/4/06
CNN, ???Iraqi raids anger Shiite militia,??? 3/25/08
Deshmukh, Jay, ???US troops plan to stay put in Sadr City,??? Middle East Online, 4/15/08
Fayad, Ma???ad, ???Iran Ordered Muqtada al-Sadr to Return to Al-Najaf ??? Iraqi Sources,??? Asharq Alawsat, 4/14/08
Glantz, Aaron, ???Iraqi Health Ministry Severs Ties With US Over Raid,??? AntiWar.com, 8/15/06
Gordon, Michael, ???In Sadr City, Basic Services Are Faltering,??? New York Times, 4/22/08
- ???U.S. Begins Erecting Wall in Sadr City,??? New York Times, 4/18/08
International Crisis Group, ???Iraq???s Civil War, The Sadrists And The Surge,??? 2/7/08
LaFranchi, Howard, ???U.S. hopes to counter Mahdi Army???s clout in Baghdad,??? Christian Science Monitor, 4/15/08
Levinson, Charles, ???Sadrists??? grip on Iraqis??? health care takes toll,??? USA Today, 3/26/08
Paley, Amit, ???Iraqi Hospitals Are War???s New ???Killing Fields,?????? Washington Post, 8/30/06
Roggio, Bill, ???19 Mahdi Army fighters killed during Baghdad battles,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/8/08
- ???GMLRS strike knocks out Special Groups command center in Sadr City,??? Long War Journal.org, 5/3/08
Tomkins, Richard, ???Iraq: U.S. Troops, Shi???ite Gunmen Battle Daily In Al-Sadr City,??? Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 5/7/08
Westervelt, Eric, ???U.S. Bids to Bring Basic Services to Sadr City,??? Weekend Edition, National Public Radio, 4/27/08