I'm back at work so I simply don't have the time right now to go back and footnote everything. I already had this on file though. It's a list of sources that I actually used. I read a lot more as well. It's unofficial because I didn't list the authors of each article, they're listed in chronological order instead. It's freaking huge so I don't know what anyone is going to get out of it other than I did my research.
Senate Intelligence Committee, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community???s Prewar Intelligence on Iraq
Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons Of Mass Destruction
THINK TANK REPORTS[/b]
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ???WMD In Iraq Evidence and Implications??? January 2004
Center For American Progress, Lawrence Korb and Brian Katulis ???Strategic Redeployment: A Progressive Plan for Iraq and the Struggle Against Violent Extremists??? 10/3/05
Center For Defense Information; Straus Military Reform Project ???Little Promise in Iraqi Security Forces??? 12/5/05
- ???Willful Ignorance: How the Pentagon sent the army to Iraq without a counterinsurgency doctrine??? 9/16/05
Center For Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman ???Iraqi Force Development: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job???? 11/29/05
Foreign Policy In Focus, Col. Daniel Smith Ret. ???Repairing a Broken Iraq???? 7/3/06
Open Society Institute, Yahia Said ???Misunderstanding Iraq: Recommendations for US Policy??? November 2005
Project On Defense Alternatives ???Disarming Iraq: What Did the UN Missions Accomplish???? 4/25/03
Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Kenneth Pollack, Brookings Institution ???A Switch In Time; A New Strategy For America In Iraq??? February 2006
U.S. Army, Military Review, Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White, ???Assessing Iraq???s Sunni Arab Insurgency??? May-June 2006
Washington Institute, Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White ???Assessing Iraq???s Sunni Arab Insurgency??? December 2005
8/12/02 ??? ???Theater Of War??? Time 8/27/02 ??? ???Vice president makes case for war on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/2/02 ??? ???Iraq & Al-Qaeda Is There A Link???? Time 9/16/02 ??? ???What Does Saddam Have???? Time 9/25/02 ??? ???Iraq???s gem weapons set to go, Blair says??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/14/02 ??? ???Why War???? U.S. News & World Report 10/21/02 ??? ???Politics and the CIA??? Time 12/2/02 ??? ???After The Fall??? Time 2003 ??? ???Analyses Going It Alone???? PBS??? Frontline 2003 ??? ???Analysis 2003: First Draft Of A Grand Strategy??? PBS??? Frontline 2003 ??? ???Chronology: The Evolution Of The Bush Doctrine??? PBS??? Frontline 2003 ??? ???Interview: Mark Danner??? PBS??? Frontline 2003 ??? ???Iraq, The Middle East, And Beyond???? PBS??? Frontline 1/13/03 ??? ???New American Empire???? U.S. News & World Report 1/27/03 ??? ???Bush???s Brainiest Hawk??? Time 2/3/03 ??? ???6 Reasons Why So Many Allies Want Bush To Slow Down??? Time 2/10/03 ??? ???Dissecting The Case??? Time 2/17/03 ??? ???What???s Behind a Sinister Flirtation??? Time 3/2/03 ??? ???Who armed Iraq San Francisco Chronicle 3/2/03 ??? ???Who will fight the war???? San Francisco Chronicle 3/2/03 ??? ???Who will suffer???? San Francisco Chronicle 3/5/03 ??? ???Why Hussein Will Not Give Weapons of Mass Destruction to Al Qaeda??? Cato Institute 3/10/03 ??? ???Looking Beyond Saddam??? Time 3/24/03 ??? ???Northern Iraq???s Other War??? U.S News & World Report 3/25/03 ??? ???A Spurious ???Smoking Gun?????? Mother Jones 3/31/03 ??? ???First Stop, Iraq??? Time 4/03 ??? ???The Thirty Year Itch??? Mother Jones 4/03 ??? ???Neo Con Chaos in the Middle East isn???t the Bush-hawks??? nightmare scenario ??? it???s their plan??? Washington Monthly 4/6/03 ??? ???Little evidence of banned weapons found so far??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/12/03 ??? ???Liquid Wealth A Mirage??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/13/03 ??? ???Bush aides press ???preemptive deterrence??? in Mideast??? Boston Globe 4/13/03 ??? ???US edges closer in search for arms??? Boston Globe 4/16/03 ??? ???CIA???s ???brightest prospect??? for Iraq presidency missing??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/18/03 ??? ???Illegal Weapons: What if U.S. forces don???t find any???? San Francisco Chronicle 4/18/03 ??? ???Political Party in Mosul Emerges With Own Army??? New York Times 4/18/03 ??? ???Rumsfeld Looking for Help In Finding Outlawed Arms??? New York Times 4/18/03 ??? ???Some Skeptics Say Arms Hunt Is Fruitless??? New York Times 4/19/03 ??? ???Iraqi crowd tells U.S. to leave??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/19/03 ??? ???Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/20/03 ??? ???U.S. may keep bases for military in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/21/03 ??? ???America & The World??? Business Week 4/21/03 ??? ???Bush lauds Syrian help corralling Hussein aides??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/21/03 ??? ???Scientist says Iraq destroyed illicit arms??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/21/03 ??? ???Where Will All That Anger Go???? Business Week 4/22/03 ??? ???U.S. overseer tours Baghdad??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/23/03 ??? ???Iraq???s Shiites show strength on once-banned pilgrimage??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/24/03 ??? ???Shiite clerics challenge U.S. goal in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/25/03 ??? ???Iraqi weapons may be gone, Bush says??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/26/03 ??? ???Iraqi in Iran urges Shiites to take power??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/26/03 ??? ???No proof of Powell???s arms claims??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/27/03 ??? ???Terrorist manual may link Iraqi group to al Qaeda??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/28/03 ??? ???Unfinished Business??? Time 5/3/03 ??? ???A classicist???s Legacy: New Empire Builders??? New York Times 5/3/03 ??? ???Bush Says It Will Take Time to Find Iraq???s Banned Arms??? New York Times 5/3/03 ??? ???Iraq Exiles, Backed by U.S. Return to Reinvent a Country??? New York Times 5/4/03 ??? ???No unconventional arms, Iraqi scientists still insist??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/7/03 ??? ???Bush appoints new overseer to run Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/10/03 ??? ???Rumsfeld foresees year in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/11/03 ??? ???Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq??? Washington Post 5/12/03 ??? ???Selective Intelligence??? New Yorker 5/12/03 ??? ???What Ever Happened to The Republican Guard???? Time 5/14/03 ??? ???Bush Officials Change Tune on Iraqi Weapons??? Reuters 5/14/03 ??? ???Locating Iraq???s weapons not vital, says UK??? Independent Online 5/23/03 ??? ???CIA to review Iraq intelligence for bias, accuracy??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/25/03 ??? ???Behind Baghdad???s fall??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/26/03 ??? ???Can Anyone Govern This Place???? Time 5/28/03 ??? ???Rumsfeld comments on Iraq weapons renew British criticism of war??? Associated Press 5/29/03 ??? ???U.K. dossier on Iraq weapons ???unreliable?????? United Press International 5/30/03 ??? ???Pentagon Expands Weapons Hunt??? Reuters 5/31/03 ??? ???Iraq war rationale questioned anew??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/1/03 ??? ???Bush Remarks Confirm Shift In Justifying War??? Washington Post 6/2/03 ??? ???U.S. drops assembly idea for interim political council??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/5/03 ??? ???Pentagon adviser denies politicizing Iraq intelligence??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/5/03 ??? ???Some Iraq Analysts Felt Pressure From Cheney Visits??? Washington Post 6/6/03 ??? ???Blix: Don???t assume Saddam had weapons of mass destruction??? Associated Press 6/6/03 ??? ???Security Council pushes for return of inspectors??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/7/03 ??? ???2002 report found no Iraqi arsenal??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/7/03 ??? ???Bush Certainty On Iraq Arms Went Beyond Analysts??? Views??? Washington Post 6/7/03 ??? ???Some experts doubt trailers were germ lab??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/9/03 ??? ???Officials Defend Iraq Intelligence??? Washington Post 6/9/03 ??? ???Truth And Consequences??? U.S. News & World Report 6/9/03 ??? ???Weapons Of Mass Disappearance??? Time 6/10/03 ??? ???War in Iraq Was ???Right Decision,??? Bush Says??? Washington Post 6/14/03 ??? ???CIA experts on Iraq arms shifted to different jobs??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/22/03 ??? ???Blix Downgrades Prewar Assessment of Iraqi Weapons??? Washington Post 6/22/00 ??? ???Report Cast Doubt on Iraq-Al Qaeda Connection??? Washington Post 6/23/03 ??? ???Spooks: No reliable intel on Iraqi weapons??? U.S. News & World Report 6/25/03 ??? ???Politics challenged analysis of Iraq, official tells panels??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/03 ??? ???Bush???s Brain Trust??? Vanity Fair 7/3/03 ??? ???Iraqis swelter in 115 heat ??? and fume at U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/7/03 ??? ???Attacks raise fears of guierrilla war in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/7/03 ??? ???Bush aides twisted findings on Iraq, former envoy says??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/7/03 ??? ???The War That Never Ends??? Time 7/8/03 ??? ???Big step toward a new Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/8/03 ??? ???White House shrinks its Iraqi nuclear claim??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/10/03 ??? ???Imports inundate Iraq under new U.S. policy??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/10/03 ??? ???U.S. to keep troop levels in Iraq unchanged??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/11/03 ??? ???Bush team united Iraq front unravels??? MSNBC.Com 7/11/03 ??? ???Iraqi oil would be collateral for loans under bank???s plan??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/12/03 ??? ???CIA director takes blame for false Iraqi claim??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/12/03 ??? ???U.S. pulls back a bit in Hussein stronghold??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/13/03 ??? ???Britain stands by claim that Iraq tried to buy uranium
in Africa??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/13/03 ??? ???Iraq pieces together its first postwar governing council??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/13/03 ??? ???Tab on Iraq war could limit other military funding??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/13/03 ??? ???Tenet had kept claim out of earlier Bush speech??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/16/03 ??? ???Shiite support for U.S. occupation of Iraq appears tenuous??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/16/03 ??? ???Soldiers Stuck In Iraq??? ABCNEWS.com 7/17/03 ??? ???General in Iraq says U.S. faces a guerrilla war??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/18/03 ??? ???Pentagon retaliates against Gis who spoke out on TV??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/18/03 ??? ???Uranium claim linked to aide at White House??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/19/03 ??? ???Iraq occupation may force U.S. to ask U.N. help??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/19/03 ??? ???White House releases spy report on Iraq arms??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/20/03 ??? ???Chaotic search for Iraq???s weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/20/03 ??? ???Many in Iraq feel U.N. needs to take bigger role??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/21/03 ??? ???Still Fighting Saddam??? Newsweek 7/22/03 ??? ???Iraqi party helping U.S. reassemble Iran spy unit??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/28/03 ??? ???West Wing Pipe Dream??? Mother Jones 7/29/03 ??? ???Iraqi detainees report ???inhumane??? treatment??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/31/03 ??? ???Bush takes blame for uranium error??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/31/03 ??? ???Iraqi council chooses a Shiite leader??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/4/03 ??? ???Civilian deaths stoke Iraqis??? resentment??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/7/03 ??? ???Iraqi anger over raids makes U.S. back off??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/7/03 ??? ???Violence in Iraq puts kids under house arrest??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/8/03 ??? ???Bush Team Kept Airing Iraq Allegation??? Washington Post 8/9/03 ??? ???Powell???s ???thick file??? looking thin??? Associated Press 8/10/03 ??? ???Experts review, poke holes in case for war??? Chicago Tribune 8/10/03 ??? ???Militants linked to al Qaeda rallying in Iraq, Bremer says??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/11/03 ??? ???Violence claims 3 lives in Basra???s searing heat??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/12/03 ??? ???Estimated tab to rebuild Iraq put as high as $600 billion??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/14/03 ??? ???U.S. gives up on idea of U.N. playing big role in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/17/03 ??? ???Iraqi oil flow halted for a week by attack??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/17/03 ??? ???Lack of phones wearing on Iraqis??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/18/03 ??? ???Vital pipelines attacked??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/19/03 ??? ???Blair aide doubted level of Iraqi threat??? Boston Globe 8/20/03 ??? ???As attacks escalate, US troops no longer sole target??? Boston Globe 8/20/03 ??? ???Blast highlights U.S. failure to end chaos in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/20/03 ??? ???Magnet For Evil??? New York Times 8/21/03 ??? ???U.S. to push in U.N. for help in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/22/03 ??? ???Powell makes appeal to U.N. for Iraq help??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/22/03 ??? ???US role in Iraq could cost $60b more??? Boston Globe 8/26/03 ??? ???Abandoned weaponry litters Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/27/03 ??? ???Cost to rebuild Iraq soars??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/28/03 ??? ???White House changes stance on U.N. in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/30/03 ??? ???85 die in Iraq shrine blast ??? key ayatollah among slain??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/31/03 ??? ???Ideology takes a backseat to reality in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/3/03 ??? ???Battlefield Casualties surging??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/3/03 ??? ???Bombing at Baghdad police compound??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/3/03 ??? ???Bush, U.N. to negotiate on troops in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/4/03 ??? ???Iraqis sample democracy in U.S.-sponsored councils??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/4/03 ??? ???Iraqis take over Cabinet posts amid insecurity??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/5/03 ??? ???Retired general lambastes U.S. policy in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/5/03 ??? ???Rumsfeld calls for more Iraqi security troops??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/8/03 ??? ???Bush asks $87 billion for war??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/12/03 ??? ???Blair warned of Iraq attack dangers??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/14/03 ??? ???Iraqis fearful of aiding U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/14/03 ??? ???Public unhappy with war funds request??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/17/03 ??? ???Misspeak first, correct later??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/18/03 ??? ???Bush: No evidence of Hussein, 9/11 link??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/18/03 ??? ???Iraqi criminal gangs prey on families??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/21/03 ??? ???Bechtel under siege??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/21/03 ??? ???Gunmen stalk Hussein party members??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/21/03 ??? ???Iraq council member ambushed??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/22/03 ??? ???Facing Reality??? Time 9/22/03 ??? ???Iraqi leaders to tell Congress of wasteful spending??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/23/03 ??? ???Bremer makes pitch for U.S. aid to Iraqis??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/23/03 ??? ???U.S.-trained Iraqi guards lack guns??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/24/03 ??? ???Bush???s no-apologies speech convinces few??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/25/03 ??? ???Iraq: How to Not Win a War??? New York Review of Books 9/28/03 ??? ???House panel skewers intelligence community on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/29/03 ??? ???Borderline War??? U.S. News & World Report 9/29/03 ??? ???Bush advisers defend Iraq intelligence??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/2/03 ??? ???500 felled towers keep Iraqi power at home??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/3/03 ??? ???No illegal weapons found in Iraq, U.S. investigator says??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/4/03 ??? ???Bush holds to his view of Iraq threat??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/4/03 ??? ???Iraqis dubious about U.S. contracts??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/5/03 ??? ???On The Frontlines Core of resistance??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/6/03 ??? ???So, What Went Wrong?/Chasing A Mirage??? Time 10/6/03 ??? ???U.S. revamps postwar command for Iraq, Afghanistan??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/7/03 ??? ???Bitter Iraqi vents anger by killing U.S. troops??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/9/03 ??? ???A Necessary War???? PBS??? Frontline 10/9/03 ??? ???Experts seek $6 billion in aid to rebuild Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/9/03 ??? ???In Their Own Words: Who Said What When??? PBS??? Frontline 10/9/03 ??? ???Is This Victory???? PBS??? Frontline 10/9/03 ??? ???The Middle East, Democracy, and Dominoes??? PBS??? Frontline 10/9/03 ??? ???Rumsfeld dismisses talk of diminished role in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/9/03 ??? ???Selective Intelligence??? PBS??? Frontline 10/9/03 ??? ???Turf Wars and the Future of Iraq??? PBS??? Frontline 10/9/03 ??? ???We Want A Government and We Want It Now??? PBS??? Frontline 10/9/03 ??? ???What???s at Stake in Iraq???? PBS??? Frontline 10/10/03 ??? ???Bush attempts to raise sagging support on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/10/03 ??? ???Sending troops to Iraq involves great risks for Turkey??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/11/03 ??? ???Cheney lashes out at policy critics??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/11/03 ??? ???Clash in Baghdad slum roils Shiites against U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/11/03 ??? ???House panel takes sides on Iraq reconstruction??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/13/03 ??? ???Leaking With A Vengeance??? Time 10/16/03 ??? ???Orwellian strategy used to sell the war??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/18/03 ??? ???Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq??? New York Times 10/19/03 ??? ???Official report sees patterns behind attacks on GIs??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/24/03 ???
???U.S. hunts Iraq funds at conference??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/25/03 ??? ???$13 billion promised by donors to aid Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/25/03 ??? ???Black gold at the end of the rainbow??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/27/03 ??? ???Bomb kills 15 at Red Cross in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/27/03 ??? ???Danger Around Eery Corner??? Time 10/28/03 ??? ???Hellish start to holy month in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/28/03 ??? ???U.S. intelligence not consistent in analyzing attacks??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/28/03 ??? ???U.S. says increased Iraqi resistance shows desperation??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/29/03 ??? ???Bush???s new word on Iraq: patience??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/30/03 ??? ???U.S. to put Iraqis in frontline fight??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/1/03 ??? ???Young militants making way to Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/2/03 ??? ???Lack of jobs pushes Iraqis toward critical mass??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/5/03 ??? ???Unlikely Iraq can tap oil to pay its way??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/12/03 ??? ???Frustrated top GI in Iraq talks tough??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/13/03 ??? ???CIA says Iraqis dubious about U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/13/03 ??? ???U.S. set to cede power to Iraqis quickly??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/14/03 ??? ???Japan balks at troops for Iraq: U.S. hammers rebels??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/14/03 ??? ???Tough tactics in Iraq stir debate by experts??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/16/03 ??? ???Iraqis to take charge of country by July??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/21/03 ??? ???Car bomb warning to sheiks??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/24/03 ??? ???If At First You Don???t Succeed?????? Time 11/27/03 ??? ???Iraq???s top Shiite assails U.S. plan to cede power??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/28/03 ??? ???Foreigners in Iraq say Koran requires fighting U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/28/03 ??? ???Iraq???s oil pipelines under attack??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/28/03 ??? ???Mosul losing faith in U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/1/03 ??? ???Iraqis deny weapons claims made by U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/1/03 ??? ???Vengeance Has Its Day??? Time 12/7/03 ??? ???U.S. getting tough with Iraqi insurgents??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/8/07 ??? ???Losing Hearts and Minds??? Time 12/10/03 ??? ???U.S. paying dearly for gas in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/11/03 ??? ???Miffed allies urged to forgive Iraq debt??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/12/03 ??? ???Pentagon alleges Iraq rip-off??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/15/03 ??? ???Life Behind Enemy Lines??? Time 12/15/03 ??? ???Will Insurgency Wane? In short term, maybe, but long-term effect more difficult to predict??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/18/03 ??? ???Delusions in Baghdad??? New York Review of Books 12/22/03 ??? ???How to Lose Friends and Alienate People??? Time 12/24/03 ??? ???Intelligence panel sees no intention to lie on Iraq arms??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/29/03 ??? ???Secretary of War??? Time
1/8/04 ??? ???U.S. cuts back crew searching for Iraq weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/11/04 ??? ???Bush Planned Iraqi Invasion Pre-9/11, O???Neil Says??? Associated Press 1/13/04 ??? ???Weapons of Misperception??? Atlantic Monthly Online 1/14/04 ??? ???Hussein was leery of jihadist ties??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/16/04 ??? ???Women???s rights at risk in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/19/04 ??? ???Confessions Of A White House Insider??? Time 1/22/04 ??? ???David Kay - Interview??? PBS??? Frontline 1/22/04 ??? ???Hans Blix - Interview??? PBS??? Frontline 1/23/04 ??? ???Cheney claims al Qaeda link to Hussein??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/24/04 ??? ???Head of U.S. weapons search quits??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/26/04 ??? ???Deal Maker, Deal Breaker??? U.S. News & World Report 1/26/04 ??? ???Ex-arms hunter wants answers on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/28/04 ??? ???Iraq destroyed arms, ex-inspecctor says??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/29/04 ??? ???Ex-inspector: Intelligence to blame for claim on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/29/04 ??? ???Top judge absolves Britain???s Tony Blair??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/30/04 ??? ???2 congressional panels echo Kay on Iraqi weaponry??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/31/04 ??? ???Political pressure ruled out in Iraq analyses??? San Francisco Chronicle 1-2/04 ??? ???Blind Into Baghdad??? Atlantic Monthly Online 1-2/04 - ???The Lie Factory??? Mother Jones 1-2/04 ??? ???Spies, Lies and Weapons: What Went Wrong??? Atlantic Monthly Online 2/4/04 ??? ???Powell reverses on comments about Iraq war??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/6/04 ??? ???CIA chief admits failings on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/8/04 ??? ???Bush, Cheney offer new arguments for war in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/8/04 ??? ???Rumsfeld fervently defends Iraq war??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/9/04 ??? ???Intercepted memo seeks al Qaeda aid??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/9/04 ??? ???So Much For The WMD??? Time 2/9/04 ??? ???Stretched Thin??? U.S. News & World Report 2/9/04 ??? ???We Were All Wrong??? U.S. News & World Report 2/16/04 ??? ???Raid prompts doubts about Iraqi security??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/20/04 ??? ???U.S. abandons Iraq caucus plan??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/26/04 ??? ???Operation Iraqi Freedom??? PBS??? Frontline 3/6/04 ??? ???Prewar reports said Iraq had no illicit weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/9/04 ??? ???Iraqi constitution in danger of being undone by factions??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/10/04 ??? ???CIA chief was out of loop on Iraq special briefing??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/11/04 ??? ???White House hit for refusing to estimate Iraq war costs??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/15/04 ??? ???Which Way Is The Exit???? Time 3/16/04 ??? ???What Iraqis fear most ??? sectarian violence??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/17/04 ??? ???Bush tries to steel allies??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/17/04 ??? ???Intelligence failure, misinterpretation or deceit??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/19/04 ??? ???Scarce jobs, unsafe streets tarnish gains in freedom??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/21/04 ??? ???Cheney, energy and Iraq invasion??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/22/04 ??? ???Ex-counterterrorism chief says Bush politicized response to 9/11??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/22/04 ??? ???Where Things Stand??? Time 3/23/04 ??? ???Ex-aide???s chargest spark blame game on 9/11, Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/25/04 ??? ???A Spurious ???Smoking Gun?????? ??? Iraq ??? Foreign Policy 3-4/04 ??? ???Thirty-Year Itch??? ??? Iraq ??? Foreign Policy 4/3/04 ??? ???Powell says bad data misled him on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/3/04 ??? ???Shiite cleric???s rhetoric ominous??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/5/04 ??? ???30 killed in Iraq clashes after arrest of cleric???s aide??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/5/04 ??? ???Is Condi The Problem???? Time 4/7/04 ??? ???12 Marines killed by Sunni rebels ??? Shiite uprising rages in south??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/12/04 ??? ???U.S. risks turning Shiite cleric into contender??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/12/04 ??? ???When Private Armies Take to the Front Lines??? Time 4/13/04 ??? ???More Gis needed in Iraq, says general??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/15/04 ??? ???Growing worry in D.C. ??? What if U.S. fails in Iraq???? San Francisco Chronicle 4/19/04 ??? ???New Thugs On The Block??? Time 4/19/04 ??? ???No Easy Options??? Time 4/19/04 ??? ???Paying The Price??? Time 4/21/04 ??? ???The failures of occupation??? San Francisco Bay Guardian 4/24/04 ??? ???U.S. changes tactics in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/25/04 ??? ???Foreign policy and its offenders??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/25/04 ??? ???Bush weighs dismal choices for Fallujah??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/25/04 ??? ???Stanford expert says Iraq spinning out of control??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/26/04 ??? ???Shifting Power??? Time 4/28/04 ??? ???2-man committee put Iraq in spotlight??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/04 ??? ???Path To War??? Vanity Fair 5/1/04 ??? ???Majority of Iraqis eager to see foreign troops go, poll finds??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/3/04 ??? ???Digging In For A Fight??? Time 5/3/04 ??? ???Can Iraqis Do The Job???? Time 5/4/04 ??? ???Abuse raises questions about role of U.S. contractors??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/4/04 ??? ???U.S. backpedals, drops Iraqi general??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/5/04 ??? ???Internal CIA probe on ???ghost detainees ???San Francisco Chronicle 5/5/04 ??? ???U.S. Predicament: Military has few, if any, good options in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/5/04 ??? ???U/S/ won???t cut troop levels after all, at least through ???05??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/6/04 ??? ???The unfolding scandal of prison abuse??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/8/04 ??? ???Early alarm bells sounded, ignored??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/8/04 ??? ???Rumsfeld warns of photos depicting worse abuses??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/9/04 ??? ???Inside war room, a battle is raging??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/9/04 ??? ???U.S. general rejects blame for abuses??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/9/04 ??? ???War tab swamps Bush???s estimate??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/10/04 ??? ???Military contractors ??? Above the law???? San Francisco Chronicle 5/10/04 ??? ???Torture At Abu Ghraib??? New Yorker 5/11/04 ??? ???Most Iraqis wrongly detained, report says??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/14/04 ??? ???Officials say methods at prison broke rules??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/16/04 ??? ???Rumsfeld Okd tactics at prison, article says??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/17/04 ??? ???Report: White House memo backed abuse??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/17/04 ??? ???Rules Of Interrogation??? Time 5/17/04 ??? ???Scandal???s Growing Stain??? Time 5/17/04 ??? ???What Happened to Bush???s Dream Team???? Time 5/18/04 ??? ???Bag over prisoner???s head hid fatal wounds??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/18/04 ??? ???Council President: Blast near U.S. headquarters??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/19/04 ??? ???U.S. sees no date for exit, aide says??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/20/04 ??? ???Intelligence officers tied to abuses in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/20/04 ??? ???Red Cross reports lost, generals says??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/21/04 ??? ???Chalabi keeps network, could thwart U.S. goals despite fall from grace??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/23/04 ??? ???Another enemy looms ??? Iraq debt??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/23/04 ??? ???Chalabi allegedly used defectors to dupe West??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/24/05 ??? ???Gray Zone??? New Yorker 5/25/04 ??? ???Appeal For Support: He says handover to Iraqis will succeed despite ???difficult days ahead??? ???San Francisco Chronicle 5/26/04 ??? ???Bush speech alarms even war enthusiasts??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/27/04 ??? ???N.Y. Times a
dmits deficiencies in Iraq coverage??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/29/04 ??? ???Nominee linked to U.S., CIA by decades of anti-Hussein work??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/29/04 ??? ???U.S. supporters of Chalabi pressure Bush??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/30/04 ??? ???Report warned hundreds held in Abu Ghraib on no evidence??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/31/04 ??? ???The Rise and Fall of Chalabi??? Newsweek 6/2/04 ??? ???Most Iraqis wary of nation???s new government??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/2/04 ??? ???President named, new government installed in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/3/04 ??? ???Army extends duty tour in units bound for Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/3/04 ??? ???Rice plays enigmatic role in Bush???s foreign policy??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/7/04 ??? ???The Master Builder??? Time 6/7/04 ??? ???Up In The Cellblocks??? U.S. News & World Report 6/9/04 ??? ???U.N. Council votes 15-0 for Iraq sovereignty??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/10/04 ??? ???8 Iraqis charge contractors abused them??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/10/04 ??? ???Include excluded rebels, clerics group says??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/10/04 ??? ???Torture and Truth??? New York Review Of Book 6/11/04 ??? ???Allies quash Bush plan for NATO forces in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/14/04 ??? ???Abu Ghraib unit says prisoner abuses reported to command in 2003??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/14/04 ??? ???Now It???s Up To Them???? U.S. News & World Report 6/14/04 ??? ???One Expert???s Verdict: The CIA Caved Under Pressure??? Time 6/16/04 ??? ???Pentagon faulted for cost overruns in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/17/04 ??? ???Panel reveals 10-plane plot, finds no Iraq-al Qaeda link??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/17/04 ??? ???Rumsfeld ordered Iraqi suspect held as ???ghost??? prisoner??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/18/04 ??? ???Bush insists on Iraq-al Qaeda link??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/21/04 ??? ???Al Qaeda closer to Pakistan than Iraq, panel chair says??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/21/04 ??? ???Iraq???s Future? These Kids Want No Part of It??? Time 6/22/04 ??? ???U.S. faulted on Iraqi oil revenue spending??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/23/04 ??? ???Heard on the horizon: calls to get all U.S. troops out of Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/23/04 ??? ???Vivisecting the Jihad??? The National Interest 6/24/04 ??? ???Logic of Torture??? New York Review Of Books 6/25/04 ??? ???Iraqis, Seeking Foes of Saudis, Contacted bin Laden, File Says??? New York Times 6/27/04 ??? ???Iraq braces for sovereignty shift??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/28/04 ??? ???Al Qaeda link exists ??? despite the fog??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/28/04 ??? ???Paul Bremer???s Rough Ride??? Time 6/28/04 ??? ???Plan B??? New Yorker 6/28/04 ??? ???U.S. hands power to Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/29/04 ??? ???Analysis: Deceptively low-key handover is critical to Bush??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/29/04 ??? ???Bremer leaves, his heart still full of zeal??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/29/04 ??? ???Iraqis anticipating security, jobs from interim government??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/29/04 ??? ???New leaders vow to destroy rebels??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/30/04 ??? ???Power Struggle??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/30/04 ??? ???Iraq won???t be paying for itself??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/30/04 ??? ???Industry ravaged by sanctions, sabotage war??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/3/04 ??? ???Army admits invasion plagued by snafus??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/4/04 ??? ???Blair Says Illicit Weapons May Never Be Found, but ???We Know Hussein Had Them?????? New York Times 7/4/04 ??? ???U.S. spends fraction of aid on rebuilding??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/5/04 ??? ???Meet The New Jihad??? Time 7/6/04 ??? ???C.I.A. Held Back Iraqi Arms Data, Officials Say??? New York Times 7/7/04 ??? ???Defense official probed on contracts??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/8/04 ??? ???Fallujah now a ???terrorist hotbed?????? San Francisco Chronicle 7/9/04 ??? ???CIA doubts hijacker met with Iraq agent??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/10/04 ??? ???Iraq-Al Qaeda Link Discounted??? Los Angeles Times 7/11/04 ??? ???Senate Panel Looking at Administration Claims??? Los Angeles Times 7/15/04 ??? ???British report assails intelligence, clears Blair??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/23/04 ??? ???Abuses an aberration, report says??? San Francisco Chronicle 7-8/04 ???The Wrong War Backdraft: How the war in Iraq has fueled Al Qaeda and ignited its dream of global jihad??? Mother Jones 8/4/04 ??? ???$1.9 billion for Halliburton being taken from Iraqi funds.??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/6/04 ??? ???Intelligence unit involved in Iraq abuse, Gis tell court??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/6/04 ??? ???Shiite cleric renews call for revolt??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/8/04 ??? ???U.S. troops were told not to aid prisoners??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/9/04 ??? ???Iraq orders arrest of Pentagon???s onetime favorite, his nephew.??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/23/04 ??? ???Showdown With The Rebel??? Time 8/25/04 ??? ???Independent panel tracks prison abuse to Pentagon??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/26/04 ??? ???Army probe of abuses faults intelligence officers??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/29/04 ??? ???CIA reconsidering interrogation tactics??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/5/04 ??? ???U.S. forfeiting influence in growing number of Iraqi cities??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/8/04 ??? ???Grim milestone: Toll tops 1,000??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/10/04 ??? ???CIA had jailers conceal ???up to 100??? Iraqi prisoners??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/11/04 ??? ???Rumsfeld: Beheadings worse than Abu Grahib??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/12/04 ??? ???Abuse known as early as 2002, author claims??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/15/04 ??? ???Attacks on police kill 59 people, wound 114??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/16/04 ??? ???Cleric???s ragtag army takes heavy toll on troops in Sadr City??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/16/04 - ???Intelligence report to Bush pessimistic about Iraq future??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/17/04 ??? ???Evidence of intent ??? but no WMD program??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/17/04 ??? ???Iraq war ???illegal??? U.N. leader tells BBC??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/20/04 ??? ???Mission Still Not Accomplished??? Time 9/22/04 ??? ???Rising call by clerics for jihad??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/23/04 ??? ???How Bush Got It Wrong??? New York Review of Books 9/23/04 ??? ???Iraq: The Bungled Transition??? New York Review of Books 9/24/04 ??? ???The Challenge Of Controlling Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/24/04 ??? ???More troops needed, new study warns??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/27/04 ??? ???Enemy With Many Faces??? Time 9/27/04 ??? ???Iraq guard general arrested??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/27/04 ??? ???Victims of Circumstance??? U.S. News & World Report 9/28/04 ??? ???Truckers say it???s not safe out there??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/28/04 ??? ???Unit???s bleak July Iraq report not its first caution to Bush???s White House??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/4 ??? ???Bush???s Lost Year??? Atlantic Monthly 10/04 ??? ???Vivisecting the Jihad: Part Two??? The National Interest 10/2/04 ??? ???Bush tempers argument for pre-emptive strikes??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/3/04 ??? ???Dispute over Iraq???s nuclear plans??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/4/04 ??? ???Can This War Be Won???? Time 10/4/04 ??? ???How Much U.S. Help???? Time 10/6/04 ??? ???Bremer says troop levels too low in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/8/04 ??? ???Bush, Kerry agreed on need to stay the course in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/9/04 ??? ???Officer says CIA attempted to avoid Geneva rules in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/10/04 ??? ???Iraqi insurgents seek chemical weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/11/04 ??? ???Broken, but not beyond repair??? San Francis
co Chronicle 10/15/04 ??? ???Hatred, fear reign after ???liberation?????? San Francisco Chronicle 10/18/04 ??? ???U.S. plans, tanks batter insurgent stronghold??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/18/04 ??? ???Vanishing Case For War??? U.S. News & World Report 10/18/04 ??? ???What Saddam Was Really Thinking??? Time 10/19/04 ??? ???The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War??? New York Times 10/20/04 ??? ???A Long, Difficult and Probably Turbulent Process??? New York Times 10/20/04 ??? ???Poor Intelligence Misled Troops About Risk of Drawn-Out War??? New York Times 10/21/04 ??? ???Debate Lingering on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military??? New York Times 10/21/04 ??? ???For Training Iraq???s Police, The Main Problem Was Time??? New York Times 10/21/04 ??? ???Iraq ideal for graft, group warns??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/21/04 ??? ???Robertson Says Bush Predicted No Iraq Toll??? New York Times 10/22/04 ??? ???Estimates by U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds??? New York Times 10/22/04 ??? ???Pentagon Reportedly Skewed C.I.A.???s View of Qaeda Tie??? New York Times 10/24/04 ??? ???Memo Okd secret transfer of detainees??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/25/04 ??? ???A top official calls for Army contract probe??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/25/04 ??? ???Huge cache of explosives vanished from site in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/26/04 ??? ???Massacre feared a setup??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/26/04 ??? ???Nationalism drives many insurgents as they fight U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/26/04 ??? ???U.S. Action Bars Right of Some Captured in Iraq??? New York Times 10/29/04 ??? ???Video shows cache of explosives??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/31/04 ??? ???Army overrode top official to extend Hallibruton contract??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/31/04 ??? ???In Iraq, U.S. Officials Cite Obstacles to Victory??? New York Times 11/04 ??? ???Plot To Sell The News??? Vanity Fair 11/04 ??? ???Truth about the Saddam-al Qaeda Connection??? The National Interest 11/1/04 ??? ???Contracts to rebuild Iraq picking up steam, report says??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/4/04 ??? ???Bombs, kidnapping in Baghdad area??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/19/04 ??? ???46 political groups vow to boycott election??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/20/04 ??? ???Insurgents threaten Iraqi elections, U.S. officials say??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/21/04 ??? ???Malnutrition mounts in young Iraqi children??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/22/04 ??? ???Iran Connection??? U.S. News & World Report 11/22/04 ??? ???Vote in Iraq set for Jan. 30??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/24/04 ??? ???Insurgent held Fallujah was under sway of local electrician and mosque imam??? Associated Press 11/25/04 ??? ???Stature of radical Islamists is up since 9/11, study says??? Associated Press 11/27/04 ??? ???Hallibruton said to lose U.S. property??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/30/04 ??? ???Iraqi forces wilting under relentless attacks??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/1/04 ??? ???Army told of abuse before Abu Ghraib??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/2/04 ??? ???U.S. to raise troop level in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/7/04 ??? ???Report: CIA Paints Pessimistic Iraq Picture??? Reuters 12/9/04 ??? ???Troops confront Rumsfeld, ask for better battle gear??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/10/04 ??? General pledges armored vehicles for all Gis in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/16/04 ??? ???Election outcome might not please U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/20/04 ??? ???Seeds Of Chaos??? U.S. News & World Report 12/22/04 ??? ???Iraq units called far from ready??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/3/05 ??? ???Suicide bombing kills 18 Iraqi guardsmen??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/4/05 ??? ???U.S. looks at adding more Americans to Iraqi units??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/6/05 ??? ???Army Reserve breaking down, general warns??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/11/05 ??? ???After bombing, Ukraine says it???s pulling out??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/14/05 ??? ???Aide to Bush???s father urges pullout??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/14/05 ??? ???Militants gun down aide to Iraq???s top Shiite leader??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/17/05 ??? ???U.S. troops go on attack in Mosul??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/22/05 ??? ???Iraq can???t find $300 million taken abroad to buy weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/22/05 ??? ???Plenty of candidates, but where do they stand???? San Francisco Chronicle 1/23/05 ??? ???Countdown to democracy??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/26/05 ??? ???Bush adds $80 billion to wars??? costs??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/26/05 ??? ???Seeking Iraq???s oil prize??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/27/05 ??? ???Deadliest day yet for U.S. troops ??? 37 killed??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/27/05 ??? ???Divided Kurkuk a rich political prize??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/28/05 ??? ???Elections begin yearlong political march in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/28/05 ??? ???U.S. firms work hinges on outcome of Iraq elections??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/29/05 ??? ???Democracy at gunpoint??? Economist 1/29/05 ??? ???Hopeful turning point, or descent into chaos???? Economist 1/30/05 ??? ???What Iraqis Are Voting For??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/30/05 ??? ???Iraq war seen as a magnet for Islamic militancy??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/31/05 ??? ???Big Turnout Buoys Hopes??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/31/05 ??? ???U.S. Reaction: Bush says his policies are paying off??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/1/05 ??? ???Election could erode backing for insurgency??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/3/05 ??? ???Marines come up short on recruits??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/7/05 ??? ???Unmasking The Insurgents??? Newsweek 2/13/05 ??? ???Insurgency intensifies ??? dozens more killed??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/13/05 ??? ???Iraqis facing year of economic and political turmoil??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/14/05 ??? ???Abu Ghraib Scandal You Don???t Know??? Time 2/14/05 ??? ???Shiite alliance appears to hold slight majority in new assembly??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/14/05 ??? ???Slim margin means Shiites will need allies??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/15/05 ??? ???$81.9 billion sought for war, aid??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/1/05 ??? ???U.S. alleges rights abuses by Iraqis??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/7/05 ??? ???Revenge of the Kurds??? Time 3/11/05 ??? Kurds, Shiites agree to resolve fat of Kirkuk??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/15/05 ??? ???Hallibruton overcharges pegged at $108 million??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/16/05 ??? ???Italy to start pulling troops out of Iraq in September??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/20/05 ??? ???Breaking free of a win-loss mindset??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/20/05 ??? ???Rebuilding Iraq a big, slow job??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/21/05 ??? ???Rumsfeld sees Turkey at fault for Iraq turmoil??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/29/05 ??? ???Panel Criticizes C.I.A. For Failure On Iraq Weapons??? New York Times 4/05 ??? ???Iraq???s Next Fault Line??? Time 4/1/05 ??? ???At least 12 Iraqis, GI killed in attacks??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/1/05 ??? ???Iraqi defector duped CIA, report says??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/1/05 ??? ???Spies called flat wrong on Iraq???s weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/4/05 ??? ???Before Iraq war, U.S. ignored work of U.N. arms inspectors, panel says??? Seattle Times 4/19/05 ??? ??????Wish lists??? of harsh tactics against Iraqi prisoners cited??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/22/05 ??? ???Senate approves $81 billion to fight Iraq, Afghan wars??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/24/05 ??? ???Bush more certain than ever on Iraq war??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/26/05 ??? ???Final weapons report find no Syrian collusion??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/29/05 ??? ???Assembly approves Shiite-led Cabinet??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/1/05 ??? ???Way of the Commandos??? New York Times Magzine 5/3/05 ??? ???Explosion of violence ??? but why???? San Francisco Chronicle 5/4/05 ??? ???Basra???s intrusive Islamists reject Iran???s theocracy as too tolerant??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/12/05 ??? ???Tally of civilian deaths depends on who???s counting??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/15/05 ??? ???Hussein???s outlawed former party gaining influence in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/17/05 ??? ???Growing violence stirs fears of Iraqi civil war??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/18/05 ??? ???A Report Card on Iraqi Troops??? Washington Post 5/19/05 ??? ???Exit from Iraq could take ???many years?????? San Francisco Chronicle 5/20/05 ??? ???Iraqi police accused of abuses??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/22/05 ??? ???Doubts about Iraq???s arms lost in march to war??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/23/05 ??? ???Shiite figure urges halt to violence??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/1/05 ??? ???The Other Bomb Drops??? Truthout.Com 6/6/05 ??? ???When Violence Comes To Campus??? Time 6/9/05 ??? ???Iraq???s top leaders voice approval of Kurdish, Shiite militias??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/9/05 ??? ???Secret Way To War??? New York Review of Books 6/12/05 ??? ???British memo shows pre-invasion doubts??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/15/05 ??? ???U.S. memo tells of abductions of Kirkuk minorities??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/16/05 ??? ???Cabinet Office Document??? PBS??? NewsHour.com 6/16/05 ??? ???Confidential and Personal??? PBS??? NewsHour.com 6/16/05 ??? ???Secret ??? Strictly Personal??? PBS??? NewsHour.com 6/16/05 ??? ???Secret and Personal??? PBS??? NewsHour.com 6/16/05 ??? ???Secret and Personal PM/02/019??? PBS??? NewsHour.com 6/17/05 ??? ???Accord on Sunni involvement??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/20/05 ??? ???WMD claims were ???totally implausible?????? U.K. Guardian 6/21/05 ??? ???War needs no protection from critics??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/27/05 ??? ???The Enemy Spies??? Newsweek 6/27/05 ??? ???Rumsfeld confirms talks with insurgent leaders??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/28/05 ??? ???A year of change for Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/30/05 ??? ???Is Bush consistent or doing an about-face???? San Francisco Chronicle 6/30/05 ??? ???New separatist push in south??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/1/05 ??? ???Why victory not a matter of troops??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/7/05 ??? ???So, Mr Bremer, where did all the money go???? U.K. Guardian 7/7/05 ??? ???West Turns Blind Eye As Police Put Saddam???s Torturers Back To Work??? Times of London 7/11/05 ??? ???Oil But No Gasoline, Rivers But No Water??? Time 7/13/05 ??? ???Pentagon planner reveals doubts on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/15/05 ??? ???GAO investigator rips Pentagon on Iraq war finances??? Boston Globe 7/17/05 ??? ???Casualty of War: The U.S. Economy??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/17/05 ??? ???Report of covert aid to Iraqi candidates??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/17/05 ??? ???Study cites seeds of terror in Iraq: War radicalized most, probes find??? Boston Globe 7/18/05 ??? ???After Iraq attack, calls for militias grow??? Christian Science Monitor 7/19/05 ??? ???Ambushes, shootings kill 26 across Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/24/05 ??? ???If It???s Civil War, Do We Know It???? ??? New York Times 7/24/05 ??? ???Iraqi insurgents getting more sophisticated??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/25/05 ??? ???Is the Country Heading for Civil War???? Der Spiegel 7/31/05 ??? ???Iraq Dances With Iran, While America Seethes??? New York Times 8/1/05 ??? ???Spy???s Notes on Iraqi ims Were Shelved, Suit Says??? New York Times 8/2/05 ??? ???Oil-rich nati
on to ration fuel to ease chronic shortages??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/3/05 ??? ???Defense Ministry accused of corruption in overspending??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/3/05 ??? ???Worry Grows as Iraq???s Defense Ministry Falls Short of Expectations??? New York Times 8/10/05 ??? ???Assembly faces 18 difficult steps??? Asia Times 8/10/05 ??? ???Baghdad mayor sacked by armed Shiites??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/10/05 ??? ???Car bomber kills 7, injures 90??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/10/05 ??? ???Weapons of self-destruction??? Asia Times 8/11/05 ??? ???Bombs bad enough, but guns worse in Baghdad??? Chicago Tribune 8/11/05 ??? ???Iraq: Bush???s Islamic Republic??? New York Review of Books 8/11/05 ??? ???Iraqis Thirst for Water and Power??? Christian Science Monitor 8/12/05 ??? ???In Iraq, No Clear Finish Line??? Washington Post 8/12/05 ??? ???Shiites Call for Own State in South??? Washington Post 8/17/05 ??? ???Expectations for Iraq downshifting??? Christian Science Monitor 8/20/05 ??? ???Militias Wresting Control Across Iraq???s North and South??? Washington Post 8/20/05 ??? ???Next Time, Sunnis Intend to Be Heard??? Los Angeles Times 8/21/05 ??? ???Evolution Of Attack??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/21/06 ??? ???Iranian factor in Iraq insurgency??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/21/05 ??? ???Sunnis offer an exit plan??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/22/05 ??? ???Inside Iran???s Secret War For Iraq??? Time 8/22/05 ??? ???Millions embezzled at Iraqi ministry??? U.K. Guardian 8/23/05 ??? ???Delegates submit incomplete constitution??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/23/05 ??? ???Syrian arrested in missile attack on U.S. warship??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/30/05 ??? ???Analysts see rift growing over charter??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/30/05 ??? ???Iraq: Democracy or Disintegration???? AntiWar.com 8/30/05 ??? ???Sadr???s Disciples Rise Again To Play Pivotal Role in Iraq??? Washington Post 8/31/05 ??? ???Draft charter leaves many tough issues unsettled??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/11/05 ??? ???U.S. casts net for Iraqi insurgents too wide??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/23/05 ??? ???Saudi official fears Iraq breakup??? San Francisco Chronicle 9/26/05 ??? ???Saddam???s Revenge??? Time 10/3/05 ??? ???Divisions mounting in Iraqi politics??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/3/05 ??? ???Generals shift course, paint rosier picture of Iraq war??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/6/05 ??? ???Lawmakers reverse voting rule change??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/9/05 ??? ???Key pillar of Bush policy on Iraq being questioned??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/11/05 ??? ???Experts see grim times ahead ??? a torn Iraq ??? even if constitution is approved??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/12/05 ??? ???Sectarian resentment extends to Iraq???s army??? Kngith Ridder 10/17/05 ??? ???Faces Of Resistance??? Time 10/18/05 ??? ???Vice president???s office at center of leak probe??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/22/05 ??? ???How Basra Slipped Out of Control??? Foreign Policy In Focus 10/26/05 ??? ???A Deadly Surge??? Los Angeles Times 10/26/05 ??? ???Constitution squeaks past strong Sunni Arab ???no??? vote??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/26/05 ??? ???Iraqi civilians bear brunt of war casualties??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/26/05 ??? ???Iraqi reconstruction faltering??? Asia Times 10/26/05 ??? ???Somber Milestone??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/29/05 ??? ???CIA Leak Probe??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/29/05 ??? ???Questions and answers about who told whom about Plame??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/30/05 ??? ???Kurds Reclaiming Prized Territory In Northern Iraq??? Washington Post 10/30/05 ??? ???Seeds of leak scandal sown in Italian intelligence agency??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/31/05 ??? ???$30 billion fund for Iraq rebuilding nearly spent??? San Francisco Chronicle 10/31/05 ??? ???US ???had no policy??? in place to rebuild Iraq??? MSNBC.com 11/1/05 ??? ???Reports of Sunni Enthusiasm May Be Premature??? AntiWar.Com 11/2/05 ??? ???Shiite power struggle simmers in Najaf??? Christian Science Monitor 11/3/05 ??? ???Torture in Iraq??? New York Review of Books 11/6/05 ??? ???2002 report doubted Iraq-al Qaeda informer??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/13/05 ??? ???Lines of control shift in sands in the desert??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/16/05 ??? ???Iraq concedes detainees likely were tortured??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/17/05 ??? ???Among Insurgents in Iraq, Few Foreigners Are Found??? Washington Post 11/17/05 ??? ???Iraqi Rift Grows After Discovery of Prison??? New York Times 11/18/05 ??? ???U.S. put ex-con in charge of cash for rebuilding of Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/19/05 ??? ???Probe into Pentagon???s pro-war team begins??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/22/05 ??? ???Key Bush Intelligence Briefing Kept From Hill Panel??? National Journal 11/28/05 ??? ???Abuse of prisoners in Iraq widespread, officials say??? Knight Ridder 11/29/05 ??? ???Killings Linked to Shiite Squads in Iraqi Police Force??? Los Angeles Times 11/30/05 ??? ???Rumsfeld???s order to end insurgency: Don???t call it that.??? San Francisco Chronicle 11/30/05 ??? ???U.S. pays Iraqi papers to run stories??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/05 ??? ???If America Left Iraq??? Atlantic Monthly 12/05 ??? ???Why Iraq Has No Army??? Atlantic Monthly 12/1/05 ??? ???Bush???s Counteroffensive On War??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/1/05 ??? ???Kurds allow Norway firm to begin drilling for oil??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/2/05 ??? ???With no head, insurgency???s body hard to kill??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/3/05 ??? ???General Says Militias Split Loyalties of Iraqi Security Forces??? New York Times 12/3/05 ??? ???Military admits planting stories in Iraqi papers??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/4/05 ??? ???An author???s confession ??? he got the war wrong??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/4/05 ??? ???New U.S. tactic: Make public see victory as likely??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/4/05 ??? ???US Army admits Iraqis outnumber foreign fighters as its main enemy??? U.K. Telegraph 12/5/05 ???Iraq VP Disputes Bush on Training of Forces??? Associated Press 12/5/05 ??? ???The New Way Out??? Newsweek 12/5/05 ??? ???U.S. Forces Try New Approach: Raid and Dig In??? New York Times 12/5/05 ??? ???Up In The Air??? New Yorker 12/6/05 ??? ???Iraq oil production on the decline??? Financial Times 12/7/05 ??? ???Documents show top brass knew of abuse??? Associated Press 12/8/05 ??? ???In Cities Bush Cited, Progress Is Relative??? Washington Post 12/11/05 ??? ???Iraq???s Sunnis urge talks with rebels??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/11/05 ??? ???Sunnis won???t boycott again??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/11/05 ??? ???Toward an Iraqi democracy??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/11/05 ??? ???U.S. propaganda is widespread, often disguised??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/11/05 ??? ???War experts advise strategy overhaul??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/12/05 ??? ???The New Rules of Engagement??? Time 12/13/05 ??? ???Tomgram: Dahr Jamail on the Missing Air War in Iraq??? TomeDispatch.Com 12/14/05 ??? ???American military tactics: How to Do Better??? Economist 12/14/05 ??? ???Deadly election-eve violence??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/14/05 ??? ???Election Goal No. 1: Holding Iraq Together??? NPR.com 12/14/05 ??? ???For Kurds, A Surge Of Violence In Campaign??? Washington Post 12/15/05 ??? ???Analysis ??? After Iraq vote success, now for the hard part??? Reuters 12/16/05 ??? ???Iraqi Vote Draws Big Turnout Of Sunnis??? Washington Post 12/16/05 ??? ???Kurds voting for autonomy and dream of independence??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/18/05 ??? ???New Mission for U.S. Division: To Put Iraqi Forces to the Test??? New York Times 12/19/05 ??? ???Next in Iraq: coalition-building??? Christian Science Monitor 12/19/05 ??? ???Rise in poll complaints
troubles Iraq vote monitors??? U.K. Guardian 12/19/05 ??? ???The Rise Of an Evil Prot??g????? Time 12/19/05 ??? ???White House Presses Nation For resolve To Win In Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/20/05 ??? ???U.S. Air Power Strikes Iraq Targets Daily??? Associated Press 12/21/05 ??? ???Various private armies still exist, threatening Iraq???s national security??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/21/05 ??? ???Washington seeks partial truce with Iraqi insurgents??? Washington Times 12/23/05 ??? ???Parties demand new elections??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/25/05 ??? ???U.S. to delay turning Iraqi detainees over to Iraqi jailers??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/26/05 ??? ???US-Shiite Struggle Could Spin out of Control??? Inter Press Service News Agency 12/27/05 ??? ???Kurds in Iraqi army proclaim loyalty to militia??? Knight Ridder 12/27/05 ??? ???Many Iraqi soldiers see a civil war on the horizon??? Knight Ridder 12/29/05 ??? ???Are Iraqi police engaging in torture tactics???? MSNBC.Com 12/29/05 ??? ???Kurds Are Flocking to Kirkuk, Laying Claim to Land and Oil??? New York Times 12/31/05 ??? ???Iraq oil chief suspended as fuel lines lengthen??? San Francisco Chronicle 12/31/05 ??? ???S. Korea OKs partial pullout of Iraq force??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/06 ??? ???Improvised, Explosive, & Divisive??? Harper???s Magazine 1/1/06 ??? ???Iraq Civil War? Some Experts Say It???s Arrived??? Los Angeles Times 1/1/06 ??? ???US forces step up Iraq airstrikes??? U.K. Sunday Times 1/2/06 ??? ???Economy in Iraq Goes in All Directions??? Los Angeles Times 1/2/06 ??? ???Iraq oil exports hit post-war low??? BBCNews.com 1/2/06 ??? ???U.S. Has End in Sight on Iraq Rebuilding??? Washington Post 1/5/06 ??? ???Secretive military unit sought to solve political WMD concerns prior to securing Iraq, intelligence sources say??? Raw Story 1/7/06 ??? ???Americans Said to Meet Rebels, Exploiting Rift??? New York Times 1/7/06 ??? ???Iraq war could cost US over $2 trillion, says Nobel price-winning economist??? U.K. Guardian 1/10/06 ??? ???US sees Iraqi oil production choked for years??? Mail& Guardian Online 1/10/06 ??? ???U.S. airstrikes in Iraq could intensify??? Knight Ridder 1/11/06 ??? ???20 charged with aiding insurgency??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/11/06 ??? ???Army???s Iraq Work Assailed by Briton??? Washington Post 1/11/06 ??? ???Leading Shiite Says He Will Oppose Changes to Iraqi Charter??? New York Times 1/12/06 ??? ???Efforts intensify to train Iraqi police??? Christian Science Monitor 1/12/06 ??? ???Local Insurgents Tell of Clashes With Al Qaeda???s Forces in Iraq??? New York Times 1/13/06 ??? ???After Handover, Hussein Palaces Looted??? Washington Post 1/14/06 ??? ???U.S. economics a hard sell in Iraq??? Cox News 1/15/06 ??? ???2,000 More M.P.???s Will Help Train the Iraqi Police??? New York Times 1/15/06 ??? ??????Marshall Plan??? for Iraq Fades??? Los Angeles Times 1/17/06 ??? ???Bush seeks his enemies??? help in Iraq??? Asia Times 1/17/06 ??? ???Some Iraq Rebuilding Funds Go Untraced??? Wall Street Journal 1/17/06 ??? ???US tries to loosen Shiite grip in Iraq??? Christian Science Monitor 1/17/06 ??? ???USAID Paper Details Security Crisis in Iraq??? Washington Post 1/20/06 ??? ???In search of rebuilding billions??? Washington Times 1/20/06 ??? ???The Iraq Reconstruction Strategy??? Asia Times 1/22/06 ??? ???Attacks in Iraq jumped in 2005??? USA Today 1/22/06 ??? ???Shiite-Kurd Goals Stymie U.S.??? Los Angeles Times 1/23/06 ??? ???Ordinary Iraqis feel pinch of free-market reforms??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/23/06 ??? ???Professionals Fleeing Iraq As Violence, Threats Persist??? Washington Post 1/24/06 ??? ???Iraq Rebuilding Badly Hobbled, U.S. Report Finds??? New York Times 1/25/06 ??? ???Audit Describes Misuse of Funds in Iraq Projects??? New York Times 1/25/06 ??? ???Iraqi Army May Be Light and Friendly??? Associated Press 1/25/06 ??? ???War???s pressures push Army to breaking point, report says??? San Francisco Chronicle 1/27/06 ??? ???Report Measures Shortfall in Iraq Goals??? Washington Post 1/29/06 ??? ???Deadly Rift Grows Among Insurgents??? Los Angeles Times 1/30/06 ??? ???Iraq???s Oil Bust??? MSNBC.Com 2/2/06 ??? ???Iraqi forces beset by sectarian differences: US intelligence czar??? Agence France Presse 2/3/06 ??? ???Blair-Bush deal before Iraq war revealed in secret memo??? U.K. Guardian Unlimited 2/5/06 ??? ???Corrupt leaders called threat to Iraq???s future??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/6/06 ??? ???Exclusive: Direct Talks ??? U.S. Officials and Iraqi Insurgents??? Newsweek 2/9/06 ??? ???Infrastructure below prewar levels??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/10/06 ??? ???Data picked to justify war, ex-official says??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/11/06 ??? ???General: Bad start in training Iraqi army??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/14/06 ??? ???Iraqi Kurds Take Tough Stance On Kirkuk??? Associated Press 2/15/06 ??? ???Radical Cleric Rising as a Kingmaker in Iraqi Politics??? New York Times 2/16/06 ??? ???Iraq economy falls below pre-war levels??? Financial Times 2/19/06 ??? ???Iraq???s Jordanian Jihadis??? New York Times 2/19/06 ??? ???Rebels??? Arsenal Includes Politics??? Los Angeles Times 2/23/06 ??? ???Shrine Blast Fans Fears of Civil War??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/24/06 ??? ???Sectarian Violence Explodes Across Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 2/28/06 ??? ???Intelligence agencies warned about growing local insurgency in late 2003??? Knight Ridder 3/9/06 ??? ???The Mess??? New York Review of Books 3/9/06 ??? ???Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq??? Foreign Affairs 3/10/06 ??? ???What happens if civil war erupts???? San Francisco Chronicle 3/14/06 ??? ???Bush says Iraqi troops to take over by year???s end??? San Francisco Chronicle 3/14/06 ??? ???US postwar Iraq strategy a mess, Blair was told??? U.K. Guardian 3/27/06 ??? ???Bush Was Set on Path to War, Memo by British Adviser Says??? Common Dreams 4/2/06 ??? ???Iraq Militias??? Wave of Death??? Boston Globe 4/3/06 ??? ???Analysis: Figures show that Iraq???s civil war is underway??? UPI 4/3/06 ??? ???US bases in Iraq: a costly legacy??? Christian Science Monitor 4/4/06 ??? ???Iraq???s interior ministry refusing to deploy US-trained police??? U.K. Guardian 4/6/06 ??? ???Iraq is Splitting??? Z Magazine 4/7/06 ??? ???Bush role alleged in leak of Iraq intelligence??? San Francisco Chronicle 4/9/06 ??? ???U.S. Study Paints Somber Portrait of Iraqi Discord??? New York Times 4/10/06 ??? ???Baghdad Blues??? U.S. News & World Report 4/11/06 ??? ???Troops in Iraq caught in middle of power struggle??? Army Times 4/12/06 ??? ???Lacking Biolabs, Trailers Carried Case for War??? Washington Post 4/14/06 ??? ???More Retired Generals Call For Rumsfeld???s Resignation??? New York Times 4/14/06 ??? ???On the ground, it???s a civil war??? Chicago Tribune 4/14/06 ??? ???Spending lags on training of Iraqi forces??? Army Times 4/16/06 ??? ???Billion Dollar Start Falls Short in Iraq??? Washington Post 4/16/06 ??? ???US Firms Suspected of Bilking Iraq Funds??? Truthout.com 4/16/06 ??? ???US plots ???new liberation of Baghdad?????? U.K. Times 4/17/06 ??? ???Why Iraq Was a Mistake??? Time 4/18/06 ??? ???U.S. ignored Shiite militias, focused on Sunni insurgency??? Contra Costa Times 4/19/06 ??? ???Iraq???s Kurds Aim for Own Oil Ministry??? Los Angeles Times 4/19/06 ??? ???Nearly 20,000 people kidnapped in Iraq in 2006??? MiddleEastOnline.com 4/26/06 ??? ???Top spys story on pre-war intel is finaly told??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/1/06 ??? ???Militias steal new recruits with better pay and perks??? U.K. Times 5/1/06 ??? ???Powell pushed for more troops??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/1/06 ??? ???U.S. Report Cites Progress, Shortfalls In Iraq Rebuilding??? Washington Post 5/3/06 ??? ???General says Iraq army is ???willing??? but not ready??? Washington Times 5/7/06 ??? ???A darling of the neocons tells why he bailed out??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/8/06 ??? ???Death squads deepen division in Baghdad??? Christian Science Monitor 5/10/06 ??? ???Adviser: Iraq ???civil war??? places U.S. in reactive role??? Associated Press 5/11/06 ??? ???Exodus of the Iraqi middle class??? U.K. Times 5/12/06 ??? ???White paper: Security, economy still lag in Iraq??? Army Times 5/15/06 ??? ???America In Baghdad??? TomPaine.CommonSense.com 5/16/06 ??? ???As the bombs fall, Iraq???s Kurds have ???no friends but the mountains?????? U.K. Independent 5/21/06 ??? ???Iraq???s cabinet falls short??? Asia Times 5/21/06 ??? ???Misjudgments Marred U.S. Plans for Iraqi Police??? New York Times 5/21/06 ??? ???Putting an Iraqi face on the fight??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/21/06 ??? ???Unity Government Begins A New Chapter For Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/22/06 ??? ???Corruption Runs Deep in Iraq??? Los Angeles Times 5/22/06 ??? ???How Iraq Police Reform Became Casualty of War??? New York Times 5/24/06 ??? ???Armed Groups Propel Iraq Toward Chaos??? New York Times 5/24/06 ??? ???Violence aside, B
aghdad is broken??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/27/06 ??? ???Local Iraqi militias guard their own??? San Francisco Chronicle 5/31/06 ??? ???Insurgent attacks rise to 600 a week??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/11/06 ??? ???Insurgency And Chaos??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/18/06 ??? ???Iraq???s Post-Hussein Air Force Finds Its Wings Clipped??? Los Angeles Times 6/20/06 ??? ???Cheney Stands by His ???Last Throes??? Remark??? Washington Post 6/23/06 ??? ???Experts Say Iraqi Forces Not Ready??? Military.com 6/25/06 ??? ???Iraqi toll said nearly double U.S. count??? San Francisco Chronicle 6/29/06 ??? ???Most foreign fighters in Iraq come from Egypt: US military??? Agence France Presse 7/1/06 ??? ???20-year-old Iraq weapons spark debate??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/7/06 ??? ???Anti-corruption chief battles on??? Qatar Gulf Times 7/9/06 ??? ???Police Abuses in Iraq Detailed??? Los Angeles Times 7/15/06 ??? ???Is US Winning? Army Chief Is at a Loss??? Common Dreams 7/17/06 ??? ???In an About-Face, Sunnis Want U.S. to Remain in Iraq??? New York Times 7/19/06 ??? ???Losing the War in Iraq???? Center For Strategic And International Studies 7/23/06 ??? ???In Iraq, Military Forgot Lessons of Vietnam??? Washington Post 7/24/06 ??? ??????It Looked Weird and Felt Wrong?????? Washington Post 7/24/06 ??? ???Top Iraqi???s White House Visit Shows Gaps With U.S.??? New York Times 7/24/06 ??? ???Wary Iraqis Are Recruited as Policemen??? New York Times 7/25/06 ??? ???Iraq???s prime minister visiting U.S. amid worry over nonstop violence??? San Francisco Chronicle 7/25/06 ??? ???Shiite Party Leader Outlines 4 Steps for Iraq to Curb Violence??? Washington Post 7/30/06 ??? ???Audit Finds U.S. Hid Actual Cost of Iraq Projects??? New York Times 7/31/06 ??? ???Number of Iraqi refugees from violence swells??? Reuters 8/3/06 ??? ???For Iraqis, a New Rule of Life: Don???t Trust Anyone in Uniform??? New York Times 8/3/06 ??? ???Iraq civil war warning for Blair??? BBC News.com 8/3/06 ??? ???Why US effort to rebuild Iraq came up short??? Christian Science Monitor 8/4/06 ??? ???Iraq at Risk Of Civil War, Top Generals Tell Senators??? Washington Post 8/6/06 ??? ???Baghdad???s Chaos Undercuts Tack Pursued by U.S.??? New York Times 8/8/06 ??? ???Hearing: GIs drank and planned??? San Francisco Chronicle 8/9/06 ??? ???Shiites Press for a Partition of Iraq??? Los Angeles Times 8/9/06 ??? ???Swath of North Turned Over to Iraqi Army??? Washington Post 8/10/06 ??? ???Mindless in Iraq??? New York Review Of Books 8/12/06 ??? ???An Audit Sharply Criticizes Iraq???s Bookkeeping??? New York Times 8/14/06 ??? ???Inside the Iraqi Forces Fiasco??? Der Spiegel Online 8/15/06 ??? ???U.S. Offers Plan to Curb Rogue Iraqi Police Forces??? Los Angeles Times 8/16/06 ??? ???As U.S. focuses on Baghdad, al-Qaeda gains strength in Sunni heartland??? 8/16/06 ??? ???Bush Dismisses the Idea of Partitioning Iraq??? Los Angeles Times 8/16/06 ??? ???Bush Said to Be Frustrated by Level of Public Support in Iraq??? New York Times 8/16/06 ??? ???Pentagon studies examine ???mistakes in Iraq, Afghanistan??? Christian Science Monitor 8/16/06 ??? ???Strife Moving Out From Baghdad to Villages??? Washington Post 8/17/06 ??? ???Iraq violence; Facts and figures??? BBC News.com 8/18/06 ??? ???Trying to build an army in a combat zone??? New York Times
I just saw a report tonight on mainstream news that 200 Iraqis have died since Sunday. It's Tuesday fucking night. That just seems insane. Does anyone have a credible report on Iraqi casaulties to date? Politics aside I cannot see how it will be possible to set up civil society under these conditions.
I just saw a report tonight on mainstream news that 200 Iraqis have died since Sunday. It's Tuesday fucking night. That just seems insane. Does anyone have a credible report on Iraqi casaulties to date? Politics aside I cannot see how it will be possible to set up civil society under these conditions.
These are the last numbers I've seen:
UN counted 14,388 civilian deaths in first six months of 2006
July 2006 Prime Minister al-Maliki said 100 Iraqis dying a day
July 3,438 civilians killed, average of 110 civilians killed each day
Almost all of the deaths are due to sectarian violence rather than the insurgency.
I just saw a report tonight on mainstream news that 200 Iraqis have died since Sunday. It's Tuesday fucking night. That just seems insane. Does anyone have a credible report on Iraqi casaulties to date? Politics aside I cannot see how it will be possible to set up civil society under these conditions.
These are the last numbers I've seen:
UN counted 14,388 civilian deaths in first six months of 2006
July 2006 Prime Minister al-Maliki said 100 Iraqis dying a day
July 3,438 civilians killed, average of 110 civilians killed each day
Almost all of the deaths are due to sectarian violence rather than the insurgency.
I think the figure for August is much less by over 50%. Also, when we left vietnam the ensuing bloodbath was in the millions.
I just saw a report tonight on mainstream news that 200 Iraqis have died since Sunday. It's Tuesday fucking night. That just seems insane. Does anyone have a credible report on Iraqi casaulties to date? Politics aside I cannot see how it will be possible to set up civil society under these conditions.
These are the last numbers I've seen:
UN counted 14,388 civilian deaths in first six months of 2006
July 2006 Prime Minister al-Maliki said 100 Iraqis dying a day
July 3,438 civilians killed, average of 110 civilians killed each day
Almost all of the deaths are due to sectarian violence rather than the insurgency.
I think the figure for August is much less by over 50%. Also, when we left vietnam the ensuing bloodbath was in the millions.
August's count is about the same. Despite some reports about violence being down in Baghdad, those only last for a day or two. Plus almost all of the reports are Baghdad-centric, so are probably undercounting the true numbers.
900 civilians killed 122 Iraqi military killed 101 Iraqi police killed 60 U.S. Soldiers
On Wednesday 65 people were killed with about half found dead in Baghdad.
Despite the U.S. military and the Iraqi government's claims, violence and deaths have not gone down, even in the capitol under their new security operation.
Not only that, but the tactics being employed, sweeps, arrests and presence operations are failed tactics as I mentioned in the report. They give a short term impression of security but do not work in the long term because: 1) most people arrested are innocent, 2) If they don't get screened before hand (which is completley inconsistent from one unit to the next) they end up in prisons where they disappear into the system to not reappear for months, 3) The tactics usually alienate and anger the populatin turning more people away from the U.S. and Iraqi security forces. You also have to accoutn for the fact that even with this redeployment of troops to Baghdad there are not enough U.S. troops to carry out an effective plan, plus the Iraqi security forces are still not very good, and many, especially the police, actually add to the violence rather than help to quell it becuase they are controlled by militias. The latest trend is for the Mahdi Army, which controlls the Ministry of Health to abduct Sunnis from hospitals in the capital.
I'm back at work so I simply don't have the time right now to go back and footnote everything. I already had this on file though. It's a list of sources that I actually used. I read a lot more as well. It's unofficial because I didn't list the authors of each article, they're listed in chronological order instead. It's freaking huge so I don't know what anyone is going to get out of it other than I did my research.
Like I said, Joel. I've read most of this stuff and your reporting is very consistent with facts. It's just that precise citation can protect you from the Sabbabababdddo slingers, but then again, your are probably right. Nothing will stop them from hurling their dung at you other than complete and utter allegiance.
I'm back at work so I simply don't have the time right now to go back and footnote everything. I already had this on file though. It's a list of sources that I actually used. I read a lot more as well. It's unofficial because I didn't list the authors of each article, they're listed in chronological order instead. It's freaking huge so I don't know what anyone is going to get out of it other than I did my research.
Like I said, Joel. I've read most of this stuff and your reporting is very consistent with facts. It's just that precise citation can protect you from the Sabbabababdddo slingers, but then again, your are probably right. Nothing will stop them from hurling their dung at you other than complete and utter allegiance.
but then again, there are always a handful of people who are on the fence. citations would make these arguments even more convincing for those people.
I'm back at work so I simply don't have the time right now to go back and footnote everything. I already had this on file though. It's a list of sources that I actually used. I read a lot more as well. It's unofficial because I didn't list the authors of each article, they're listed in chronological order instead. It's freaking huge so I don't know what anyone is going to get out of it other than I did my research.
Like I said, Joel. I've read most of this stuff and your reporting is very consistent with facts. It's just that precise citation can protect you from the Sabbabababdddo slingers, but then again, your are probably right. Nothing will stop them from hurling their dung at you other than complete and utter allegiance.
but then again, there are always a handful of people who are on the fence. citations would make these arguments even more convincing for those people.
that's what i was getting at.
btw--i tried a hamhock in my cornflakes before. it's not good. but when mrs fatback asks me to clean the bathtub, i'm always like "that ring is soul. it needs to stay"
I'm back at work so I simply don't have the time right now to go back and footnote everything. I already had this on file though. It's a list of sources that I actually used. I read a lot more as well. It's unofficial because I didn't list the authors of each article, they're listed in chronological order instead. It's freaking huge so I don't know what anyone is going to get out of it other than I did my research.
Like I said, Joel. I've read most of this stuff and your reporting is very consistent with facts. It's just that precise citation can protect you from the Sabbabababdddo slingers, but then again, your are probably right. Nothing will stop them from hurling their dung at you other than complete and utter allegiance.
but then again, there are always a handful of people who are on the fence. citations would make these arguments even more convincing for those people.
Well all of the sources that I actually USED are now posted. There were probably another 100-200 articles that I read but didn't use and didn't include in the list.
I just saw a report tonight on mainstream news that 200 Iraqis have died since Sunday. It's Tuesday fucking night. That just seems insane. Does anyone have a credible report on Iraqi casaulties to date? Politics aside I cannot see how it will be possible to set up civil society under these conditions.
Here's some numbers I just found in today's local (SF Chronicle) paper:
Deaths since the war began March 2003:
Iraqi military between 4,895-6,370 Iraqi civilians between 40,833-45,399
I just saw a report tonight on mainstream news that 200 Iraqis have died since Sunday. It's Tuesday fucking night. That just seems insane. Does anyone have a credible report on Iraqi casaulties to date? Politics aside I cannot see how it will be possible to set up civil society under these conditions.
These are the last numbers I've seen:
UN counted 14,388 civilian deaths in first six months of 2006
July 2006 Prime Minister al-Maliki said 100 Iraqis dying a day
July 3,438 civilians killed, average of 110 civilians killed each day
Almost all of the deaths are due to sectarian violence rather than the insurgency.
I think the figure for August is much less by over 50%. Also, when we left vietnam the ensuing bloodbath was in the millions.
I would take the outcome of Vietnam in a heartbeat right now. Shit their our little buddy.
By MICHAEL R. GORDON Published: September 2, 2006 WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 ??? Iraqi casualties soared by more than 50 percent in recent months, the product of spiraling sectarian clashes and a Sunni-based insurgency that remains ???potent and viable,??? the Pentagon said in its latest comprehensive assessment of security in Iraq.
During the period from the establishment of the new Iraqi government on May 20 until Aug. 11, the average number of weekly attacks jumped to almost 800. That was a substantial increase from earlier this year and almost double the number of the first part of 2004.
As a consequence, Iraqi casualties increased 51 percent over the last reporting period. The document notes that, based on initial reports, Iraqi casualties among civilians and security forces reached nearly 120 a day, up from about 80 a day in the pervious reporting period from mid-February to mid-May. About two years ago they were running about 30 a day.
???Although the overall number of attacks increased in all categories, the proportion of those attacks directed against civilians increased substantially,??? the Pentagon noted. ???Death squads and terrorists are locked in mutually reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife, with Sunni and Shia extremists each portraying themselves as the defenders of their respective sectarian groups.???
The Pentagon report, titled ???Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,??? is mandated by Congress and issued quarterly. It covers a broad range of subjects, including the economy, public attitudes, and security.
This time, the study is the focus of special interest because of increasing fears that Iraq is sliding into civil war and because it is being published at a time when President Bush and members of his cabinet have been trying to present a strong case in support of the war, in the face of vehement criticism from Democrats.
The report does not take account of the latest efforts to bring order to Baghdad, operations that involved 12,000 additional soldiers, including some 7,000 additional American troops. Col. Thomas Vail, the commander of a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, told reporters on Friday that his troops had made progress in recent days in tamping down the violence in the capital. The last several days have been particularly bloody, with about 250 Iraqis killed and scores wounded since Sunday. The Pentagon acknowledged that the grim data on attacks, casualties and executions was distressing. ???It???s a pretty sober report this time,??? said Peter Rodman, a senior Pentagon official, who met with reporters to discuss it. ???The last quarter, it???s been rough. Sectarian violence has been particularly acute and disturbing.???
Democratic lawmakers portrayed the report as evidence that the administration???s strategy was failing. ???They have not provided the real resources, in terms of both military and civilian advisers, nor real dollars to reconstruct and help Iraq emerge from this period of instability,??? Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island said.
The report chronicles dangers on an array of fronts. Although the Sunni-based insurgency has received less news media attention since the surge of sectarian violence, the report cautions that it is resilient and strong. The number of attacks in Anbar Province, a vast Sunni-dominated region in western Iraq, averages more than 30 a day.
Regarding Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia???s operations in Iraq, the report says the network???s ???cellular nature??? has enabled it to continue attacks despite the death of its leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
But sectarian strife has emerged as the biggest worry. In recent months, the Pentagon noted, ???The core conflict in Iraq changed into a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create or protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their own respective political and religious agendas.??? Echoing recent statements by senior American military commanders, the report says that ???conditions that could lead to civil war exist in Iraq, especially in and around Baghdad, and concern about civil war within the Iraqi population has increased in recent months.???
The report notes that sectarian violence is gradually expanding north to Kirkuk and Diyala Province. Further, the confidence of Iraqis in the future has diminished, according to public opinion surveys cited in the Pentagon report.
Still, the study says the fighting in Iraq does not meet the ???stringent international legal standards for civil war,??? without further explanation. Even so, the sectarian fighting has been bloodier than ever.
In discussing daily casualty rates, the report did not distinguish between the number of dead and wounded. But it noted that execution-type killings, in particular, reached a new high in July. ???The Baghdad Coroner???s Office reported 1,600 bodies arrived in June and more than 1,800 bodies in July, 90 percent of which were assessed to be the result of executions,??? the report states.
The report says that progress has been made in fielding Iraqi Army units and police that can take over the main responsibility for security. It says 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25 brigades and 85 battalions have the lead for security in their areas. It notes that a lack of noncommissioned officers and absenteeism are obstacles to fielding an effective Iraqi force. Though the 63-page report does not discuss military operations in Baghdad in detail, it has become clear in recent months that Iraq could not be effectively secured without the active involvement of the Americans. When the Americans cut back patrols in Baghdad, violence rose and American commanders decided to send additional troops to the capital from elsewhere in the country.
The report notes that Iraq???s Interior Ministry does not have a system to determine how many of the forces trained by police advisers are still on the job. Advisers from the American-led forces estimate that the attrition rate is about 20 percent a year.
Citing polling data from the International Republican Institute, the report states that almost 80 percent of Iraqis thought in April 2006 that the general situation would be better in a year. By June, it was less than 50 percent. ???In general, Iraqis have had an optimistic outlook,??? the report stated. ???However, as time has passed, their optimism has eroded.???
Thank you for all your hard work. Footnoting all this would be ridiculous. The appendix with your sources would be sufficient, except that you sited San Francisco Chronicle thus you must be a commie Bush hater.
At the beginning of September 2006 the Senate Intelligence Committee released two new reports on pre-war intelligence on Iraq. One was a 148-page document entitled ???Postwar Findings About Iraq???s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare to Prewar Assessments.??? Most of the report is actually a rehash of already public findings such as the Committee???s July 2004 report on prewar intelligence, and the work of the Iraq Survey Group that was created after the war to find Iraq???s WMD. However there are some interesting new tidbits. These mostly come in the form of interviews with top Iraqi officials by the FBI, including Saddam Hussein himself. These sections reveal such interesting details as Saddam???s motivation for not coming clean about his WMD program and his personnel opinion of Al Qaeda. In the end, the report has the same major conclusions as its July 2004 paper, the U.S. intelligence community completely failed when looking into Iraq???s WMD, but that it was pretty much right in believing that Iraq did not have a relationship with Al Qaeda. Rather than simply summarize all of the information contained within the Committee???s findings, I???ve tried to focus upon the new revelations and add some context to each to fully understand them.
Iraq???s WMD Program ??? New Information[/b]
Before the war, the U.S. intelligence community???s general view of Iraq was that it possessed WMD and had an active program that was actually larger than before the 1991 Gulf War. This was of course, completely wrong. The July 2004 Senate Intelligence Report found that this opinion was not supported by the intelligence and in fact was largely an exaggeration. When U.S. intelligence officials couldn???t find strong evidence of Iraq???s weapons program, they used that as proof that Iraq was hiding its WMD.
The Iraq Survey Group found that Iraq had destroyed its WMD stockpiles in 1991 and 1992 right after the Gulf War. Saddam was hoping to maintain his program however and wait for the international dust to settle to restart it in the future. When Saddam???s brother in law, Hussein Kamal, who was head of the country???s WMD program, defected to Jordan in 1994, the country???s plans were exposed. This led to the destruction of Iraq???s primary WMD facility in 1996 by U.N. inspectors. What was left were the scientists and their intellectual know how, which Saddam hoped to cultivate by having them work on various government funded scientific projects. The Iraq Survey Group found that even that didn???t work, and several Iraqi officials told the FBI that if Saddam ever wanted to restart the program in the future it would have been very difficult.
Not only that, but Saddam???s own actions had the unintended affect of making his officials give up on the program. Saddam told U.S. interviewers that he believed that the U.S. knew that Iraq didn???t have WMD, but was using it to push for regime change. That was the reason why he stopped cooperating with U.N. inspectors in 1998 who left in December of that year. In response, Pres. Clinton launched the largest strike against Iraq since the Gulf War that destroyed most of Iraq???s remaining weapons facilities. That in turn led Iraq???s WMD establishment to believe that they could never have another such program because the U.S. would always destroy its facilities. The only program that was maintained were small covert labs run by Iraq???s intelligence service that worked on small scale research and testing that were discovered by the Iraq Survey Group after the war. Otherwise, Iraq???s WMD program was dead and the U.S. didn???t even know. Even if presented with this news it would be highly improbably that U.S. intelligence or the Bush administration would believe it because they had such a biased view against Iraq and its WMD program. They both believed that Saddam would never give them up no matter what.
Even though Iraq didn???t have weapons anymore and now had stopped work on them, they still never came clean about it publicly. Saddam told the FBI that the reason why was to deter Iran, Iraq???s historical rival. Yes, Iraq wanted to be a leading Arab country and needed to challenge Israel, but Saddam continually told investigators about the need to stave off Iran and how he believed WMD had saved his government during the Iran-Iraq war. Saddam???s motivation was never picked up U.S. intelligence before the war.
Saddam also completely misread the United States and its intentions. Saddam said that he didn???t think of the U.S. as a natural enemy, and actually thought that he could improve relations. He sent out various feelers to U.S. officials, but these overtures were missed by America. He seemed to have had no idea that the American government really did believe that Iraq was a threat to U.S. interest in the Persian Gulf and still possessed WMD.
Iraq???s WMD munitions ??? New Information[/b]
The United Nations and the Bush administration both claimed that Iraq had never fully accounted for all of its WMD munitions after the 1991 Gulf War. U.N. reports repeatedly said that Iraq had not accounted for around 500 WMD artillery shells. The major American pre-war intelligence report on Iraq, the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and Secretary of State Colin Powell???s speech to the United Nations in May 2003 both repeated the charge. In June 2006 the House Armed Services Committee made public an April 2006 report by the U.S. Army???s National Ground Intelligence Center that said about 500 rockets and artillery shells full of mustard gas and sarin had been found in Iraq since the war ended. The munitions dated back to the 1980s Iran-Iraq war and their contents had degraded significantly. Republicans on the House committee claimed that the report proved the president???s pre-war claims that Iraq possessed and was hiding a stockpile of WMD. However, the Iraq Survey Group had found a few of these munitions itself while in the country and said that U.S. forces would continue to find old WMD munitions that had been lost or misplaced, but they were not purposely hidden. None of these weapons were part of an active stockpile.
Iraq & Musab al-Zarqawi ??? New Information[/b]
The Senate Committee???s reporting on Iraq and Al Qaeda is even more interesting. One of the major claims that Pres. Bush has stuck to since the war ended is that Iraq is the major front in the war on terror and that we are fighting terrorists over there so we don???t have to fight them here. One of the main players in this claim was the recently killed Jordanian terrorist Musab al-Zarqawi of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (Iraq). All along the administration has said that Zarqawi was an Al Qaeda leader, and that therefore America had invaded Iraq to fight terrorism after 9/11.
The U.S.???s earliest public claim about Iraq???s links with Zarqawi came in a speech Pres. Bush gave in Cincinnati in October 2002 when he said senior Al Qaeda leaders had fled to Iraq from Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion. Bush was talking about Zarqawi even though he wasn???t named. Zarqawi had fought alongside Al Qaeda against the U.S. in Afghanistan, but had been wounded. He subsequently passed through Iraq where he had surgery, which led to all kinds of speculation. Powell would later include Zarqawi in his speech to the United Nations as an example of cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda claiming that he received medical treatment in Baghdad, that he had set up terrorist camps in Kurdish northern Iraq, and that he had assassinated a U.S. diplomat in Jordan, all with Iraqi knowledge and support. At the time, U.S. intelligence actually said that Zarqawi was not a member of Al Qaeda, but rather headed his own independent terrorist organization. At the same time the CIA had intelligence from a captured Al Qaeda leader that Zarqawi was associated with Al Qaeda and had good relations with Iraq, but that it was not part of a formal relationship with bin Laden.
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq the situation was clarified. An April 2003 CIA report found that Zarqawi was not a member of Al Qaeda, but the leader of his own group. Bin Laden had tried to recruit him, but Zarqawi turned him down. Interviews with captured Iraqi officials also found that Iraq had tried to detain him when Jordan asked them to, but they were unsuccessful. An Iraqi official even went to Saddam after Powell???s U.N. speech to discuss the Zarqawi claim. Saddam said that Zarqawi was an enemy of the government and had worked with terrorists that set off two bombs in Baghdad. A 2005 CIA report said that Saddam???s government ???did not have a relationship, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi and his associates.??? That didn???t stop the administration from maintaining its claim that Zarqawi was part of Al Qaeda and that Iraq had supported him.
It appears that Zarqawi headed to Iraq not to be Al Qaeda???s agent or work with Saddam???s government, but rather to prepare to fight the Americans when they invaded Iraq and become a terrorist star. The American and Iraqi government???s tendency to blame all suicide bombings on him did just that. It wasn???t until 2004 that Zarqawi reached out to bin Laden to increase his legitimacy in the international Islamist terrorist community. He would eventually change the name of his organization of Attawhid wal Jihad (Unity and Holy War) to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (Iraq). The U.S. invasion of Iraq gave him the opportunity to almost supersede bin Laden as the leading Islamist terrorist in the world.
Iraq & Al Qaeda ??? New Information[/b]
Besides Zarqawi, one of the administration???s major claims for war was that rogue states such Iraq would give their WMD to terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda to attack the U.S. America would not allow this to happen after 9/11. Bush would tell reporters, ???You can???t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror.??? The Bush administration repeated these claims so many times that more than half of the U.S. public came to believe that Iraq was behind the September 11 attacks. These claims were not supported by intelligence before the war, and the Senate Intelligence Committee adds new details from top Iraqi officials, including Saddam himself, about their animosity towards Al Qaeda and Islamists in general.
Before the war U.S. intelligence received several contradictory reports about possible contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda, but overall concluded that there was no relationship. Various reports said that Saddam had a ???deep suspicion??? of bin Laden, that ???bin Laden generally opposed collaboration??? with Iraq, and that ???Saddam Husayn and Usama bin Ladin are far from being natural partners.??? In the 1990s both sides had contacted each other and met in places such as Sudan, but nothing came of it. Throughout 2002 the CIA and DIA released reports making these conclusions. Evidence linking the two sides mostly came in the form of reports that Al Qaeda fighters had fled to Iraq after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. These operatives were based in northern Kurdish Iraq where Baghdad had no control and worked with an Islamist, anti-Kurdish group called Ansar Al Islam. There were also reports that fighters had gone to the capitol itself. Intelligence reports said that the Iraqi government knew about these movements, but did not support them. The White House however went ahead and said that Iraq had a long standing relationship with Al Qaeda dating back to the 1990s and that Saddam was providing a safe haven to Al Qaeda members in public speeches.
There were also contradictory reports about Iraq providing training in WMD to Al Qaeda operatives. The CIA tended to believe the story, while the DIA said that the Al Qaeda operative that was the source, Ibn al-Libi, was lying and that Iraq would never cooperate with Al Qaeda. Libi claimed that two Al Qaeda operatives had gone to Iraq for training in 2000 but he didn???t know what became of them. By early 2003, just before the war started, CIA Chief George Tenet told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the operatives had successfully completed their training even though there was no new intelligence on the matter, and the claim made its way into various speeches by administration officials. In the end, the Libi case was a warning about the uses of torture. Libi originally came up with the story so that he could be treated better by his American captors and not be sent to a foreign country to be tortured. The U.S. ended up sending him to a third country anyway, and there, after beatings, he elaborated on the story of the operatives traveling to Iraq by making new things up. The foreign intelligence service continued beating him to get more information out of him but he couldn???t understand their questions, so he wasn???t able to make up any more stories to get them to stop.
After the war when the FBI interviewed Saddam he was asked about possible ties with Al Qaeda. He said the two sides had met in the past, but did not cooperate. When asked if Iraq would work with Al Qaeda because the enemy of my enemy is my friend, Saddam said that if he wanted to do that he would???ve worked with North Korea or China, not Al Qaeda. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said that Iraq was so averse to being linked with Al Qaeda that it didn???t even open an embassy in Afghanistan after the Taliban took power. Aziz also said that the government had tried to crack down on Islamists that had come to its country. Saddam even issued a presidential general order saying not to cooperate with Al Qaeda. In one case, in 2002, when Saddam found out that an al Qaeda official had secretly entered the country from Iran, he ordered him to leave immediately. Iraqi intelligence was also fully aware that the U.S. would use the presence of Ansar al Islam in Kurdish Iraq against the government, and tried to spy on them to keep track of their activities.
U.S. interrogators also found additional evidence of how Saddam didn???t understand domestic American politics when it came to terrorism. After 9/11 Iraqi officials wanted Saddam to issue an official statement condemning the attacks because it didn???t want to be seen as supporting al Qaeda. Saddam refused however because he was glad that the attacks had hurt the U.S. after America had imposed such pain on Iraq with U.N. sanctions. The international media would report that Saddam praised the attacks, giving ammunition to the war supporters in America.
CONCLUSION[/b]
These are the major pieces of new information provided by this Senate Intelligence Committee???s September 2006 report. U.S. intelligence completely missed the destruction of Iraq???s WMD capabilities because it was so set in the belief that Iraq would never give them up. They also never figured out that Iraq was focused upon Iran more than the U.S., and that was why it never came fully clean about its WMD program. The Bush administration also ignored U.S. intelligence reports that there was no relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda in the run-up to the war, and made it a major tool to convince the public of the necessity for invading Iraq. Even after the invasion, the White House used Zarqawi as a way to justify Iraq as being part of the war on terror even though U.S. intelligence didn???t believe him to be part of Al Qaeda. Saddam???s own misreading of American politics also made him take missteps that compounded America???s suspicion of him rather than alleviated it.
When the report was first released the White House spokesman said that it covered nothing new. In a way he was correct, because much of the report was a review of previous material. However the new information continues to show how the administration has not owned up on its own mistakes leading up to the war and its justifications for continuing to fight there. The Bush administration continues to claim that Saddam was a threat because he had intentions to have WMD, even though that???s all they w
ere intentions. As the postwar interviews show, he would have had a difficult time restarting his weapons programs even if he wanted to and his scientists had basically given up on the project. The White House also continues to say that Iraq had a longstanding relationship with Al Qaeda. This was never really supported by intelligence before the war and even now that almost all of Saddam???s top officials have been captured and interviewed and told U.S. interrogators that there was no relationship, Bush, Cheney and others continue to cling to the claim. The U.S. even turned Zarqawi into what he wasn???t initially, an international terrorist star and Al Qaeda agent before he was finally killed this summer. All of these issues point towards the stubbornness of this administration to admit that it has made mistakes and adjust its policy. It is committed to staying the course, no matter how wrong this course has been.
SOURCES:[/b]
Books[/b]
Prados, John, Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War (New Press: New York, London, 2004)
Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, The American Military Adventure In Iraq (Penguin Press: New York, 2006)
Government Reports[/b]
9/11 Commission, ???9/11 commission staff statement No. 15 The text as submitted to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,??? MSNBC.com, 6/16/04
Senate Intelligence Committee, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community???s Prewar Intelligence on Iraq, July 2004
Senate Intelligence Committee, Postwar Findings About Iraq???s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare to Prewar Assessments, September 2006
Articles[/b]
Leiken, Robert, ???The Truth about the Saddam ??? al Qaeda Connection,??? National Interest, November 2004
Lynch, Colum, ???Blix Downgrades Prewar Assessment of Iraqi Weapons,??? Washington Post, 6/22/03
Nordland, Rod, Masland, Tom, and Dickey, Christopher, ???Unmasking The Insurgents,??? Newsweek, 2/7/05
Pincus, Walter, ???20-year-old Iraq weapons spark debate,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 7/1/06 - ???Report Cast Doubt on Iraq-Al Qaeda Connection,??? Washington Post, 6/22/03
Pollack, Kenneth, ???Weapons of Misperception,??? Atlantic Monthly Online, 1/13/04
Ware, Michael, ???Meet The New Jihad,??? Time, 7/5/04
It's just that precise citation can protect you from the Sabbabababdddo slingers, but then again, your are probably right. Nothing will stop them from hurling their dung at you other than complete and utter allegiance.
U.S. Policy Towards Iraq At The Crossroads I. President Bush???s View II. Counterviews of U.S. Policy III. Problems With The Counterinsurgency Program IV. The Failure of Operation Together Forward I & II In Baghdad V. Training Iraqi Forces VI. Training the Iraqi Army VII. Iraqi Police Training VIII. Criticisms of Training Program IX. Strains On U.S. Ground Forces X. Failure of U.S. Policy In Iraq XI. The End Of Iraqi Reconstruction XII. Shrinking Coalition Of The Willing
The Iraqi Civil War XIII. Sectarian Killings And Refugees XIV. Causes XV. Sadr???s Mahdi Army XVI. Other Shiite Forces XVII. Responses to the Shiite Militias XVIII. A U.S. Timetable for Iraq? XIX. The Insurgency
Al-Maliki???s Government XX. Under Cut By Other Shiites XXI. Economic Problems XXII. Corruption XXIII. The Kurds
Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Introduction[/b]
Now seems as good a time as any to write an Iraq update what with U.S. midterm elections having just ended and the announcement that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is to be replaced. Iraq played an important role in both of those events. By November 2006 60% of Americans were opposed to the war in Iraq, 56% felt less safe because of it, 55% thought it was a mistake to invade, and 65% disapproved of Bush???s handling of the war. On October 25, 2006 right before the elections Bush gave a televised speech to the nation to rally his supporters. In the speech Bush said, ???The ultimate accountability ??? rests with me. ??? It???s what the 2004 campaign was about. If people ??? if people are unhappy about it, look right to the president.??? That???s exactly what the American public did as it voted out Republicans, and the Democrats took control of Congress. Shortly afterwards Bush announced that Donald Rumsfeld would step down as Secretary of Defense, to be replaced with longtime Republican foreign policy establishment figure Robert Gates, who had been Bush???s father???s CIA Chief. The White House had actually already decided on removing Rumsfeld, but didn???t want to do it before the election and give critics more ammunition to attack the president with. The question now is will President Bush make meaningful changes to his Iraq policy after having declared over and over that the U.S. will ???stay the course,??? or perhaps even worse, is it too late for the U.S. to do anything about the problems Iraq now faces?
Iraq itself is sinking into chaos. A Defense Department briefing slide was leaked to the New York Times in October 2006 that said, ???Urban areas experiencing ???ethnic cleansing??? campaigns to consolidate control ??? violence at all-time high, spreading geographically.??? It seems that about every six months the situation becomes worse. In February 2006 the Shiite shrine in Samarra was bombed setting off a wave of retaliation killings of Sunnis by Shiite militias. Before that event, there were some low level death squad activities and abuses by the Shiite dominated police, but after the February bombing, violence escalated tremendously with Sunnis dying for every attack upon Shiites. This summer was marked by the failure of Operation Together Forward, the joint U.S.-Iraqi attempt to secure the capital Baghdad from sectarian killings. Since then, the U.S. and Iraqi government of Prime Minister al-Maliki have engaged in increasing recriminations against each other over who is responsible.
What appears to be happening now is that the Shiite parties are preparing to win a civil war against the Sunnis with the U.S. acting as a temporary band-aid dimming violence in the neighborhoods they occupy, only to see deaths increase as soon as they leave. Iraqi security forces are usually implicated in these murders, putting an end Bush???s claim that the U.S. will draw down when the Iraqis stand up.
With the U.S. elections over, the Bush administration is finally set to change its Iraq policy, but in all likelihood, it???s too late to stop events from continuing to spiral out of control until a full fledged civil war breaks out between Sunnis and Shiites. At the same time, ethnic tensions are increasing in the northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul between Kurds, who are attempting to take over those cities and incorporate them within Kurdistan even though Kurds are a minority there, and Arabs and Turkomans. In the South, there are also increasing tensions between rival Shiite factions. Iraq is turning into a country where almost every group is fighting against each other in a war of all against all with the U.S. stuck in the middle.
U.S. Policy Towards Iraq At The Crossroads[/b]
I. President Bush???s View
???We???re winning and we will win, unless we leave before the job is done.??? ??? Pres. Bush, televised speech, 10/25/06
President Bush likes to portray himself as a man with strong faith and commitments. When it comes to Iraq however, these traits have failed him. Bush???s insistence on equating Iraq with the war on terror and that the U.S. is winning are no longer believed by a large sector of America. Not only that, but it makes him appear to be detached from the realities on the ground in Iraq.
Iraq was never a war between Al Qaeda and the U.S. as Bush claims it is, but that is the major framework that the president likes to place the war within. In an October 2006 speech he said, ???If we were to abandon that country [Iraq] before the Iraqis can defend their young democracy, the terrorists would take control of Iraq and establish a new safe haven from which to launch attacks on America.??? He continued, ???We can???t tolerate a new terrorist state in the heart of the Middle East with large oil reserves that could be used to fund its radical ambitions or used to inflict economic damage on the West.??? The problem with this vision is three fold. First, Sunni Islamists can never come to power in a country that is 60% Shiite and also possess a sizeable and powerful Kurdish minority. Not only that, but the Sunnis live in Western Iraq that is pretty much devoid of oil wealth. Last, no Iraqi analysts believe that the insurgency can win, only that they can cause havoc within the country. Iraq is only a front in the war on terror because of the U.S. invasion. More importantly, the violence is now mostly between Sunnis and Shiites, rather than insurgents versus Americans.
Despite the increasing violence, President Bush and the White House continue to speak about how their policies are working in the country. Part of that was due to the November 2006 mid-term election in which the President was reluctant to show any weaknesses in the face of the Democrat???s criticism, however Bush genuinely seems to believe that the U.S. is winning. In August 2006, Bush met with a small group of professors and experts on the Middle East at the White House. He told them that he would make no policy changes. In the fall of 2006 Bob Woodward released another book on the Bush presidency and the war in Iraq. Woodward wrote that Henry Kissinger was one of the Bush???s leading foreign policy advisors outside the White House. Kissinger???s main advice, based upon his experience in Vietnam, was to stick it out in Iraq and only think about victory. In October 2006 Vice President Cheney expressed just this opinion when he told Time magazine, ???We???re looking for victory??? in Iraq. Bush repeatedly said in speeches that the U.S. would ???stay the course??? in Iraq as well. On October 25, Bush gave a televised speech to the nation in which he said, ???But we cannot allow our dissatisfaction to turn into disillusionment about our purpose in this war.??? He assured the public, ???We???re winning and we will win, unless we leave before the job is done.???
The question remains whether Bush and his cabinet will really mak
e any real changes in policy now that U.S. elections are over, and more importantly whether these will have any effect within Iraq. In late October 2006 White House spokesman Tony Snow made a bungled attempt at claiming that Bush had always been changing his policy on Iraq. He said, ???This is not a stay-the-course policy??? despite Bush having said this over and over in speeches to the public. Bush seems both confused and frustrated by the situation within Iraq. After a meeting with conservative journalists in October 2006, the National Review???s online magazine wrote, ???At times during the conversation, the president seemed vexed ??? not beaten, not downcast, but vexed ??? by conditions in Iraq. Bush didn???t say so, but from his words it seemed hard to deny that in some significant measure the insurgents and the sectarian killers are in control in the country, and that the fate of the American mission is in their hands. ???The frustration is that the definition of success has now gotten to be, how many innocent people are dying???? the president said. ???And if there???s a lot of dying, it means the enemy is winning.??? He paused. ???That doesn???t mean they???re winning.?????? Bush seems unable to detach Iraq from the war on terror and realize that Iraq is facing a civil war. During the same meeting with conservative writers he complained that he couldn???t find any statistical means to prove that the U.S. was winning. By his own account, he realized that the numbers of death are actually proving the opposite, even though he wasn???t able to admit it in the end. Until he comes to terms with these two issues, U.S. policy may not take any major changes under Bush???s presidency. As James Phillips, an Iraq expert at the Heritage Foundation said, ???President Bush is committed to a strategic end, probably until the end of his administration.???
II. Counterviews of U.S. Policy
???We???re losing. The country is sliding into civil war, and the president doesn???t seem to be doing very much about it.??? ??? Max Boot, Council On Foreign Relations, August 2006
By the winter of 2006 liberal, conservative and neoconservative experts alike in the U.S., along with even a few American generals and former and current members of the administration noted that the U.S. was failing in Iraq despite Bush???s pronouncements of success. A review of reports, interviews and Congressional testimony turned up quotes such as the following:
- ???The reconstruction of Iraq is not doomed to fail, but the Bush Administration does not yet have a strategy that is likely to succeed. ??? U.S. policy often focuses on the wrong problems and employs the wrong solutions.??? Kenneth Pollack, a long time Iraq expert from the Saban Center at the Brookings Institute, February 2006 report on Iraq
- ???These trends strongly argue that the Iraqi government and the United States are now losing, not winning,??? Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and one of the top Iraq experts in a July 2006 report
- ???I think I would answer that be telling you I don???t think we???re losing.??? General Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, in congressional testimony in the summer of 2006
- ???There is clearly no momentum in this struggle.??? Frederick Kagan, a neoconservative Iraq expert at the American Enterprise Institute in a July 2006 editorial
- ???We???re losing. The country is sliding into civil war, and the president doesn???t seem to be doing very much about it.??? Max Boot, from the Council on Foreign Relations think tank, August 2006
- ???There???s a very broad view among not only the established pro-American regimes ??? the Jordanian regime, the Moroccan regime, even the Egyptian and Saudi, and Qatar and Kuwait even more so ??? and among many secular democratic forces in the region, that we have just messed up very badly, and strengthened Islamic forces, and strengthened the instinct of a lot of these regimes to resist.??? Larry Diamond, former Coalition Provisional Authority constitution expert and senior fellow at the Hoover Institute think tank at Stanford University, August 2006.
- ???The message is clear: We have a failed strategy, and we need new leadership and a new strategy to secure (our) interests in the region.??? Retired U.S. Army General, September 2006
- ???More of essentially the same is going to be a policy that very few people are going to be able to support. ??? [It] has virtually no chance of succeeding.??? Richard Haas, former Bush administration foreign policy official, now president of the Council on Foreign Relations, October 2006
- ???We???re not winning. It???s apparent. I checked with almost a dozen sources in Baghdad in just the last 24 hours. Every single one of them answered the question as to whether the violence is lessoning, or getting worse with ??? ???worse.?????? Wayne White, former head of the State Department???s Iraq section until 2005, October 2006
- ???That the Iraq war is, if not a failure, failing requires little demonstration.??? Eliot Cohen, current member of the Pentagon???s Defense Policy Board, October 2006
Evidence that the U.S. was not winning in Iraq was apparent everywhere. The U.S. proved that it could neither secure Anbar province in western Iraq, the base of the Sunni insurgency, nor make the capital safe from Shiite militias, their police allies, and Sunni fighters. Training Iraqi security forces was plagued by problems, and reconstruction in the country was coming to a flawed end with more reports of corruption, mismanagement and unfinished projects. It seemed like the U.S. could do nothing right.
III. Problems With The Counterinsurgency Program
???The United States has devoted considerable energy and resources to fighting the insurgency, but it has consistently employed the wrong strategy.??? Kenneth Pollack, Saban Center at the Brookings Institute, February 2006
In March 2006 Bush announced a new ???Clear, Hold and Build??? counterinsurgency policy. The plan was to first clear an area of insurgents, then hold it by turning over security to Iraqi forces, and then finally send in reconstruction teams that would start economic projects to win over the population. The plan was first applied to Anbar province in western Iraq, the center of the insurgency.
The first sign that the ???Clear, Hold and Build??? policy was failing came in the summer of 2006 as Iraqi forces proved incapable of carrying out their duties. In June 2006 for example, there were 5200 policemen in Anbar. Most were in the large cities such as Fallujah that had 1700 officers. In July 2006 the deputy police chief of the city was assassinated, while in October the provincial commander was killed. The attacks got so bad that by November there were no police patrols in the city. Police were so terrified of insurgent attacks that many were living in the police stations rather than going home and exposing their families to retribution. The Iraqi army fared only a little better. There were 13,000 Iraqi soldiers in the province in October 2006. The two Iraqi divisions deployed there were short about 5,000 soldiers with another 660 AWOL. One division only had 35% of its troops while the other only 50%. An added problem was that both the population and the U.S. military generally saw the police as incompetent and corrupt, while the local Sunni population feared that the largely Shiite army would carry out sectarian attacks. Either way, the people in the province did not feel secure with either around.
U.S. tactics were not universally applied nor accepted either in Anbar. For example, in the town of Hit a small Special Forces unit was attempting to recruit local Iraqis into the security forces and win hearts and minds, while a regular Army unit was trying to disband these forces because they were not under its control. The Special Forces unit also spent their time amongst the Iraqis as counter
insurgency strategy advocates, while the regular Army unit had minimal contact with Iraqis other than when carrying out operations, and tended to stay within their base. Operations were also hindered by a constant rotation of U.S. troops in and out of the province with no coordination. That meant every time a new unit was deployed they started from scratch. 5 different U.S. units have been based in Hit since 2005.
Despite being the center of the new policy, the U.S. has also never had enough troops in the province to effectively secure it. When U.S. troops were shifted from Fallujah to Ramadi and later Baghdad for new offensives, violence increased in Fallujah and Iraqi units were incapable of stopping it. The U.S. simply doesn???t have enough troops to clear one area, hold it, and then move onto another. This despite the fact that the military announced that troop levels had risen to 150,000 by October 2006, the highest since the January 2005 elections for Iraq???s parliament.
The policy seemed to completely collapse in the fall of 2006 when many U.S. forces withdrew from the province to be re-deployed to Baghdad. Fallujah was been called a success story, but residents must go through extensive ID and security checks to pass through 7 check points in and out of the city, while insurgents are still active. Besides attacks on police, several prominent city leaders have been assassinated including the city council chief, and a senior cleric, plus the mayor had to flee due to death threats. A police captain in the city told a reporter, ???The Iraq resistance has not stopped for a single day despite the huge U.S. army activities. The wise men of the city explained to U.S. officials that it is impossible to stop the resistance by military operations, but it seems the Americans prefer to do it the hard way.??? Similar problems occurred in Ramadi where an Iraqi government official said, ???No government official can do anything without contacting the resistance first. Even the governor used to [get] their approval for everything. When he stopped doing so, they issued a death sentence against him, and now he cannot move without American protection.???
The general collapse of security in the province led a Marine intelligence officer, Col. Pete Devlin of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to issue a dire report on Anbar in September 2006. He said that the U.S. was losing because of a lack of a functioning local government and no representation by the central government that was leaving a vacuum filled by Al Qaeda in Iraq. Devlin also noted that the U.S. lacked the force levels to be successful, and that both the U.S. and Iraqi forces proved incapable of securing anything but their bases. A U.S. Army officer summed up Devlin???s report by saying, ???We haven???t been defeated militarily, but we have been defeated politically ??? and that???s where wars are won and lost.??? Devlin???s report was followed up by another military report that month that said the U.S. had lost control of the province and that insurgents controlled Fallujah and surrounding cities.
IV. The Failure of Operation Together Forward I & II In Baghdad
???In Baghdad, Operation Together Forward has made a difference in the focus areas but has not met our overall expectations in sustaining a reduction in the level of violence. ??? The violence is indeed disheartening.??? Maj. General William Caldwell, U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, October 2006
In March 2006 the new Iraqi government of Prime Minister al-Maliki and the U.S. military said that Baghdad had become the center of gravity in the fight for Iraq. The city was not only the site of insurgent attacks, but increasing sectarian violence between Shiite and Sunnis. The capital had to be secured to succeed in the country. In June 2006 Operation Together Forward was announced by Prime Minister al-Maliki. As noted Iraqi expert Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said, ???I don???t believe this operation was designed to turn a corner. I believe it was designed to stop a civil war.??? As part of the new operation 43,500 Iraqi forces and 7,200 U.S. soldiers were deployed, but with little success. By the end of July 2006 Maj. General William Caldwell, the U.S. military spokesman in Iraq announced, ???We have not witnessed the reduction in violence one would have hoped for,??? after the beginning of operations. This led to another troop increase before the month was up. 3,700 U.S. troops that were set to return home were given stop-loss orders to stay in Baghdad for at least four more months. By the end of August there were 15,000 U.S. servicemen and women in the city for Together Forward II. The U.S. also asked for an additional 4,000 Iraqi troops, but only a quarter showed up. Many Iraqi units simply refused to leave their home provinces or to conduct operations against their fellow Shiites.
By October 2006 the second Operation Together Forward was also failing. U.S. and Iraqi forces had entered 9 neighborhoods in Baghdad, 2 Sunni and 7 Shiite. The U.S. military said that it was operating against 23 Shiite and Sunni militias, many having ties with politicians in the government. The Iraqis were officially supposed to be running the operation, but the U.S. was doing almost all of the work. The major tactic was to clear neighborhoods block by block and then send in reconstruction teams that had $630 million to spend on projects to win hearts and minds. Because of the lack of security and the slowness of the Maliki government few infrastructure projects had even started by mid-October, and most were to be delayed until November. The real difficulties in the operation began with the Shiite neighborhoods. The U.S. began raiding areas thought to be bases for Shiite death squads and militias. As before, after a raid, Iraqi forces were suppose to take over security of the area, but rarely did. The commanding U.S. general in Iraq noted the problem himself when he said, ???The difficult part is going to be holding these areas with Iraqi security forces.??? He was echoed by an officer on the ground, Col. Michael Shields of the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team who told reporters, ???We come back to the dike all the time and stick our finger in. It is a longtime process. ??? The reality is that if we left that neighborhood tomorrow, it [the violence] would start again.??? In the Ghazaliya area for example, U.S. troops swept through clearing the area, but when it was turned over to Iraqi police, Shiite militias returned. American officials said that the police let them back in. The situation in the city got so bad that Prime Minister Maliki announced in October a plan for joint Sunni and Shiite checkpoints throughout Baghdad because the security forces were so mistrusted.
Even with the new offensive in the capital, the violence seemed to continue unabated. One stark instance took place during the summer. On July 8 Sunnis bombed a Shiite mosque in West Baghdad. The following day, Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army militia swept through the neighborhood killing 56 Sunnis. A man who witnessed the attacks called Iraq???s emergency number to report it. The operator told him, ???The Mahdi Army are not terrorists like you. They are people dong their duty. And how could you know that they are the Mahdi Army? Is it written on their foreheads???? Then the operator hung up. Hours after the killing, Sunnis bombed another Shiite mosque with two car bombs killing 18 and wounding 38.
To make matters worse, the U.S. played a numbers game to make it seem like they were being successful at first. In August 2006 Gen. Caldwell claimed that there had been a 52% decrease in deaths because of the new operation. Later, it turned out the U.S. was not counting people killed in bombings and mortar attacks. There was in fact, a decrease reported by the Baghdad morgue, but it was only a 17% decrease from over 1800 in July to over 1500 in August. Deaths would go up in September with 165 bodies found in a single four
-day stretch in the capital alone. The U.S. also had to return to several neighborhoods they had declared cleared. By October 2006, the U.S. military was reporting that sectarian violence had increased 28% despite the security crackdown. By the end of the month, the U.S. military acknowledged that the 2nd Operation Together Forward had failed. Gen. Caldwell told reporters, ???In Baghdad, Operation Together Forward has made a difference in the focus area but has not met our overall expectations in sustaining a reduction in the level of violence. ??? The violence is indeed disheartening.???
By October 2006 then, the U.S. had failed to secure both Anbar province and the Iraqi capital. The U.S. military and Iraq experts had both said that the summer and fall were crucial moments in the war, but the U.S. had come up short once again. The U.S. training program for the Iraqi forces was faring no better.
V. Training Iraqi Forces
???Even as the number and capabilities of Iraqi security forces have increased, overall security conditions have deteriorated, as evidenced by attack trends, sectarian violence, and the growth and influence of militias.??? Government Accountability Office report to Congress, July 2006
In October 2006 President Bush said that the U.S.???s goal was to train 325,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers so that they could take over the security of the country and begin the drawdown of U.S. forces. Bush has often said that the U.S. ???will stand down as they [the Iraqi security forces] stand up.??? U.S. commander in Iraq Gen. Casey said that Iraqis would begin to take over the counterinsurgency campaign back in 2005, and in June 2006 sent a plan to the White House to withdraw up to 50% of U.S. forces by the beginning of September 2006 in anticipation of increased Iraqi participation. Of course, during the summer sectarian violence escalated and Iraqi forces largely failed in both Anbar province and Baghdad. By the end of October 2006 Gen. Casey was talking about increasing U.S. forces, while still talking about troop withdrawals sometime in the future when Iraqi forces could do their job.
VI. Training the Iraqi Army
???Thirty years from now, when historians are trying to figure out howe we lost this war, they???ll look to the MiTT [the Iraqi army training] program.??? U.S. MiTT team leader in Iraq, August 2006
The U.S. has gone through several haphazard and failed attempts to rebuild the Iraqi army. The current program is led by Military Transition Teams (MiTT), which are plagued with problems. There is mismanagement, inadequate training, lack of supplies and equipment, and the teams are undermanned, and usually staffed by non-combat troops who are not prepared for the training mission. For example, a Marine MiTT in Anbar province had a second in command that was a traffic management official who had never served in an infantry unit before. Only a third of the team had been trained with the foreign weapons they were suppose to train the Iraqis in. A senior enlisted man in the team said their preparation was ???a joke.??? The operation has been so poorly carried out that even the ranking Marine general in Iraq, Lt. General John Sattler complained about the lack of supplies given to the MiTTs. Iraq expert Kenneth Pollack from the Brookings Institute wrote, ???Many Iraqi formations are being trained by conventional U.S. units that lack the know-how, the inclination, or the time to properly teach counterinsurgency and stability operations. Moreover, Iraqi combat formations are still not always receiving the right kinds of training, and are often being pressed into service too soon after their formal periods of training.???
Because of the poor training regime, former State Department Iraq analyst Wayen White believed, ???There???s no reason for us to expect it [the Iraqi army to take over security duties] to happen. There???ve been claims since 2004 that the Iraqi army is largely ready. The army???s performance has disappointed deadline after deadline and prediction after prediction.??? Worse yet, an October 2006 report by the U.S. inspector general in Iraq found that the U.S. was not providing the Iraqi army with the capability to supply and operate itself independently. That meant the Iraqis would continue to rely upon the U.S. for guns, ammunition, rations, transportation, etc. Most Iraqi units could only operate for a few hours outside of their bases because they lacked basic vehicles and even gas to do much more. The report noted that the main problem in the training program was a lack of U.S. troops, and that no plan had been developed to fix the problem. The inspector general also wondered whether the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was even capable of supplying the Iraqi Army in the future because of a lack of money and know how.
Overall, the Iraqi soldiers were prone to desert, battalions were never at full strength, and the troops lacked discipline, especially during battle. Usually 25% of every unit was on leave to deliver their paychecks to their families, while 5-8% deserted. In areas with heavy combat such as Anbar, the numbers were even higher. Many units were also all from one ethnic/religious group with many ethnic militias having joined en masse, leading to questions about their loyalties. Half of each Iraqi army division is recruited locally, and they usually refuse to leave their home area as happened when only a quarter of Iraqi troops arrived to reinforce operations in Baghdad when requested. As Brig. General Dana Pittard, in charge of the training effort noted, ???The Iraqi Army is supposed to be a national army. They were recruited regionally, and for the most part they???ve been operating regionally. So that???s where the difficulty is.??? Prof. Tom Mockaitis of DePaul University saw a larger problem in this recruiting process. ???The question is, who are the Iraqi troops loyal to and what are their capabilities? And what does this say about internal security? At this point, I don???t see much more than a symbolic gesture.??? The Maliki government???s solution to this problem is to increase troop strength by 50,000 in the hopes that more soldiers can be on duty at any given time.
Despite all of these problems, Iraq???s government has been given, and is calling, for more control over the Iraqi army. In September 2006 the Iraqi ground forces command was established to run the army???s battalions while 2 divisions were turned over to direct control by the Iraqi government. The plan was to have 1/3 of the Iraqi security forces under Iraqi control by the end of October 2006, but like so many other things within the country, that plan was delayed. Gen. Casey claims that the Iraqi army is still 12-18 months away from being able to operate without heavy U.S. assistance. Anthony Cordesman felt, ???A lot of his is just rhetoric. It???s all part of a process to give the Iraqi forces more visibility, more confidence and, hopefully, give the government more leverage in terms of its ability to influence political compromise,??? because as he noted, Iraqi units will still be completely dependent upon U.S. forces and the U.S. will still be in the lead in any security operations. When this will end, no one knows.
VII. Iraqi Police Training
???We have to have the courage to admit that there are structural problems in the way the security forces were recruited. There has not been enough attention paid to quality, nor to leadership. Command and control remains a problem.??? Barham Salih, deputy Prime Minister, August 2006
2006 was dubbed ???the year of the police.??? The program has turned out to be even a larger failure than the training of the Iraqi army. The Iraqi police forces have expanded from 146,000 to 188,000 and are mostly Shiite, and deeply mistrusted by the Sunnis. New recruits are to receive 10 weeks of training either in Baghdad or Jordan. Like the army, police units have high absentee rates of 30-40%. The Interior Min
istry, which is in charge of the police, is so disorganized that it neither knows how many officers have actually finished their training, nor how many they actually have under their command. Things were so bad that by October 2006 the U.S. announced that it would start a second round of training to make sure that all police officers received it. The future of this force is also unclear as the U.S. inspector general in Iraq noted in an October 2006 report that the Interior Ministry might not be able to pay for the force in the future.
The greatest problem with the police and the Interior Ministry is that it is thoroughly infiltrated by Shiite militias from top to bottom. An example is the 150,000 strong Facilities Protection Force. This is a separate force from the national police with each ministry allowed to create its own units. The force is a major home to Shiite militiamen and has been blamed for sectarian attacks on Sunnis. Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani even accused the Protection Force of death squad activities. In another case, Captain Alexander Shaw, head of the 372nd Military Police Battalion, in charge of training all of the Iraqi police in Baghdad, told the Washington Post in October 2006 that 70% of the regular Iraqi police officers were Shiite militiamen. Shaw told the Post of a police station in Baghdad full of posters of cleric Moqtada al-Sadr where the police chief openly spoke of wiping out all of the Sunnis in the country. When Shaw???s unit followed some of the chief???s police for escorting some Mahdi Army militiamen through the city, the police set up an ambush and killed an American soldier. Capt. Shaw told the Post, ???How can we expect ordinary Iraqis to trust the police when we don???t even trust them not to kill our own men? ??? To be perfectly honest, I???m not even sure we???re ever going to have police here that are free of the militia influence.??? A police commander that Shaw admired, Brig. General Salah al-Ani, told the Post, ???None of the Iraqi police are working to make their country better. They???re working for the militias or to put money in their pocket.???
The U.S. has put increasing pressure on the Interior Ministry to clean up its ties with the Shiite militias, but to little effect. In August 2006 the U.S. announced that it was setting up inspection boards that would go through one unit each month to make sure that it had all of its equipment and screen the loyalty of the officers. Whether the program will work has been questioned by U.S. trainers who have put in dozens of reports complaining about military control of police units but to no effect.
The training program has also been an example of great waste. The $75 million Baghdad Police College, which was suppose to be the center of the program, was so beset with construction problems that parts of it have to be torn down. A September 2006 audit of the school found that there was human waste leaking through the ceiling, water leaks, etc. The U.S. inspector general for Iraq said, ???This is the most essential civil security project in the country ??? and it???s a failure. The Baghdad police academy is a disaster.??? The Mosul police headquarters was also beset by construction problems. That project cost $988,000 and was suppose to have 10 showers and 10 toilets, but only ended up with one of each. There was so little oversight of the project, that a tree was cemented over and included in a wall.
VIII. Criticisms of Training Program
???The U.S. strategy of training Iraqi security forces ??? is merely preparing another set of fighters for the rapidly escalating civil war.??? Ivan Eland, senior fellow at the Independent Institute, October 2006
The failure of the U.S. training program has led to many criticisms. There are not enough Iraqi security forces being trained, the current security forces are leading to sectarian violence, there needs to be more time spent on training, the Iraqis will still be dependent upon the U.S., and that there is not enough money and advisors.
First, there are not enough Iraqi forces to secure the country. Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institute told Congress in July 2006 that only 1/3 of the Iraqi forces are capable of carrying out operations. Even if all of the Iraqi solders and police were capable, that still would not be enough. Based upon previous counterinsurgency campaigns, Iraq needed twice as many forces, approximately 500,000. Second, even if the forces were increased there was no telling whether they would be loyal to the government or to militias. There are reports over and over of Iraqi policemen carrying out sectarian killings, while others stand by and do nothing out of either fear or support. Some argue that the training program is simply creating soldiers for a burgeoning civil war. As Ivan Eland of the Independent Institute noted, ???The U.S. strategy of training Iraqi security forces ??? is merely preparing another set of fighters for the rapidly escalating civil war.??? Others say that the U.S. has been fixated on putting as many Iraqis into uniform as possible rather than emphasizing training and professionalism. Even with increased training the Iraqis lack the forces, money and know how to supply themselves. An October 2006 U.S. inspector general report found that the Iraqi government is not close to being able to provide for their own security forces. This all means that more money and more U.S. troops are needed to effectively carry out the training mission, but there are no plans to do so.
IX. Strains On U.S. Ground Forces
???What we???re working out of right now is a situation where we have absolutely piecemealed our forces to death.??? Lt. General Clyde Vaughn, Chief of the Army National Guard, November 2006
The Iraq war is placing tremendous strains upon the U.S. ground forces. There simply aren???t enough troops within the military???s timeframe of training, refitting and readiness to meet the demands of Iraq right now. Already, many U.S. units are serving their third tours in the country. In order to reach the current level of 150,000 U.S. troops, the military had to give involuntary recalls to 2,500 Marine reservists and 10,000 Army soldiers in August 2006. The next month the Army announced that 4,000 more soldiers would have their tours extended 46 days. By November, plans were announced to send in additional 7,000 National Guard troops in a special deployment. The Army was also discussing starting involuntary mobilizations of Reserves and National Guard troops as a possible solution. The troops are also running out of equipment. Units have left much of their equipment in Iraq to be taken up by new incoming ones. The National Guard alone has left 64,000 pieces of ordinance in the country. The situation is so dire that many troops don???t have enough to train and refit with once they return to the U.S. The Guard announced that it had a $24 billion equipment shortfall and only 1/3 of their essential equipment on hand. Regular Army units are also using up their gear at four times the usual rate. Officers have warned that the ground forces are at the breaking point. This is especially ironic because when Bush was running for president he said that he was going to rebuild the U.S. military and cut back its overseas deployments. Instead he is leaving it in tatters.
X. Failure Of U.S. Policy In Iraq
???There???s a sense among many people now that things in Iraq are slipping fast and there isn???t a lot of time to reverse them.??? Larry Diamond, former CPA official, and Hoover Institute fellow, October 2006
The continued problems with counterinsurgency, security and training operations have led to a widespread sense of dismay, reflection and review of U.S. policy in Iraq. Even before the November U.S. midterm elections, the Bush administration itself had slowly come to the realization that change was needed. Bush set up the Iraq Study Group under co-chairman James Baker to come up with ne
w approaches to the war. Some leading Republican Senators such as John Warner, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, also urged a change in strategy. The press has speculated that when the Study Group issues its report it will suggest convening a regional conference to come up with a united policy on Iraq, more pressure on the Iraqi government to crack down on the Shiite militias, set up a system to share oil revenues to ensure the Sunnis that they won???t be shut out of the country???s wealth, and eventual troop reductions. There is even talk of abandoning the Maliki government by either forcing him to step down or fomenting a coup against him so that a government, not beholden to the Shiite parties, can rule.
The U.S. military also began reviewing its policies because it realized that things have not gone well. In the summer of 2006 the Pentagon ordered two separate studies. They found that the U.S. often used too much force that alienated Iraqis, that the U.S. was slow to work with Iraqis, didn???t consider the security of Iraqi civilians as important, and lacked intelligence about the insurgency. This led to an order in October 2006 that all U.S. soldiers, not just officers, be trained in counterinsurgency strategy.
Iraq experts have also criticized the tactics used in Iraq. One criticism came from the Brookings Institutes??? Kenneth Pollack who said that the U.S. emphasized offensive operations in areas where success was unlikely rather than securing the Iraqi population and winning them over to America???s cause. As Bush emphasized, ???The principal task of our military is to find and defeat the terrorists, and that is why we are on the offense.??? Most of these operations have been carried out in western Iraq and Anbar province where support for the U.S. and Iraqi government are at its lowest. Pollack argued that the U.S. couldn???t succeed in these areas because the population didn???t support them. ???We are committing the cardinal military sin of reinforcing failure by concentrating too many of our forces in Iraq???s western province ??? where the insurgents are thickest and where support for reconstruction is thinnest. This approach has repeatedly resulted in counterinsurgency failures throughout history. Our efforts to ???take the fight to the enemy??? and mount offensive sweep operations designed to kill insurgents and eliminate their strongholds have failed to eradicate the insurgency so far, and likely will continue to do so, as was the case in Vietnam and other lost guerrilla wars,??? he wrote in a study of Iraq in February 2006. Pollack thought that the U.S. carried out these operations because it doesn???t want to admit that it really doesn???t control the country and because conventional military wisdom is to attack, while counterinsurgency doctrine calls for a different kind of thinking where securing the populace is the number one priority. Instead the U.S. military is committing mass sweeps where they break down doors and search for insurgents, which costs hearts and minds. A September 2006 public opinion poll for example, found that 71% of Iraqis wanted the U.S. to withdraw within a year. Pollack argues that the U.S. needs to withdraw to some core areas such as Kurdistan, areas of the Shiite South and Baghdad where public support is strongest for security and reconstruction if it wants a shot at being successful.
Even that policy is questionable however. Having failed with successive military policies, the question must be raised, could Iraq be so fractured that no military policy will be effective? The U.S. is no longer fighting just an insurgency, it is now fighting a sectarian civil war. On the one hand, the U.S. is combating Sunni insurgents and foreign fighters, some of which have ties to parties participating in the government. On the other hand the U.S. is also trying to clamp down on Shiite militias, who are also connected to the government, who are killing Sunnis. At the same time the U.S. is trying to prop up an Iraqi government whose own ministries and security forces are participating in the sectarian violence. With so many factions, who is the U.S. actually fighting for, and what are they trying to secure?
???The U.S. aid and economic development effort has been and is a dismal failure that has wasted at least $10 billion of US and Iraqi money. It has never been properly planned, has little impact in the poorest and high-threat areas, has failed in many key sectors, and has lacked meaningful audits and measures of effectiveness.??? Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International studies, Congressional testimony, July 2006
The record of U.S. reconstruction since the 2003 invasion has been plagued by problems. On October 7, 2006 U.S. funding for reconstruction officially ended. The U.S. will only finish projects that it has already started. Any new projects will have to be paid for by the Iraqi government. Only half of the oil and electrical projects planned have been completed, and many of the projects that have been finished face problems. Electrical and oil production is only a little above pre-war levels, while attacks upon the infrastructure continue to limit basic services and any building projects. U.S. government agencies in charge of reconstruction hid cost overruns, while 30% of the projects looked at by the U.S. inspector general in Iraq were found to be substandard or complete failures. There is no punishment for these U.S. companies because they were given cost-plus contracts, which meant that they were paid no matter what, whether they made mistakes, were late, or didn???t finish. In October 2006 the Maliki government announced that it needed $100 billion over the next four years to rebuild Iraq???s infrastructure. No one knows where that money will come from and there are questions over the competency of the Iraqi government to carry out any new projects due to a lack of know how and widespread corruption.
XII. The Shrinking Coalition Of The Willing
???British armed forces are effectively held hostage in Iraq.??? British Ministry of Defense Memo, September 2006
The Coalition of the Willing which was suppose to support the U.S. effort in Iraq has decreased since the beginning of 2006. Italy and Romania announced that they would start drawing down their troop by the end of the year. More importantly, England, America???s closest ally in the Iraq war and the largest member of the Coalition after the U.S., has been making moves to withdraw many of its troops as well. The English Army Chief, Gen. Richard Dannatt said that the goodwill of the Iraqi people had ended and that England should ???get ourselves out sometime soon because our presence exacerbates the security problems.??? In order to maintain favor with the U.S. and save face, the British military has announced that it will begin pulling out troops from Iraq so that they can be redeployed to Afghanistan. Like the U.S. military, Iraq has strained England???s armed forces with an extended overseas commitment, and British officers are frustrated with the slow development of Iraqi security forces. A September 2006 Ministry of Defense memo said, ???British armed forces are effectively held hostage in Iraq ??? following the failure of the deal being attempted by COS [chief of staff] to extricate UK armed forces from Iraq on the basis of ???doing Afghanistan??? ??? and we are now fighting (and arguably losing or potentially losing) on two fronts.??? The British commander in Iraq, Major Gen. Richard Shirreff was determined to carry out one final operation in Iraq, Operation Sinbad, aimed at clearing out Shiite militias and criminals from Basra before he started withdrawing troops from the country. By early 2007, they hope that to start the process of reducing their troops from 7200 to 3500. Still, the troops left in Iraq are expected to stay in the country until at least 2010.
The Iraqi Civil War[/b]
???The sectarian violence is probably as bad as I???ve seen it. If not stopped, it is possible that Iraq could move toward civil war.??? Gen. John Abizaid, CENTCOM commander to Senate Armed Services Committee, August 2006
Attacks between Shiites and Sunnis, rather than fighting between insurgents and the U.S., now constitute the major causes of deaths in Iraq. An August 2006 Defense Department report to Congress said, ???The core conflict in Iraq [has] changed into a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists.??? Despite the escalation in sectarian killings the Pentagon has denied that Iraq is in the midst of a civil war. ???The idea that the country???s aflame in sectarian violence is just not right. So I don???t subscribe to the civil war theory,??? Gen. Casey, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, told reporters in October 2006. A report on sectarian violence by the Brookings Institute found many Iraqis agreed. ???The fact that full-scale civil war has not yet erupted between these communities bears witness to the resilience of Iraqi society in general, and especially to the forbearance of large (but not all) parts of Iraq???s Shi???a communities. Across the country, Sunni and Shi???a interviewed for this research stressed that there is no civil war as long as ordinary people are not killing their neighbors. They argue that it is a war between radical extremists, and that civilians pay the price.??? The violence has mostly been concentrated in the country???s largest cities, but there are reports that it is spreading into the countryside as well. Since the February 2006 bombing of a Shiite shrine, sectarian violence has escalated to new highs and been accompanied by acts of ethnic cleansing.
XIII. Sectarian Killings and Refugees
???Hundreds of bodies have continued to appear throughout the country bearing signs of severe torture and execution-style killings.??? U.N. study, September 2006
Every month since the February shrine bombing, with the exception of a short dip in the middle of the summer, has seen a steady increase in deaths in Iraq. The U.N. estimated that 17,776 civilians had been killed in the first seven months of 2006, while Gen. Casey believed that Shiite militias and death squads were responsible for 60% of them. In July 3,438 civilians were killed with an average of 100 a day. August saw a small dip, only to hit record highs in September. A U.N. report from that month found that 5,106 civilians had been killed in Baghdad alone from July to August 2006. ???Hundreds of bodies have continued to appear throughout the country bearing signs of severe torture and execution-style killings,??? the report announced.
Descriptions of these deaths and violence are breathtaking. Shiites and Sunnis in central Iraq have resorted to tit for tat attacks on each other at an alarming and deadly rate. In October, for example, there was the Balad incident. Balad is a mixed city 50 miles south of Baghdad. Early that month 2 or 3 Sunni men were killed, one of them being the local leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. On October 13, Sunni insurgents in neighboring Duluiyah kidnapped and beheaded 17 Shiite workers in retaliation. The U.S. military arrested 2 Sunni police officers from the town for their alleged involvement in the murders. Local Shiite leaders were not satisfied however and called on Sadr???s office in Baghdad to exact revenge. Mahdi Army militiamen from Baghdad responded coming down in buses to Balad. More fighters in army uniforms and trucks, and Interior Ministry commando uniforms arrived as well. On October 14 the Mahdi Army set out to cleanse Balad of all Sunnis. Sunnis were told to leave the city in 48 hours, and Shiite militiamen set up roadblocks to check for Sunnis. By the next day the U.S. military reported that 57 people had died in Balad, while the city morgue reported around 80. Most were Sunnis who had not only been shot, but were also tortured, often with holes drilled in their bodies. The Iraqi government finally sent in police commandos and an army unit to quell the violence. By that time there were only 5 to 6 Sunni families left in the city, the rest had fled. The Mahdi Army was still in the city
however, and formed neighborhood defense forces and set up new roadblocks outside the city to turn away any Sunnis they could find. The police stood around and did nothing. 3 miles away Sunni insurgents were organizing and vowing revenge.
The violence is also leading to a refugee crisis in the country. The Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration announced in September that an estimated 240,000 people, up from 162,000 in July, had been displaced and sought help from the government. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees claims that there are now 1.6 million Iraqis who have fled their country and 1.5 million internally displaced by October 2006. Many of these people have been forced out by armed factions as happened in Balad, especially in the Baghdad area and southern Iraq, in ethnic cleansing operations by both Sunnis and Shiites. These displacements are strengthening the hand of radical groups on both sides that blame their enemies, set up aid operations, and claim to be their protectors.
XIV. Causes
???It is likely that sectarian violence is causing lasting change to Iraq???s social and demographic make-up. That is when the radical armed groups on both sides seek to achieve ??? and they are succeeding.??? ???Sectarian Violence??? report by the Brookings Institution, October 2006
Sectarian violence in Iraq is a result of radical Shiite and Sunni factions jockeying for position to control the future of the country. Most of the killing are centered in the large urban areas, namely Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, and Salah ad-Din, Diyala and Babil provinces, but has also leaked out to some rural sections as well. The more mixed a community or city is, the more likely there is to be sectarian conflicts. To the Sunnis they are fighting against Shiites who are working with Iraq???s longtime enemy Iran to seize control of the country and set up a theocracy. For the Shiites, they believe that the Sunnis are trying to re-impose Hussein???s oppressive dictatorship, while radical foreign elements such as Al Qaeda In Iraq are trying to set up a radical Islamist government. Both sides see themselves as victims, and their violence is portrayed only as a defense against the others. The main culprits on the Shiite side are Sadr???s Mahdi Army and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq???s Badr Brigade, while on the Sunni side there are the Association of Muslim Scholars and the Islamic Party who are connected to the insurgency. All parties are using violence to secure their political power base. With a weak central government that has limited influence outside of the Green Zone in Baghdad, force is seen as the only legitimate source of protection and power. To ensure their power both sides are increasingly resorting to ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods and cities to ensure that their sect is concentrated in one area. The threat of ethnic cleansing can also be used as an excuse to enter into a new area as protection for their sect as well. As an October 2006 study by the Brookings Institution found, ???The groups all share in fact common goals: to consolidate their territory, to maintain some of ???their??? people in the territory of the ???other??? and, in the context of a feeble government, to pose as both protector and provider.??? The report continued by saying that radical groups on both sides are succeeding in their attempt to remake Iraqi society.
XV. Sadr???s Mahdi Army
???The Sadr movement has spread like lightning through almost all of the southern provinces.??? Prof. Jaun Cole, Middle East expert at the University of Michigan, August 2006
The main perpetrator of sectarian violence on the Shiite side has been Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army. After the February 2003 bombing of the Samaara shrine, Sadr unleashed his Mahdi Army as a way to gain popular support amongst the Shiites in the country. Sadr has been able to supersede the two leading Shiite political parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Dawa Party. In the process however, his movement has grown so quickly that he has lost control of parts of it, while others have broken off and formed their own organizations.
Sadr???s organization is based upon the Hezbollah model. It provides social services to poor Shiites, operates as a political party, and also has armed fighters with its militia. There are between 6,000-10,000 Mahdi Army militiamen in Baghdad alone. More importantly, he controls the 140,000 strong Facilities Protection Service, which has been accused of killings, kidnappings, and crime. Sadr also ran candidates in the last national election and holds a large and powerful block of 30 seats in parliament. His parliamentary seats provide the main base for Prime Minister al-Maliki???s ruling coalition. As an active member in the government Sadr now controls the Health Ministry, which controls hospitals and clinics that serve up to 50% of the population. The ministry has been used as a source of patronage to expand his influence as well as intimidation against Sunnis. During the summer for example, there were reports that Mahdi Army members were going through hospitals rounding up Sunnis and killing them. Sadr???s organization also provides help to Shiite refugees fleeing Sunni violence, which again, improves his standing amongst his sect.
Sadr himself is a nationalist who is opposed to both the U.S. occupation and the growing influence of Iran. He would like to set up his own Shiite theocracy. He considers SCIRI an older and more conservative party that is beholden to Iran. As Middle East expert Prof. Juan Cole from the Univ. of Michigan said, ???It???s essentially a class war. The Sadr guys are pressing ??? for a kind of Shiite Maoism. SCIRI represents what???s left of the Shiite middle classes.??? Sadr funds his organization through donations, businesses, such as a string of gas stations in the capital, and, according to the U.S. military, a vast criminal network. Lt. Col. William Brown, a U.S. military intelligence officer in Baghdad estimated that Sadr and other Shiite groups were raising at least $1 million a day through crime, ???especially from kidnappings, extortion, black marketeering and blackmail.???
Increasingly, Sadr and SCIRI have come into open conflict. In October 2006 the Mahdi Army battled SCIRI???s Badr Brigade in the city of Amara. Amara is the capital of Maysan province, which has been a political battleground between the two. Sadr???s political party controls the provincial council, with the governor a former Mahdi Army commander, while the Badr Brigade controls the police. The fighting in Amara started when a local police chief, who was a Badr member, was killed in a bombing blamed on the Mahdi Army. Police then arrested the brother of the Mahdi Army commander in the city. In response, 200 Mahdi Army militiamen poured into Amara leading to shoot outs with the Badr Brigade. The Badr Brigade controlled police eventually ran out of ammunition and fled, leaving the eastern half of the city in the hands of Sadr???s men. Prime Minister Malki had to send in negotiators to stop the fighting. In the end, 10 policemen and 15 militiamen were killed and 90 wounded. In the end, Sadr came out the winner as Prime Minister Maliki sent his Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani to meet with Sadr to re-assure him that the government was not moving against him or his militia.
XVI. Other Shiite Forces
???When Sadr says you can???t do this, for whatever reasons, that???s when they start to go rogue. Frankly, at that point, they start to become very open to alternative sources of sponsorship.??? Senior U.S. intelligence officer to the New York Times, September 2006
Beginning in August 2006 the press started reporting that the Mahdi Army had grown so large and fast that Sadr had lost control over parts of it. A U.S. military officer told the Los Angeles Times in September 2006, Sadr ???has a measure of control, but when you get down to
the bottom of the stack, I don???t think he has ultimate control of every entity that operates under his name.??? Things got so bad that Sadr began dismissing militia commanders in Najaf and Basra to try to re-assert control. Up to 6 of these former officers ended up starting their own militias. A September estimate said that up to 1/3 of the Mahdi Army had become independent. Some members didn???t think that Sadr was radical enough anymore after he had participated in elections and become part of the government. Some wanted to stand up to the Sunnis, while still others simply wanted to create their own fiefdoms. A U.S. officer said, ???I???ll tell you as time goes on, you???re going to continue to see elements break off the organization and become sort of these semi-independent players, but none of them remain independent for long. They all find a sponsor.???
SCIRI???s Badr Brigade has also been implicated in sectarian killings. In July 2006 SCIRI???s leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim stood up for the militias when he said that it was legitimate for citizens to take up arms to protect themselves. There are reports that the Baghdad Order Maintenance police and elements of the Interior Ministry are controlled by the Badr organization and are carrying out death squad activities. In the city of Basra, a Toyota sedan infamous for kidnapping and killing Sunnis has been seen outside local SCIRI offices and a police station run by the Badr Brigade.
In southern Iraq there are various other, smaller Shiite organizations. Mahmud al-Hasani and his Husayn Army in Karbala, for example, is a new young cleric trying to imitate the success of Sadr. Hasani studied under Sadr???s father and was briefly allied with Moqtada, but broke with him over his participation in parliamentary elections. Like Sadr, Hasani is anti-American, anti-Iranian, opposed to SCIRI, and wants to set up an Islamic run government. Hasani has claimed that he is the ultimate authority on Shiisim in Iraq and has attacked U.S. forces off and on since October 2003. Hasani has fought another new Shiite group, the Fadhila party that has its own militia in the South. These and other organizations have openly battled each other in southern cities and carried out assassinations against one another. U.S. officials are afraid that these groups will eventually turn to Iran for money, weapons and support, and continue the fracturing of the country.
XVII. Responses to the Shiite Militias
???There is no evidence that shows that the minister of defense or interior are doing anything to stop this toll [of sectarian violence].??? Haider al-Abaadi, member of the ruling Shiite Alliance in the Iraqi Parliament, September 2006
What to do about the increasing sectarian violence and the Shiite militias has become the main point of contention between the U.S. and the government of Prime Minister al-Maliki. Even politicians in the ruling Shiite Alliance have questioned the government???s competency over the issue. One Shiite politician said, ???There is no evidence that shows that the minister of defense or interior are doing anything to stop this toll.??? Despite the mounting pressure Prime Minister Maliki has not introduced any new policy to deal with the militias. One reason is that he depends upon Sadr???s 30 parliamentary seats to stay in power. Joost Hiltermann, an Iraq expert at the International Crisis Group said, Maliki ???can???t get rid of [the Mahdi Army] without destroying his power base and therefore himself.??? Maliki also doesn???t have the forces necessary to crack down on the militias even if he wanted to. The U.S. controls 8 of the 10 Iraqi army divisions, and the majority of the police are run by militias. Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani has started making some moves to gain control of his ministry and the police under his command. In October he announced that he was going to clean up the Interior Ministry and started by firing more than 4,500 employees, this included two high-ranking police commanders, both believed to be Shiite militia members. A high-ranking police commander was also arrested for kidnapping over 26 workers in Baghdad, and a police brigade was taken out of service for arresting and kidnapping 24 workers in the city. The following month he charged 100 members of his ministry for running a prison in Baghdad where 1,431 prisoners were found to be tortured back in May 2006. Still, Bolani???s deputy minister is a Sadr follower and the police brigade taken out of service were not going to be punished, but rather sent in for more training.
Unhappy with the Iraqi government???s lack of action, the U.S. began moving against the Mahdi Army indirectly in the summer of 2006. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad said in a press conference that, ???Militias are the infrastructure of a civil war, and they go against resolving disputes through the political process.??? He said they needed to be ???decommissioned, demobilized and reintegrated,??? and singled out the Mahdi Army. The U.S. crack down has been delicate and inconsistent, because they can???t openly go after Sadr without taking on the Iraqi government, which the U.S. is trying to prop up. Because of that, the U.S. often does not mention the Mahdi Army publicly, but rather says that it is cracking down on Shiite death squads. In July, the U.S. military made a raid that led to the arrest of 30-40 gunmen and a militia commander. August 7 they moved into Sadr City in Baghdad that led to a day-long firefight with the Mahdi Army. All of these actions were condemned by Prime Minister Maliki. Maliki???s spokesman said, ???We don???t want to solve this problem with military force.??? Instead, the Iraqi government has told the Bush administration that it needs to negotiate with Sadr and treat him as a political leader. Things came to a head in October when the U.S. arrested one of Sadr???s lieutenants and Maliki ordered his release, which infuriated U.S. military commanders in Iraq.
The U.S. has also tried to use the Iraqi Army against Sadr because it is more ethnically mixed than the police. This led to a large clash in the city of Diwaniya on August 28. It started when Iraqi soldiers arrested one of Sadr???s supporters. This led to a gunfight between the Mahdi Army and several other Shiite militias in the city and the Iraqi Army. When the Iraqi soldiers ran out of ammunition they were captured, taken to the public square and executed by the militiamen. The fighting only stopped when Shiite politicians went to see Sadr and negotiated a cease-fire. The Iraqi Army was also used in a raid against cleric Mahmud al-Hasani that led to a day of street fighting in Karbala and protests in Nasiriyah and Basra against the government.
Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh has argued that the U.S. needs to undercut Sadr???s support by providing the base of his support, poor Shiites with jobs and reconstruction projects. ???The best way to do it is to give them jobs, not in the security system, but where they could be active in the economy. Once they get an income, I don???t think they will follow an ideology or become fundamentalist and extremist,??? he said. Iraq experts in the U.S. have also said similar things and advocated that the U.S. and Iraqi government provide social services and establish the rule of law in neighborhoods run by the Mahdi Army. The problem with that is the Ministry of Health, that might provide such services, is controlled by Sadr and the police are not reliable. Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group warned, ???Unless directly provoked, Sadrists will lay low, because they know the American???s time in Iraq is coming to an end. Why would they risk another major loss of fighters if it???s not necessary. Americans in their eyes are already defeated ??? they???re going to leave.???
???Deadlines could help ensure that the Iraqi leaders recognize the imperative of coming to grips with the tough decisions they???ve got to make for there to be progress in the political arena.??? Senior U.S. Army officer who served in Iraq, October 2006
In October 2006 with the surge in sectarian violence, the U.S. began to reevaluate its policy towards Iraq. Gen. Casey and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad began working on a new plan that would include peace negotiations with warring factions, universal political freedoms to maintain a democracy, sharing of oil revenues to assure Sunnis they would not be cut out of the country???s wealth, ending the de-Baathification program so that more Sunnis could be brought into the government, and disarming of the Shiite militias. If these ideas worked out U.S. troops could start leaving Iraq. The plan was both an attempt to take a new look at solutions to Iraq as well as show that the Bush administration was doing something about Iraq before the November mid-term Congressional elections in the U.S. Suddenly the U.S. was talking about timetables after Bush had rejected them. Timetables had been turned down in the past because they would help the insurgents, but by the fall of 2006 people inside and outside the White House were arguing that timetables would force the Iraqi government to make the tough decisions it had been avoiding. Some U.S. Army officers also supported timelines because they would set a deadline for when U.S. troops would leave Iraq instead of being stuck in an open ended deployment in Iraq.
The major problem with the U.S. timetable was that the Maliki government was so weak it probably could not accomplish most if any of the goals. The U.S. also didn???t mention what would happen if the Iraqis didn???t meet the guidelines. As soon as the plan became public, Prime Minister Maliki rejected it. ???I affirm that this government represents the will of the people, and no one has the right to impose a timetable on it,??? Maliki said in a press conference in October 2006. The prime minister also exposed one of the key motivations behind the U.S. timetable when he said at the same media briefing, ???I am positive that this is not the official policy of the American government but rather a result of the ongoing election campaign. And that does not concern us much.??? The U.S. timetable also had major problems besides Maliki. There are no assurances that the Shiites and Kurds, who live where almost all of Iraq???s oil is, would want to share its wealth with the Sunnis who they blame for the Saddam government and the constant bombings and attacks. Sunnis on the other hand, are increasingly becoming frustrated with participating in the Iraqi parliament where they have gotten little to nothing in return. ???The feeling has started to creep in that ???we participated in the political process, but what has it got us???? There is a real danger that ??? the Sunnis [will] wash their hands of being involved in the political process,??? Peter Khalil, an Iraq expert at the Eurasia Group, said. Details were never given on the U.S. timetable and after the U.S. elections they were seemingly dropped by the U.S., raising the question of whether there was ever a timetable plan, or whether it was just pre-election posturing by the administration.
XIX. The Insurgency
???The insurgency remains strong and virulent because the reason for its existence hasn???t changed. There???s still an occupation. As long as Sunni fears exist and as long as those who want to preserve the privileges they had under the former regime exist, there will be an insurgency.??? Joost Hilterman, Iraq expert, International Crisis Group, August 2006
Along with the growth of the Shiite militias, the Sunni insurgency continues to be alive and well in Iraq. In 2003 the U.S. estimated that there were 5,000 insurgents. By late 2004 that number had risen to 12,000-16,000. By 2006 the U.S. estimated that there were between 8,000-20,000 insurgents with up to 160,000 supporters. A Pentagon assessment reported in September 2006 that 75% of the Sunni population supported the insurgency, an amazing increase from only 14% in 2003. July 2006 saw the highest number of insurgent attacks with over 4,500 a month, while October saw one of the highest U.S. casualty rates since the U.S. invasion. This was all despite the killing of Al Qaeda in Iraq???s leader Abu Zarqawi in June that was hailed as a great victory for the U.S. The insurgency proved so strong that Vice President Cheney finally backed off his wild claim that it was in its ???last throes.???
Despite Zarqawi???s death, Al Qaeda in Iraq has actually grown. Their new leader is an Egyptian Abu Ayyub Masri who is seen as being more flexible than Zarqawi who was known for his rigid ideological views. Masri has allowed many new recruits to join the organization, especially local Iraqis, to expand their base. Before his death, Zarqawi had turned to threatening Sunni tribal leaders if they didn???t cooperate. This led to a vast exodus of tribes to the government???s side. Masri has mended fences with these leaders. Al Qaeda in Iraq and other Islamist insurgent groups also declared their own Islamic republic in western Iraq, but that was more for show than reality. The insurgents were able to have a parade down the middle of Ramadi though, after the announcement, to show their strength.
There are also continued reports of Iraq having a negative effect on the war on terror. Most striking was the seeming transfer of tactics from Iraq to Afghanistan. The summer and fall of 2006 saw a surge of attacks in Afghanistan using roadside bombs, kidnappings, and suicide bombings all imported from Iraq. ???The increase in vehicle bombings in Kabul ??? that???s straight-out-of-Iraq stuff. Now Iraq is the source of the expertise and Afghanistan is receiving,??? noted Brian Jenkins, a terrorist expert at the RAND Corp. The similarity in tactics was probably the result of Iraqi veterans traveling to Afghanistan. Asia Times estimated that at least 500 fighters had gone from Iraq to Afghanistan by March 2006. According to the SITE Institute, that monitors terrorism, terrorist training camps in Iraq have trained Afghan fighters. In September 2006 a Taliban leader told Newsweek about his training in one of these camps. ???I???m explaining to my fighters every day the lessons I learned and experienced in Iraq. I want to copy in Afghanistan the tactics and spirit of the glorious Iraqi resistance.??? France???s Le Monde newspaper also reported that Iraqi fighters had established training camps in Waziristan in northern Pakistan as well.
These events led to a series of intelligence reports warning of Iraq???s influence on global terror. A January 2003 National Intelligence Council report said that the Iraq war had the potential to increase support for Islamism and terrorism in the Muslim world. An earlier report by the Council that reports to the president, said back in early 2005 that Iraq had become the primary training ground for terrorists and that veterans might become the next terrorist leaders of the future. In April 2006, a report by the U.N. found that Iraqis had provided Al Qaeda with a training center and new recruits. It found concrete evidence of this influence in Afghanistan. ???New explosive devices are now used in Afghanistan within a month of their first appearing in Iraq.??? The White House itself, in a September 2006 report called ???9/11 Five Years Later: Success and Challenges,??? acknowledged that, ???The on going fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry.??? Also that foreign fighters in Iraq could return home ???exacerbating domestic conflicts or fomenting radical ideologies.??? That same month parts of a National Intelligence Estimate, which is suppose to reflect the consensus of all of the U.S. intelligence agencies, became public. The report said, ???We assess th
at the Iraqi jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere,??? and that ???The Iraq conflict has become the ???cause celebre??? for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.??? It also warned that, ???The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa???ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.??? Likewise, the British in a secret September 2006 report from their Defense Academy noted, ???The war in Iraq ??? has acted as a recruiting sergeant for extremists across the Muslim world ??? Iraq has served to radicalize an already disillusioned youth and al-Qaida has given them the will, intent, purpose and ideology to act.???
Despite all of these dire warnings, experts disagree on the overall impact of Iraq on the international Islamist movement. Most insurgents in Iraq are Iraqis, not foreigners that constitute only 10% of the fighters. Estimates say only about 50-70 foreign fighters enter Iraq each month. This could mean that Iraq will not create as many battle tested fighters as Afghanistan did in the 1980s. ???It is not obvious now how many Iraqi jihadists will support the global jihad of bin Laden and how many will focus their efforts on Iraq???s fledging state,??? a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found in October 2006. Some fighters may not be interested in fighting outside of Iraq, however it only takes a few to return to their homes and start new terrorist cells. Ironically, the death of Zarqawi, who focused upon killing Shiites and starting a sectarian civil war, might actually align the Islamists and foreign fighters in Iraq more with Al Qaeda and bin Laden, who was for uniting all Muslims against the U.S. While many experts agree that Iraq has radicalized a new generation of Islamists, the movement would have continued whether the U.S. had invaded Iraq or not. Islamism ???existed before Iraq and they will be after Iraq. But Iraq is hurting our efforts to battle this group??? argued Joseph Cirincione, a terrorist expert at the Center for American Progress. President Bush likes to say that Iraq is the main front in the war on terror, but fails to note that it was one of our own making. Not only that, the U.S. is in the precarious position where as long as it stays in Iraq, it will create violent opposition inside and outside the country, while if it withdraws it will provide Islamists with a victory. Prof. Fawaz Gerges of Cairo University stated this point well when he said, ???The predicament the United States faces right now is that we are basically bogged down in the shifting sand of Iraq, and the longer we stay, the more we provide ammunition to the jihadist leaders. But if we ??? retreat from Iraq, the militants will be empowered.???
Al-Maliki???s Government[/b]
???Persistent problems are eroding Iraq???s institutional capacity and popular support for U.S.-led reconstruction. Corruption is rampant in Baghdad and has rotted out nearly every Iraqi ministry. Two-and-a-half years after the fall of Saddam???s regime, the Iraqi central government has little ability to effect real change anywhere outside Baghdad???s heavily protected Green Zone. Rather than build ties to their people and improve the lives of their constituents, many Iraqi politicians are becoming disconnected from society at large and more pre-occupied with dividing up the country???s wealth among themselves.??? Kenneth Pollack, Iraq expert, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, February 2006 report on Iraq.
The White House praised Iraq???s parliamentary elections and the formation of Prime Minister Maliki???s government as a great step in the country???s democracy. However only a few months later people were wondering whether Iraq was really governable. The problems with the Maliki government are so numerous its doubtful they can ever be corrected. Maliki comes from the Dawa Party, the weakest of the three leading Shiite parties. It doesn???t have its own militia so it is seen as no threat to SCIRI or Sadr, and thus usually operates from a position of weakness when dealing with those two. Iraqi society has also become so deeply divided that it is fueling the violence and preventing the effective functioning of the government. The lack of effective security and loyal security forces also means that the government has little influence outside of the Green Zone. Maliki also came into office trying to satisfy too many groups at the same time. He needs the support of the U.S., but doesn???t want to be seen as an American puppet and his inaction with the militias has cost him much of their goodwill. He has also tried to make concessions to the Sunnis to bring them into the government, despite the fact that almost all of their major parties are connected to the insurgency, which enrages the Shiite militants. Maliki is also part of the ruling Shiite Alliance that that is involved in the sectarian violence. He is therefore unable to move against either the Sunni insurgents or Shiite militias without losing something. A leading Shiite legislator noted the divisions in the Maliki government when he said, ???There is a real trust crisis. The prime minister does not trust his deputy,??? and the speaker of parliament ???does not trust his first deputy.??? There are growing calls for a reorganization of Maliki???s cabinet, with some Shiites calling for the removal of all the Sunni members. On the other hand, things got so bad in September and October that rumors were flying around Baghdad that a coup could be made to remove Maliki from power. A provisional government would then take power that was not baked by the Shiite parties, suspend parliament, impose martial law, and try to stop the violence.
When Maliki first came into power his government did not seem so distraught. In fact, he seemed to come in with a plan on how to ease some of the country???s woes. In June 2006 he announced a 24-point peace plan called the National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project. His plan included an amnesty for insurgents that would give up fighting, a timetable for the departure of U.S. troops, ending military operations against rebel strongholds such as Fallujah, monetary payments to victims of attacks, a crack down on Shiite militias, and cleaning up prisons that were noted for abuses. Parts of his plan immediately caused problems. First was the amnesty issue. Immediately after Maliki announced the plan half a dozen nationalist Sunni insurgent groups contacted the government about being pardoned. However the Americans and other Shiite political parties did not want to give amnesties to insurgents that had killed American soldiers and attacked Shiites. Maliki was eventually forced to change his plan to only apply to insurgents that had not killed anyone, making it meaningless in the process. A timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal was also drew American objections. Until the November U.S. elections, Bush had rejected any timetables as giving into the insurgents. Like the amnesty program, Maliki had to shelve this plan as well. Together these two reverses ended negotiations with the Sunni insurgents, torpedoing the peace plan before it even had time to breathe. ???U.S. interference has complicated the reconciliation process, thereby prolonging the U.S. presence and perpetuating the killing and destruction,??? wrote retired Col. Daniel Smith, in a study for the Foreign Policy In Focus think tank. Maliki tried to move ahead by sending out emissaries to the neighboring countries of Jordan, Egypt, Syria and the United Arab Emirates to try to end foreign support of the insurgents. He also announced a new plan to create community commissions of both Sunnis and Shiites to try to overcome the sectarian differences. That too was quickly cancelled however as the violence reached new levels of brutality. By October, Maliki??
?s plan was virtually dead.
Maliki tried to deal with all of his problems by standing up to the U.S. to gain back public support. He condemned U.S. raids against the Mahdi Army and denounced the proposed U.S. timetable as an affront to Iraqi sovereignty and an election year stunt by the White House. In November he ordered an end to a U.S. blockade around Baghdad???s Sadr City to find a kidnapped American soldier. Whatever the direction of Maliki???s government, many experts believe he doesn???t have much time left to make a decisive move to save the country. The Iraq Study Group, created by the White House to make recommendations to President Bush, said that Maliki only has until the end of 2006 to turn things around.
XX. Undercut By Other Shiites
To make matters worse, Maliki faced increasing difficulties from fellow Shiites. The government was losing control of Basra, the 2nd largest city in the country, to battles between Sadr and the SCIRI. On the other hand SCIRI was pushing for constitutional amendments to the constitution that would allow for an oil-rich autonomous Shiite South that would further fracture the country and ensure the hatred and continued insurgency by the Sunnis who felt threatened by the rising Shiite power. Maliki proved incapable of dealing with either problem.
During the summer as sectarian violence took off in central Iraq, in southern Iraq Shiites were turning on each other. The main point of contention between the various factions was control of the oil fields surrounding the city of Basra and its port, which was the gateway to the Persian Gulf. The South provides 90% of Iraq???s oil revenue. ???Shiite militias are fighting over that crown in the jewel,??? noted Peter Khalil, a Middle East analyst at the Eurasia Group. Militias and criminal gangs have set up clandestine networks throughout the South that are involved in smuggling, corruption, and extortion rackets. With that came increased violence with 85 murders in Basra in May 2006, triple the number of January of that year. Politically, the city is split between the smaller Fadhila party that was aligned with Sadr, and the SCIRI and Dawa Party. Fadhila controls the province???s governor, the chairman of the provincial council, and the Southern Oil Company???s security forces. At the same time the Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade have had armed clashes over control of the city. In response Maliki announced a state of emergency in the city, but it had little effect.
In Baghdad SCIRI was causing controversy over the Constitution. When the Constitution was voted on in January 2005 many of the major issues like federalism were left unfinished. The Maliki government was supposed to come up with amendments to resolve these issues, but the negotiations went nowhere. In August 2006 SCIRI called for creating an autonomous region for Shiites in southern Iraq. By the next month Parliament had cut a deal to wait at least 18 months to handle the issue. SCIRI pushed through a resolution in October to set up steps to form federal regions in the country after that 18 months hiatus. The vote caused even more dissension within Parliament. Sadr and the Fadhila party abstained from the vote because they were opposed to the idea, while the Sunnis boycotted. The Sunnis were afraid that the Kurds and Shiites would carve up large sections of Iraq that possessed all of the country???s oil leaving the Sunnis with nothing. Sadr on the other hand had aspirations to rule all of Iraq, not a section of it. Like most things, Prime Minister Maliki had no solution to this problem, and has remained largely silent on it.
XXI. Economic Problems
???Iraq is a devastated economic wasteland.??? Hussain al-Shahristani, Oil Minister, August 2006
Besides political problems and sectarian violence, the Maliki government also faced serious economic difficulties. Like everything else, things were getting worse during 2006. Unemployment ranged from 30-60% depending upon the study. All seemed to say that it was increasing however. A senior official at the Iraqi Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs said that 5.6 million Iraqis were living below the poverty line. For 40% of those, conditions were worsening. That was a 35% increase from before the 2003 invasion. At the same time inflation was skyrocketing to as high as 70%, up from 32% in 2005. Fuel and electricity prices were up 270% in 2005. The rise in prices and subsequent inflation were caused by the lack of security, insurgent attacks on the infrastructure, and an International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity program. The IMF program had been agreed upon to lower the country???s debt. Under the IMF plan Iraq was making major cuts to government spending just when the country needed more jobs, infrastructure, services, etc. As part of the plan the government was cutting gas subsidies, which led to skyrocketing prices and an increase in inflation. Getting gas could last a day and cost an average of several days??? pay. In return, 80% of Iraq???s foreign debt has been forgiven. Manufacturing was also crippled, there was a lack of foreign investment because of the violence, and agriculture was handicapped because farm products couldn???t be safely shipped around the country with insurgent and sectarian violence.
The only good news was that oil and electrical output, for the first time, passed pre-war production levels in November 2006. That didn???t automatically translate to better service and delivery, which continues to be spotty with only a few hours of electricity a day, and oil delivery hampered by insurgent attacks and widespread corruption and smuggling. At the same time, much of the infrastructure that produces oil and electricity was obsolete and barely functioning. The Bayji refinery is a perfect example. It???s the largest and newest in the country, yet it was built in the 1980s. It has a capacity of 310,00 barrels of oil per day, but hasn???t produced more than 170,000 since May 2006. During the summer of 2006 production dropped to as low as 7,500 barrels a day. It has an efficiency rate of only 50% compared to modern refiners that rate 90%. The U.S. inspector general for Iraq reported in September 2006 that Iraq lost $16 billion from January 2004 to March 2006 in potential oil sales because of insurgent attacks, bad equipment and smuggling. The inspector general said the problems were so bad that even if there were no insurgent attacks on the oil network, criminals and old equipment would still hamper effective oil production. Even though Iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world, it is forced to import billions of dollars of oil products because of its inadequate production and delivery system. The high oil prices during the summer of 2006 brought in high revenues for the government that tended to mask the large economic problems the country was facing.
XII. Corruption
???Corruption has become common in Iraq. Every government department is plagued by some type of corruption and the problem has become endemic countrywide.??? Judge Radhi al-Radhi, head of the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, September 2006
Corruption is also rampant throughout Iraqi society and government. In November 2006 the U.S. inspector general for Iraq said that the Iraqi government was losing $4 billion a year due to corruption. That was 10% of the country???s national income. Judge Radi Hamza Radhi al-Radhi, head of Iraq???s Commission on Public Integrity that investigates corruption said, ???Corruption has exploded??? since the fall of Saddam. He blamed the ???weakness of state institutions during the transition period which saw several governments succeed each other in a short period of time??? after the U.S. invasion. ???Corruption is definitely hampering reconstruction. Corruption affects development and prevents benefits from flowing to those who most need them,??? noted Arwa Hussein, Middle East Program Coordinator for Transparency International, a Berlin based Non-Government O
rganization that monitors world corruption. At the root of corruption were the various political parties that used government posts as patronage for their followers rather than appoint qualified personnel. An August report by the Pentagon to the U.S. Congress found, ???Experienced or talented employees are often purged and replaced with party elements/cronies as a result of a spoils system. Many of Iraq???s political factions tend to view government ministries and their associated budgets as sources of power, patronage, and funding for their parties.??? Currently eight former ministers are under investigation for corruption. However the likelihood that they will ever be punished is slim due to their political connections.
Corruption is pervasive at the lower levels of the Iraqi government as well, most notably in the police force. A report fond that insurgents are routinely released in return for bribes for example. The U.S. State Department found that police were selling passports. The police are also accused of all kinds of abuses such as torture, death squads, working for the militias, and kidnapping rings. A July 2006 State Department report found, ???Despite great progress and genuine commitment on the part of many ministry officials, the current climate of corruption, human rights violations and sectarian violence found in Iraq???s security forces undermines public confidence.??? There are no serious efforts underway to end corruption because there is no security. The courts are overwhelmed dealing with terrorism cases and have no time for dealing with corruption, plus with most political parties connected to an armed group, they would most likely not allow any high ranking official to ever go to trial.
XIII. The Kurds
The Kurds are generally considered the one success story in Iraq. Yet even in the north, the violence and sectarian divisions are spreading, and the Kurdish parties are walking a fine line between demanding autonomy, keeping Iraq together, and not angering the neighboring countries.
The Kurds back a federalist plan for Iraq where they could maintain their relative autonomy in the north. At the same time they realize that they need to be part of Iraq because if the country were to really break apart the violence would spill over into their territory. Not only that, they are surrounded by Turkey, Syria and Iran who are all opposed to Kurdish autonomy. At the same time the Kurds passed a draft law that would grant them control of the oil in their region and the neighboring city of Kirkuk, have banned the flying of the Iraqi flag, and no longer teach their children Arabic in school. Kirkuk and Mosul are the two flashpoints in the north. Both are outside Kurdistan, but the Kurds are set on incorporating both within their region even though Kurds are a minority in both cities. As a consequence, both places have seen an increase in violence between Sunni insurgents, Kurdish security forces, and Turkoman.
There are also Kurdish guerrilla groups that are intent on creating a larger Kurdistan that have conducted military operations in Iran and Turkey. In response, Iran has shelled Kurdistan off and on. Turkey also bombed a suspected Kurdish guerrilla base. Turkey has been pressing the Maliki government to crack down on these Kurdish groups, and warned Kurdish officials not to seize the city of Kirkuk. By the winter of 2006 the U.S. was able to negotiate an informal cease-fire with the Kurdistan Workers Party that had been launching raids into Turkey. A larger solution to the problem has not been worked out, and neither has the future of Kirkuk and Mosul.
Conclusion[/b]
In the third year since the U.S. invasion little seems to be going right with the American project in Iraq. In fact, on most fronts, things are worse now than before. President Bush is still steadfast in his view that America is winning, but that???s based upon his beliefs rather than any reality in Iraq. The U.S. counterinsurgency program is still deeply flawed, the U.S. failed to secure the capital twice, and the training of the Iraqi security forces is creating a completely dependent Iraqi Army and a police force who increase the violence rather than work to end it. The lack of adequate U.S. troops has been a major detriment to success of all of these programs, but the U.S. is simply running out of men and equipment to be sent overseas without either increasing the number of active duty soldiers or changing the troop rotations of regular, Reserve, and National Guard soldiers.
On the Iraqi side the country is sliding closer and closer to a full-fledged civil war, which the U.S. has not been able to stop, and parts of the Iraqi government are helping to create. The Shiites are also fracturing into armed camps fighting against not only the Sunni insurgents but themselves as well for power and the future of the country. The Maliki government, dependent upon Sadr and his militia, has largely sat on the sidelines while events spiral out of control around them. The Sunnis meanwhile are backing the insurgency more than ever, while the Kurds are trying to incorporate northern cities into their existing Kurdistan. The U.S. and the Iraqi people have largely lost confidence in the prime minister to fix any of these problems, and rumors of a possible coup have only increased as a consequence.
Many in the U.S. hope that the change in power from Republicans to Democrats in Congress and the presidential appointed Iraq Study Group will lead to a dramatic change in U.S. policy, but those hopes will probably prove unfounded. The Democrats in Congress want to bring up troop withdrawals sooner rather than later, while the Iraq Survey Group will probably only come up with modest proposals that will not fix the deep ceded problems in the country.
A basic American belief is that there are always solutions to problems. Iraq may prove that belief wrong. The time to fix Iraq???s problems might have been in the first year of the occupation, and once that passed, events took on a life of their own outside of American control and headed towards chaos. A civil war maybe inevitable and there is nothing the U.S. can do, but temporarily stop the worst violence in specific neighborhoods while the rest of the country goes up in flames.
Comments
you should cite your sources. it will strengthen your piece significantly.
use APA style
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack
Richard Clark, Against All Enemies
Francis Fukayama, America At The Crossroads
George Packer, The Assassin???s Gate
John Prados, Hoodwinked
Thomas Ricks, Fiasco
Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine
- Price Of Loyalty
Bob Woodward, Bush At War
- Plan of Attack
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS[/b]
British Downing Street Memos
GOVERNMENT REPORTS[/b]
9/11 Commission Official Report
Senate Intelligence Committee, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community???s Prewar Intelligence on Iraq
Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons Of Mass Destruction
THINK TANK REPORTS[/b]
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ???WMD In Iraq Evidence and Implications??? January 2004
Center For American Progress, Lawrence Korb and Brian Katulis ???Strategic Redeployment: A Progressive Plan for Iraq and the Struggle Against Violent Extremists??? 10/3/05
Center For Defense Information; Straus Military Reform Project ???Little Promise in Iraqi Security Forces??? 12/5/05
- ???Willful Ignorance: How the Pentagon sent the army to Iraq without a counterinsurgency doctrine??? 9/16/05
Center For Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman ???Iraqi Force Development: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job???? 11/29/05
Foreign Policy In Focus, Col. Daniel Smith Ret. ???Repairing a Broken Iraq???? 7/3/06
Open Society Institute, Yahia Said ???Misunderstanding Iraq: Recommendations for US Policy??? November 2005
Project On Defense Alternatives ???Disarming Iraq: What Did the UN Missions Accomplish???? 4/25/03
Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Kenneth Pollack, Brookings Institution ???A Switch In Time; A New Strategy For America In Iraq??? February 2006
U.S. Army, Military Review, Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White, ???Assessing Iraq???s Sunni Arab Insurgency??? May-June 2006
Washington Institute, Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White ???Assessing Iraq???s Sunni Arab Insurgency??? December 2005
8/12/02 ??? ???Theater Of War??? Time
8/27/02 ??? ???Vice president makes case for war on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/2/02 ??? ???Iraq & Al-Qaeda Is There A Link???? Time
9/16/02 ??? ???What Does Saddam Have???? Time
9/25/02 ??? ???Iraq???s gem weapons set to go, Blair says??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/14/02 ??? ???Why War???? U.S. News & World Report
10/21/02 ??? ???Politics and the CIA??? Time
12/2/02 ??? ???After The Fall??? Time
2003 ??? ???Analyses Going It Alone???? PBS??? Frontline
2003 ??? ???Analysis 2003: First Draft Of A Grand Strategy??? PBS??? Frontline
2003 ??? ???Chronology: The Evolution Of The Bush Doctrine??? PBS??? Frontline
2003 ??? ???Interview: Mark Danner??? PBS??? Frontline
2003 ??? ???Iraq, The Middle East, And Beyond???? PBS??? Frontline
1/13/03 ??? ???New American Empire???? U.S. News & World Report
1/27/03 ??? ???Bush???s Brainiest Hawk??? Time
2/3/03 ??? ???6 Reasons Why So Many Allies Want Bush To Slow Down??? Time
2/10/03 ??? ???Dissecting The Case??? Time
2/17/03 ??? ???What???s Behind a Sinister Flirtation??? Time
3/2/03 ??? ???Who armed Iraq San Francisco Chronicle
3/2/03 ??? ???Who will fight the war???? San Francisco Chronicle
3/2/03 ??? ???Who will suffer???? San Francisco Chronicle
3/5/03 ??? ???Why Hussein Will Not Give Weapons of Mass Destruction to Al Qaeda??? Cato Institute
3/10/03 ??? ???Looking Beyond Saddam??? Time
3/24/03 ??? ???Northern Iraq???s Other War??? U.S News & World Report
3/25/03 ??? ???A Spurious ???Smoking Gun?????? Mother Jones
3/31/03 ??? ???First Stop, Iraq??? Time
4/03 ??? ???The Thirty Year Itch??? Mother Jones
4/03 ??? ???Neo Con Chaos in the Middle East isn???t the Bush-hawks??? nightmare scenario ??? it???s their plan??? Washington Monthly
4/6/03 ??? ???Little evidence of banned weapons found so far??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/12/03 ??? ???Liquid Wealth A Mirage??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/13/03 ??? ???Bush aides press ???preemptive deterrence??? in Mideast??? Boston Globe
4/13/03 ??? ???US edges closer in search for arms??? Boston Globe
4/16/03 ??? ???CIA???s ???brightest prospect??? for Iraq presidency missing??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/18/03 ??? ???Illegal Weapons: What if U.S. forces don???t find any???? San Francisco Chronicle
4/18/03 ??? ???Political Party in Mosul Emerges With Own Army??? New York Times
4/18/03 ??? ???Rumsfeld Looking for Help In Finding Outlawed Arms??? New York Times
4/18/03 ??? ???Some Skeptics Say Arms Hunt Is Fruitless??? New York Times
4/19/03 ??? ???Iraqi crowd tells U.S. to leave??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/19/03 ??? ???Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/20/03 ??? ???U.S. may keep bases for military in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/21/03 ??? ???America & The World??? Business Week
4/21/03 ??? ???Bush lauds Syrian help corralling Hussein aides??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/21/03 ??? ???Scientist says Iraq destroyed illicit arms??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/21/03 ??? ???Where Will All That Anger Go???? Business Week
4/22/03 ??? ???U.S. overseer tours Baghdad??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/23/03 ??? ???Iraq???s Shiites show strength on once-banned pilgrimage??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/24/03 ??? ???Shiite clerics challenge U.S. goal in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/25/03 ??? ???Iraqi weapons may be gone, Bush says??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/26/03 ??? ???Iraqi in Iran urges Shiites to take power??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/26/03 ??? ???No proof of Powell???s arms claims??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/27/03 ??? ???Terrorist manual may link Iraqi group to al Qaeda??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/28/03 ??? ???Unfinished Business??? Time
5/3/03 ??? ???A classicist???s Legacy: New Empire Builders??? New York Times
5/3/03 ??? ???Bush Says It Will Take Time to Find Iraq???s Banned Arms??? New York Times
5/3/03 ??? ???Iraq Exiles, Backed by U.S. Return to Reinvent a Country??? New York Times
5/4/03 ??? ???No unconventional arms, Iraqi scientists still insist??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/7/03 ??? ???Bush appoints new overseer to run Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/10/03 ??? ???Rumsfeld foresees year in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/11/03 ??? ???Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq??? Washington Post
5/12/03 ??? ???Selective Intelligence??? New Yorker
5/12/03 ??? ???What Ever Happened to The Republican Guard???? Time
5/14/03 ??? ???Bush Officials Change Tune on Iraqi Weapons??? Reuters
5/14/03 ??? ???Locating Iraq???s weapons not vital, says UK??? Independent Online
5/23/03 ??? ???CIA to review Iraq intelligence for bias, accuracy??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/25/03 ??? ???Behind Baghdad???s fall??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/26/03 ??? ???Can Anyone Govern This Place???? Time
5/28/03 ??? ???Rumsfeld comments on Iraq weapons renew British criticism of war??? Associated Press
5/29/03 ??? ???U.K. dossier on Iraq weapons ???unreliable?????? United Press International
5/30/03 ??? ???Pentagon Expands Weapons Hunt??? Reuters
5/31/03 ??? ???Iraq war rationale questioned anew??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/1/03 ??? ???Bush Remarks Confirm Shift In Justifying War??? Washington Post
6/2/03 ??? ???U.S. drops assembly idea for interim political council??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/5/03 ??? ???Pentagon adviser denies politicizing Iraq intelligence??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/5/03 ??? ???Some Iraq Analysts Felt Pressure From Cheney Visits??? Washington Post
6/6/03 ??? ???Blix: Don???t assume Saddam had weapons of mass destruction??? Associated Press
6/6/03 ??? ???Security Council pushes for return of inspectors??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/7/03 ??? ???2002 report found no Iraqi arsenal??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/7/03 ??? ???Bush Certainty On Iraq Arms Went Beyond Analysts??? Views??? Washington Post
6/7/03 ??? ???Some experts doubt trailers were germ lab??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/9/03 ??? ???Officials Defend Iraq Intelligence??? Washington Post
6/9/03 ??? ???Truth And Consequences??? U.S. News & World Report
6/9/03 ??? ???Weapons Of Mass Disappearance??? Time
6/10/03 ??? ???War in Iraq Was ???Right Decision,??? Bush Says??? Washington Post
6/14/03 ??? ???CIA experts on Iraq arms shifted to different jobs??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/22/03 ??? ???Blix Downgrades Prewar Assessment of Iraqi Weapons??? Washington Post
6/22/00 ??? ???Report Cast Doubt on Iraq-Al Qaeda Connection??? Washington Post
6/23/03 ??? ???Spooks: No reliable intel on Iraqi weapons??? U.S. News & World Report
6/25/03 ??? ???Politics challenged analysis of Iraq, official tells panels??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/03 ??? ???Bush???s Brain Trust??? Vanity Fair
7/3/03 ??? ???Iraqis swelter in 115 heat ??? and fume at U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/7/03 ??? ???Attacks raise fears of guierrilla war in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/7/03 ??? ???Bush aides twisted findings on Iraq, former envoy says??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/7/03 ??? ???The War That Never Ends??? Time
7/8/03 ??? ???Big step toward a new Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/8/03 ??? ???White House shrinks its Iraqi nuclear claim??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/10/03 ??? ???Imports inundate Iraq under new U.S. policy??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/10/03 ??? ???U.S. to keep troop levels in Iraq unchanged??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/11/03 ??? ???Bush team united Iraq front unravels??? MSNBC.Com
7/11/03 ??? ???Iraqi oil would be collateral for loans under bank???s plan??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/12/03 ??? ???CIA director takes blame for false Iraqi claim??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/12/03 ??? ???U.S. pulls back a bit in Hussein stronghold??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/13/03 ??? ???Britain stands by claim that Iraq tried to buy uranium in Africa??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/13/03 ??? ???Iraq pieces together its first postwar governing council??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/13/03 ??? ???Tab on Iraq war could limit other military funding??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/13/03 ??? ???Tenet had kept claim out of earlier Bush speech??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/16/03 ??? ???Shiite support for U.S. occupation of Iraq appears tenuous??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/16/03 ??? ???Soldiers Stuck In Iraq??? ABCNEWS.com
7/17/03 ??? ???General in Iraq says U.S. faces a guerrilla war??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/18/03 ??? ???Pentagon retaliates against Gis who spoke out on TV??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/18/03 ??? ???Uranium claim linked to aide at White House??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/19/03 ??? ???Iraq occupation may force U.S. to ask U.N. help??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/19/03 ??? ???White House releases spy report on Iraq arms??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/20/03 ??? ???Chaotic search for Iraq???s weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/20/03 ??? ???Many in Iraq feel U.N. needs to take bigger role??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/21/03 ??? ???Still Fighting Saddam??? Newsweek
7/22/03 ??? ???Iraqi party helping U.S. reassemble Iran spy unit??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/28/03 ??? ???West Wing Pipe Dream??? Mother Jones
7/29/03 ??? ???Iraqi detainees report ???inhumane??? treatment??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/31/03 ??? ???Bush takes blame for uranium error??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/31/03 ??? ???Iraqi council chooses a Shiite leader??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/4/03 ??? ???Civilian deaths stoke Iraqis??? resentment??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/7/03 ??? ???Iraqi anger over raids makes U.S. back off??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/7/03 ??? ???Violence in Iraq puts kids under house arrest??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/8/03 ??? ???Bush Team Kept Airing Iraq Allegation??? Washington Post
8/9/03 ??? ???Powell???s ???thick file??? looking thin??? Associated Press
8/10/03 ??? ???Experts review, poke holes in case for war??? Chicago Tribune
8/10/03 ??? ???Militants linked to al Qaeda rallying in Iraq, Bremer says??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/11/03 ??? ???Violence claims 3 lives in Basra???s searing heat??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/12/03 ??? ???Estimated tab to rebuild Iraq put as high as $600 billion??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/14/03 ??? ???U.S. gives up on idea of U.N. playing big role in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/17/03 ??? ???Iraqi oil flow halted for a week by attack??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/17/03 ??? ???Lack of phones wearing on Iraqis??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/18/03 ??? ???Vital pipelines attacked??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/19/03 ??? ???Blair aide doubted level of Iraqi threat??? Boston Globe
8/20/03 ??? ???As attacks escalate, US troops no longer sole target??? Boston Globe
8/20/03 ??? ???Blast highlights U.S. failure to end chaos in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/20/03 ??? ???Magnet For Evil??? New York Times
8/21/03 ??? ???U.S. to push in U.N. for help in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/22/03 ??? ???Powell makes appeal to U.N. for Iraq help??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/22/03 ??? ???US role in Iraq could cost $60b more??? Boston Globe
8/26/03 ??? ???Abandoned weaponry litters Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/27/03 ??? ???Cost to rebuild Iraq soars??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/28/03 ??? ???White House changes stance on U.N. in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/30/03 ??? ???85 die in Iraq shrine blast ??? key ayatollah among slain??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/31/03 ??? ???Ideology takes a backseat to reality in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/3/03 ??? ???Battlefield Casualties surging??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/3/03 ??? ???Bombing at Baghdad police compound??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/3/03 ??? ???Bush, U.N. to negotiate on troops in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/4/03 ??? ???Iraqis sample democracy in U.S.-sponsored councils??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/4/03 ??? ???Iraqis take over Cabinet posts amid insecurity??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/5/03 ??? ???Retired general lambastes U.S. policy in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/5/03 ??? ???Rumsfeld calls for more Iraqi security troops??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/8/03 ??? ???Bush asks $87 billion for war??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/12/03 ??? ???Blair warned of Iraq attack dangers??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/14/03 ??? ???Iraqis fearful of aiding U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/14/03 ??? ???Public unhappy with war funds request??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/17/03 ??? ???Misspeak first, correct later??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/18/03 ??? ???Bush: No evidence of Hussein, 9/11 link??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/18/03 ??? ???Iraqi criminal gangs prey on families??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/21/03 ??? ???Bechtel under siege??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/21/03 ??? ???Gunmen stalk Hussein party members??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/21/03 ??? ???Iraq council member ambushed??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/22/03 ??? ???Facing Reality??? Time
9/22/03 ??? ???Iraqi leaders to tell Congress of wasteful spending??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/23/03 ??? ???Bremer makes pitch for U.S. aid to Iraqis??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/23/03 ??? ???U.S.-trained Iraqi guards lack guns??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/24/03 ??? ???Bush???s no-apologies speech convinces few??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/25/03 ??? ???Iraq: How to Not Win a War??? New York Review of Books
9/28/03 ??? ???House panel skewers intelligence community on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/29/03 ??? ???Borderline War??? U.S. News & World Report
9/29/03 ??? ???Bush advisers defend Iraq intelligence??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/2/03 ??? ???500 felled towers keep Iraqi power at home??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/3/03 ??? ???No illegal weapons found in Iraq, U.S. investigator says??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/4/03 ??? ???Bush holds to his view of Iraq threat??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/4/03 ??? ???Iraqis dubious about U.S. contracts??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/5/03 ??? ???On The Frontlines Core of resistance??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/6/03 ??? ???So, What Went Wrong?/Chasing A Mirage??? Time
10/6/03 ??? ???U.S. revamps postwar command for Iraq, Afghanistan??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/7/03 ??? ???Bitter Iraqi vents anger by killing U.S. troops??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/9/03 ??? ???A Necessary War???? PBS??? Frontline
10/9/03 ??? ???Experts seek $6 billion in aid to rebuild Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/9/03 ??? ???In Their Own Words: Who Said What When??? PBS??? Frontline
10/9/03 ??? ???Is This Victory???? PBS??? Frontline
10/9/03 ??? ???The Middle East, Democracy, and Dominoes??? PBS??? Frontline
10/9/03 ??? ???Rumsfeld dismisses talk of diminished role in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/9/03 ??? ???Selective Intelligence??? PBS??? Frontline
10/9/03 ??? ???Turf Wars and the Future of Iraq??? PBS??? Frontline
10/9/03 ??? ???We Want A Government and We Want It Now??? PBS??? Frontline
10/9/03 ??? ???What???s at Stake in Iraq???? PBS??? Frontline
10/10/03 ??? ???Bush attempts to raise sagging support on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/10/03 ??? ???Sending troops to Iraq involves great risks for Turkey??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/11/03 ??? ???Cheney lashes out at policy critics??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/11/03 ??? ???Clash in Baghdad slum roils Shiites against U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/11/03 ??? ???House panel takes sides on Iraq reconstruction??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/13/03 ??? ???Leaking With A Vengeance??? Time
10/16/03 ??? ???Orwellian strategy used to sell the war??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/18/03 ??? ???Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq??? New York Times
10/19/03 ??? ???Official report sees patterns behind attacks on GIs??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/24/03 ??? ???U.S. hunts Iraq funds at conference??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/25/03 ??? ???$13 billion promised by donors to aid Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/25/03 ??? ???Black gold at the end of the rainbow??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/27/03 ??? ???Bomb kills 15 at Red Cross in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/27/03 ??? ???Danger Around Eery Corner??? Time
10/28/03 ??? ???Hellish start to holy month in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/28/03 ??? ???U.S. intelligence not consistent in analyzing attacks??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/28/03 ??? ???U.S. says increased Iraqi resistance shows desperation??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/29/03 ??? ???Bush???s new word on Iraq: patience??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/30/03 ??? ???U.S. to put Iraqis in frontline fight??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/1/03 ??? ???Young militants making way to Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/2/03 ??? ???Lack of jobs pushes Iraqis toward critical mass??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/5/03 ??? ???Unlikely Iraq can tap oil to pay its way??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/12/03 ??? ???Frustrated top GI in Iraq talks tough??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/13/03 ??? ???CIA says Iraqis dubious about U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/13/03 ??? ???U.S. set to cede power to Iraqis quickly??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/14/03 ??? ???Japan balks at troops for Iraq: U.S. hammers rebels??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/14/03 ??? ???Tough tactics in Iraq stir debate by experts??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/16/03 ??? ???Iraqis to take charge of country by July??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/21/03 ??? ???Car bomb warning to sheiks??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/24/03 ??? ???If At First You Don???t Succeed?????? Time
11/27/03 ??? ???Iraq???s top Shiite assails U.S. plan to cede power??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/28/03 ??? ???Foreigners in Iraq say Koran requires fighting U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/28/03 ??? ???Iraq???s oil pipelines under attack??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/28/03 ??? ???Mosul losing faith in U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/1/03 ??? ???Iraqis deny weapons claims made by U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/1/03 ??? ???Vengeance Has Its Day??? Time
12/7/03 ??? ???U.S. getting tough with Iraqi insurgents??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/8/07 ??? ???Losing Hearts and Minds??? Time
12/10/03 ??? ???U.S. paying dearly for gas in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/11/03 ??? ???Miffed allies urged to forgive Iraq debt??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/12/03 ??? ???Pentagon alleges Iraq rip-off??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/15/03 ??? ???Life Behind Enemy Lines??? Time
12/15/03 ??? ???Will Insurgency Wane? In short term, maybe, but long-term effect more difficult to predict??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/18/03 ??? ???Delusions in Baghdad??? New York Review of Books
12/22/03 ??? ???How to Lose Friends and Alienate People??? Time
12/24/03 ??? ???Intelligence panel sees no intention to lie on Iraq arms??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/29/03 ??? ???Secretary of War??? Time
1/11/04 ??? ???Bush Planned Iraqi Invasion Pre-9/11, O???Neil Says??? Associated Press
1/13/04 ??? ???Weapons of Misperception??? Atlantic Monthly Online
1/14/04 ??? ???Hussein was leery of jihadist ties??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/16/04 ??? ???Women???s rights at risk in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/19/04 ??? ???Confessions Of A White House Insider??? Time
1/22/04 ??? ???David Kay - Interview??? PBS??? Frontline
1/22/04 ??? ???Hans Blix - Interview??? PBS??? Frontline
1/23/04 ??? ???Cheney claims al Qaeda link to Hussein??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/24/04 ??? ???Head of U.S. weapons search quits??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/26/04 ??? ???Deal Maker, Deal Breaker??? U.S. News & World Report
1/26/04 ??? ???Ex-arms hunter wants answers on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/28/04 ??? ???Iraq destroyed arms, ex-inspecctor says??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/29/04 ??? ???Ex-inspector: Intelligence to blame for claim on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/29/04 ??? ???Top judge absolves Britain???s Tony Blair??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/30/04 ??? ???2 congressional panels echo Kay on Iraqi weaponry??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/31/04 ??? ???Political pressure ruled out in Iraq analyses??? San Francisco Chronicle
1-2/04 ??? ???Blind Into Baghdad??? Atlantic Monthly Online
1-2/04 - ???The Lie Factory??? Mother Jones
1-2/04 ??? ???Spies, Lies and Weapons: What Went Wrong??? Atlantic Monthly Online
2/4/04 ??? ???Powell reverses on comments about Iraq war??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/6/04 ??? ???CIA chief admits failings on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/8/04 ??? ???Bush, Cheney offer new arguments for war in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/8/04 ??? ???Rumsfeld fervently defends Iraq war??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/9/04 ??? ???Intercepted memo seeks al Qaeda aid??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/9/04 ??? ???So Much For The WMD??? Time
2/9/04 ??? ???Stretched Thin??? U.S. News & World Report
2/9/04 ??? ???We Were All Wrong??? U.S. News & World Report
2/16/04 ??? ???Raid prompts doubts about Iraqi security??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/20/04 ??? ???U.S. abandons Iraq caucus plan??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/26/04 ??? ???Operation Iraqi Freedom??? PBS??? Frontline
3/6/04 ??? ???Prewar reports said Iraq had no illicit weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/9/04 ??? ???Iraqi constitution in danger of being undone by factions??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/10/04 ??? ???CIA chief was out of loop on Iraq special briefing??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/11/04 ??? ???White House hit for refusing to estimate Iraq war costs??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/15/04 ??? ???Which Way Is The Exit???? Time
3/16/04 ??? ???What Iraqis fear most ??? sectarian violence??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/17/04 ??? ???Bush tries to steel allies??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/17/04 ??? ???Intelligence failure, misinterpretation or deceit??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/19/04 ??? ???Scarce jobs, unsafe streets tarnish gains in freedom??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/21/04 ??? ???Cheney, energy and Iraq invasion??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/22/04 ??? ???Ex-counterterrorism chief says Bush politicized response to 9/11??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/22/04 ??? ???Where Things Stand??? Time
3/23/04 ??? ???Ex-aide???s chargest spark blame game on 9/11, Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/25/04 ??? ???A Spurious ???Smoking Gun?????? ??? Iraq ??? Foreign Policy
3-4/04 ??? ???Thirty-Year Itch??? ??? Iraq ??? Foreign Policy
4/3/04 ??? ???Powell says bad data misled him on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/3/04 ??? ???Shiite cleric???s rhetoric ominous??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/5/04 ??? ???30 killed in Iraq clashes after arrest of cleric???s aide??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/5/04 ??? ???Is Condi The Problem???? Time
4/7/04 ??? ???12 Marines killed by Sunni rebels ??? Shiite uprising rages in south??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/12/04 ??? ???U.S. risks turning Shiite cleric into contender??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/12/04 ??? ???When Private Armies Take to the Front Lines??? Time
4/13/04 ??? ???More Gis needed in Iraq, says general??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/15/04 ??? ???Growing worry in D.C. ??? What if U.S. fails in Iraq???? San Francisco Chronicle
4/19/04 ??? ???New Thugs On The Block??? Time
4/19/04 ??? ???No Easy Options??? Time
4/19/04 ??? ???Paying The Price??? Time
4/21/04 ??? ???The failures of occupation??? San Francisco Bay Guardian
4/24/04 ??? ???U.S. changes tactics in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/25/04 ??? ???Foreign policy and its offenders??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/25/04 ??? ???Bush weighs dismal choices for Fallujah??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/25/04 ??? ???Stanford expert says Iraq spinning out of control??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/26/04 ??? ???Shifting Power??? Time
4/28/04 ??? ???2-man committee put Iraq in spotlight??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/04 ??? ???Path To War??? Vanity Fair
5/1/04 ??? ???Majority of Iraqis eager to see foreign troops go, poll finds??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/3/04 ??? ???Digging In For A Fight??? Time
5/3/04 ??? ???Can Iraqis Do The Job???? Time
5/4/04 ??? ???Abuse raises questions about role of U.S. contractors??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/4/04 ??? ???U.S. backpedals, drops Iraqi general??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/5/04 ??? ???Internal CIA probe on ???ghost detainees ???San Francisco Chronicle
5/5/04 ??? ???U.S. Predicament: Military has few, if any, good options in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/5/04 ??? ???U/S/ won???t cut troop levels after all, at least through ???05??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/6/04 ??? ???The unfolding scandal of prison abuse??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/8/04 ??? ???Early alarm bells sounded, ignored??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/8/04 ??? ???Rumsfeld warns of photos depicting worse abuses??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/9/04 ??? ???Inside war room, a battle is raging??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/9/04 ??? ???U.S. general rejects blame for abuses??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/9/04 ??? ???War tab swamps Bush???s estimate??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/10/04 ??? ???Military contractors ??? Above the law???? San Francisco Chronicle
5/10/04 ??? ???Torture At Abu Ghraib??? New Yorker
5/11/04 ??? ???Most Iraqis wrongly detained, report says??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/14/04 ??? ???Officials say methods at prison broke rules??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/16/04 ??? ???Rumsfeld Okd tactics at prison, article says??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/17/04 ??? ???Report: White House memo backed abuse??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/17/04 ??? ???Rules Of Interrogation??? Time
5/17/04 ??? ???Scandal???s Growing Stain??? Time
5/17/04 ??? ???What Happened to Bush???s Dream Team???? Time
5/18/04 ??? ???Bag over prisoner???s head hid fatal wounds??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/18/04 ??? ???Council President: Blast near U.S. headquarters??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/19/04 ??? ???U.S. sees no date for exit, aide says??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/20/04 ??? ???Intelligence officers tied to abuses in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/20/04 ??? ???Red Cross reports lost, generals says??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/21/04 ??? ???Chalabi keeps network, could thwart U.S. goals despite fall from grace??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/23/04 ??? ???Another enemy looms ??? Iraq debt??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/23/04 ??? ???Chalabi allegedly used defectors to dupe West??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/24/05 ??? ???Gray Zone??? New Yorker
5/25/04 ??? ???Appeal For Support: He says handover to Iraqis will succeed despite ???difficult days ahead??? ???San Francisco Chronicle
5/26/04 ??? ???Bush speech alarms even war enthusiasts??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/27/04 ??? ???N.Y. Times a dmits deficiencies in Iraq coverage??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/29/04 ??? ???Nominee linked to U.S., CIA by decades of anti-Hussein work??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/29/04 ??? ???U.S. supporters of Chalabi pressure Bush??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/30/04 ??? ???Report warned hundreds held in Abu Ghraib on no evidence??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/31/04 ??? ???The Rise and Fall of Chalabi??? Newsweek
6/2/04 ??? ???Most Iraqis wary of nation???s new government??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/2/04 ??? ???President named, new government installed in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/3/04 ??? ???Army extends duty tour in units bound for Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/3/04 ??? ???Rice plays enigmatic role in Bush???s foreign policy??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/7/04 ??? ???The Master Builder??? Time
6/7/04 ??? ???Up In The Cellblocks??? U.S. News & World Report
6/9/04 ??? ???U.N. Council votes 15-0 for Iraq sovereignty??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/10/04 ??? ???8 Iraqis charge contractors abused them??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/10/04 ??? ???Include excluded rebels, clerics group says??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/10/04 ??? ???Torture and Truth??? New York Review Of Book
6/11/04 ??? ???Allies quash Bush plan for NATO forces in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/14/04 ??? ???Abu Ghraib unit says prisoner abuses reported to command in 2003??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/14/04 ??? ???Now It???s Up To Them???? U.S. News & World Report
6/14/04 ??? ???One Expert???s Verdict: The CIA Caved Under Pressure??? Time
6/16/04 ??? ???Pentagon faulted for cost overruns in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/17/04 ??? ???Panel reveals 10-plane plot, finds no Iraq-al Qaeda link??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/17/04 ??? ???Rumsfeld ordered Iraqi suspect held as ???ghost??? prisoner??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/18/04 ??? ???Bush insists on Iraq-al Qaeda link??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/21/04 ??? ???Al Qaeda closer to Pakistan than Iraq, panel chair says??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/21/04 ??? ???Iraq???s Future? These Kids Want No Part of It??? Time
6/22/04 ??? ???U.S. faulted on Iraqi oil revenue spending??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/23/04 ??? ???Heard on the horizon: calls to get all U.S. troops out of Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/23/04 ??? ???Vivisecting the Jihad??? The National Interest
6/24/04 ??? ???Logic of Torture??? New York Review Of Books
6/25/04 ??? ???Iraqis, Seeking Foes of Saudis, Contacted bin Laden, File Says??? New York Times
6/27/04 ??? ???Iraq braces for sovereignty shift??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/28/04 ??? ???Al Qaeda link exists ??? despite the fog??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/28/04 ??? ???Paul Bremer???s Rough Ride??? Time
6/28/04 ??? ???Plan B??? New Yorker
6/28/04 ??? ???U.S. hands power to Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/29/04 ??? ???Analysis: Deceptively low-key handover is critical to Bush??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/29/04 ??? ???Bremer leaves, his heart still full of zeal??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/29/04 ??? ???Iraqis anticipating security, jobs from interim government??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/29/04 ??? ???New leaders vow to destroy rebels??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/30/04 ??? ???Power Struggle??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/30/04 ??? ???Iraq won???t be paying for itself??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/30/04 ??? ???Industry ravaged by sanctions, sabotage war??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/3/04 ??? ???Army admits invasion plagued by snafus??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/4/04 ??? ???Blair Says Illicit Weapons May Never Be Found, but ???We Know Hussein Had Them?????? New York Times
7/4/04 ??? ???U.S. spends fraction of aid on rebuilding??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/5/04 ??? ???Meet The New Jihad??? Time
7/6/04 ??? ???C.I.A. Held Back Iraqi Arms Data, Officials Say??? New York Times
7/7/04 ??? ???Defense official probed on contracts??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/8/04 ??? ???Fallujah now a ???terrorist hotbed?????? San Francisco Chronicle
7/9/04 ??? ???CIA doubts hijacker met with Iraq agent??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/10/04 ??? ???Iraq-Al Qaeda Link Discounted??? Los Angeles Times
7/11/04 ??? ???Senate Panel Looking at Administration Claims??? Los Angeles Times
7/15/04 ??? ???British report assails intelligence, clears Blair??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/23/04 ??? ???Abuses an aberration, report says??? San Francisco Chronicle
7-8/04 ???The Wrong War Backdraft: How the war in Iraq has fueled Al Qaeda and ignited its dream of global jihad??? Mother Jones
8/4/04 ??? ???$1.9 billion for Halliburton being taken from Iraqi funds.??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/6/04 ??? ???Intelligence unit involved in Iraq abuse, Gis tell court??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/6/04 ??? ???Shiite cleric renews call for revolt??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/8/04 ??? ???U.S. troops were told not to aid prisoners??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/9/04 ??? ???Iraq orders arrest of Pentagon???s onetime favorite, his nephew.??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/23/04 ??? ???Showdown With The Rebel??? Time
8/25/04 ??? ???Independent panel tracks prison abuse to Pentagon??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/26/04 ??? ???Army probe of abuses faults intelligence officers??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/29/04 ??? ???CIA reconsidering interrogation tactics??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/5/04 ??? ???U.S. forfeiting influence in growing number of Iraqi cities??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/8/04 ??? ???Grim milestone: Toll tops 1,000??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/10/04 ??? ???CIA had jailers conceal ???up to 100??? Iraqi prisoners??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/11/04 ??? ???Rumsfeld: Beheadings worse than Abu Grahib??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/12/04 ??? ???Abuse known as early as 2002, author claims??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/15/04 ??? ???Attacks on police kill 59 people, wound 114??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/16/04 ??? ???Cleric???s ragtag army takes heavy toll on troops in Sadr City??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/16/04 - ???Intelligence report to Bush pessimistic about Iraq future??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/17/04 ??? ???Evidence of intent ??? but no WMD program??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/17/04 ??? ???Iraq war ???illegal??? U.N. leader tells BBC??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/20/04 ??? ???Mission Still Not Accomplished??? Time
9/22/04 ??? ???Rising call by clerics for jihad??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/23/04 ??? ???How Bush Got It Wrong??? New York Review of Books
9/23/04 ??? ???Iraq: The Bungled Transition??? New York Review of Books
9/24/04 ??? ???The Challenge Of Controlling Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/24/04 ??? ???More troops needed, new study warns??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/27/04 ??? ???Enemy With Many Faces??? Time
9/27/04 ??? ???Iraq guard general arrested??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/27/04 ??? ???Victims of Circumstance??? U.S. News & World Report
9/28/04 ??? ???Truckers say it???s not safe out there??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/28/04 ??? ???Unit???s bleak July Iraq report not its first caution to Bush???s White House??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/4 ??? ???Bush???s Lost Year??? Atlantic Monthly
10/04 ??? ???Vivisecting the Jihad: Part Two??? The National Interest
10/2/04 ??? ???Bush tempers argument for pre-emptive strikes??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/3/04 ??? ???Dispute over Iraq???s nuclear plans??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/4/04 ??? ???Can This War Be Won???? Time
10/4/04 ??? ???How Much U.S. Help???? Time
10/6/04 ??? ???Bremer says troop levels too low in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/8/04 ??? ???Bush, Kerry agreed on need to stay the course in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/9/04 ??? ???Officer says CIA attempted to avoid Geneva rules in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/10/04 ??? ???Iraqi insurgents seek chemical weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/11/04 ??? ???Broken, but not beyond repair??? San Francis co Chronicle
10/15/04 ??? ???Hatred, fear reign after ???liberation?????? San Francisco Chronicle
10/18/04 ??? ???U.S. plans, tanks batter insurgent stronghold??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/18/04 ??? ???Vanishing Case For War??? U.S. News & World Report
10/18/04 ??? ???What Saddam Was Really Thinking??? Time
10/19/04 ??? ???The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War??? New York Times
10/20/04 ??? ???A Long, Difficult and Probably Turbulent Process??? New York Times
10/20/04 ??? ???Poor Intelligence Misled Troops About Risk of Drawn-Out War??? New York Times
10/21/04 ??? ???Debate Lingering on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military??? New York Times
10/21/04 ??? ???For Training Iraq???s Police, The Main Problem Was Time??? New York Times
10/21/04 ??? ???Iraq ideal for graft, group warns??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/21/04 ??? ???Robertson Says Bush Predicted No Iraq Toll??? New York Times
10/22/04 ??? ???Estimates by U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds??? New York Times
10/22/04 ??? ???Pentagon Reportedly Skewed C.I.A.???s View of Qaeda Tie??? New York Times
10/24/04 ??? ???Memo Okd secret transfer of detainees??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/25/04 ??? ???A top official calls for Army contract probe??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/25/04 ??? ???Huge cache of explosives vanished from site in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/26/04 ??? ???Massacre feared a setup??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/26/04 ??? ???Nationalism drives many insurgents as they fight U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/26/04 ??? ???U.S. Action Bars Right of Some Captured in Iraq??? New York Times
10/29/04 ??? ???Video shows cache of explosives??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/31/04 ??? ???Army overrode top official to extend Hallibruton contract??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/31/04 ??? ???In Iraq, U.S. Officials Cite Obstacles to Victory??? New York Times
11/04 ??? ???Plot To Sell The News??? Vanity Fair
11/04 ??? ???Truth about the Saddam-al Qaeda Connection??? The National Interest
11/1/04 ??? ???Contracts to rebuild Iraq picking up steam, report says??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/4/04 ??? ???Bombs, kidnapping in Baghdad area??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/19/04 ??? ???46 political groups vow to boycott election??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/20/04 ??? ???Insurgents threaten Iraqi elections, U.S. officials say??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/21/04 ??? ???Malnutrition mounts in young Iraqi children??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/22/04 ??? ???Iran Connection??? U.S. News & World Report
11/22/04 ??? ???Vote in Iraq set for Jan. 30??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/24/04 ??? ???Insurgent held Fallujah was under sway of local electrician and mosque imam??? Associated Press
11/25/04 ??? ???Stature of radical Islamists is up since 9/11, study says??? Associated Press
11/27/04 ??? ???Hallibruton said to lose U.S. property??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/30/04 ??? ???Iraqi forces wilting under relentless attacks??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/1/04 ??? ???Army told of abuse before Abu Ghraib??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/2/04 ??? ???U.S. to raise troop level in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/7/04 ??? ???Report: CIA Paints Pessimistic Iraq Picture??? Reuters
12/9/04 ??? ???Troops confront Rumsfeld, ask for better battle gear??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/10/04 ??? General pledges armored vehicles for all Gis in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/16/04 ??? ???Election outcome might not please U.S.??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/20/04 ??? ???Seeds Of Chaos??? U.S. News & World Report
12/22/04 ??? ???Iraq units called far from ready??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/4/05 ??? ???U.S. looks at adding more Americans to Iraqi units??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/6/05 ??? ???Army Reserve breaking down, general warns??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/11/05 ??? ???After bombing, Ukraine says it???s pulling out??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/14/05 ??? ???Aide to Bush???s father urges pullout??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/14/05 ??? ???Militants gun down aide to Iraq???s top Shiite leader??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/17/05 ??? ???U.S. troops go on attack in Mosul??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/22/05 ??? ???Iraq can???t find $300 million taken abroad to buy weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/22/05 ??? ???Plenty of candidates, but where do they stand???? San Francisco Chronicle
1/23/05 ??? ???Countdown to democracy??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/26/05 ??? ???Bush adds $80 billion to wars??? costs??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/26/05 ??? ???Seeking Iraq???s oil prize??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/27/05 ??? ???Deadliest day yet for U.S. troops ??? 37 killed??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/27/05 ??? ???Divided Kurkuk a rich political prize??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/28/05 ??? ???Elections begin yearlong political march in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/28/05 ??? ???U.S. firms work hinges on outcome of Iraq elections??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/29/05 ??? ???Democracy at gunpoint??? Economist
1/29/05 ??? ???Hopeful turning point, or descent into chaos???? Economist
1/30/05 ??? ???What Iraqis Are Voting For??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/30/05 ??? ???Iraq war seen as a magnet for Islamic militancy??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/31/05 ??? ???Big Turnout Buoys Hopes??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/31/05 ??? ???U.S. Reaction: Bush says his policies are paying off??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/1/05 ??? ???Election could erode backing for insurgency??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/3/05 ??? ???Marines come up short on recruits??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/7/05 ??? ???Unmasking The Insurgents??? Newsweek
2/13/05 ??? ???Insurgency intensifies ??? dozens more killed??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/13/05 ??? ???Iraqis facing year of economic and political turmoil??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/14/05 ??? ???Abu Ghraib Scandal You Don???t Know??? Time
2/14/05 ??? ???Shiite alliance appears to hold slight majority in new assembly??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/14/05 ??? ???Slim margin means Shiites will need allies??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/15/05 ??? ???$81.9 billion sought for war, aid??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/1/05 ??? ???U.S. alleges rights abuses by Iraqis??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/7/05 ??? ???Revenge of the Kurds??? Time
3/11/05 ??? Kurds, Shiites agree to resolve fat of Kirkuk??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/15/05 ??? ???Hallibruton overcharges pegged at $108 million??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/16/05 ??? ???Italy to start pulling troops out of Iraq in September??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/20/05 ??? ???Breaking free of a win-loss mindset??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/20/05 ??? ???Rebuilding Iraq a big, slow job??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/21/05 ??? ???Rumsfeld sees Turkey at fault for Iraq turmoil??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/29/05 ??? ???Panel Criticizes C.I.A. For Failure On Iraq Weapons??? New York Times
4/05 ??? ???Iraq???s Next Fault Line??? Time
4/1/05 ??? ???At least 12 Iraqis, GI killed in attacks??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/1/05 ??? ???Iraqi defector duped CIA, report says??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/1/05 ??? ???Spies called flat wrong on Iraq???s weapons??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/4/05 ??? ???Before Iraq war, U.S. ignored work of U.N. arms inspectors, panel says??? Seattle Times
4/19/05 ??? ??????Wish lists??? of harsh tactics against Iraqi prisoners cited??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/22/05 ??? ???Senate approves $81 billion to fight Iraq, Afghan wars??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/24/05 ??? ???Bush more certain than ever on Iraq war??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/26/05 ??? ???Final weapons report find no Syrian collusion??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/29/05 ??? ???Assembly approves Shiite-led Cabinet??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/1/05 ??? ???Way of the Commandos??? New York Times Magzine
5/3/05 ??? ???Explosion of violence ??? but why???? San Francisco Chronicle
5/4/05 ??? ???Basra???s intrusive Islamists reject Iran???s theocracy as too tolerant??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/12/05 ??? ???Tally of civilian deaths depends on who???s counting??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/15/05 ??? ???Hussein???s outlawed former party gaining influence in Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/17/05 ??? ???Growing violence stirs fears of Iraqi civil war??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/18/05 ??? ???A Report Card on Iraqi Troops??? Washington Post
5/19/05 ??? ???Exit from Iraq could take ???many years?????? San Francisco Chronicle
5/20/05 ??? ???Iraqi police accused of abuses??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/22/05 ??? ???Doubts about Iraq???s arms lost in march to war??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/23/05 ??? ???Shiite figure urges halt to violence??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/1/05 ??? ???The Other Bomb Drops??? Truthout.Com
6/6/05 ??? ???When Violence Comes To Campus??? Time
6/9/05 ??? ???Iraq???s top leaders voice approval of Kurdish, Shiite militias??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/9/05 ??? ???Secret Way To War??? New York Review of Books
6/12/05 ??? ???British memo shows pre-invasion doubts??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/15/05 ??? ???U.S. memo tells of abductions of Kirkuk minorities??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/16/05 ??? ???Cabinet Office Document??? PBS??? NewsHour.com
6/16/05 ??? ???Confidential and Personal??? PBS??? NewsHour.com
6/16/05 ??? ???Secret ??? Strictly Personal??? PBS??? NewsHour.com
6/16/05 ??? ???Secret and Personal??? PBS??? NewsHour.com
6/16/05 ??? ???Secret and Personal PM/02/019??? PBS??? NewsHour.com
6/17/05 ??? ???Accord on Sunni involvement??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/20/05 ??? ???WMD claims were ???totally implausible?????? U.K. Guardian
6/21/05 ??? ???War needs no protection from critics??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/27/05 ??? ???The Enemy Spies??? Newsweek
6/27/05 ??? ???Rumsfeld confirms talks with insurgent leaders??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/28/05 ??? ???A year of change for Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/30/05 ??? ???Is Bush consistent or doing an about-face???? San Francisco Chronicle
6/30/05 ??? ???New separatist push in south??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/1/05 ??? ???Why victory not a matter of troops??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/7/05 ??? ???So, Mr Bremer, where did all the money go???? U.K. Guardian
7/7/05 ??? ???West Turns Blind Eye As Police Put Saddam???s Torturers Back To Work??? Times of London
7/11/05 ??? ???Oil But No Gasoline, Rivers But No Water??? Time
7/13/05 ??? ???Pentagon planner reveals doubts on Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/15/05 ??? ???GAO investigator rips Pentagon on Iraq war finances??? Boston Globe
7/17/05 ??? ???Casualty of War: The U.S. Economy??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/17/05 ??? ???Report of covert aid to Iraqi candidates??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/17/05 ??? ???Study cites seeds of terror in Iraq: War radicalized most, probes find??? Boston Globe
7/18/05 ??? ???After Iraq attack, calls for militias grow??? Christian Science Monitor
7/19/05 ??? ???Ambushes, shootings kill 26 across Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/24/05 ??? ???If It???s Civil War, Do We Know It???? ??? New York Times
7/24/05 ??? ???Iraqi insurgents getting more sophisticated??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/25/05 ??? ???Is the Country Heading for Civil War???? Der Spiegel
7/31/05 ??? ???Iraq Dances With Iran, While America Seethes??? New York Times
8/1/05 ??? ???Spy???s Notes on Iraqi ims Were Shelved, Suit Says??? New York Times
8/2/05 ??? ???Oil-rich nati on to ration fuel to ease chronic shortages??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/3/05 ??? ???Defense Ministry accused of corruption in overspending??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/3/05 ??? ???Worry Grows as Iraq???s Defense Ministry Falls Short of Expectations??? New York Times
8/10/05 ??? ???Assembly faces 18 difficult steps??? Asia Times
8/10/05 ??? ???Baghdad mayor sacked by armed Shiites??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/10/05 ??? ???Car bomber kills 7, injures 90??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/10/05 ??? ???Weapons of self-destruction??? Asia Times
8/11/05 ??? ???Bombs bad enough, but guns worse in Baghdad??? Chicago Tribune
8/11/05 ??? ???Iraq: Bush???s Islamic Republic??? New York Review of Books
8/11/05 ??? ???Iraqis Thirst for Water and Power??? Christian Science Monitor
8/12/05 ??? ???In Iraq, No Clear Finish Line??? Washington Post
8/12/05 ??? ???Shiites Call for Own State in South??? Washington Post
8/17/05 ??? ???Expectations for Iraq downshifting??? Christian Science Monitor
8/20/05 ??? ???Militias Wresting Control Across Iraq???s North and South??? Washington Post
8/20/05 ??? ???Next Time, Sunnis Intend to Be Heard??? Los Angeles Times
8/21/05 ??? ???Evolution Of Attack??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/21/06 ??? ???Iranian factor in Iraq insurgency??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/21/05 ??? ???Sunnis offer an exit plan??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/22/05 ??? ???Inside Iran???s Secret War For Iraq??? Time
8/22/05 ??? ???Millions embezzled at Iraqi ministry??? U.K. Guardian
8/23/05 ??? ???Delegates submit incomplete constitution??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/23/05 ??? ???Syrian arrested in missile attack on U.S. warship??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/30/05 ??? ???Analysts see rift growing over charter??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/30/05 ??? ???Iraq: Democracy or Disintegration???? AntiWar.com
8/30/05 ??? ???Sadr???s Disciples Rise Again To Play Pivotal Role in Iraq??? Washington Post
8/31/05 ??? ???Draft charter leaves many tough issues unsettled??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/11/05 ??? ???U.S. casts net for Iraqi insurgents too wide??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/23/05 ??? ???Saudi official fears Iraq breakup??? San Francisco Chronicle
9/26/05 ??? ???Saddam???s Revenge??? Time
10/3/05 ??? ???Divisions mounting in Iraqi politics??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/3/05 ??? ???Generals shift course, paint rosier picture of Iraq war??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/6/05 ??? ???Lawmakers reverse voting rule change??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/9/05 ??? ???Key pillar of Bush policy on Iraq being questioned??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/11/05 ??? ???Experts see grim times ahead ??? a torn Iraq ??? even if constitution is approved??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/12/05 ??? ???Sectarian resentment extends to Iraq???s army??? Kngith Ridder
10/17/05 ??? ???Faces Of Resistance??? Time
10/18/05 ??? ???Vice president???s office at center of leak probe??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/22/05 ??? ???How Basra Slipped Out of Control??? Foreign Policy In Focus
10/26/05 ??? ???A Deadly Surge??? Los Angeles Times
10/26/05 ??? ???Constitution squeaks past strong Sunni Arab ???no??? vote??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/26/05 ??? ???Iraqi civilians bear brunt of war casualties??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/26/05 ??? ???Iraqi reconstruction faltering??? Asia Times
10/26/05 ??? ???Somber Milestone??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/29/05 ??? ???CIA Leak Probe??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/29/05 ??? ???Questions and answers about who told whom about Plame??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/30/05 ??? ???Kurds Reclaiming Prized Territory In Northern Iraq??? Washington Post
10/30/05 ??? ???Seeds of leak scandal sown in Italian intelligence agency??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/31/05 ??? ???$30 billion fund for Iraq rebuilding nearly spent??? San Francisco Chronicle
10/31/05 ??? ???US ???had no policy??? in place to rebuild Iraq??? MSNBC.com
11/1/05 ??? ???Reports of Sunni Enthusiasm May Be Premature??? AntiWar.Com
11/2/05 ??? ???Shiite power struggle simmers in Najaf??? Christian Science Monitor
11/3/05 ??? ???Torture in Iraq??? New York Review of Books
11/6/05 ??? ???2002 report doubted Iraq-al Qaeda informer??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/13/05 ??? ???Lines of control shift in sands in the desert??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/16/05 ??? ???Iraq concedes detainees likely were tortured??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/17/05 ??? ???Among Insurgents in Iraq, Few Foreigners Are Found??? Washington Post
11/17/05 ??? ???Iraqi Rift Grows After Discovery of Prison??? New York Times
11/18/05 ??? ???U.S. put ex-con in charge of cash for rebuilding of Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/19/05 ??? ???Probe into Pentagon???s pro-war team begins??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/22/05 ??? ???Key Bush Intelligence Briefing Kept From Hill Panel??? National Journal
11/28/05 ??? ???Abuse of prisoners in Iraq widespread, officials say??? Knight Ridder
11/29/05 ??? ???Killings Linked to Shiite Squads in Iraqi Police Force??? Los Angeles Times
11/30/05 ??? ???Rumsfeld???s order to end insurgency: Don???t call it that.??? San Francisco Chronicle
11/30/05 ??? ???U.S. pays Iraqi papers to run stories??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/05 ??? ???If America Left Iraq??? Atlantic Monthly
12/05 ??? ???Why Iraq Has No Army??? Atlantic Monthly
12/1/05 ??? ???Bush???s Counteroffensive On War??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/1/05 ??? ???Kurds allow Norway firm to begin drilling for oil??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/2/05 ??? ???With no head, insurgency???s body hard to kill??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/3/05 ??? ???General Says Militias Split Loyalties of Iraqi Security Forces??? New York Times
12/3/05 ??? ???Military admits planting stories in Iraqi papers??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/4/05 ??? ???An author???s confession ??? he got the war wrong??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/4/05 ??? ???New U.S. tactic: Make public see victory as likely??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/4/05 ??? ???US Army admits Iraqis outnumber foreign fighters as its main enemy??? U.K. Telegraph
12/5/05 ???Iraq VP Disputes Bush on Training of Forces??? Associated Press
12/5/05 ??? ???The New Way Out??? Newsweek
12/5/05 ??? ???U.S. Forces Try New Approach: Raid and Dig In??? New York Times
12/5/05 ??? ???Up In The Air??? New Yorker
12/6/05 ??? ???Iraq oil production on the decline??? Financial Times
12/7/05 ??? ???Documents show top brass knew of abuse??? Associated Press
12/8/05 ??? ???In Cities Bush Cited, Progress Is Relative??? Washington Post
12/11/05 ??? ???Iraq???s Sunnis urge talks with rebels??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/11/05 ??? ???Sunnis won???t boycott again??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/11/05 ??? ???Toward an Iraqi democracy??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/11/05 ??? ???U.S. propaganda is widespread, often disguised??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/11/05 ??? ???War experts advise strategy overhaul??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/12/05 ??? ???The New Rules of Engagement??? Time
12/13/05 ??? ???Tomgram: Dahr Jamail on the Missing Air War in Iraq??? TomeDispatch.Com
12/14/05 ??? ???American military tactics: How to Do Better??? Economist
12/14/05 ??? ???Deadly election-eve violence??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/14/05 ??? ???Election Goal No. 1: Holding Iraq Together??? NPR.com
12/14/05 ??? ???For Kurds, A Surge Of Violence In Campaign??? Washington Post
12/15/05 ??? ???Analysis ??? After Iraq vote success, now for the hard part??? Reuters
12/16/05 ??? ???Iraqi Vote Draws Big Turnout Of Sunnis??? Washington Post
12/16/05 ??? ???Kurds voting for autonomy and dream of independence??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/18/05 ??? ???New Mission for U.S. Division: To Put Iraqi Forces to the Test??? New York Times
12/19/05 ??? ???Next in Iraq: coalition-building??? Christian Science Monitor
12/19/05 ??? ???Rise in poll complaints troubles Iraq vote monitors??? U.K. Guardian
12/19/05 ??? ???The Rise Of an Evil Prot??g????? Time
12/19/05 ??? ???White House Presses Nation For resolve To Win In Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/20/05 ??? ???U.S. Air Power Strikes Iraq Targets Daily??? Associated Press
12/21/05 ??? ???Various private armies still exist, threatening Iraq???s national security??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/21/05 ??? ???Washington seeks partial truce with Iraqi insurgents??? Washington Times
12/23/05 ??? ???Parties demand new elections??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/25/05 ??? ???U.S. to delay turning Iraqi detainees over to Iraqi jailers??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/26/05 ??? ???US-Shiite Struggle Could Spin out of Control??? Inter Press Service News Agency
12/27/05 ??? ???Kurds in Iraqi army proclaim loyalty to militia??? Knight Ridder
12/27/05 ??? ???Many Iraqi soldiers see a civil war on the horizon??? Knight Ridder
12/29/05 ??? ???Are Iraqi police engaging in torture tactics???? MSNBC.Com
12/29/05 ??? ???Kurds Are Flocking to Kirkuk, Laying Claim to Land and Oil??? New York Times
12/31/05 ??? ???Iraq oil chief suspended as fuel lines lengthen??? San Francisco Chronicle
12/31/05 ??? ???S. Korea OKs partial pullout of Iraq force??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/1/06 ??? ???Iraq Civil War? Some Experts Say It???s Arrived??? Los Angeles Times
1/1/06 ??? ???US forces step up Iraq airstrikes??? U.K. Sunday Times
1/2/06 ??? ???Economy in Iraq Goes in All Directions??? Los Angeles Times
1/2/06 ??? ???Iraq oil exports hit post-war low??? BBCNews.com
1/2/06 ??? ???U.S. Has End in Sight on Iraq Rebuilding??? Washington Post
1/5/06 ??? ???Secretive military unit sought to solve political WMD concerns prior to securing Iraq, intelligence sources say??? Raw Story
1/7/06 ??? ???Americans Said to Meet Rebels, Exploiting Rift??? New York Times
1/7/06 ??? ???Iraq war could cost US over $2 trillion, says Nobel price-winning economist??? U.K. Guardian
1/10/06 ??? ???US sees Iraqi oil production choked for years??? Mail& Guardian Online
1/10/06 ??? ???U.S. airstrikes in Iraq could intensify??? Knight Ridder
1/11/06 ??? ???20 charged with aiding insurgency??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/11/06 ??? ???Army???s Iraq Work Assailed by Briton??? Washington Post
1/11/06 ??? ???Leading Shiite Says He Will Oppose Changes to Iraqi Charter??? New York Times
1/12/06 ??? ???Efforts intensify to train Iraqi police??? Christian Science Monitor
1/12/06 ??? ???Local Insurgents Tell of Clashes With Al Qaeda???s Forces in Iraq??? New York Times
1/13/06 ??? ???After Handover, Hussein Palaces Looted??? Washington Post
1/14/06 ??? ???U.S. economics a hard sell in Iraq??? Cox News
1/15/06 ??? ???2,000 More M.P.???s Will Help Train the Iraqi Police??? New York Times
1/15/06 ??? ??????Marshall Plan??? for Iraq Fades??? Los Angeles Times
1/17/06 ??? ???Bush seeks his enemies??? help in Iraq??? Asia Times
1/17/06 ??? ???Some Iraq Rebuilding Funds Go Untraced??? Wall Street Journal
1/17/06 ??? ???US tries to loosen Shiite grip in Iraq??? Christian Science Monitor
1/17/06 ??? ???USAID Paper Details Security Crisis in Iraq??? Washington Post
1/20/06 ??? ???In search of rebuilding billions??? Washington Times
1/20/06 ??? ???The Iraq Reconstruction Strategy??? Asia Times
1/22/06 ??? ???Attacks in Iraq jumped in 2005??? USA Today
1/22/06 ??? ???Shiite-Kurd Goals Stymie U.S.??? Los Angeles Times
1/23/06 ??? ???Ordinary Iraqis feel pinch of free-market reforms??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/23/06 ??? ???Professionals Fleeing Iraq As Violence, Threats Persist??? Washington Post
1/24/06 ??? ???Iraq Rebuilding Badly Hobbled, U.S. Report Finds??? New York Times
1/25/06 ??? ???Audit Describes Misuse of Funds in Iraq Projects??? New York Times
1/25/06 ??? ???Iraqi Army May Be Light and Friendly??? Associated Press
1/25/06 ??? ???War???s pressures push Army to breaking point, report says??? San Francisco Chronicle
1/27/06 ??? ???Report Measures Shortfall in Iraq Goals??? Washington Post
1/29/06 ??? ???Deadly Rift Grows Among Insurgents??? Los Angeles Times
1/30/06 ??? ???Iraq???s Oil Bust??? MSNBC.Com
2/2/06 ??? ???Iraqi forces beset by sectarian differences: US intelligence czar??? Agence France Presse
2/3/06 ??? ???Blair-Bush deal before Iraq war revealed in secret memo??? U.K. Guardian Unlimited
2/5/06 ??? ???Corrupt leaders called threat to Iraq???s future??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/6/06 ??? ???Exclusive: Direct Talks ??? U.S. Officials and Iraqi Insurgents??? Newsweek
2/9/06 ??? ???Infrastructure below prewar levels??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/10/06 ??? ???Data picked to justify war, ex-official says??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/11/06 ??? ???General: Bad start in training Iraqi army??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/14/06 ??? ???Iraqi Kurds Take Tough Stance On Kirkuk??? Associated Press
2/15/06 ??? ???Radical Cleric Rising as a Kingmaker in Iraqi Politics??? New York Times
2/16/06 ??? ???Iraq economy falls below pre-war levels??? Financial Times
2/19/06 ??? ???Iraq???s Jordanian Jihadis??? New York Times
2/19/06 ??? ???Rebels??? Arsenal Includes Politics??? Los Angeles Times
2/23/06 ??? ???Shrine Blast Fans Fears of Civil War??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/24/06 ??? ???Sectarian Violence Explodes Across Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
2/28/06 ??? ???Intelligence agencies warned about growing local insurgency in late 2003??? Knight Ridder
3/9/06 ??? ???The Mess??? New York Review of Books
3/9/06 ??? ???Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq??? Foreign Affairs
3/10/06 ??? ???What happens if civil war erupts???? San Francisco Chronicle
3/14/06 ??? ???Bush says Iraqi troops to take over by year???s end??? San Francisco Chronicle
3/14/06 ??? ???US postwar Iraq strategy a mess, Blair was told??? U.K. Guardian
3/27/06 ??? ???Bush Was Set on Path to War, Memo by British Adviser Says??? Common Dreams
4/2/06 ??? ???Iraq Militias??? Wave of Death??? Boston Globe
4/3/06 ??? ???Analysis: Figures show that Iraq???s civil war is underway??? UPI
4/3/06 ??? ???US bases in Iraq: a costly legacy??? Christian Science Monitor
4/4/06 ??? ???Iraq???s interior ministry refusing to deploy US-trained police??? U.K. Guardian
4/6/06 ??? ???Iraq is Splitting??? Z Magazine
4/7/06 ??? ???Bush role alleged in leak of Iraq intelligence??? San Francisco Chronicle
4/9/06 ??? ???U.S. Study Paints Somber Portrait of Iraqi Discord??? New York Times
4/10/06 ??? ???Baghdad Blues??? U.S. News & World Report
4/11/06 ??? ???Troops in Iraq caught in middle of power struggle??? Army Times
4/12/06 ??? ???Lacking Biolabs, Trailers Carried Case for War??? Washington Post
4/14/06 ??? ???More Retired Generals Call For Rumsfeld???s Resignation??? New York Times
4/14/06 ??? ???On the ground, it???s a civil war??? Chicago Tribune
4/14/06 ??? ???Spending lags on training of Iraqi forces??? Army Times
4/16/06 ??? ???Billion Dollar Start Falls Short in Iraq??? Washington Post
4/16/06 ??? ???US Firms Suspected of Bilking Iraq Funds??? Truthout.com
4/16/06 ??? ???US plots ???new liberation of Baghdad?????? U.K. Times
4/17/06 ??? ???Why Iraq Was a Mistake??? Time
4/18/06 ??? ???U.S. ignored Shiite militias, focused on Sunni insurgency??? Contra Costa Times
4/19/06 ??? ???Iraq???s Kurds Aim for Own Oil Ministry??? Los Angeles Times
4/19/06 ??? ???Nearly 20,000 people kidnapped in Iraq in 2006??? MiddleEastOnline.com
4/26/06 ??? ???Top spys story on pre-war intel is finaly told??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/1/06 ??? ???Militias steal new recruits with better pay and perks??? U.K. Times
5/1/06 ??? ???Powell pushed for more troops??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/1/06 ??? ???U.S. Report Cites Progress, Shortfalls In Iraq Rebuilding??? Washington Post
5/3/06 ??? ???General says Iraq army is ???willing??? but not ready??? Washington Times
5/7/06 ??? ???A darling of the neocons tells why he bailed out??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/8/06 ??? ???Death squads deepen division in Baghdad??? Christian Science Monitor
5/10/06 ??? ???Adviser: Iraq ???civil war??? places U.S. in reactive role??? Associated Press
5/11/06 ??? ???Exodus of the Iraqi middle class??? U.K. Times
5/12/06 ??? ???White paper: Security, economy still lag in Iraq??? Army Times
5/15/06 ??? ???America In Baghdad??? TomPaine.CommonSense.com
5/16/06 ??? ???As the bombs fall, Iraq???s Kurds have ???no friends but the mountains?????? U.K. Independent
5/21/06 ??? ???Iraq???s cabinet falls short??? Asia Times
5/21/06 ??? ???Misjudgments Marred U.S. Plans for Iraqi Police??? New York Times
5/21/06 ??? ???Putting an Iraqi face on the fight??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/21/06 ??? ???Unity Government Begins A New Chapter For Iraq??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/22/06 ??? ???Corruption Runs Deep in Iraq??? Los Angeles Times
5/22/06 ??? ???How Iraq Police Reform Became Casualty of War??? New York Times
5/24/06 ??? ???Armed Groups Propel Iraq Toward Chaos??? New York Times
5/24/06 ??? ???Violence aside, B aghdad is broken??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/27/06 ??? ???Local Iraqi militias guard their own??? San Francisco Chronicle
5/31/06 ??? ???Insurgent attacks rise to 600 a week??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/11/06 ??? ???Insurgency And Chaos??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/18/06 ??? ???Iraq???s Post-Hussein Air Force Finds Its Wings Clipped??? Los Angeles Times
6/20/06 ??? ???Cheney Stands by His ???Last Throes??? Remark??? Washington Post
6/23/06 ??? ???Experts Say Iraqi Forces Not Ready??? Military.com
6/25/06 ??? ???Iraqi toll said nearly double U.S. count??? San Francisco Chronicle
6/29/06 ??? ???Most foreign fighters in Iraq come from Egypt: US military??? Agence France Presse
7/1/06 ??? ???20-year-old Iraq weapons spark debate??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/7/06 ??? ???Anti-corruption chief battles on??? Qatar Gulf Times
7/9/06 ??? ???Police Abuses in Iraq Detailed??? Los Angeles Times
7/15/06 ??? ???Is US Winning? Army Chief Is at a Loss??? Common Dreams
7/17/06 ??? ???In an About-Face, Sunnis Want U.S. to Remain in Iraq??? New York Times
7/19/06 ??? ???Losing the War in Iraq???? Center For Strategic And International Studies
7/23/06 ??? ???In Iraq, Military Forgot Lessons of Vietnam??? Washington Post
7/24/06 ??? ??????It Looked Weird and Felt Wrong?????? Washington Post
7/24/06 ??? ???Top Iraqi???s White House Visit Shows Gaps With U.S.??? New York Times
7/24/06 ??? ???Wary Iraqis Are Recruited as Policemen??? New York Times
7/25/06 ??? ???Iraq???s prime minister visiting U.S. amid worry over nonstop violence??? San Francisco Chronicle
7/25/06 ??? ???Shiite Party Leader Outlines 4 Steps for Iraq to Curb Violence??? Washington Post
7/30/06 ??? ???Audit Finds U.S. Hid Actual Cost of Iraq Projects??? New York Times
7/31/06 ??? ???Number of Iraqi refugees from violence swells??? Reuters
8/3/06 ??? ???For Iraqis, a New Rule of Life: Don???t Trust Anyone in Uniform??? New York Times
8/3/06 ??? ???Iraq civil war warning for Blair??? BBC News.com
8/3/06 ??? ???Why US effort to rebuild Iraq came up short??? Christian Science Monitor
8/4/06 ??? ???Iraq at Risk Of Civil War, Top Generals Tell Senators??? Washington Post
8/6/06 ??? ???Baghdad???s Chaos Undercuts Tack Pursued by U.S.??? New York Times
8/8/06 ??? ???Hearing: GIs drank and planned??? San Francisco Chronicle
8/9/06 ??? ???Shiites Press for a Partition of Iraq??? Los Angeles Times
8/9/06 ??? ???Swath of North Turned Over to Iraqi Army??? Washington Post
8/10/06 ??? ???Mindless in Iraq??? New York Review Of Books
8/12/06 ??? ???An Audit Sharply Criticizes Iraq???s Bookkeeping??? New York Times
8/14/06 ??? ???Inside the Iraqi Forces Fiasco??? Der Spiegel Online
8/15/06 ??? ???U.S. Offers Plan to Curb Rogue Iraqi Police Forces??? Los Angeles Times
8/16/06 ??? ???As U.S. focuses on Baghdad, al-Qaeda gains strength in Sunni heartland???
8/16/06 ??? ???Bush Dismisses the Idea of Partitioning Iraq??? Los Angeles Times
8/16/06 ??? ???Bush Said to Be Frustrated by Level of Public Support in Iraq??? New York Times
8/16/06 ??? ???Pentagon studies examine ???mistakes in Iraq, Afghanistan??? Christian Science Monitor
8/16/06 ??? ???Strife Moving Out From Baghdad to Villages??? Washington Post
8/17/06 ??? ???Iraq violence; Facts and figures??? BBC News.com
8/18/06 ??? ???Trying to build an army in a combat zone??? New York Times
These are the last numbers I've seen:
UN counted 14,388 civilian deaths in first six months of 2006
July 2006 Prime Minister al-Maliki said 100 Iraqis dying a day
July 3,438 civilians killed, average of 110 civilians killed each day
Almost all of the deaths are due to sectarian violence rather than the insurgency.
I think the figure for August is much less by over 50%. Also, when we left vietnam the ensuing bloodbath was in the millions.
August's count is about the same. Despite some reports about violence being down in Baghdad, those only last for a day or two. Plus almost all of the reports are Baghdad-centric, so are probably undercounting the true numbers.
http://rempost.blogspot.com/2006/08/iraq-strikes-peace-deal-with-militia.html
Youre right. I was thinking just Baghdad.
900 civilians killed
122 Iraqi military killed
101 Iraqi police killed
60 U.S. Soldiers
On Wednesday 65 people were killed with about half found dead in Baghdad.
Despite the U.S. military and the Iraqi government's claims, violence and deaths have not gone down, even in the capitol under their new security operation.
Not only that, but the tactics being employed, sweeps, arrests and presence operations are failed tactics as I mentioned in the report. They give a short term impression of security but do not work in the long term because: 1) most people arrested are innocent, 2) If they don't get screened before hand (which is completley inconsistent from one unit to the next) they end up in prisons where they disappear into the system to not reappear for months, 3) The tactics usually alienate and anger the populatin turning more people away from the U.S. and Iraqi security forces. You also have to accoutn for the fact that even with this redeployment of troops to Baghdad there are not enough U.S. troops to carry out an effective plan, plus the Iraqi security forces are still not very good, and many, especially the police, actually add to the violence rather than help to quell it becuase they are controlled by militias. The latest trend is for the Mahdi Army, which controlls the Ministry of Health to abduct Sunnis from hospitals in the capital.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/31/washin...artner=homepage
Like I said, Joel. I've read most of this stuff and your reporting is very consistent with facts. It's just that precise citation can protect you from the Sabbabababdddo slingers, but then again, your are probably right. Nothing will stop them from hurling their dung at you other than complete and utter allegiance.
please to send this as txt. or pdf. file to [email]jgalt2dtm@hotmail.com[/email]
Thank you.
but then again, there are always a handful of people who are on the fence. citations would make these arguments even more convincing for those people.
that's what i was getting at.
btw--i tried a hamhock in my cornflakes before. it's not good. but when mrs fatback asks me to clean the bathtub, i'm always like "that ring is soul. it needs to stay"
Well all of the sources that I actually USED are now posted. There were probably another 100-200 articles that I read but didn't use and didn't include in the list.
Here's some numbers I just found in today's local (SF Chronicle) paper:
Deaths since the war began March 2003:
Iraqi military between 4,895-6,370
Iraqi civilians between 40,833-45,399
I would take the outcome of Vietnam in a heartbeat right now. Shit their our little buddy.
Iraqi Casualties Are Up Sharply, Study Finds
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Published: September 2, 2006
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 ??? Iraqi casualties soared by more than 50 percent in recent months, the product of spiraling sectarian clashes and a Sunni-based insurgency that remains ???potent and viable,??? the Pentagon said in its latest comprehensive assessment of security in Iraq.
During the period from the establishment of the new Iraqi government on May 20 until Aug. 11, the average number of weekly attacks jumped to almost 800. That was a substantial increase from earlier this year and almost double the number of the first part of 2004.
As a consequence, Iraqi casualties increased 51 percent over the last reporting period. The document notes that, based on initial reports, Iraqi casualties among civilians and security forces reached nearly 120 a day, up from about 80 a day in the pervious reporting period from mid-February to mid-May. About two years ago they were running about 30 a day.
???Although the overall number of attacks increased in all categories, the proportion of those attacks directed against civilians increased substantially,??? the Pentagon noted. ???Death squads and terrorists are locked in mutually reinforcing cycles of sectarian strife, with Sunni and Shia extremists each portraying themselves as the defenders of their respective sectarian groups.???
The Pentagon report, titled ???Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,??? is mandated by Congress and issued quarterly. It covers a broad range of subjects, including the economy, public attitudes, and security.
This time, the study is the focus of special interest because of increasing fears that Iraq is sliding into civil war and because it is being published at a time when President Bush and members of his cabinet have been trying to present a strong case in support of the war, in the face of vehement criticism from Democrats.
The report does not take account of the latest efforts to bring order to Baghdad, operations that involved 12,000 additional soldiers, including some 7,000 additional American troops. Col. Thomas Vail, the commander of a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, told reporters on Friday that his troops had made progress in recent days in tamping down the violence in the capital. The last several days have been particularly bloody, with about 250 Iraqis killed and scores wounded since Sunday. The Pentagon acknowledged that the grim data on attacks, casualties and executions was distressing. ???It???s a pretty sober report this time,??? said Peter Rodman, a senior Pentagon official, who met with reporters to discuss it. ???The last quarter, it???s been rough. Sectarian violence has been particularly acute and disturbing.???
Democratic lawmakers portrayed the report as evidence that the administration???s strategy was failing. ???They have not provided the real resources, in terms of both military and civilian advisers, nor real dollars to reconstruct and help Iraq emerge from this period of instability,??? Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island said.
The report chronicles dangers on an array of fronts. Although the Sunni-based insurgency has received less news media attention since the surge of sectarian violence, the report cautions that it is resilient and strong. The number of attacks in Anbar Province, a vast Sunni-dominated region in western Iraq, averages more than 30 a day.
Regarding Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia???s operations in Iraq, the report says the network???s ???cellular nature??? has enabled it to continue attacks despite the death of its leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
But sectarian strife has emerged as the biggest worry. In recent months, the Pentagon noted, ???The core conflict in Iraq changed into a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create or protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources, and impose their own respective political and religious agendas.??? Echoing recent statements by senior American military commanders, the report says that ???conditions that could lead to civil war exist in Iraq, especially in and around Baghdad, and concern about civil war within the Iraqi population has increased in recent months.???
The report notes that sectarian violence is gradually expanding north to Kirkuk and Diyala Province. Further, the confidence of Iraqis in the future has diminished, according to public opinion surveys cited in the Pentagon report.
Still, the study says the fighting in Iraq does not meet the ???stringent international legal standards for civil war,??? without further explanation. Even so, the sectarian fighting has been bloodier than ever.
In discussing daily casualty rates, the report did not distinguish between the number of dead and wounded. But it noted that execution-type killings, in particular, reached a new high in July. ???The Baghdad Coroner???s Office reported 1,600 bodies arrived in June and more than 1,800 bodies in July, 90 percent of which were assessed to be the result of executions,??? the report states.
The report says that progress has been made in fielding Iraqi Army units and police that can take over the main responsibility for security. It says 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25 brigades and 85 battalions have the lead for security in their areas. It notes that a lack of noncommissioned officers and absenteeism are obstacles to fielding an effective Iraqi force. Though the 63-page report does not discuss military operations in Baghdad in detail, it has become clear in recent months that Iraq could not be effectively secured without the active involvement of the Americans. When the Americans cut back patrols in Baghdad, violence rose and American commanders decided to send additional troops to the capital from elsewhere in the country.
The report notes that Iraq???s Interior Ministry does not have a system to determine how many of the forces trained by police advisers are still on the job. Advisers from the American-led forces estimate that the attrition rate is about 20 percent a year.
Citing polling data from the International Republican Institute, the report states that almost 80 percent of Iraqis thought in April 2006 that the general situation would be better in a year. By June, it was less than 50 percent. ???In general, Iraqis have had an optimistic outlook,??? the report stated. ???However, as time has passed, their optimism has eroded.???
Dan
At the beginning of September 2006 the Senate Intelligence Committee released two new reports on pre-war intelligence on Iraq. One was a 148-page document entitled ???Postwar Findings About Iraq???s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare to Prewar Assessments.??? Most of the report is actually a rehash of already public findings such as the Committee???s July 2004 report on prewar intelligence, and the work of the Iraq Survey Group that was created after the war to find Iraq???s WMD. However there are some interesting new tidbits. These mostly come in the form of interviews with top Iraqi officials by the FBI, including Saddam Hussein himself. These sections reveal such interesting details as Saddam???s motivation for not coming clean about his WMD program and his personnel opinion of Al Qaeda. In the end, the report has the same major conclusions as its July 2004 paper, the U.S. intelligence community completely failed when looking into Iraq???s WMD, but that it was pretty much right in believing that Iraq did not have a relationship with Al Qaeda. Rather than simply summarize all of the information contained within the Committee???s findings, I???ve tried to focus upon the new revelations and add some context to each to fully understand them.
Iraq???s WMD Program ??? New Information[/b]
Before the war, the U.S. intelligence community???s general view of Iraq was that it possessed WMD and had an active program that was actually larger than before the 1991 Gulf War. This was of course, completely wrong. The July 2004 Senate Intelligence Report found that this opinion was not supported by the intelligence and in fact was largely an exaggeration. When U.S. intelligence officials couldn???t find strong evidence of Iraq???s weapons program, they used that as proof that Iraq was hiding its WMD.
The Iraq Survey Group found that Iraq had destroyed its WMD stockpiles in 1991 and 1992 right after the Gulf War. Saddam was hoping to maintain his program however and wait for the international dust to settle to restart it in the future. When Saddam???s brother in law, Hussein Kamal, who was head of the country???s WMD program, defected to Jordan in 1994, the country???s plans were exposed. This led to the destruction of Iraq???s primary WMD facility in 1996 by U.N. inspectors. What was left were the scientists and their intellectual know how, which Saddam hoped to cultivate by having them work on various government funded scientific projects. The Iraq Survey Group found that even that didn???t work, and several Iraqi officials told the FBI that if Saddam ever wanted to restart the program in the future it would have been very difficult.
Not only that, but Saddam???s own actions had the unintended affect of making his officials give up on the program. Saddam told U.S. interviewers that he believed that the U.S. knew that Iraq didn???t have WMD, but was using it to push for regime change. That was the reason why he stopped cooperating with U.N. inspectors in 1998 who left in December of that year. In response, Pres. Clinton launched the largest strike against Iraq since the Gulf War that destroyed most of Iraq???s remaining weapons facilities. That in turn led Iraq???s WMD establishment to believe that they could never have another such program because the U.S. would always destroy its facilities. The only program that was maintained were small covert labs run by Iraq???s intelligence service that worked on small scale research and testing that were discovered by the Iraq Survey Group after the war. Otherwise, Iraq???s WMD program was dead and the U.S. didn???t even know. Even if presented with this news it would be highly improbably that U.S. intelligence or the Bush administration would believe it because they had such a biased view against Iraq and its WMD program. They both believed that Saddam would never give them up no matter what.
Even though Iraq didn???t have weapons anymore and now had stopped work on them, they still never came clean about it publicly. Saddam told the FBI that the reason why was to deter Iran, Iraq???s historical rival. Yes, Iraq wanted to be a leading Arab country and needed to challenge Israel, but Saddam continually told investigators about the need to stave off Iran and how he believed WMD had saved his government during the Iran-Iraq war. Saddam???s motivation was never picked up U.S. intelligence before the war.
Saddam also completely misread the United States and its intentions. Saddam said that he didn???t think of the U.S. as a natural enemy, and actually thought that he could improve relations. He sent out various feelers to U.S. officials, but these overtures were missed by America. He seemed to have had no idea that the American government really did believe that Iraq was a threat to U.S. interest in the Persian Gulf and still possessed WMD.
Iraq???s WMD munitions ??? New Information[/b]
The United Nations and the Bush administration both claimed that Iraq had never fully accounted for all of its WMD munitions after the 1991 Gulf War. U.N. reports repeatedly said that Iraq had not accounted for around 500 WMD artillery shells. The major American pre-war intelligence report on Iraq, the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and Secretary of State Colin Powell???s speech to the United Nations in May 2003 both repeated the charge. In June 2006 the House Armed Services Committee made public an April 2006 report by the U.S. Army???s National Ground Intelligence Center that said about 500 rockets and artillery shells full of mustard gas and sarin had been found in Iraq since the war ended. The munitions dated back to the 1980s Iran-Iraq war and their contents had degraded significantly. Republicans on the House committee claimed that the report proved the president???s pre-war claims that Iraq possessed and was hiding a stockpile of WMD. However, the Iraq Survey Group had found a few of these munitions itself while in the country and said that U.S. forces would continue to find old WMD munitions that had been lost or misplaced, but they were not purposely hidden. None of these weapons were part of an active stockpile.
Iraq & Musab al-Zarqawi ??? New Information[/b]
The Senate Committee???s reporting on Iraq and Al Qaeda is even more interesting. One of the major claims that Pres. Bush has stuck to since the war ended is that Iraq is the major front in the war on terror and that we are fighting terrorists over there so we don???t have to fight them here. One of the main players in this claim was the recently killed Jordanian terrorist Musab al-Zarqawi of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (Iraq). All along the administration has said that Zarqawi was an Al Qaeda leader, and that therefore America had invaded Iraq to fight terrorism after 9/11.
The U.S.???s earliest public claim about Iraq???s links with Zarqawi came in a speech Pres. Bush gave in Cincinnati in October 2002 when he said senior Al Qaeda leaders had fled to Iraq from Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion. Bush was talking about Zarqawi even though he wasn???t named. Zarqawi had fought alongside Al Qaeda against the U.S. in Afghanistan, but had been wounded. He subsequently passed through Iraq where he had surgery, which led to all kinds of speculation. Powell would later include Zarqawi in his speech to the United Nations as an example of cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda claiming that he received medical treatment in Baghdad, that he had set up terrorist camps in Kurdish northern Iraq, and that he had assassinated a U.S. diplomat in Jordan, all with Iraqi knowledge and support. At the time, U.S. intelligence actually said that Zarqawi was not a member of Al Qaeda, but rather headed his own independent terrorist organization. At the same time the CIA had intelligence from a captured Al Qaeda leader that Zarqawi was associated with Al Qaeda and had good relations with Iraq, but that it was not part of a formal relationship with bin Laden.
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq the situation was clarified. An April 2003 CIA report found that Zarqawi was not a member of Al Qaeda, but the leader of his own group. Bin Laden had tried to recruit him, but Zarqawi turned him down. Interviews with captured Iraqi officials also found that Iraq had tried to detain him when Jordan asked them to, but they were unsuccessful. An Iraqi official even went to Saddam after Powell???s U.N. speech to discuss the Zarqawi claim. Saddam said that Zarqawi was an enemy of the government and had worked with terrorists that set off two bombs in Baghdad. A 2005 CIA report said that Saddam???s government ???did not have a relationship, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi and his associates.??? That didn???t stop the administration from maintaining its claim that Zarqawi was part of Al Qaeda and that Iraq had supported him.
It appears that Zarqawi headed to Iraq not to be Al Qaeda???s agent or work with Saddam???s government, but rather to prepare to fight the Americans when they invaded Iraq and become a terrorist star. The American and Iraqi government???s tendency to blame all suicide bombings on him did just that. It wasn???t until 2004 that Zarqawi reached out to bin Laden to increase his legitimacy in the international Islamist terrorist community. He would eventually change the name of his organization of Attawhid wal Jihad (Unity and Holy War) to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (Iraq). The U.S. invasion of Iraq gave him the opportunity to almost supersede bin Laden as the leading Islamist terrorist in the world.
Iraq & Al Qaeda ??? New Information[/b]
Besides Zarqawi, one of the administration???s major claims for war was that rogue states such Iraq would give their WMD to terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda to attack the U.S. America would not allow this to happen after 9/11. Bush would tell reporters, ???You can???t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror.??? The Bush administration repeated these claims so many times that more than half of the U.S. public came to believe that Iraq was behind the September 11 attacks. These claims were not supported by intelligence before the war, and the Senate Intelligence Committee adds new details from top Iraqi officials, including Saddam himself, about their animosity towards Al Qaeda and Islamists in general.
Before the war U.S. intelligence received several contradictory reports about possible contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda, but overall concluded that there was no relationship. Various reports said that Saddam had a ???deep suspicion??? of bin Laden, that ???bin Laden generally opposed collaboration??? with Iraq, and that ???Saddam Husayn and Usama bin Ladin are far from being natural partners.??? In the 1990s both sides had contacted each other and met in places such as Sudan, but nothing came of it. Throughout 2002 the CIA and DIA released reports making these conclusions. Evidence linking the two sides mostly came in the form of reports that Al Qaeda fighters had fled to Iraq after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. These operatives were based in northern Kurdish Iraq where Baghdad had no control and worked with an Islamist, anti-Kurdish group called Ansar Al Islam. There were also reports that fighters had gone to the capitol itself. Intelligence reports said that the Iraqi government knew about these movements, but did not support them. The White House however went ahead and said that Iraq had a long standing relationship with Al Qaeda dating back to the 1990s and that Saddam was providing a safe haven to Al Qaeda members in public speeches.
There were also contradictory reports about Iraq providing training in WMD to Al Qaeda operatives. The CIA tended to believe the story, while the DIA said that the Al Qaeda operative that was the source, Ibn al-Libi, was lying and that Iraq would never cooperate with Al Qaeda. Libi claimed that two Al Qaeda operatives had gone to Iraq for training in 2000 but he didn???t know what became of them. By early 2003, just before the war started, CIA Chief George Tenet told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the operatives had successfully completed their training even though there was no new intelligence on the matter, and the claim made its way into various speeches by administration officials. In the end, the Libi case was a warning about the uses of torture. Libi originally came up with the story so that he could be treated better by his American captors and not be sent to a foreign country to be tortured. The U.S. ended up sending him to a third country anyway, and there, after beatings, he elaborated on the story of the operatives traveling to Iraq by making new things up. The foreign intelligence service continued beating him to get more information out of him but he couldn???t understand their questions, so he wasn???t able to make up any more stories to get them to stop.
After the war when the FBI interviewed Saddam he was asked about possible ties with Al Qaeda. He said the two sides had met in the past, but did not cooperate. When asked if Iraq would work with Al Qaeda because the enemy of my enemy is my friend, Saddam said that if he wanted to do that he would???ve worked with North Korea or China, not Al Qaeda. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said that Iraq was so averse to being linked with Al Qaeda that it didn???t even open an embassy in Afghanistan after the Taliban took power. Aziz also said that the government had tried to crack down on Islamists that had come to its country. Saddam even issued a presidential general order saying not to cooperate with Al Qaeda. In one case, in 2002, when Saddam found out that an al Qaeda official had secretly entered the country from Iran, he ordered him to leave immediately. Iraqi intelligence was also fully aware that the U.S. would use the presence of Ansar al Islam in Kurdish Iraq against the government, and tried to spy on them to keep track of their activities.
U.S. interrogators also found additional evidence of how Saddam didn???t understand domestic American politics when it came to terrorism. After 9/11 Iraqi officials wanted Saddam to issue an official statement condemning the attacks because it didn???t want to be seen as supporting al Qaeda. Saddam refused however because he was glad that the attacks had hurt the U.S. after America had imposed such pain on Iraq with U.N. sanctions. The international media would report that Saddam praised the attacks, giving ammunition to the war supporters in America.
CONCLUSION[/b]
These are the major pieces of new information provided by this Senate Intelligence Committee???s September 2006 report. U.S. intelligence completely missed the destruction of Iraq???s WMD capabilities because it was so set in the belief that Iraq would never give them up. They also never figured out that Iraq was focused upon Iran more than the U.S., and that was why it never came fully clean about its WMD program. The Bush administration also ignored U.S. intelligence reports that there was no relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda in the run-up to the war, and made it a major tool to convince the public of the necessity for invading Iraq. Even after the invasion, the White House used Zarqawi as a way to justify Iraq as being part of the war on terror even though U.S. intelligence didn???t believe him to be part of Al Qaeda. Saddam???s own misreading of American politics also made him take missteps that compounded America???s suspicion of him rather than alleviated it.
When the report was first released the White House spokesman said that it covered nothing new. In a way he was correct, because much of the report was a review of previous material. However the new information continues to show how the administration has not owned up on its own mistakes leading up to the war and its justifications for continuing to fight there. The Bush administration continues to claim that Saddam was a threat because he had intentions to have WMD, even though that???s all they w ere intentions. As the postwar interviews show, he would have had a difficult time restarting his weapons programs even if he wanted to and his scientists had basically given up on the project. The White House also continues to say that Iraq had a longstanding relationship with Al Qaeda. This was never really supported by intelligence before the war and even now that almost all of Saddam???s top officials have been captured and interviewed and told U.S. interrogators that there was no relationship, Bush, Cheney and others continue to cling to the claim. The U.S. even turned Zarqawi into what he wasn???t initially, an international terrorist star and Al Qaeda agent before he was finally killed this summer. All of these issues point towards the stubbornness of this administration to admit that it has made mistakes and adjust its policy. It is committed to staying the course, no matter how wrong this course has been.
SOURCES:[/b]
Books[/b]
Prados, John, Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War (New Press: New York, London, 2004)
Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco, The American Military Adventure In Iraq (Penguin Press: New York, 2006)
Government Reports[/b]
9/11 Commission, ???9/11 commission staff statement No. 15 The text as submitted to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,??? MSNBC.com, 6/16/04
Senate Intelligence Committee, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community???s Prewar Intelligence on Iraq, July 2004
Senate Intelligence Committee, Postwar Findings About Iraq???s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare to Prewar Assessments, September 2006
Articles[/b]
Leiken, Robert, ???The Truth about the Saddam ??? al Qaeda Connection,??? National Interest, November 2004
Lynch, Colum, ???Blix Downgrades Prewar Assessment of Iraqi Weapons,??? Washington Post, 6/22/03
Nordland, Rod, Masland, Tom, and Dickey, Christopher, ???Unmasking The Insurgents,??? Newsweek, 2/7/05
Pincus, Walter, ???20-year-old Iraq weapons spark debate,??? San Francisco Chronicle, 7/1/06
- ???Report Cast Doubt on Iraq-Al Qaeda Connection,??? Washington Post, 6/22/03
Pollack, Kenneth, ???Weapons of Misperception,??? Atlantic Monthly Online, 1/13/04
Ware, Michael, ???Meet The New Jihad,??? Time, 7/5/04
Ha! I wonder why it took him so long?
INDEX:[/b]
Introduction
U.S. Policy Towards Iraq At The Crossroads
I. President Bush???s View
II. Counterviews of U.S. Policy
III. Problems With The Counterinsurgency Program
IV. The Failure of Operation Together Forward I & II In Baghdad
V. Training Iraqi Forces
VI. Training the Iraqi Army
VII. Iraqi Police Training
VIII. Criticisms of Training Program
IX. Strains On U.S. Ground Forces
X. Failure of U.S. Policy In Iraq
XI. The End Of Iraqi Reconstruction
XII. Shrinking Coalition Of The Willing
The Iraqi Civil War
XIII. Sectarian Killings And Refugees
XIV. Causes
XV. Sadr???s Mahdi Army
XVI. Other Shiite Forces
XVII. Responses to the Shiite Militias
XVIII. A U.S. Timetable for Iraq?
XIX. The Insurgency
Al-Maliki???s Government
XX. Under Cut By Other Shiites
XXI. Economic Problems
XXII. Corruption
XXIII. The Kurds
Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Introduction[/b]
Now seems as good a time as any to write an Iraq update what with U.S. midterm elections having just ended and the announcement that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is to be replaced. Iraq played an important role in both of those events. By November 2006 60% of Americans were opposed to the war in Iraq, 56% felt less safe because of it, 55% thought it was a mistake to invade, and 65% disapproved of Bush???s handling of the war. On October 25, 2006 right before the elections Bush gave a televised speech to the nation to rally his supporters. In the speech Bush said, ???The ultimate accountability ??? rests with me. ??? It???s what the 2004 campaign was about. If people ??? if people are unhappy about it, look right to the president.??? That???s exactly what the American public did as it voted out Republicans, and the Democrats took control of Congress. Shortly afterwards Bush announced that Donald Rumsfeld would step down as Secretary of Defense, to be replaced with longtime Republican foreign policy establishment figure Robert Gates, who had been Bush???s father???s CIA Chief. The White House had actually already decided on removing Rumsfeld, but didn???t want to do it before the election and give critics more ammunition to attack the president with. The question now is will President Bush make meaningful changes to his Iraq policy after having declared over and over that the U.S. will ???stay the course,??? or perhaps even worse, is it too late for the U.S. to do anything about the problems Iraq now faces?
Iraq itself is sinking into chaos. A Defense Department briefing slide was leaked to the New York Times in October 2006 that said, ???Urban areas experiencing ???ethnic cleansing??? campaigns to consolidate control ??? violence at all-time high, spreading geographically.??? It seems that about every six months the situation becomes worse. In February 2006 the Shiite shrine in Samarra was bombed setting off a wave of retaliation killings of Sunnis by Shiite militias. Before that event, there were some low level death squad activities and abuses by the Shiite dominated police, but after the February bombing, violence escalated tremendously with Sunnis dying for every attack upon Shiites. This summer was marked by the failure of Operation Together Forward, the joint U.S.-Iraqi attempt to secure the capital Baghdad from sectarian killings. Since then, the U.S. and Iraqi government of Prime Minister al-Maliki have engaged in increasing recriminations against each other over who is responsible.
What appears to be happening now is that the Shiite parties are preparing to win a civil war against the Sunnis with the U.S. acting as a temporary band-aid dimming violence in the neighborhoods they occupy, only to see deaths increase as soon as they leave. Iraqi security forces are usually implicated in these murders, putting an end Bush???s claim that the U.S. will draw down when the Iraqis stand up.
With the U.S. elections over, the Bush administration is finally set to change its Iraq policy, but in all likelihood, it???s too late to stop events from continuing to spiral out of control until a full fledged civil war breaks out between Sunnis and Shiites. At the same time, ethnic tensions are increasing in the northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul between Kurds, who are attempting to take over those cities and incorporate them within Kurdistan even though Kurds are a minority there, and Arabs and Turkomans. In the South, there are also increasing tensions between rival Shiite factions. Iraq is turning into a country where almost every group is fighting against each other in a war of all against all with the U.S. stuck in the middle.
U.S. Policy Towards Iraq At The Crossroads[/b]
I. President Bush???s View
???We???re winning and we will win, unless we leave before the job is done.??? ??? Pres. Bush, televised speech, 10/25/06
President Bush likes to portray himself as a man with strong faith and commitments. When it comes to Iraq however, these traits have failed him. Bush???s insistence on equating Iraq with the war on terror and that the U.S. is winning are no longer believed by a large sector of America. Not only that, but it makes him appear to be detached from the realities on the ground in Iraq.
Iraq was never a war between Al Qaeda and the U.S. as Bush claims it is, but that is the major framework that the president likes to place the war within. In an October 2006 speech he said, ???If we were to abandon that country [Iraq] before the Iraqis can defend their young democracy, the terrorists would take control of Iraq and establish a new safe haven from which to launch attacks on America.??? He continued, ???We can???t tolerate a new terrorist state in the heart of the Middle East with large oil reserves that could be used to fund its radical ambitions or used to inflict economic damage on the West.??? The problem with this vision is three fold. First, Sunni Islamists can never come to power in a country that is 60% Shiite and also possess a sizeable and powerful Kurdish minority. Not only that, but the Sunnis live in Western Iraq that is pretty much devoid of oil wealth. Last, no Iraqi analysts believe that the insurgency can win, only that they can cause havoc within the country. Iraq is only a front in the war on terror because of the U.S. invasion. More importantly, the violence is now mostly between Sunnis and Shiites, rather than insurgents versus Americans.
Despite the increasing violence, President Bush and the White House continue to speak about how their policies are working in the country. Part of that was due to the November 2006 mid-term election in which the President was reluctant to show any weaknesses in the face of the Democrat???s criticism, however Bush genuinely seems to believe that the U.S. is winning. In August 2006, Bush met with a small group of professors and experts on the Middle East at the White House. He told them that he would make no policy changes. In the fall of 2006 Bob Woodward released another book on the Bush presidency and the war in Iraq. Woodward wrote that Henry Kissinger was one of the Bush???s leading foreign policy advisors outside the White House. Kissinger???s main advice, based upon his experience in Vietnam, was to stick it out in Iraq and only think about victory. In October 2006 Vice President Cheney expressed just this opinion when he told Time magazine, ???We???re looking for victory??? in Iraq. Bush repeatedly said in speeches that the U.S. would ???stay the course??? in Iraq as well. On October 25, Bush gave a televised speech to the nation in which he said, ???But we cannot allow our dissatisfaction to turn into disillusionment about our purpose in this war.??? He assured the public, ???We???re winning and we will win, unless we leave before the job is done.???
The question remains whether Bush and his cabinet will really mak e any real changes in policy now that U.S. elections are over, and more importantly whether these will have any effect within Iraq. In late October 2006 White House spokesman Tony Snow made a bungled attempt at claiming that Bush had always been changing his policy on Iraq. He said, ???This is not a stay-the-course policy??? despite Bush having said this over and over in speeches to the public. Bush seems both confused and frustrated by the situation within Iraq. After a meeting with conservative journalists in October 2006, the National Review???s online magazine wrote, ???At times during the conversation, the president seemed vexed ??? not beaten, not downcast, but vexed ??? by conditions in Iraq. Bush didn???t say so, but from his words it seemed hard to deny that in some significant measure the insurgents and the sectarian killers are in control in the country, and that the fate of the American mission is in their hands. ???The frustration is that the definition of success has now gotten to be, how many innocent people are dying???? the president said. ???And if there???s a lot of dying, it means the enemy is winning.??? He paused. ???That doesn???t mean they???re winning.?????? Bush seems unable to detach Iraq from the war on terror and realize that Iraq is facing a civil war. During the same meeting with conservative writers he complained that he couldn???t find any statistical means to prove that the U.S. was winning. By his own account, he realized that the numbers of death are actually proving the opposite, even though he wasn???t able to admit it in the end. Until he comes to terms with these two issues, U.S. policy may not take any major changes under Bush???s presidency. As James Phillips, an Iraq expert at the Heritage Foundation said, ???President Bush is committed to a strategic end, probably until the end of his administration.???
II. Counterviews of U.S. Policy
???We???re losing. The country is sliding into civil war, and the president doesn???t seem to be doing very much about it.??? ??? Max Boot, Council On Foreign Relations, August 2006
By the winter of 2006 liberal, conservative and neoconservative experts alike in the U.S., along with even a few American generals and former and current members of the administration noted that the U.S. was failing in Iraq despite Bush???s pronouncements of success. A review of reports, interviews and Congressional testimony turned up quotes such as the following:
- ???The reconstruction of Iraq is not doomed to fail, but the Bush Administration does not yet have a strategy that is likely to succeed. ??? U.S. policy often focuses on the wrong problems and employs the wrong solutions.??? Kenneth Pollack, a long time Iraq expert from the Saban Center at the Brookings Institute, February 2006 report on Iraq
- ???These trends strongly argue that the Iraqi government and the United States are now losing, not winning,??? Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and one of the top Iraq experts in a July 2006 report
- ???I think I would answer that be telling you I don???t think we???re losing.??? General Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, in congressional testimony in the summer of 2006
- ???There is clearly no momentum in this struggle.??? Frederick Kagan, a neoconservative Iraq expert at the American Enterprise Institute in a July 2006 editorial
- ???We???re losing. The country is sliding into civil war, and the president doesn???t seem to be doing very much about it.??? Max Boot, from the Council on Foreign Relations think tank, August 2006
- ???There???s a very broad view among not only the established pro-American regimes ??? the Jordanian regime, the Moroccan regime, even the Egyptian and Saudi, and Qatar and Kuwait even more so ??? and among many secular democratic forces in the region, that we have just messed up very badly, and strengthened Islamic forces, and strengthened the instinct of a lot of these regimes to resist.??? Larry Diamond, former Coalition Provisional Authority constitution expert and senior fellow at the Hoover Institute think tank at Stanford University, August 2006.
- ???The message is clear: We have a failed strategy, and we need new leadership and a new strategy to secure (our) interests in the region.??? Retired U.S. Army General, September 2006
- ???More of essentially the same is going to be a policy that very few people are going to be able to support. ??? [It] has virtually no chance of succeeding.??? Richard Haas, former Bush administration foreign policy official, now president of the Council on Foreign Relations, October 2006
- ???We???re not winning. It???s apparent. I checked with almost a dozen sources in Baghdad in just the last 24 hours. Every single one of them answered the question as to whether the violence is lessoning, or getting worse with ??? ???worse.?????? Wayne White, former head of the State Department???s Iraq section until 2005, October 2006
- ???That the Iraq war is, if not a failure, failing requires little demonstration.??? Eliot Cohen, current member of the Pentagon???s Defense Policy Board, October 2006
Evidence that the U.S. was not winning in Iraq was apparent everywhere. The U.S. proved that it could neither secure Anbar province in western Iraq, the base of the Sunni insurgency, nor make the capital safe from Shiite militias, their police allies, and Sunni fighters. Training Iraqi security forces was plagued by problems, and reconstruction in the country was coming to a flawed end with more reports of corruption, mismanagement and unfinished projects. It seemed like the U.S. could do nothing right.
III. Problems With The Counterinsurgency Program
???The United States has devoted considerable energy and resources to fighting the insurgency, but it has consistently employed the wrong strategy.??? Kenneth Pollack, Saban Center at the Brookings Institute, February 2006
In March 2006 Bush announced a new ???Clear, Hold and Build??? counterinsurgency policy. The plan was to first clear an area of insurgents, then hold it by turning over security to Iraqi forces, and then finally send in reconstruction teams that would start economic projects to win over the population. The plan was first applied to Anbar province in western Iraq, the center of the insurgency.
The first sign that the ???Clear, Hold and Build??? policy was failing came in the summer of 2006 as Iraqi forces proved incapable of carrying out their duties. In June 2006 for example, there were 5200 policemen in Anbar. Most were in the large cities such as Fallujah that had 1700 officers. In July 2006 the deputy police chief of the city was assassinated, while in October the provincial commander was killed. The attacks got so bad that by November there were no police patrols in the city. Police were so terrified of insurgent attacks that many were living in the police stations rather than going home and exposing their families to retribution. The Iraqi army fared only a little better. There were 13,000 Iraqi soldiers in the province in October 2006. The two Iraqi divisions deployed there were short about 5,000 soldiers with another 660 AWOL. One division only had 35% of its troops while the other only 50%. An added problem was that both the population and the U.S. military generally saw the police as incompetent and corrupt, while the local Sunni population feared that the largely Shiite army would carry out sectarian attacks. Either way, the people in the province did not feel secure with either around.
U.S. tactics were not universally applied nor accepted either in Anbar. For example, in the town of Hit a small Special Forces unit was attempting to recruit local Iraqis into the security forces and win hearts and minds, while a regular Army unit was trying to disband these forces because they were not under its control. The Special Forces unit also spent their time amongst the Iraqis as counter insurgency strategy advocates, while the regular Army unit had minimal contact with Iraqis other than when carrying out operations, and tended to stay within their base. Operations were also hindered by a constant rotation of U.S. troops in and out of the province with no coordination. That meant every time a new unit was deployed they started from scratch. 5 different U.S. units have been based in Hit since 2005.
Despite being the center of the new policy, the U.S. has also never had enough troops in the province to effectively secure it. When U.S. troops were shifted from Fallujah to Ramadi and later Baghdad for new offensives, violence increased in Fallujah and Iraqi units were incapable of stopping it. The U.S. simply doesn???t have enough troops to clear one area, hold it, and then move onto another. This despite the fact that the military announced that troop levels had risen to 150,000 by October 2006, the highest since the January 2005 elections for Iraq???s parliament.
The policy seemed to completely collapse in the fall of 2006 when many U.S. forces withdrew from the province to be re-deployed to Baghdad. Fallujah was been called a success story, but residents must go through extensive ID and security checks to pass through 7 check points in and out of the city, while insurgents are still active. Besides attacks on police, several prominent city leaders have been assassinated including the city council chief, and a senior cleric, plus the mayor had to flee due to death threats. A police captain in the city told a reporter, ???The Iraq resistance has not stopped for a single day despite the huge U.S. army activities. The wise men of the city explained to U.S. officials that it is impossible to stop the resistance by military operations, but it seems the Americans prefer to do it the hard way.??? Similar problems occurred in Ramadi where an Iraqi government official said, ???No government official can do anything without contacting the resistance first. Even the governor used to [get] their approval for everything. When he stopped doing so, they issued a death sentence against him, and now he cannot move without American protection.???
The general collapse of security in the province led a Marine intelligence officer, Col. Pete Devlin of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to issue a dire report on Anbar in September 2006. He said that the U.S. was losing because of a lack of a functioning local government and no representation by the central government that was leaving a vacuum filled by Al Qaeda in Iraq. Devlin also noted that the U.S. lacked the force levels to be successful, and that both the U.S. and Iraqi forces proved incapable of securing anything but their bases. A U.S. Army officer summed up Devlin???s report by saying, ???We haven???t been defeated militarily, but we have been defeated politically ??? and that???s where wars are won and lost.??? Devlin???s report was followed up by another military report that month that said the U.S. had lost control of the province and that insurgents controlled Fallujah and surrounding cities.
IV. The Failure of Operation Together Forward I & II In Baghdad
???In Baghdad, Operation Together Forward has made a difference in the focus areas but has not met our overall expectations in sustaining a reduction in the level of violence. ??? The violence is indeed disheartening.??? Maj. General William Caldwell, U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, October 2006
In March 2006 the new Iraqi government of Prime Minister al-Maliki and the U.S. military said that Baghdad had become the center of gravity in the fight for Iraq. The city was not only the site of insurgent attacks, but increasing sectarian violence between Shiite and Sunnis. The capital had to be secured to succeed in the country. In June 2006 Operation Together Forward was announced by Prime Minister al-Maliki. As noted Iraqi expert Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said, ???I don???t believe this operation was designed to turn a corner. I believe it was designed to stop a civil war.??? As part of the new operation 43,500 Iraqi forces and 7,200 U.S. soldiers were deployed, but with little success. By the end of July 2006 Maj. General William Caldwell, the U.S. military spokesman in Iraq announced, ???We have not witnessed the reduction in violence one would have hoped for,??? after the beginning of operations. This led to another troop increase before the month was up. 3,700 U.S. troops that were set to return home were given stop-loss orders to stay in Baghdad for at least four more months. By the end of August there were 15,000 U.S. servicemen and women in the city for Together Forward II. The U.S. also asked for an additional 4,000 Iraqi troops, but only a quarter showed up. Many Iraqi units simply refused to leave their home provinces or to conduct operations against their fellow Shiites.
By October 2006 the second Operation Together Forward was also failing. U.S. and Iraqi forces had entered 9 neighborhoods in Baghdad, 2 Sunni and 7 Shiite. The U.S. military said that it was operating against 23 Shiite and Sunni militias, many having ties with politicians in the government. The Iraqis were officially supposed to be running the operation, but the U.S. was doing almost all of the work. The major tactic was to clear neighborhoods block by block and then send in reconstruction teams that had $630 million to spend on projects to win hearts and minds. Because of the lack of security and the slowness of the Maliki government few infrastructure projects had even started by mid-October, and most were to be delayed until November. The real difficulties in the operation began with the Shiite neighborhoods. The U.S. began raiding areas thought to be bases for Shiite death squads and militias. As before, after a raid, Iraqi forces were suppose to take over security of the area, but rarely did. The commanding U.S. general in Iraq noted the problem himself when he said, ???The difficult part is going to be holding these areas with Iraqi security forces.??? He was echoed by an officer on the ground, Col. Michael Shields of the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team who told reporters, ???We come back to the dike all the time and stick our finger in. It is a longtime process. ??? The reality is that if we left that neighborhood tomorrow, it [the violence] would start again.??? In the Ghazaliya area for example, U.S. troops swept through clearing the area, but when it was turned over to Iraqi police, Shiite militias returned. American officials said that the police let them back in. The situation in the city got so bad that Prime Minister Maliki announced in October a plan for joint Sunni and Shiite checkpoints throughout Baghdad because the security forces were so mistrusted.
Even with the new offensive in the capital, the violence seemed to continue unabated.
One stark instance took place during the summer. On July 8 Sunnis bombed a Shiite mosque in West Baghdad. The following day, Moqtada al-Sadr???s Mahdi Army militia swept through the neighborhood killing 56 Sunnis. A man who witnessed the attacks called Iraq???s emergency number to report it. The operator told him, ???The Mahdi Army are not terrorists like you. They are people dong their duty. And how could you know that they are the Mahdi Army? Is it written on their foreheads???? Then the operator hung up. Hours after the killing, Sunnis bombed another Shiite mosque with two car bombs killing 18 and wounding 38.
To make matters worse, the U.S. played a numbers game to make it seem like they were being successful at first. In August 2006 Gen. Caldwell claimed that there had been a 52% decrease in deaths because of the new operation. Later, it turned out the U.S. was not counting people killed in bombings and mortar attacks. There was in fact, a decrease reported by the Baghdad morgue, but it was only a 17% decrease from over 1800 in July to over 1500 in August. Deaths would go up in September with 165 bodies found in a single four -day stretch in the capital alone. The U.S. also had to return to several neighborhoods they had declared cleared. By October 2006, the U.S. military was reporting that sectarian violence had increased 28% despite the security crackdown. By the end of the month, the U.S. military acknowledged that the 2nd Operation Together Forward had failed. Gen. Caldwell told reporters, ???In Baghdad, Operation Together Forward has made a difference in the focus area but has not met our overall expectations in sustaining a reduction in the level of violence. ??? The violence is indeed disheartening.???
By October 2006 then, the U.S. had failed to secure both Anbar province and the Iraqi capital. The U.S. military and Iraq experts had both said that the summer and fall were crucial moments in the war, but the U.S. had come up short once again. The U.S. training program for the Iraqi forces was faring no better.
V. Training Iraqi Forces
???Even as the number and capabilities of Iraqi security forces have increased, overall security conditions have deteriorated, as evidenced by attack trends, sectarian violence, and the growth and influence of militias.??? Government Accountability Office report to Congress, July 2006
In October 2006 President Bush said that the U.S.???s goal was to train 325,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers so that they could take over the security of the country and begin the drawdown of U.S. forces. Bush has often said that the U.S. ???will stand down as they [the Iraqi security forces] stand up.??? U.S. commander in Iraq Gen. Casey said that Iraqis would begin to take over the counterinsurgency campaign back in 2005, and in June 2006 sent a plan to the White House to withdraw up to 50% of U.S. forces by the beginning of September 2006 in anticipation of increased Iraqi participation. Of course, during the summer sectarian violence escalated and Iraqi forces largely failed in both Anbar province and Baghdad. By the end of October 2006 Gen. Casey was talking about increasing U.S. forces, while still talking about troop withdrawals sometime in the future when Iraqi forces could do their job.
VI. Training the Iraqi Army
???Thirty years from now, when historians are trying to figure out howe we lost this war, they???ll look to the MiTT [the Iraqi army training] program.??? U.S. MiTT team leader in Iraq, August 2006
The U.S. has gone through several haphazard and failed attempts to rebuild the Iraqi army. The current program is led by Military Transition Teams (MiTT), which are plagued with problems. There is mismanagement, inadequate training, lack of supplies and equipment, and the teams are undermanned, and usually staffed by non-combat troops who are not prepared for the training mission. For example, a Marine MiTT in Anbar province had a second in command that was a traffic management official who had never served in an infantry unit before. Only a third of the team had been trained with the foreign weapons they were suppose to train the Iraqis in. A senior enlisted man in the team said their preparation was ???a joke.??? The operation has been so poorly carried out that even the ranking Marine general in Iraq, Lt. General John Sattler complained about the lack of supplies given to the MiTTs. Iraq expert Kenneth Pollack from the Brookings Institute wrote, ???Many Iraqi formations are being trained by conventional U.S. units that lack the know-how, the inclination, or the time to properly teach counterinsurgency and stability operations. Moreover, Iraqi combat formations are still not always receiving the right kinds of training, and are often being pressed into service too soon after their formal periods of training.???
Because of the poor training regime, former State Department Iraq analyst Wayen White believed, ???There???s no reason for us to expect it [the Iraqi army to take over security duties] to happen. There???ve been claims since 2004 that the Iraqi army is largely ready. The army???s performance has disappointed deadline after deadline and prediction after prediction.??? Worse yet, an October 2006 report by the U.S. inspector general in Iraq found that the U.S. was not providing the Iraqi army with the capability to supply and operate itself independently. That meant the Iraqis would continue to rely upon the U.S. for guns, ammunition, rations, transportation, etc. Most Iraqi units could only operate for a few hours outside of their bases because they lacked basic vehicles and even gas to do much more. The report noted that the main problem in the training program was a lack of U.S. troops, and that no plan had been developed to fix the problem. The inspector general also wondered whether the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was even capable of supplying the Iraqi Army in the future because of a lack of money and know how.
Overall, the Iraqi soldiers were prone to desert, battalions were never at full strength, and the troops lacked discipline, especially during battle. Usually 25% of every unit was on leave to deliver their paychecks to their families, while 5-8% deserted. In areas with heavy combat such as Anbar, the numbers were even higher. Many units were also all from one ethnic/religious group with many ethnic militias having joined en masse, leading to questions about their loyalties. Half of each Iraqi army division is recruited locally, and they usually refuse to leave their home area as happened when only a quarter of Iraqi troops arrived to reinforce operations in Baghdad when requested. As Brig. General Dana Pittard, in charge of the training effort noted, ???The Iraqi Army is supposed to be a national army. They were recruited regionally, and for the most part they???ve been operating regionally. So that???s where the difficulty is.??? Prof. Tom Mockaitis of DePaul University saw a larger problem in this recruiting process. ???The question is, who are the Iraqi troops loyal to and what are their capabilities? And what does this say about internal security? At this point, I don???t see much more than a symbolic gesture.??? The Maliki government???s solution to this problem is to increase troop strength by 50,000 in the hopes that more soldiers can be on duty at any given time.
Despite all of these problems, Iraq???s government has been given, and is calling, for more control over the Iraqi army. In September 2006 the Iraqi ground forces command was established to run the army???s battalions while 2 divisions were turned over to direct control by the Iraqi government. The plan was to have 1/3 of the Iraqi security forces under Iraqi control by the end of October 2006, but like so many other things within the country, that plan was delayed. Gen. Casey claims that the Iraqi army is still 12-18 months away from being able to operate without heavy U.S. assistance. Anthony Cordesman felt, ???A lot of his is just rhetoric. It???s all part of a process to give the Iraqi forces more visibility, more confidence and, hopefully, give the government more leverage in terms of its ability to influence political compromise,??? because as he noted, Iraqi units will still be completely dependent upon U.S. forces and the U.S. will still be in the lead in any security operations. When this will end, no one knows.
VII. Iraqi Police Training
???We have to have the courage to admit that there are structural problems in the way the security forces were recruited. There has not been enough attention paid to quality, nor to leadership. Command and control remains a problem.??? Barham Salih, deputy Prime Minister, August 2006
2006 was dubbed ???the year of the police.??? The program has turned out to be even a larger failure than the training of the Iraqi army. The Iraqi police forces have expanded from 146,000 to 188,000 and are mostly Shiite, and deeply mistrusted by the Sunnis. New recruits are to receive 10 weeks of training either in Baghdad or Jordan. Like the army, police units have high absentee rates of 30-40%. The Interior Min istry, which is in charge of the police, is so disorganized that it neither knows how many officers have actually finished their training, nor how many they actually have under their command. Things were so bad that by October 2006 the U.S. announced that it would start a second round of training to make sure that all police officers received it. The future of this force is also unclear as the U.S. inspector general in Iraq noted in an October 2006 report that the Interior Ministry might not be able to pay for the force in the future.
The greatest problem with the police and the Interior Ministry is that it is thoroughly infiltrated by Shiite militias from top to bottom. An example is the 150,000 strong Facilities Protection Force. This is a separate force from the national police with each ministry allowed to create its own units. The force is a major home to Shiite militiamen and has been blamed for sectarian attacks on Sunnis. Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani even accused the Protection Force of death squad activities. In another case, Captain Alexander Shaw, head of the 372nd Military Police Battalion, in charge of training all of the Iraqi police in Baghdad, told the Washington Post in October 2006 that 70% of the regular Iraqi police officers were Shiite militiamen. Shaw told the Post of a police station in Baghdad full of posters of cleric Moqtada al-Sadr where the police chief openly spoke of wiping out all of the Sunnis in the country. When Shaw???s unit followed some of the chief???s police for escorting some Mahdi Army militiamen through the city, the police set up an ambush and killed an American soldier. Capt. Shaw told the Post, ???How can we expect ordinary Iraqis to trust the police when we don???t even trust them not to kill our own men? ??? To be perfectly honest, I???m not even sure we???re ever going to have police here that are free of the militia influence.??? A police commander that Shaw admired, Brig. General Salah al-Ani, told the Post, ???None of the Iraqi police are working to make their country better. They???re working for the militias or to put money in their pocket.???
The U.S. has put increasing pressure on the Interior Ministry to clean up its ties with the Shiite militias, but to little effect. In August 2006 the U.S. announced that it was setting up inspection boards that would go through one unit each month to make sure that it had all of its equipment and screen the loyalty of the officers. Whether the program will work has been questioned by U.S. trainers who have put in dozens of reports complaining about military control of police units but to no effect.
The training program has also been an example of great waste. The $75 million Baghdad Police College, which was suppose to be the center of the program, was so beset with construction problems that parts of it have to be torn down. A September 2006 audit of the school found that there was human waste leaking through the ceiling, water leaks, etc. The U.S. inspector general for Iraq said, ???This is the most essential civil security project in the country ??? and it???s a failure. The Baghdad police academy is a disaster.??? The Mosul police headquarters was also beset by construction problems. That project cost $988,000 and was suppose to have 10 showers and 10 toilets, but only ended up with one of each. There was so little oversight of the project, that a tree was cemented over and included in a wall.
VIII. Criticisms of Training Program
???The U.S. strategy of training Iraqi security forces ??? is merely preparing another set of fighters for the rapidly escalating civil war.??? Ivan Eland, senior fellow at the Independent Institute, October 2006
The failure of the U.S. training program has led to many criticisms. There are not enough Iraqi security forces being trained, the current security forces are leading to sectarian violence, there needs to be more time spent on training, the Iraqis will still be dependent upon the U.S., and that there is not enough money and advisors.
First, there are not enough Iraqi forces to secure the country. Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institute told Congress in July 2006 that only 1/3 of the Iraqi forces are capable of carrying out operations. Even if all of the Iraqi solders and police were capable, that still would not be enough. Based upon previous counterinsurgency campaigns, Iraq needed twice as many forces, approximately 500,000. Second, even if the forces were increased there was no telling whether they would be loyal to the government or to militias. There are reports over and over of Iraqi policemen carrying out sectarian killings, while others stand by and do nothing out of either fear or support. Some argue that the training program is simply creating soldiers for a burgeoning civil war. As Ivan Eland of the Independent Institute noted, ???The U.S. strategy of training Iraqi security forces ??? is merely preparing another set of fighters for the rapidly escalating civil war.??? Others say that the U.S. has been fixated on putting as many Iraqis into uniform as possible rather than emphasizing training and professionalism. Even with increased training the Iraqis lack the forces, money and know how to supply themselves. An October 2006 U.S. inspector general report found that the Iraqi government is not close to being able to provide for their own security forces. This all means that more money and more U.S. troops are needed to effectively carry out the training mission, but there are no plans to do so.
IX. Strains On U.S. Ground Forces
???What we???re working out of right now is a situation where we have absolutely piecemealed our forces to death.??? Lt. General Clyde Vaughn, Chief of the Army National Guard, November 2006
The Iraq war is placing tremendous strains upon the U.S. ground forces. There simply aren???t enough troops within the military???s timeframe of training, refitting and readiness to meet the demands of Iraq right now. Already, many U.S. units are serving their third tours in the country. In order to reach the current level of 150,000 U.S. troops, the military had to give involuntary recalls to 2,500 Marine reservists and 10,000 Army soldiers in August 2006. The next month the Army announced that 4,000 more soldiers would have their tours extended 46 days. By November, plans were announced to send in additional 7,000 National Guard troops in a special deployment. The Army was also discussing starting involuntary mobilizations of Reserves and National Guard troops as a possible solution. The troops are also running out of equipment. Units have left much of their equipment in Iraq to be taken up by new incoming ones. The National Guard alone has left 64,000 pieces of ordinance in the country. The situation is so dire that many troops don???t have enough to train and refit with once they return to the U.S. The Guard announced that it had a $24 billion equipment shortfall and only 1/3 of their essential equipment on hand. Regular Army units are also using up their gear at four times the usual rate. Officers have warned that the ground forces are at the breaking point. This is especially ironic because when Bush was running for president he said that he was going to rebuild the U.S. military and cut back its overseas deployments. Instead he is leaving it in tatters.
X. Failure Of U.S. Policy In Iraq
???There???s a sense among many people now that things in Iraq are slipping fast and there isn???t a lot of time to reverse them.??? Larry Diamond, former CPA official, and Hoover Institute fellow, October 2006
The continued problems with counterinsurgency, security and training operations have led to a widespread sense of dismay, reflection and review of U.S. policy in Iraq. Even before the November U.S. midterm elections, the Bush administration itself had slowly come to the realization that change was needed. Bush set up the Iraq Study Group under co-chairman James Baker to come up with ne w approaches to the war. Some leading Republican Senators such as John Warner, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, also urged a change in strategy. The press has speculated that when the Study Group issues its report it will suggest convening a regional conference to come up with a united policy on Iraq, more pressure on the Iraqi government to crack down on the Shiite militias, set up a system to share oil revenues to ensure the Sunnis that they won???t be shut out of the country???s wealth, and eventual troop reductions. There is even talk of abandoning the Maliki government by either forcing him to step down or fomenting a coup against him so that a government, not beholden to the Shiite parties, can rule.
The U.S. military also began reviewing its policies because it realized that things have not gone well. In the summer of 2006 the Pentagon ordered two separate studies. They found that the U.S. often used too much force that alienated Iraqis, that the U.S. was slow to work with Iraqis, didn???t consider the security of Iraqi civilians as important, and lacked intelligence about the insurgency. This led to an order in October 2006 that all U.S. soldiers, not just officers, be trained in counterinsurgency strategy.
Iraq experts have also criticized the tactics used in Iraq. One criticism came from the Brookings Institutes??? Kenneth Pollack who said that the U.S. emphasized offensive operations in areas where success was unlikely rather than securing the Iraqi population and winning them over to America???s cause. As Bush emphasized, ???The principal task of our military is to find and defeat the terrorists, and that is why we are on the offense.??? Most of these operations have been carried out in western Iraq and Anbar province where support for the U.S. and Iraqi government are at its lowest. Pollack argued that the U.S. couldn???t succeed in these areas because the population didn???t support them. ???We are committing the cardinal military sin of reinforcing failure by concentrating too many of our forces in Iraq???s western province ??? where the insurgents are thickest and where support for reconstruction is thinnest. This approach has repeatedly resulted in counterinsurgency failures throughout history. Our efforts to ???take the fight to the enemy??? and mount offensive sweep operations designed to kill insurgents and eliminate their strongholds have failed to eradicate the insurgency so far, and likely will continue to do so, as was the case in Vietnam and other lost guerrilla wars,??? he wrote in a study of Iraq in February 2006. Pollack thought that the U.S. carried out these operations because it doesn???t want to admit that it really doesn???t control the country and because conventional military wisdom is to attack, while counterinsurgency doctrine calls for a different kind of thinking where securing the populace is the number one priority. Instead the U.S. military is committing mass sweeps where they break down doors and search for insurgents, which costs hearts and minds. A September 2006 public opinion poll for example, found that 71% of Iraqis wanted the U.S. to withdraw within a year. Pollack argues that the U.S. needs to withdraw to some core areas such as Kurdistan, areas of the Shiite South and Baghdad where public support is strongest for security and reconstruction if it wants a shot at being successful.
Even that policy is questionable however. Having failed with successive military policies, the question must be raised, could Iraq be so fractured that no military policy will be effective? The U.S. is no longer fighting just an insurgency, it is now fighting a sectarian civil war. On the one hand, the U.S. is combating Sunni insurgents and foreign fighters, some of which have ties to parties participating in the government. On the other hand the U.S. is also trying to clamp down on Shiite militias, who are also connected to the government, who are killing Sunnis. At the same time the U.S. is trying to prop up an Iraqi government whose own ministries and security forces are participating in the sectarian violence. With so many factions, who is the U.S. actually fighting for, and what are they trying to secure?
???The U.S. aid and economic development effort has been and is a dismal failure that has wasted at least $10 billion of US and Iraqi money. It has never been properly planned, has little impact in the poorest and high-threat areas, has failed in many key sectors, and has lacked meaningful audits and measures of effectiveness.??? Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International studies, Congressional testimony, July 2006
The record of U.S. reconstruction since the 2003 invasion has been plagued by problems.
On October 7, 2006 U.S. funding for reconstruction officially ended. The U.S. will only finish projects that it has already started. Any new projects will have to be paid for by the Iraqi government. Only half of the oil and electrical projects planned have been completed, and many of the projects that have been finished face problems. Electrical and oil production is only a little above pre-war levels, while attacks upon the infrastructure continue to limit basic services and any building projects. U.S. government agencies in charge of reconstruction hid cost overruns, while 30% of the projects looked at by the U.S. inspector general in Iraq were found to be substandard or complete failures. There is no punishment for these U.S. companies because they were given cost-plus contracts, which meant that they were paid no matter what, whether they made mistakes, were late, or didn???t finish. In October 2006 the Maliki government announced that it needed $100 billion over the next four years to rebuild Iraq???s infrastructure. No one knows where that money will come from and there are questions over the competency of the Iraqi government to carry out any new projects due to a lack of know how and widespread corruption.
XII. The Shrinking Coalition Of The Willing
???British armed forces are effectively held hostage in Iraq.??? British Ministry of Defense Memo, September 2006
The Coalition of the Willing which was suppose to support the U.S. effort in Iraq has decreased since the beginning of 2006. Italy and Romania announced that they would start drawing down their troop by the end of the year. More importantly, England, America???s closest ally in the Iraq war and the largest member of the Coalition after the U.S., has been making moves to withdraw many of its troops as well. The English Army Chief, Gen. Richard Dannatt said that the goodwill of the Iraqi people had ended and that England should ???get ourselves out sometime soon because our presence exacerbates the security problems.??? In order to maintain favor with the U.S. and save face, the British military has announced that it will begin pulling out troops from Iraq so that they can be redeployed to Afghanistan. Like the U.S. military, Iraq has strained England???s armed forces with an extended overseas commitment, and British officers are frustrated with the slow development of Iraqi security forces. A September 2006 Ministry of Defense memo said, ???British armed forces are effectively held hostage in Iraq ??? following the failure of the deal being attempted by COS [chief of staff] to extricate UK armed forces from Iraq on the basis of ???doing Afghanistan??? ??? and we are now fighting (and arguably losing or potentially losing) on two fronts.??? The British commander in Iraq, Major Gen. Richard Shirreff was determined to carry out one final operation in Iraq, Operation Sinbad, aimed at clearing out Shiite militias and criminals from Basra before he started withdrawing troops from the country. By early 2007, they hope that to start the process of reducing their troops from 7200 to 3500. Still, the troops left in Iraq are expected to stay in the country until at least 2010.
The Iraqi Civil War[/b]
???The sectarian violence is probably as bad as I???ve seen it. If not stopped, it is possible that Iraq could move toward civil war.??? Gen. John Abizaid, CENTCOM commander to Senate Armed Services Committee, August 2006
Attacks between Shiites and Sunnis, rather than fighting between insurgents and the U.S., now constitute the major causes of deaths in Iraq. An August 2006 Defense Department report to Congress said, ???The core conflict in Iraq [has] changed into a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists.??? Despite the escalation in sectarian killings the Pentagon has denied that Iraq is in the midst of a civil war. ???The idea that the country???s aflame in sectarian violence is just not right. So I don???t subscribe to the civil war theory,??? Gen. Casey, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, told reporters in October 2006. A report on sectarian violence by the Brookings Institute found many Iraqis agreed. ???The fact that full-scale civil war has not yet erupted between these communities bears witness to the resilience of Iraqi society in general, and especially to the forbearance of large (but not all) parts of Iraq???s Shi???a communities. Across the country, Sunni and Shi???a interviewed for this research stressed that there is no civil war as long as ordinary people are not killing their neighbors. They argue that it is a war between radical extremists, and that civilians pay the price.??? The violence has mostly been concentrated in the country???s largest cities, but there are reports that it is spreading into the countryside as well. Since the February 2006 bombing of a Shiite shrine, sectarian violence has escalated to new highs and been accompanied by acts of ethnic cleansing.
XIII. Sectarian Killings and Refugees
???Hundreds of bodies have continued to appear throughout the country bearing signs of severe torture and execution-style killings.??? U.N. study, September 2006
Every month since the February shrine bombing, with the exception of a short dip in the middle of the summer, has seen a steady increase in deaths in Iraq. The U.N. estimated that 17,776 civilians had been killed in the first seven months of 2006, while Gen. Casey believed that Shiite militias and death squads were responsible for 60% of them. In July 3,438 civilians were killed with an average of 100 a day. August saw a small dip, only to hit record highs in September. A U.N. report from that month found that 5,106 civilians had been killed in Baghdad alone from July to August 2006. ???Hundreds of bodies have continued to appear throughout the country bearing signs of severe torture and execution-style killings,??? the report announced.
Descriptions of these deaths and violence are breathtaking. Shiites and Sunnis in central Iraq have resorted to tit for tat attacks on each other at an alarming and deadly rate. In October, for example, there was the Balad incident. Balad is a mixed city 50 miles south of Baghdad. Early that month 2 or 3 Sunni men were killed, one of them being the local leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. On October 13, Sunni insurgents in neighboring Duluiyah kidnapped and beheaded 17 Shiite workers in retaliation. The U.S. military arrested 2 Sunni police officers from the town for their alleged involvement in the murders. Local Shiite leaders were not satisfied however and called on Sadr???s office in Baghdad to exact revenge. Mahdi Army militiamen from Baghdad responded coming down in buses to Balad. More fighters in army uniforms and trucks, and Interior Ministry commando uniforms arrived as well. On October 14 the Mahdi Army set out to cleanse Balad of all Sunnis. Sunnis were told to leave the city in 48 hours, and Shiite militiamen set up roadblocks to check for Sunnis. By the next day the U.S. military reported that 57 people had died in Balad, while the city morgue reported around 80. Most were Sunnis who had not only been shot, but were also tortured, often with holes drilled in their bodies. The Iraqi government finally sent in police commandos and an army unit to quell the violence. By that time there were only 5 to 6 Sunni families left in the city, the rest had fled. The Mahdi Army was still in the city however, and formed neighborhood defense forces and set up new roadblocks outside the city to turn away any Sunnis they could find. The police stood around and did nothing. 3 miles away Sunni insurgents were organizing and vowing revenge.
The violence is also leading to a refugee crisis in the country. The Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration announced in September that an estimated 240,000 people, up from 162,000 in July, had been displaced and sought help from the government. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees claims that there are now 1.6 million Iraqis who have fled their country and 1.5 million internally displaced by October 2006. Many of these people have been forced out by armed factions as happened in Balad, especially in the Baghdad area and southern Iraq, in ethnic cleansing operations by both Sunnis and Shiites. These displacements are strengthening the hand of radical groups on both sides that blame their enemies, set up aid operations, and claim to be their protectors.
XIV. Causes
???It is likely that sectarian violence is causing lasting change to Iraq???s social and demographic make-up. That is when the radical armed groups on both sides seek to achieve ??? and they are succeeding.??? ???Sectarian Violence??? report by the Brookings Institution, October 2006
Sectarian violence in Iraq is a result of radical Shiite and Sunni factions jockeying for position to control the future of the country. Most of the killing are centered in the large urban areas, namely Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, and Salah ad-Din, Diyala and Babil provinces, but has also leaked out to some rural sections as well. The more mixed a community or city is, the more likely there is to be sectarian conflicts. To the Sunnis they are fighting against Shiites who are working with Iraq???s longtime enemy Iran to seize control of the country and set up a theocracy. For the Shiites, they believe that the Sunnis are trying to re-impose Hussein???s oppressive dictatorship, while radical foreign elements such as Al Qaeda In Iraq are trying to set up a radical Islamist government. Both sides see themselves as victims, and their violence is portrayed only as a defense against the others. The main culprits on the Shiite side are Sadr???s Mahdi Army and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq???s Badr Brigade, while on the Sunni side there are the Association of Muslim Scholars and the Islamic Party who are connected to the insurgency. All parties are using violence to secure their political power base. With a weak central government that has limited influence outside of the Green Zone in Baghdad, force is seen as the only legitimate source of protection and power. To ensure their power both sides are increasingly resorting to ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods and cities to ensure that their sect is concentrated in one area. The threat of ethnic cleansing can also be used as an excuse to enter into a new area as protection for their sect as well. As an October 2006 study by the Brookings Institution found, ???The groups all share in fact common goals: to consolidate their territory, to maintain some of ???their??? people in the territory of the ???other??? and, in the context of a feeble government, to pose as both protector and provider.??? The report continued by saying that radical groups on both sides are succeeding in their attempt to remake Iraqi society.
XV. Sadr???s Mahdi Army
???The Sadr movement has spread like lightning through almost all of the southern provinces.??? Prof. Jaun Cole, Middle East expert at the University of Michigan, August 2006
The main perpetrator of sectarian violence on the Shiite side has been Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army. After the February 2003 bombing of the Samaara shrine, Sadr unleashed his Mahdi Army as a way to gain popular support amongst the Shiites in the country. Sadr has been able to supersede the two leading Shiite political parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Dawa Party. In the process however, his movement has grown so quickly that he has lost control of parts of it, while others have broken off and formed their own organizations.
Sadr???s organization is based upon the Hezbollah model. It provides social services to poor Shiites, operates as a political party, and also has armed fighters with its militia. There are between 6,000-10,000 Mahdi Army militiamen in Baghdad alone. More importantly, he controls the 140,000 strong Facilities Protection Service, which has been accused of killings, kidnappings, and crime. Sadr also ran candidates in the last national election and holds a large and powerful block of 30 seats in parliament. His parliamentary seats provide the main base for Prime Minister al-Maliki???s ruling coalition. As an active member in the government Sadr now controls the Health Ministry, which controls hospitals and clinics that serve up to 50% of the population. The ministry has been used as a source of patronage to expand his influence as well as intimidation against Sunnis. During the summer for example, there were reports that Mahdi Army members were going through hospitals rounding up Sunnis and killing them. Sadr???s organization also provides help to Shiite refugees fleeing Sunni violence, which again, improves his standing amongst his sect.
Sadr himself is a nationalist who is opposed to both the U.S. occupation and the growing influence of Iran. He would like to set up his own Shiite theocracy. He considers SCIRI an older and more conservative party that is beholden to Iran. As Middle East expert Prof. Juan Cole from the Univ. of Michigan said, ???It???s essentially a class war. The Sadr guys are pressing ??? for a kind of Shiite Maoism. SCIRI represents what???s left of the Shiite middle classes.??? Sadr funds his organization through donations, businesses, such as a string of gas stations in the capital, and, according to the U.S. military, a vast criminal network. Lt. Col. William Brown, a U.S. military intelligence officer in Baghdad estimated that Sadr and other Shiite groups were raising at least $1 million a day through crime, ???especially from kidnappings, extortion, black marketeering and blackmail.???
Increasingly, Sadr and SCIRI have come into open conflict. In October 2006 the Mahdi Army battled SCIRI???s Badr Brigade in the city of Amara. Amara is the capital of Maysan province, which has been a political battleground between the two. Sadr???s political party controls the provincial council, with the governor a former Mahdi Army commander, while the Badr Brigade controls the police. The fighting in Amara started when a local police chief, who was a Badr member, was killed in a bombing blamed on the Mahdi Army. Police then arrested the brother of the Mahdi Army commander in the city. In response, 200 Mahdi Army militiamen poured into Amara leading to shoot outs with the Badr Brigade. The Badr Brigade controlled police eventually ran out of ammunition and fled, leaving the eastern half of the city in the hands of Sadr???s men. Prime Minister Malki had to send in negotiators to stop the fighting. In the end, 10 policemen and 15 militiamen were killed and 90 wounded. In the end, Sadr came out the winner as Prime Minister Maliki sent his Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani to meet with Sadr to re-assure him that the government was not moving against him or his militia.
XVI. Other Shiite Forces
???When Sadr says you can???t do this, for whatever reasons, that???s when they start to go rogue. Frankly, at that point, they start to become very open to alternative sources of sponsorship.??? Senior U.S. intelligence officer to the New York Times, September 2006
Beginning in August 2006 the press started reporting that the Mahdi Army had grown so large and fast that Sadr had lost control over parts of it. A U.S. military officer told the Los Angeles Times in September 2006, Sadr ???has a measure of control, but when you get down to the bottom of the stack, I don???t think he has ultimate control of every entity that operates under his name.??? Things got so bad that Sadr began dismissing militia commanders in Najaf and Basra to try to re-assert control. Up to 6 of these former officers ended up starting their own militias. A September estimate said that up to 1/3 of the Mahdi Army had become independent. Some members didn???t think that Sadr was radical enough anymore after he had participated in elections and become part of the government. Some wanted to stand up to the Sunnis, while still others simply wanted to create their own fiefdoms. A U.S. officer said, ???I???ll tell you as time goes on, you???re going to continue to see elements break off the organization and become sort of these semi-independent players, but none of them remain independent for long. They all find a sponsor.???
SCIRI???s Badr Brigade has also been implicated in sectarian killings. In July 2006 SCIRI???s leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim stood up for the militias when he said that it was legitimate for citizens to take up arms to protect themselves. There are reports that the Baghdad Order Maintenance police and elements of the Interior Ministry are controlled by the Badr organization and are carrying out death squad activities. In the city of Basra, a Toyota sedan infamous for kidnapping and killing Sunnis has been seen outside local SCIRI offices and a police station run by the Badr Brigade.
In southern Iraq there are various other, smaller Shiite organizations. Mahmud al-Hasani and his Husayn Army in Karbala, for example, is a new young cleric trying to imitate the success of Sadr. Hasani studied under Sadr???s father and was briefly allied with Moqtada, but broke with him over his participation in parliamentary elections. Like Sadr, Hasani is anti-American, anti-Iranian, opposed to SCIRI, and wants to set up an Islamic run government. Hasani has claimed that he is the ultimate authority on Shiisim in Iraq and has attacked U.S. forces off and on since October 2003. Hasani has fought another new Shiite group, the Fadhila party that has its own militia in the South. These and other organizations have openly battled each other in southern cities and carried out assassinations against one another. U.S. officials are afraid that these groups will eventually turn to Iran for money, weapons and support, and continue the fracturing of the country.
XVII. Responses to the Shiite Militias
???There is no evidence that shows that the minister of defense or interior are doing anything to stop this toll [of sectarian violence].??? Haider al-Abaadi, member of the ruling Shiite Alliance in the Iraqi Parliament, September 2006
What to do about the increasing sectarian violence and the Shiite militias has become the main point of contention between the U.S. and the government of Prime Minister al-Maliki. Even politicians in the ruling Shiite Alliance have questioned the government???s competency over the issue. One Shiite politician said, ???There is no evidence that shows that the minister of defense or interior are doing anything to stop this toll.??? Despite the mounting pressure Prime Minister Maliki has not introduced any new policy to deal with the militias. One reason is that he depends upon Sadr???s 30 parliamentary seats to stay in power. Joost Hiltermann, an Iraq expert at the International Crisis Group said, Maliki ???can???t get rid of [the Mahdi Army] without destroying his power base and therefore himself.??? Maliki also doesn???t have the forces necessary to crack down on the militias even if he wanted to. The U.S. controls 8 of the 10 Iraqi army divisions, and the majority of the police are run by militias. Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani has started making some moves to gain control of his ministry and the police under his command. In October he announced that he was going to clean up the Interior Ministry and started by firing more than 4,500 employees, this included two high-ranking police commanders, both believed to be Shiite militia members. A high-ranking police commander was also arrested for kidnapping over 26 workers in Baghdad, and a police brigade was taken out of service for arresting and kidnapping 24 workers in the city. The following month he charged 100 members of his ministry for running a prison in Baghdad where 1,431 prisoners were found to be tortured back in May 2006. Still, Bolani???s deputy minister is a Sadr follower and the police brigade taken out of service were not going to be punished, but rather sent in for more training.
Unhappy with the Iraqi government???s lack of action, the U.S. began moving against the Mahdi Army indirectly in the summer of 2006. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad said in a press conference that, ???Militias are the infrastructure of a civil war, and they go against resolving disputes through the political process.??? He said they needed to be ???decommissioned, demobilized and reintegrated,??? and singled out the Mahdi Army. The U.S. crack down has been delicate and inconsistent, because they can???t openly go after Sadr without taking on the Iraqi government, which the U.S. is trying to prop up. Because of that, the U.S. often does not mention the Mahdi Army publicly, but rather says that it is cracking down on Shiite death squads. In July, the U.S. military made a raid that led to the arrest of 30-40 gunmen and a militia commander. August 7 they moved into Sadr City in Baghdad that led to a day-long firefight with the Mahdi Army. All of these actions were condemned by Prime Minister Maliki. Maliki???s spokesman said, ???We don???t want to solve this problem with military force.??? Instead, the Iraqi government has told the Bush administration that it needs to negotiate with Sadr and treat him as a political leader. Things came to a head in October when the U.S. arrested one of Sadr???s lieutenants and Maliki ordered his release, which infuriated U.S. military commanders in Iraq.
The U.S. has also tried to use the Iraqi Army against Sadr because it is more ethnically mixed than the police. This led to a large clash in the city of Diwaniya on August 28. It started when Iraqi soldiers arrested one of Sadr???s supporters. This led to a gunfight between the Mahdi Army and several other Shiite militias in the city and the Iraqi Army. When the Iraqi soldiers ran out of ammunition they were captured, taken to the public square and executed by the militiamen. The fighting only stopped when Shiite politicians went to see Sadr and negotiated a cease-fire. The Iraqi Army was also used in a raid against cleric Mahmud al-Hasani that led to a day of street fighting in Karbala and protests in Nasiriyah and Basra against the government.
Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh has argued that the U.S. needs to undercut Sadr???s support by providing the base of his support, poor Shiites with jobs and reconstruction projects. ???The best way to do it is to give them jobs, not in the security system, but where they could be active in the economy. Once they get an income, I don???t think they will follow an ideology or become fundamentalist and extremist,??? he said. Iraq experts in the U.S. have also said similar things and advocated that the U.S. and Iraqi government provide social services and establish the rule of law in neighborhoods run by the Mahdi Army. The problem with that is the Ministry of Health, that might provide such services, is controlled by Sadr and the police are not reliable. Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group warned, ???Unless directly provoked, Sadrists will lay low, because they know the American???s time in Iraq is coming to an end. Why would they risk another major loss of fighters if it???s not necessary. Americans in their eyes are already defeated ??? they???re going to leave.???
???Deadlines could help ensure that the Iraqi leaders recognize the imperative of coming to grips with the tough decisions they???ve got to make for there to be progress in the political arena.??? Senior U.S. Army officer who served in Iraq, October 2006
In October 2006 with the surge in sectarian violence, the U.S. began to reevaluate its policy towards Iraq. Gen. Casey and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad began working on a new plan that would include peace negotiations with warring factions, universal political freedoms to maintain a democracy, sharing of oil revenues to assure Sunnis they would not be cut out of the country???s wealth, ending the de-Baathification program so that more Sunnis could be brought into the government, and disarming of the Shiite militias. If these ideas worked out U.S. troops could start leaving Iraq. The plan was both an attempt to take a new look at solutions to Iraq as well as show that the Bush administration was doing something about Iraq before the November mid-term Congressional elections in the U.S. Suddenly the U.S. was talking about timetables after Bush had rejected them. Timetables had been turned down in the past because they would help the insurgents, but by the fall of 2006 people inside and outside the White House were arguing that timetables would force the Iraqi government to make the tough decisions it had been avoiding. Some U.S. Army officers also supported timelines because they would set a deadline for when U.S. troops would leave Iraq instead of being stuck in an open ended deployment in Iraq.
The major problem with the U.S. timetable was that the Maliki government was so weak it probably could not accomplish most if any of the goals. The U.S. also didn???t mention what would happen if the Iraqis didn???t meet the guidelines. As soon as the plan became public, Prime Minister Maliki rejected it. ???I affirm that this government represents the will of the people, and no one has the right to impose a timetable on it,??? Maliki said in a press conference in October 2006. The prime minister also exposed one of the key motivations behind the U.S. timetable when he said at the same media briefing, ???I am positive that this is not the official policy of the American government but rather a result of the ongoing election campaign. And that does not concern us much.??? The U.S. timetable also had major problems besides Maliki. There are no assurances that the Shiites and Kurds, who live where almost all of Iraq???s oil is, would want to share its wealth with the Sunnis who they blame for the Saddam government and the constant bombings and attacks. Sunnis on the other hand, are increasingly becoming frustrated with participating in the Iraqi parliament where they have gotten little to nothing in return. ???The feeling has started to creep in that ???we participated in the political process, but what has it got us???? There is a real danger that ??? the Sunnis [will] wash their hands of being involved in the political process,??? Peter Khalil, an Iraq expert at the Eurasia Group, said. Details were never given on the U.S. timetable and after the U.S. elections they were seemingly dropped by the U.S., raising the question of whether there was ever a timetable plan, or whether it was just pre-election posturing by the administration.
XIX. The Insurgency
???The insurgency remains strong and virulent because the reason for its existence hasn???t changed. There???s still an occupation. As long as Sunni fears exist and as long as those who want to preserve the privileges they had under the former regime exist, there will be an insurgency.??? Joost Hilterman, Iraq expert, International Crisis Group, August 2006
Along with the growth of the Shiite militias, the Sunni insurgency continues to be alive and well in Iraq. In 2003 the U.S. estimated that there were 5,000 insurgents. By late 2004 that number had risen to 12,000-16,000. By 2006 the U.S. estimated that there were between 8,000-20,000 insurgents with up to 160,000 supporters. A Pentagon assessment reported in September 2006 that 75% of the Sunni population supported the insurgency, an amazing increase from only 14% in 2003. July 2006 saw the highest number of insurgent attacks with over 4,500 a month, while October saw one of the highest U.S. casualty rates since the U.S. invasion. This was all despite the killing of Al Qaeda in Iraq???s leader Abu Zarqawi in June that was hailed as a great victory for the U.S. The insurgency proved so strong that Vice President Cheney finally backed off his wild claim that it was in its ???last throes.???
Despite Zarqawi???s death, Al Qaeda in Iraq has actually grown. Their new leader is an Egyptian Abu Ayyub Masri who is seen as being more flexible than Zarqawi who was known for his rigid ideological views. Masri has allowed many new recruits to join the organization, especially local Iraqis, to expand their base. Before his death, Zarqawi had turned to threatening Sunni tribal leaders if they didn???t cooperate. This led to a vast exodus of tribes to the government???s side. Masri has mended fences with these leaders. Al Qaeda in Iraq and other Islamist insurgent groups also declared their own Islamic republic in western Iraq, but that was more for show than reality. The insurgents were able to have a parade down the middle of Ramadi though, after the announcement, to show their strength.
There are also continued reports of Iraq having a negative effect on the war on terror. Most striking was the seeming transfer of tactics from Iraq to Afghanistan. The summer and fall of 2006 saw a surge of attacks in Afghanistan using roadside bombs, kidnappings, and suicide bombings all imported from Iraq. ???The increase in vehicle bombings in Kabul ??? that???s straight-out-of-Iraq stuff. Now Iraq is the source of the expertise and Afghanistan is receiving,??? noted Brian Jenkins, a terrorist expert at the RAND Corp. The similarity in tactics was probably the result of Iraqi veterans traveling to Afghanistan. Asia Times estimated that at least 500 fighters had gone from Iraq to Afghanistan by March 2006. According to the SITE Institute, that monitors terrorism, terrorist training camps in Iraq have trained Afghan fighters. In September 2006 a Taliban leader told Newsweek about his training in one of these camps. ???I???m explaining to my fighters every day the lessons I learned and experienced in Iraq. I want to copy in Afghanistan the tactics and spirit of the glorious Iraqi resistance.??? France???s Le Monde newspaper also reported that Iraqi fighters had established training camps in Waziristan in northern Pakistan as well.
These events led to a series of intelligence reports warning of Iraq???s influence on global terror. A January 2003 National Intelligence Council report said that the Iraq war had the potential to increase support for Islamism and terrorism in the Muslim world. An earlier report by the Council that reports to the president, said back in early 2005 that Iraq had become the primary training ground for terrorists and that veterans might become the next terrorist leaders of the future. In April 2006, a report by the U.N. found that Iraqis had provided Al Qaeda with a training center and new recruits. It found concrete evidence of this influence in Afghanistan. ???New explosive devices are now used in Afghanistan within a month of their first appearing in Iraq.??? The White House itself, in a September 2006 report called ???9/11 Five Years Later: Success and Challenges,??? acknowledged that, ???The on going fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry.??? Also that foreign fighters in Iraq could return home ???exacerbating domestic conflicts or fomenting radical ideologies.??? That same month parts of a National Intelligence Estimate, which is suppose to reflect the consensus of all of the U.S. intelligence agencies, became public. The report said, ???We assess th at the Iraqi jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere,??? and that ???The Iraq conflict has become the ???cause celebre??? for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.??? It also warned that, ???The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa???ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.??? Likewise, the British in a secret September 2006 report from their Defense Academy noted, ???The war in Iraq ??? has acted as a recruiting sergeant for extremists across the Muslim world ??? Iraq has served to radicalize an already disillusioned youth and al-Qaida has given them the will, intent, purpose and ideology to act.???
Despite all of these dire warnings, experts disagree on the overall impact of Iraq on the international Islamist movement. Most insurgents in Iraq are Iraqis, not foreigners that constitute only 10% of the fighters. Estimates say only about 50-70 foreign fighters enter Iraq each month. This could mean that Iraq will not create as many battle tested fighters as Afghanistan did in the 1980s. ???It is not obvious now how many Iraqi jihadists will support the global jihad of bin Laden and how many will focus their efforts on Iraq???s fledging state,??? a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found in October 2006. Some fighters may not be interested in fighting outside of Iraq, however it only takes a few to return to their homes and start new terrorist cells. Ironically, the death of Zarqawi, who focused upon killing Shiites and starting a sectarian civil war, might actually align the Islamists and foreign fighters in Iraq more with Al Qaeda and bin Laden, who was for uniting all Muslims against the U.S. While many experts agree that Iraq has radicalized a new generation of Islamists, the movement would have continued whether the U.S. had invaded Iraq or not. Islamism ???existed before Iraq and they will be after Iraq. But Iraq is hurting our efforts to battle this group??? argued Joseph Cirincione, a terrorist expert at the Center for American Progress. President Bush likes to say that Iraq is the main front in the war on terror, but fails to note that it was one of our own making. Not only that, the U.S. is in the precarious position where as long as it stays in Iraq, it will create violent opposition inside and outside the country, while if it withdraws it will provide Islamists with a victory. Prof. Fawaz Gerges of Cairo University stated this point well when he said, ???The predicament the United States faces right now is that we are basically bogged down in the shifting sand of Iraq, and the longer we stay, the more we provide ammunition to the jihadist leaders. But if we ??? retreat from Iraq, the militants will be empowered.???
Al-Maliki???s Government[/b]
???Persistent problems are eroding Iraq???s institutional capacity and popular support for U.S.-led reconstruction. Corruption is rampant in Baghdad and has rotted out nearly every Iraqi ministry. Two-and-a-half years after the fall of Saddam???s regime, the Iraqi central government has little ability to effect real change anywhere outside Baghdad???s heavily protected Green Zone. Rather than build ties to their people and improve the lives of their constituents, many Iraqi politicians are becoming disconnected from society at large and more pre-occupied with dividing up the country???s wealth among themselves.??? Kenneth Pollack, Iraq expert, Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, February 2006 report on Iraq.
The White House praised Iraq???s parliamentary elections and the formation of Prime Minister Maliki???s government as a great step in the country???s democracy. However only a few months later people were wondering whether Iraq was really governable. The problems with the Maliki government are so numerous its doubtful they can ever be corrected. Maliki comes from the Dawa Party, the weakest of the three leading Shiite parties. It doesn???t have its own militia so it is seen as no threat to SCIRI or Sadr, and thus usually operates from a position of weakness when dealing with those two. Iraqi society has also become so deeply divided that it is fueling the violence and preventing the effective functioning of the government. The lack of effective security and loyal security forces also means that the government has little influence outside of the Green Zone. Maliki also came into office trying to satisfy too many groups at the same time. He needs the support of the U.S., but doesn???t want to be seen as an American puppet and his inaction with the militias has cost him much of their goodwill. He has also tried to make concessions to the Sunnis to bring them into the government, despite the fact that almost all of their major parties are connected to the insurgency, which enrages the Shiite militants. Maliki is also part of the ruling Shiite Alliance that that is involved in the sectarian violence. He is therefore unable to move against either the Sunni insurgents or Shiite militias without losing something. A leading Shiite legislator noted the divisions in the Maliki government when he said, ???There is a real trust crisis. The prime minister does not trust his deputy,??? and the speaker of parliament ???does not trust his first deputy.??? There are growing calls for a reorganization of Maliki???s cabinet, with some Shiites calling for the removal of all the Sunni members. On the other hand, things got so bad in September and October that rumors were flying around Baghdad that a coup could be made to remove Maliki from power. A provisional government would then take power that was not baked by the Shiite parties, suspend parliament, impose martial law, and try to stop the violence.
When Maliki first came into power his government did not seem so distraught. In fact, he seemed to come in with a plan on how to ease some of the country???s woes. In June 2006 he announced a 24-point peace plan called the National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project. His plan included an amnesty for insurgents that would give up fighting, a timetable for the departure of U.S. troops, ending military operations against rebel strongholds such as Fallujah, monetary payments to victims of attacks, a crack down on Shiite militias, and cleaning up prisons that were noted for abuses. Parts of his plan immediately caused problems. First was the amnesty issue. Immediately after Maliki announced the plan half a dozen nationalist Sunni insurgent groups contacted the government about being pardoned. However the Americans and other Shiite political parties did not want to give amnesties to insurgents that had killed American soldiers and attacked Shiites. Maliki was eventually forced to change his plan to only apply to insurgents that had not killed anyone, making it meaningless in the process. A timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal was also drew American objections. Until the November U.S. elections, Bush had rejected any timetables as giving into the insurgents. Like the amnesty program, Maliki had to shelve this plan as well. Together these two reverses ended negotiations with the Sunni insurgents, torpedoing the peace plan before it even had time to breathe. ???U.S. interference has complicated the reconciliation process, thereby prolonging the U.S. presence and perpetuating the killing and destruction,??? wrote retired Col. Daniel Smith, in a study for the Foreign Policy In Focus think tank. Maliki tried to move ahead by sending out emissaries to the neighboring countries of Jordan, Egypt, Syria and the United Arab Emirates to try to end foreign support of the insurgents. He also announced a new plan to create community commissions of both Sunnis and Shiites to try to overcome the sectarian differences. That too was quickly cancelled however as the violence reached new levels of brutality. By October, Maliki?? ?s plan was virtually dead.
Maliki tried to deal with all of his problems by standing up to the U.S. to gain back public support. He condemned U.S. raids against the Mahdi Army and denounced the proposed U.S. timetable as an affront to Iraqi sovereignty and an election year stunt by the White House. In November he ordered an end to a U.S. blockade around Baghdad???s Sadr City to find a kidnapped American soldier. Whatever the direction of Maliki???s government, many experts believe he doesn???t have much time left to make a decisive move to save the country. The Iraq Study Group, created by the White House to make recommendations to President Bush, said that Maliki only has until the end of 2006 to turn things around.
XX. Undercut By Other Shiites
To make matters worse, Maliki faced increasing difficulties from fellow Shiites. The government was losing control of Basra, the 2nd largest city in the country, to battles between Sadr and the SCIRI. On the other hand SCIRI was pushing for constitutional amendments to the constitution that would allow for an oil-rich autonomous Shiite South that would further fracture the country and ensure the hatred and continued insurgency by the Sunnis who felt threatened by the rising Shiite power. Maliki proved incapable of dealing with either problem.
During the summer as sectarian violence took off in central Iraq, in southern Iraq Shiites were turning on each other. The main point of contention between the various factions was control of the oil fields surrounding the city of Basra and its port, which was the gateway to the Persian Gulf. The South provides 90% of Iraq???s oil revenue. ???Shiite militias are fighting over that crown in the jewel,??? noted Peter Khalil, a Middle East analyst at the Eurasia Group. Militias and criminal gangs have set up clandestine networks throughout the South that are involved in smuggling, corruption, and extortion rackets. With that came increased violence with 85 murders in Basra in May 2006, triple the number of January of that year. Politically, the city is split between the smaller Fadhila party that was aligned with Sadr, and the SCIRI and Dawa Party. Fadhila controls the province???s governor, the chairman of the provincial council, and the Southern Oil Company???s security forces. At the same time the Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade have had armed clashes over control of the city. In response Maliki announced a state of emergency in the city, but it had little effect.
In Baghdad SCIRI was causing controversy over the Constitution. When the Constitution was voted on in January 2005 many of the major issues like federalism were left unfinished. The Maliki government was supposed to come up with amendments to resolve these issues, but the negotiations went nowhere. In August 2006 SCIRI called for creating an autonomous region for Shiites in southern Iraq. By the next month Parliament had cut a deal to wait at least 18 months to handle the issue. SCIRI pushed through a resolution in October to set up steps to form federal regions in the country after that 18 months hiatus. The vote caused even more dissension within Parliament. Sadr and the Fadhila party abstained from the vote because they were opposed to the idea, while the Sunnis boycotted. The Sunnis were afraid that the Kurds and Shiites would carve up large sections of Iraq that possessed all of the country???s oil leaving the Sunnis with nothing. Sadr on the other hand had aspirations to rule all of Iraq, not a section of it. Like most things, Prime Minister Maliki had no solution to this problem, and has remained largely silent on it.
XXI. Economic Problems
???Iraq is a devastated economic wasteland.??? Hussain al-Shahristani, Oil Minister, August 2006
Besides political problems and sectarian violence, the Maliki government also faced serious economic difficulties. Like everything else, things were getting worse during 2006. Unemployment ranged from 30-60% depending upon the study. All seemed to say that it was increasing however. A senior official at the Iraqi Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs said that 5.6 million Iraqis were living below the poverty line. For 40% of those, conditions were worsening. That was a 35% increase from before the 2003 invasion. At the same time inflation was skyrocketing to as high as 70%, up from 32% in 2005. Fuel and electricity prices were up 270% in 2005. The rise in prices and subsequent inflation were caused by the lack of security, insurgent attacks on the infrastructure, and an International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity program. The IMF program had been agreed upon to lower the country???s debt. Under the IMF plan Iraq was making major cuts to government spending just when the country needed more jobs, infrastructure, services, etc. As part of the plan the government was cutting gas subsidies, which led to skyrocketing prices and an increase in inflation. Getting gas could last a day and cost an average of several days??? pay. In return, 80% of Iraq???s foreign debt has been forgiven. Manufacturing was also crippled, there was a lack of foreign investment because of the violence, and agriculture was handicapped because farm products couldn???t be safely shipped around the country with insurgent and sectarian violence.
The only good news was that oil and electrical output, for the first time, passed pre-war production levels in November 2006. That didn???t automatically translate to better service and delivery, which continues to be spotty with only a few hours of electricity a day, and oil delivery hampered by insurgent attacks and widespread corruption and smuggling. At the same time, much of the infrastructure that produces oil and electricity was obsolete and barely functioning. The Bayji refinery is a perfect example. It???s the largest and newest in the country, yet it was built in the 1980s. It has a capacity of 310,00 barrels of oil per day, but hasn???t produced more than 170,000 since May 2006. During the summer of 2006 production dropped to as low as 7,500 barrels a day. It has an efficiency rate of only 50% compared to modern refiners that rate 90%. The U.S. inspector general for Iraq reported in September 2006 that Iraq lost $16 billion from January 2004 to March 2006 in potential oil sales because of insurgent attacks, bad equipment and smuggling. The inspector general said the problems were so bad that even if there were no insurgent attacks on the oil network, criminals and old equipment would still hamper effective oil production. Even though Iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world, it is forced to import billions of dollars of oil products because of its inadequate production and delivery system. The high oil prices during the summer of 2006 brought in high revenues for the government that tended to mask the large economic problems the country was facing.
XII. Corruption
???Corruption has become common in Iraq. Every government department is plagued by some type of corruption and the problem has become endemic countrywide.??? Judge Radhi al-Radhi, head of the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, September 2006
Corruption is also rampant throughout Iraqi society and government. In November 2006 the U.S. inspector general for Iraq said that the Iraqi government was losing $4 billion a year due to corruption. That was 10% of the country???s national income. Judge Radi Hamza Radhi al-Radhi, head of Iraq???s Commission on Public Integrity that investigates corruption said, ???Corruption has exploded??? since the fall of Saddam. He blamed the ???weakness of state institutions during the transition period which saw several governments succeed each other in a short period of time??? after the U.S. invasion. ???Corruption is definitely hampering reconstruction. Corruption affects development and prevents benefits from flowing to those who most need them,??? noted Arwa Hussein, Middle East Program Coordinator for Transparency International, a Berlin based Non-Government O rganization that monitors world corruption. At the root of corruption were the various political parties that used government posts as patronage for their followers rather than appoint qualified personnel. An August report by the Pentagon to the U.S. Congress found, ???Experienced or talented employees are often purged and replaced with party elements/cronies as a result of a spoils system. Many of Iraq???s political factions tend to view government ministries and their associated budgets as sources of power, patronage, and funding for their parties.??? Currently eight former ministers are under investigation for corruption. However the likelihood that they will ever be punished is slim due to their political connections.
Corruption is pervasive at the lower levels of the Iraqi government as well, most notably in the police force. A report fond that insurgents are routinely released in return for bribes for example. The U.S. State Department found that police were selling passports. The police are also accused of all kinds of abuses such as torture, death squads, working for the militias, and kidnapping rings. A July 2006 State Department report found, ???Despite great progress and genuine commitment on the part of many ministry officials, the current climate of corruption, human rights violations and sectarian violence found in Iraq???s security forces undermines public confidence.??? There are no serious efforts underway to end corruption because there is no security. The courts are overwhelmed dealing with terrorism cases and have no time for dealing with corruption, plus with most political parties connected to an armed group, they would most likely not allow any high ranking official to ever go to trial.
XIII. The Kurds
The Kurds are generally considered the one success story in Iraq. Yet even in the north, the violence and sectarian divisions are spreading, and the Kurdish parties are walking a fine line between demanding autonomy, keeping Iraq together, and not angering the neighboring countries.
The Kurds back a federalist plan for Iraq where they could maintain their relative autonomy in the north. At the same time they realize that they need to be part of Iraq because if the country were to really break apart the violence would spill over into their territory. Not only that, they are surrounded by Turkey, Syria and Iran who are all opposed to Kurdish autonomy. At the same time the Kurds passed a draft law that would grant them control of the oil in their region and the neighboring city of Kirkuk, have banned the flying of the Iraqi flag, and no longer teach their children Arabic in school. Kirkuk and Mosul are the two flashpoints in the north. Both are outside Kurdistan, but the Kurds are set on incorporating both within their region even though Kurds are a minority in both cities. As a consequence, both places have seen an increase in violence between Sunni insurgents, Kurdish security forces, and Turkoman.
There are also Kurdish guerrilla groups that are intent on creating a larger Kurdistan that have conducted military operations in Iran and Turkey. In response, Iran has shelled Kurdistan off and on. Turkey also bombed a suspected Kurdish guerrilla base. Turkey has been pressing the Maliki government to crack down on these Kurdish groups, and warned Kurdish officials not to seize the city of Kirkuk. By the winter of 2006 the U.S. was able to negotiate an informal cease-fire with the Kurdistan Workers Party that had been launching raids into Turkey. A larger solution to the problem has not been worked out, and neither has the future of Kirkuk and Mosul.
Conclusion[/b]
In the third year since the U.S. invasion little seems to be going right with the American project in Iraq. In fact, on most fronts, things are worse now than before. President Bush is still steadfast in his view that America is winning, but that???s based upon his beliefs rather than any reality in Iraq. The U.S. counterinsurgency program is still deeply flawed, the U.S. failed to secure the capital twice, and the training of the Iraqi security forces is creating a completely dependent Iraqi Army and a police force who increase the violence rather than work to end it. The lack of adequate U.S. troops has been a major detriment to success of all of these programs, but the U.S. is simply running out of men and equipment to be sent overseas without either increasing the number of active duty soldiers or changing the troop rotations of regular, Reserve, and National Guard soldiers.
On the Iraqi side the country is sliding closer and closer to a full-fledged civil war, which the U.S. has not been able to stop, and parts of the Iraqi government are helping to create. The Shiites are also fracturing into armed camps fighting against not only the Sunni insurgents but themselves as well for power and the future of the country. The Maliki government, dependent upon Sadr and his militia, has largely sat on the sidelines while events spiral out of control around them. The Sunnis meanwhile are backing the insurgency more than ever, while the Kurds are trying to incorporate northern cities into their existing Kurdistan. The U.S. and the Iraqi people have largely lost confidence in the prime minister to fix any of these problems, and rumors of a possible coup have only increased as a consequence.
Many in the U.S. hope that the change in power from Republicans to Democrats in Congress and the presidential appointed Iraq Study Group will lead to a dramatic change in U.S. policy, but those hopes will probably prove unfounded. The Democrats in Congress want to bring up troop withdrawals sooner rather than later, while the Iraq Survey Group will probably only come up with modest proposals that will not fix the deep ceded problems in the country.
A basic American belief is that there are always solutions to problems. Iraq may prove that belief wrong. The time to fix Iraq???s problems might have been in the first year of the occupation, and once that passed, events took on a life of their own outside of American control and headed towards chaos. A civil war maybe inevitable and there is nothing the U.S. can do, but temporarily stop the worst violence in specific neighborhoods while the rest of the country goes up in flames.