I do blame the Neo-cons for not engaging in the process in Palestine. That has further weakened Fatah and helped Hamas.
Don't beleive the hype. Fateh was not a partner either. They proved that.
Sorry, but the neo-cons simply can't be blamed for a deeply-held societal norm among the Palestinians that Israel's existence is to be rejected.
I can understand how someone born and living in Gaza could brainwashed to think that way. It's horrible and wrong, yes, but (in addition to a multitude of reasons) at least partly the fault of Israeli oppression. The result for that is that education and employment are basically non-existent in Gaza, and the Palestinians living in those hellish conditions have absolutely no way out, except radicalism.
Now that Hamas have screwed things up for Palestinians, Israel's recent actions in Gaza should be condemned to the fullest.
Despite all of this, Iran is still orchestrating the death squads in Baghdad. Despite being offered trade, money and equipment, they are still not cooperating with the IAEA, still enriching uranium etc... Some critics have suggested this is because of the axis of evil speech and Bush's rhetorical support for the indigenous democrats. But if you look at the diplomacy, it does not add up.
So what does Iran want? Why have they not acted like a rational nation state? I don't know, maybe it's cause they are run by a bunch of millenarian fuckwad terrorists.
Why is Iran??s behaviour not rational? They are better off the way they and they have more options. The chaos in Iraq further improves their position. And although Iranian government / Islamistic elites may be considered to be crazy terrorists or whatever, I am pretty sure they exactly know what they are doing.
Agreed, if you do a simple cost benefit analysis of what Iran has been doing they are winning on all fronts.
1) Building a nuclear bomb A nuke would give Iran prestige, power, protection/security, and instill fear. Nothing the international community has offered can give them this. Actions against Iran's nuclear program also haven't had deep effects upon the country so picking between giving up the program and continuing with it seems a simple choice for the former. Success.
2) Selling oil The reason Iran can stand up to the international community is because of their great oil wealth. There are plenty of buyers and the rise in oil prices was a boon for the country. Success.
3) Undermine the U.S. in Iraq while supporting its Iraqi Shiite allies Iran has strong ties to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Dawa Party which are part of the ruling Shiite coalition that runs Iraq. They give weapons and money to them, and have sent plenty of agents into Iraq. Sadr and some smaller Shiite parties are opposed to the Iranians out of nationalist stances, but Iran still holds a lot of sway within the country. At the same time, they are undermining the U.S. in the country with little costs to themselves. Succes.
4) Supporting Hezbollah One of the greatest defeats of the Iranian Revolution was its inability to export its revolution in the 1980s. They had 2 things going against them, they weren't Arabs and they were Shiites. The only success they had was in Lebanon with Hezbollah. Hezbollah's recent fight with Israel proved that Shiites could be leaders in the Arab struggle against Isarel and Iran was sitting in the background soaking up the prestige as well having armed and financed Hezbollah. Success.
5) Becoming a regional power Iran has always wanted to be a regional power in the Middle East for centuries. The Shah wanted it and Khomeini as well. All of the above actions, along with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which destroyed their only real rival Saddam, has allowed them to achieve greater influence in the Persian Gulf. More than they've probably had in decades.
I don't see any real radicalism in any of these moves. The only signs of "radicalism" would be things like the Iranian president forging ties with Chavez in Venezuala and Castro in Cuba, and that's just image making/window dressing, while the above seem to be power moves in the region.
So then why hasn't Iran launched missiles at one of rivals Saudi Arabia? Why hasn't it sent its Revolutionary Guard to Paletsine to launch endless human wave attacks against Israel, or at least blow a lot of shit up? It's already got Revolutionary Guards helping Hezbollah in Lebanon, why don't they just invade northern Israel to destroy it?
Iran seems to be acting pretty much like any other state despite the ideology of some of its leaders.
Surely you do not doubt the ideological sincerity of al-qaeda yet they also do not simply rush head on into conflict with their enemies. That iran hasnt immolated itself in return for what it would get now doesnt mean there arent any conditions it would do so in the future. Islamists have demonstrated time and time again that they are willing to sacrifice themselves and scores of other muslims in pursuit of their goals. Im not convinced that a nuclear iran wouldnt consider a few million americans in exchange for a few million iranians a good deal.
I'm sorry to say, but there are plenty of Islamists who have not go around with suicide vests ready to blow themselves up. That's obviously the public image that has been forged, but there are plenty of strains of Islamism out there that do not include suicide bombings and sacrificing themselves.
Have you ever noticed that at every Christian soldiers funeral that people say; "He is in a better now." "He has gone to paradise." "He died for his country and gone to his just reward in heaven." ?
How is Christians dying in war and going to paradise and a better life different from Muslims doing the same thing? These are simply the words that leaders (who have no intention of dying) use to get young people to sacrifce their lives to enrich the powerful.
I assure you if you enlisted and went to Iraq and died in battle, Bush would tell your parents that you were a hero has gone to paradise.
Apples - Oranges
As soon as the first U.S. Soldier straps a bomb on himself and sets out to puposefully die for the reward of Paradise then we'll be talking Apples = Apples.
I don't care what you believe in....
Comparing 2006 Christianity to 2006 Radical Islam is
Why did you remove your post I was responding to?:
over 5 years on and you still dont get it. Any muslim who is killed in the pursuit of jihad is guranteed paradise. Radical islam is a death cult, islamists glory in it, the prospect of mutual destruction is something they would not be adverse to.
According to the CIA there are 1.6 billion muslims in the world. If what you believe is true there would be a lot more than 3 or 4 suicide attacks in the world a week.
The leaders who talk people into suicide bombings do not want to be destroyed any more than our leaders who send people to Iraq want to be destroyed. Their leaders want the same thing our leaders want, power.
Leaders in Iraq, Palestine, Iran just want power. To say that it is because they are Muslim is the same as saying our leaders want power because they are Christian. Apples and Apples.
It would appear your blind hatered of Muslims is keeping you from seeing the truth.
Have you ever noticed that at every Christian soldiers funeral that people say; "He is in a better now." "He has gone to paradise." "He died for his country and gone to his just reward in heaven." ?
How is Christians dying in war and going to paradise and a better life different from Muslims doing the same thing? These are simply the words that leaders (who have no intention of dying) use to get young people to sacrifce their lives to enrich the powerful.
I assure you if you enlisted and went to Iraq and died in battle, Bush would tell your parents that you were a hero has gone to paradise.
Apples - Oranges
As soon as the first U.S. Soldier straps a bomb on himself and sets out to puposefully die for the reward of Paradise then we'll be talking Apples = Apples.
I don't care what you believe in....
Comparing 2006 Christianity to 2006 Radical Islam is
Why did you remove your post I was responding to?:
over 5 years on and you still dont get it. Any muslim who is killed in the pursuit of jihad is guranteed paradise. Radical islam is a death cult, islamists glory in it, the prospect of mutual destruction is something they would not be adverse to.
According to the CIA there are 1.6 billion muslims in the world. If what you believe is true there would be a lot more than 3 or 4 suicide attacks in the world a week.
The leaders who talk people into suicide bombings do not want to be destroyed any more than our leaders who send people to Iraq want to be destroyed. Their leaders want the same thing our leaders want, power.
Leaders in Iraq, Palestine, Iran just want power. To say that it is because they are Muslim is the same as saying our leaders want power because they are Christian. Apples and Apples.
It would appear your blind hatered of Muslims is keeping you from seeing the truth.
Surely you do not doubt the ideological sincerity of al-queda yet they also do not simply rush head on into conflict with their enemies. That iran hasnt immolated itself in return for what it would get now doesnt mean there arent any conditions it would do so in the future. Islamists have demonstrated time and time again that they are willing to sacrifice themselves and scores of other muslims in pursuit of their goals. Im not convinced that a nuclear iran wouldnt consider a few million americans in exchange for a few million iranians a good deal.
Dolo, Al Queda is an organization comprised mainly of Sunnis. Iran is trying to spark a regional Shia revolution. To Conflate the two under the title "Islamist" is like conflating Saddam-a secular nationalist, with Al Queda. This concept of "Islamists" is ignoring important political, ideological, historical differences.
They will not use it against Israel, nor will they give it to a third party to use against Israel. I am guessing.
Why? The same reason we did not use one against the Soviet Union, and they did not use one against us. Mutually Assured Destruction.
Right now Israel (or the US) might use one against Iran. Neither needs to fear Mutually assured destruction, because Iran is under no ones nuclear umbrella.
The nut jobs running Iran are not suicidal. They are the opposite. There main focus is on survival through greater power. Since whats his name was democratically elected we should be dealing with him directly to find common ground, so we can start working toward peace in the Middle East.
It is vital that Iran and Syria (and Turkey and Saudi Arabia) be given more of a voice in stabilizing Iraq.
:5pager:
over 5 years on and you still dont get it. Any muslim who is killed in the pursuit of jihad is guranteed paradise. Radical islam is a death cult, islamists glory in it, the prospect of mutual destruction is something they would not be adverse to.
Have you ever noticed that at every Christian soldiers funeral that people say; "He is in a better now." "He has gone to paradise." "He died for his country and gone to his just reward in heaven." ?
How is Christians dying in war and going to paradise and a better life different from Muslims doing the same thing? These are simply the words that leaders (who have no intention of dying) use to get young people to sacrifce their lives to enrich the powerful.
I assure you if you enlisted and went to Iraq and died in battle, Bush would tell your parents that you were a hero has gone to paradise.
I agree with some of what you're saying here, Laser, but there are some fundamental differences in popular religious myth that make the pathologies of the average Christian soldier dying in war and a jihadist suicide bomber different. To be fair, I'd wager there are also Muslim suicide bombers who don't consider themselves part of what is labeled the jihadist movement. It should also be said that there are significant contextual differences between the average Christian soldier at war and a Muslim suicide bomber that make the comparison, as presented, Apples to Oranges. I don't think the characterization of radical Islam as a death cult necessarily = unfair anti-Muslim hostility. Although I will say that the apparent reluctance to contextualize suicide bombings is par for the course in some Strutters' defenses of Israel. (Because it's really ONLY about misguided crazies who want to strap bombs to themselves to get to paradise . . . The occupation is just a small subtext. And "I don't agree with that they're doing to the Palestinians, but they're there. Let 'em be." Come the fuck on-- "I don't agree with what the SS is doing, but they're there. Let 'em be.")
That said, Iran is definitely a religious totalitarian state, with Holocaust denying leaders who deploy homosexual-killing deathsquads . . .which is morally impermissable. (Had to add that lest I be painted as an apologist for Iran's leadership, anti-Semitism at large, and Islamofascism.)
So then why hasn't Iran launched missiles at one of rivals Saudi Arabia? Why hasn't it sent its Revolutionary Guard to Paletsine to launch endless human wave attacks against Israel, or at least blow a lot of shit up? It's already got Revolutionary Guards helping Hezbollah in Lebanon, why don't they just invade northern Israel to destroy it?
Iran seems to be acting pretty much like any other state despite the ideology of some of its leaders.
Surely you do not doubt the ideological sincerity of al-qaeda yet they also do not simply rush head on into conflict with their enemies. That iran hasnt immolated itself in return for what it would get now doesnt mean there arent any conditions it would do so in the future. Islamists have demonstrated time and time again that they are willing to sacrifice themselves and scores of other muslims in pursuit of their goals. Im not convinced that a nuclear iran wouldnt consider a few million americans in exchange for a few million iranians a good deal.
I'm sorry to say, but there are plenty of Islamists who have not go around with suicide vests ready to blow themselves up. That's obviously the public image that has been forged, but there are plenty of strains of Islamism out there that do not include suicide bombings and sacrificing themselves.
Of course there are self interested individuals whom exploit islam for ends unrelated to the rhetoric they espouse. To say that the the mullahs are of this persuasion based upon their failure to do certain things up to this point isnt credible. This is why I brought up al-qaeda. Osama bin laden hasnt blown himself up but considering his circumstances prior to forming al-qaeda can you think of a plausible reason for forming it other than a sincere ideological commitment?
If the mullahs ambitions are really of the material world rather than the spiritual there are alot securer ways to pursue them than antagonising both the regional power in israel and the world power in the US.
According to the CIA there are 1.6 billion muslims in the world. If what you believe is true there would be a lot more than 3 or 4 suicide attacks in the world a week.
The leaders who talk people into suicide bombings do not want to be destroyed any more than our leaders who send people to Iraq want to be destroyed. Their leaders want the same thing our leaders want, power.
Leaders in Iraq, Palestine, Iran just want power. To say that it is because they are Muslim is the same as saying our leaders want power because they are Christian. Apples and Apples.
It would appear your blind hatered of Muslims is keeping you from seeing the truth.
To the contrary it seems your slavish devotion to the leftist orthodoxy is precluding you from the truth. Hence your condemning my supposed 'blind hatred of muslims' despite that ive cleary been refering to radicals throughout.
evidence lot #2 in the case of your unthinking devotion to leftist orthodoxy is your insistence that there is no essential difference between christianity and islam. Relativist nonsense of the highest order. If there were no essential difference between the two we would expect them to produce radicals in a similar number and of a similar belligerance. No doubt we see a healthy number of christian crackpots scattered about the place but do they really compare with the untold thousands possibly millions of jihadi's whom operate in just about every country on earth? I dont think so
According to the CIA there are 1.6 billion muslims in the world. If what you believe is true there would be a lot more than 3 or 4 suicide attacks in the world a week.
The leaders who talk people into suicide bombings do not want to be destroyed any more than our leaders who send people to Iraq want to be destroyed. Their leaders want the same thing our leaders want, power.
Leaders in Iraq, Palestine, Iran just want power. To say that it is because they are Muslim is the same as saying our leaders want power because they are Christian. Apples and Apples.
It would appear your blind hatered of Muslims is keeping you from seeing the truth.
To the contrary it seems your slavish devotion to the leftist orthodoxy is precluding you from the truth. Hence your condemning my supposed 'blind hatred of muslims' despite that ive cleary been refering to radicals throughout.
evidence lot #2 in the case of your unthinking devotion to leftist orthodoxy is your insistence that there is no essential difference between christianity and islam. Relativist nonsense of the highest order. If there were no essential difference between the two we would expect them to produce radicals in a similar number and of a similar belligerance. No doubt we see a healthy number of christian crackpots scattered about the place but do they really compare with the untold thousands possibly millions of jihadi's whom operate in just about every country on earth? I dont think so
Uh a little context would be appropriate. These guys believe they are fighting for their sovereignty/freedom. Most live under dictatorships that are incredibly cruel with no seeming end. Terrorism is the most effective tool in bringing a greater military power to the table. Just ask the IRA, they understood. Just ask the Vietcong, they understood, just ask Menachem Begin he understood.
Christians on the other hand largely live in democracies and are not subject to the daily abrogations of dignity common to the middle east. I think it is abundantly clear from the ultra violent behavior of pro-life activists as well as others that if pushed Orthodox Christians wouldn't hestitate to resort to violence to achieve their ends.
I do not like the fanatics any more than you do. I think we have to fight them differently. So that we actually will prevail.
Uh a little context would be appropriate. These guys believe they are fighting for their sovereignty/freedom. Most live under dictatorships that are incredibly cruel with no seeming end. Terrorism is the most effective tool in bringing a greater military power to the table. Just ask the IRA, they understood. Just ask the Vietcong, they understood, just ask Menachem Begin he understood.
yeah...but they don't ALL live under dictatorships. Intelligence estimates routinely place the number of jihadists residing in France and the UK (to name just two Western democracies) in the thousands. And you'll remember the thousands that have died in Spain, the US and the UK at the hands of jihadists. I got gripes about my country's foreign policy - you can believe that. But I don't go around killing people because I think I'm right. That's just arrogant.
So then why hasn't Iran launched missiles at one of rivals Saudi Arabia? Why hasn't it sent its Revolutionary Guard to Paletsine to launch endless human wave attacks against Israel, or at least blow a lot of shit up? It's already got Revolutionary Guards helping Hezbollah in Lebanon, why don't they just invade northern Israel to destroy it?
Iran seems to be acting pretty much like any other state despite the ideology of some of its leaders.
Surely you do not doubt the ideological sincerity of al-qaeda yet they also do not simply rush head on into conflict with their enemies. That iran hasnt immolated itself in return for what it would get now doesnt mean there arent any conditions it would do so in the future. Islamists have demonstrated time and time again that they are willing to sacrifice themselves and scores of other muslims in pursuit of their goals. Im not convinced that a nuclear iran wouldnt consider a few million americans in exchange for a few million iranians a good deal.
I'm sorry to say, but there are plenty of Islamists who have not go around with suicide vests ready to blow themselves up. That's obviously the public image that has been forged, but there are plenty of strains of Islamism out there that do not include suicide bombings and sacrificing themselves.
Of course there are self interested individuals whom exploit islam for ends unrelated to the rhetoric they espouse. To say that the the mullahs are of this persuasion based upon their failure to do certain things up to this point isnt credible. This is why I brought up al-qaeda. Osama bin laden hasnt blown himself up but considering his circumstances prior to forming al-qaeda can you think of a plausible reason for forming it other than a sincere ideological commitment?
If the mullahs ambitions are really of the material world rather than the spiritual there are alot securer ways to pursue them than antagonising both the regional power in israel and the world power in the US.
You're conflating tactics with ideology. Just because some Islamist groups have used suicide bombings does not mean that they ALL are ready to sacrifice themselves and thousands of others for their cause. Nor does the fact that they have religious driven ideologies make that true.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is the granddady of all Islamist movements and is trying to participate in Egyptian politics despite being officially banned. They do not use suicide bombers.
The Madrid train bombers did not carry out suicide attacks. They were hoping that they could carry out several terrorist attacks after the Madris one.
The Taliban did not use suicide bombings until fighters from Iraq started going there around 2005.
And as I listed before, Iran has been very successful in carrying out their policies with no serious consequences. They are rolling in oil money, continue to work on their nuclear program, are supporting some of the Shiite militias in Iraq while undermining the U.S. effort there, and got some of the shine from Hezbollah's standoff with Israel. They did not have to have a religious ideology to do any of that did they? North Korea doesn't have a religious ideology and has carried out similar policies and worse.
According to the CIA there are 1.6 billion muslims in the world. If what you believe is true there would be a lot more than 3 or 4 suicide attacks in the world a week.
The leaders who talk people into suicide bombings do not want to be destroyed any more than our leaders who send people to Iraq want to be destroyed. Their leaders want the same thing our leaders want, power.
Leaders in Iraq, Palestine, Iran just want power. To say that it is because they are Muslim is the same as saying our leaders want power because they are Christian. Apples and Apples.
It would appear your blind hatered of Muslims is keeping you from seeing the truth.
To the contrary it seems your slavish devotion to the leftist orthodoxy is precluding you from the truth. Hence your condemning my supposed 'blind hatred of muslims' despite that ive cleary been refering to radicals throughout.
evidence lot #2 in the case of your unthinking devotion to leftist orthodoxy is your insistence that there is no essential difference between christianity and islam. Relativist nonsense of the highest order. If there were no essential difference between the two we would expect them to produce radicals in a similar number and of a similar belligerance. No doubt we see a healthy number of christian crackpots scattered about the place but do they really compare with the untold thousands possibly millions of jihadi's whom operate in just about every country on earth? I dont think so
Uh a little context would be appropriate. These guys believe they are fighting for their sovereignty/freedom. Most live under dictatorships that are incredibly cruel with no seeming end. Terrorism is the most effective tool in bringing a greater military power to the table. Just ask the IRA, they understood. Just ask the Vietcong, they understood, just ask Menachem Begin he understood.
Christians on the other hand largely live in democracies and are not subject to the daily abrogations of dignity common to the middle east. I think it is abundantly clear from the ultra violent behavior of pro-life activists as well as others that if pushed Orthodox Christians wouldn't hestitate to resort to violence to achieve their ends.
I do not like the fanatics any more than you do. I think we have to fight them differently. So that we actually will prevail.
This is pure nonsense. An islamic terrorist is by definition motivated by religious doctrine and any other consideration is a distant second. The idea that they are primarily engaged in overthrowing tyrannies is simply factually incorrect and when they are fighting opressive governments it is because they impose the wrong kind of opression, not because they desire freedom.
Youre contention that we dont see similar things in christians because of sociopolitical environment is again wrong on the facts(there are millions of christians whom face persecution around the world) and doesnt account for the huge islamic terrorist activity in western societies.
This is pure nonsense. An islamic terrorist is by definition motivated by religious doctrine and any other consideration is a distant second. The idea that they are primarily engaged in overthrowing tyrannies is simply factually incorrect and when they are fighting opressive governments it is because they impose the wrong kind of opression, not because they desire freedom.
Actually, the majority of Islamist groups are based around overthrowing their home country's government. It's only been very recently with Al Qaeda and a few offshoots, who are still the minority in the Islamist movement, that attacking the U.S. has become a priority, but that's because they see the U.S. as the main supporter of the status quo and governments in the Muslim world they want to overthrow.
In Tunisia and Algeria the Islamist movements there were peaceful/non-violent organizations that wanted to participate in elections after years of authoritarian rule. When it appeared both would win, the militaries stepped in and stopped them and tried to destroy them leading to parts of the Islamic movement turning into an insurgency, especially a very bloody civil war in Algeria. These organizations were based upon first trying to transform their societies, and then overthrowing the government which they saw as illegitimate.
Hezbollah was formed to kick Israel out of Lebanon after it invaded. They also wanted to empower the Shiites who were the largest group within the country, but were always shit on by the Christians and Sunnis and were locked out of real political power by the arcane system created by the French colonists.
Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian revolution as well was based upon replacing the Shah of Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to replace the Egyptian government with an Islamic one, etc.
All of these groups whether they wanted to work within the political system or otherwise saw their governments as the main problems with their societies, and it wasn't just because they weren't Islamic. Arab nationalism and communism/socialism proved to be failures. More than 50% of the population was under 21 years old but had no futures finding jobs in often corrupt and command economies. Plus Arab governments had been consistently defeated by Israel which they saw as a "puppet" of U.S. interests in the Middle East. Together, these forces led to the major growth of Islamic movements in the 1980s and 1990s because Islam was felt as the way out of these problems. In Islamist literature this is called fighting against the "near enemy" - their own governments to be replaced with an Islamic won that is suppose to bring justice and empower Muslims.
What bin Laden did is totally change up the game by emphasizing attacking America instead of the home countries as the main priority. (Little side note, but bin Laden actually started off as an anti-communist and saw Russia as the main enemy to Islam because they had invaded Afghanistan. It was only later that he eventually changed his emphasis to the U.S.) That's the "far enemy." That's what led to the Cole bombing, U.S. embassy bombings and eventually 9/11. Zarqawi and Al Qaeda in Iraq took up this call as well as the bombers in Spain and England. Again, the idea is to attack the U.S. because they believe this will lead to the rallying of Muslims to their Islamist cause so they can eventually take over their home countries. (Remember, bin Laden talked a lot about wanting to overthrow the Saudi government and Zarwawi startd off fighting against his home government in Jordan).
So Islamist groups usually don't talk about fighting for freedom, but fighting against what they see as their oppressive home government is still a large part of their ideology for the majority of the Islamist movement.
This is pure nonsense. An islamic terrorist is by definition motivated by religious doctrine and any other consideration is a distant second. The idea that they are primarily engaged in overthrowing tyrannies is simply factually incorrect and when they are fighting opressive governments it is because they impose the wrong kind of opression, not because they desire freedom.
Actually, the majority of Islamist groups are based around overthrowing their home country's government. It's only been very recently with Al Qaeda and a few offshoots, who are still the minority in the Islamist movement, that attacking the U.S. has become a priority, but that's because they see the U.S. as the main supporter of the status quo and governments in the Muslim world they want to overthrow.
In Tunisia and Algeria the Islamist movements there were peaceful/non-violent organizations that wanted to participate in elections after years of authoritarian rule. When it appeared both would win, the militaries stepped in and stopped them and tried to destroy them leading to parts of the Islamic movement turning into an insurgency, especially a very bloody civil war in Algeria. These organizations were based upon first trying to transform their societies, and then overthrowing the government which they saw as illegitimate.
Hezbollah was formed to kick Israel out of Lebanon after it invaded. They also wanted to empower the Shiites who were the largest group within the country, but were always shit on by the Christians and Sunnis and were locked out of real political power by the arcane system created by the French colonists.
Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian revolution as well was based upon replacing the Shah of Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to replace the Egyptian government with an Islamic one, etc.
All of these groups whether they wanted to work within the political system or otherwise saw their governments as the main problems with their societies, and it wasn't just because they weren't Islamic. Arab nationalism and communism/socialism proved to be failures. More than 50% of the population was under 21 years old but had no futures finding jobs in often corrupt and command economies. Plus Arab governments had been consistently defeated by Israel which they saw as a "puppet" of U.S. interests in the Middle East. Together, these forces led to the major growth of Islamic movements in the 1980s and 1990s because Islam was felt as the way out of these problems. In Islamist literature this is called fighting against the "near enemy" - their own governments to be replaced with an Islamic won that is suppose to bring justice and empower Muslims.
What bin Laden did is totally change up the game by emphasizing attacking America instead of the home countries as the main priority. (Little side note, but bin Laden actually started off as an anti-communist and saw Russia as the main enemy to Islam because they had invaded Afghanistan. It was only later that he eventually changed his emphasis to the U.S.) That's the "far enemy." That's what led to the Cole bombing, U.S. embassy bombings and eventually 9/11. Zarqawi and Al Qaeda in Iraq took up this call as well as the bombers in Spain and England. Again, the idea is to attack the U.S. because they believe this will lead to the rallying of Muslims to their Islamist cause so they can eventually take over their home countries. (Remember, bin Laden talked a lot about wanting to overthrow the Saudi government and Zarwawi startd off fighting against his home government in Jordan).
So Islamist groups usually don't talk about fighting for freedom, but fighting against what they see as their oppressive home government is still a large part of their ideology for the majority of the Islamist movement.
true. but Islamism can also be seen as one successor to pan-Arabism, and as such is motivated by more over-arching goals also. while these groups have individual goals limited to the reform or overthrow of their home governments, surely you realize the common thread that runs between them. there is a global element that leads people to get on board these movements. and while these movements do seek to overthrow their allegedly corrupt national governments, many of them (certainly Hezbollah and the Islamic movement in Algeria) also seek to impose their own opressive regimes in place of the old ones.
This is a book review by Gary Sick. He???s a well known political writer in America that appeared in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, one of America???s leading foreign policy journals. The book being reviewed is Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic, which talks about the history of Iran and how the U.S. should handle it.
A Selective Partnership: Getting U.S.-Iranian Relations Right By Gary Sick
From Foreign Affairs, November/December 2006
Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. Ray Takeyh. : Times Books, 2006, 272 pp.$25.00
Despite the deep political chasm that separates Iran and the United States, they have repeatedly tried to communicate. These two wary powers have made significant overtures to each other at least nine times since the end of the hostage crisis in 1981. First was the U.S.-Israeli initiative in 1985 (better known as the Iran-contra affair); most recently, in May 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a conditional offer of direct talks. In between, there were official attempts at dialogue from the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, collaboration between Tehran and Washington following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and, more recently, three high-level Iranian communications on the nuclear issue. There has also been a steady stream of unofficial "Track II" meetings between former Iranian and U.S. officials, as well as persistent but unverified rumors of covert meetings.
Although all of these efforts have failed, the very fact that so many officials in both countries have persevered, risking their careers and reputations in the process, is a testament to the importance they attach to getting U.S.-Iranian relations right. [/b] Iran and the United States are the two most consequential powers in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. It does not take a Clausewitz to recognize that the region's fate may well be determined by these two antagonists.
In his new book, Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, tries to strip away some of the misconceptions about Iran that have bedeviled Western policymakers. Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic addresses the fundamental questions that plague policy officials (and ordinary citizens) in the West: Is Iran exploiting its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to covertly build a bomb? Does Iran control terrorist attacks against Israel via its surrogates in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories? Is Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with all his bluster and wild pronouncements, really in charge of his country? If not, who is? Just how do policies get made in the Islamic Republic? Takeyh wrote his book well before Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers and set off a major confrontation with Israel last summer, but these events have merely highlighted the need for the wider optic that Takeyh provides.
Iran is unique. A non-Arab (and non-Arabic-speaking) state in the Middle East with its own ancient history and culture and a distinctive political style, it is the only Shiite theocracy in the world. It has both a revolutionary regime and a deeply traditional and conservative society, and its decision-making system relies on shifting coalitions among competing power centers. Iran does not yield easily to the standard tools of Western political analysis.[/b] Takeyh, a regular in Washington policy circles and himself of Iranian ancestry, sets out to demystify this conundrum for a Western audience. His book's introduction is entitled "Getting Iran Wrong," and its conclusion, "Getting Iran Right." The chapters in between examine Iran's political history and changing role in the region since the Iranian Revolution, U.S.-Iranian relations, terrorism and the relevance of 9/11 for Iran, Iran's nuclear program, the implications for Iran of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and Iran's relationship with Israel.
Takeyh examines these subjects without any of the hysteria that characterizes so much of what passes for political debate about Iran (and without the jargon that often clutters the writing of Washington insiders). His tone is explanatory rather than censorious. If he has any agenda at all, it appears to be the promotion of rational pragmatism -- a stance unlikely to ingratiate him to ideologues on either the left or the right.
SEEING STRAIGHT
"From its inception," Takeyh argues, "the Islamic Republic was a state divided between competing centers of power and profoundly differing conceptions of political authority." Yet even if U.S. officials and pundits can agree that Iran today is not Saddam Hussein's Iraq or Kim Jong Il's North Korea, they seem incapable of resisting the temptation to treat Iran as a unitary, totalitarian, and implacably evil entity. Takeyh views this persistent misjudgment not as the failing of any particular administration but rather as a congenital condition that has plagued U.S. policymaking ever since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Still, even if demonizing one's adversary is a common tactic of international politics, such careless rhetoric can be costly when it produces policies that do not work.[/b]
For Takeyh, there is no question that change is coming to Iran. The country's "sophisticated and youthful populace can be neither appeased by cosmetic concessions nor silenced by threats of coercion," he writes. But he thinks change will come from Iran's internal dynamics and at its own pace. External powers eager to shape or accelerate reform must recognize, Takeyh cautions, that crude appeals for regime change undermine local proponents of transformation by making them look like imperialist lackeys; the forces of repression seize on such statements to stifle the opposition on grounds of national security.[/b]
Takeyh aptly shows how President George W. Bush's inclusion of Iran in the "axis of evil" (alongside Iraq and North Korea) and his calls for regime change in Tehran have produced precisely the opposite of what Bush hoped for. The label may have had a nice ring to American ears, particularly at a time when the United States was beginning to prepare its case against Saddam. But it dealt a severe blow to those in Iran who were fighting for political liberalization.[/b] Bush proclaimed the "axis of evil" in January 2002, soon after Tehran and Washington had cooperated in setting up the government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan -- their only successful joint venture since the Iranian Revolution. At the time, the reformist administration of Muhammad Khatami was struggling to sustain itself against its radical opponents. Although President Khatami's failure in Iran was due to many factors, not least his own timid leadership style, Washington's contemptuous dismissal of his democratization program appears to have been phenomenally self-defeating, especially considering the slash-and-burn rhetoric Ahmadinejad favors today.
The 14-month period between President Bush's "axis of evil" speech and his triumphal appearance on the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, in May 2003, was a time of unparalleled hubris in U.S. foreign policy. Washington had eliminated tyrannical regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, briskly and with remarkably little loss of life. Proponents of the audacious use of U.S. power to reshape the Middle East were openly debating whether the next target should be Iran or Syria. In the midst of all the self-congratulation, few U.S. officials were interested in Tehran's offer to hold direct talks on all outstanding issues between Iran and the United States. According to former officials and even Secretary of State Rice, not only was the message studiously ignored, but the Swiss ambassador in Tehran, who represented U.S. diplomatic interests in Iran, was chastised for exceeding his authority simply by having delivered it.[/b]
Wherever one looks in the Middle East today, the specter of Iran hovers like Banquo's ghost at Macbeth's table. Quite
inadvertently, the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq empowered Iran by eradicating its two most potent enemies, the Taliban and Saddam. And for the first time in history, Iraq's majority Shiite population, which is far more sympathetic to Iran than were the formerly dominant Sunnis, has taken the reins of power. At least partly as a consequence, Iran has become much bolder in challenging the West over its nuclear-enrichment program and in offering gratuitous advice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[/b]
A NEW BALANCE
These events, together with the fact of Iran's long-standing alliance with the Alawite rulers of Syria, whom many regard as crypto-Shiites, have led some to suspect the United States of having hatched a secret plan to replace its old Sunni allies -- the rulers of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia -- with new Shiite partners. Such a view may seem outlandish to most Americans. But Sunni rulers are genuinely concerned about a possible Shiite renaissance, which, along with the Islamist political revival seemingly under way, could threaten their political and religious legitimacy. Such fears prompted Saudi Arabia and other Arab states initially to condemn Hezbollah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers last summer. Later, when popular outrage soared over the collateral damage inflicted by Israel on the civilian population of Lebanon, they had to backtrack. But even their momentary willingness to denounce an Arab-Shiite force opposing Israel was evidence that fears of Iran's rising power throughout the region are more than idle mutterings about a new "Shiite crescent."
The United States' Arab friends in the Middle East have vivid memories of Washington's alliance with the shah, and they recognize that, as Takeyh points out, U.S. and Iranian "strategic interests coincide in the region." As they watch the United States systematically eliminate Iran's worst enemies and install pro-Iranian governments in Kabul and Baghdad, they may understand these developments as inadvertent byproducts of the larger U.S. enterprise. But they know that such changes will necessarily strengthen Iran -- and that they will have to live with the consequences.
Iran has not been shy about exploiting the new opportunities. In only a year, President Ahmadinejad has placed Iran in the vanguard of a radical anti-American alliance that includes Venezuelan President Hugo Ch??vez, Cuban President Fidel Castro, and other populists around the globe. Ahmadinejad belongs to a generation of Iranian leaders who won their spurs in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, and his virulent anti-Americanism has embarrassed many of the aging Iranian clerics and revolutionaries who led the revolt against the shah and who regard the Islamic Republic as theirs to rule. But, as Takeyh observes, by quoting Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and continuing to parrot anti-Israel slogans that have become ritual since 1979, Ahmadinejad has made it difficult for the old guard to chastise him. And the popularity of his shenanigans has offset his lack of a viable economic strategy. These play well in Iran's provincial capitals and throughout the developing world; in some places, he has attained rock-star status.[/b]
Iran is emerging as Israel's main rival. As Takeyh notes, such a rivalry did not always exist. Under the monarchy, these two non-Arab states fashioned a close and productive relationship involving shipments of Iranian oil to Elat in exchange for covert collaboration on missile development, as well as joint agricultural and other projects. That relationship continued well into the 1980s. But the two states have become bitter enemies since. With its incendiary anti-Israel rhetoric, Iran now appeals directly to the Arab people, often over the heads of their more cautious governments. Israel, in turn, has come to see Iran as a threat to its existence on the grounds that Iran's nuclear program and missile development will, in Israel's eyes, inevitably result in a deliverable nuclear weapon unless something is done to stop it.[/b] Israel has long regarded Hezbollah as part of Iran's deterrence strategy -- a force that could be unleashed against Israel if it or the United States ever attacked Iran. That reasoning partly motivated Israel's massive retaliation after the Hezbollah kidnappings, and it seems to have played a role in Washington's initial decision to give Israel the leeway to destroy Hezbollah's military and command structures. Many in the region see the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict as a proxy war, the real war being between the United States and Iran. Although Iran's relationship with Hezbollah is no doubt more complicated than the bond between master and servant, there is no question that Iran is deriving both satisfaction and prestige from Hezbollah's reputation as the only Arab force capable of standing up to Israel's might.
Takeyh does not pretend to have a silver bullet for all the problems, but he does offer some sage advice based on his careful and sophisticated reading of the recent history. In his view, effective policy must begin with a willingness to see Iran as it is, on its own terms, rather than as a caricature or a clumsy model of a rogue state. He warns against facile claims that Iran is so fragile that it is about to collapse -- an assessment solemnly repeated for more than a quarter of a century. Takeyh sees Iran as a state in transition, with multiple centers of authority and constant power struggles. It has changed and will no doubt change much more, but, he argues, its basic system is remarkably resilient to wars, economic crises, and intense domestic rivalries.[/b]
The United States has relied heavily on sanctions as a way of containing and weakening Iran. But these have had a dismal record, and Takeyh advises U.S. policymakers to consider more effective alternatives. Similarly, he sees Washington's refusal to consider settling one problem, such as the nuclear question, without also addressing Iran's behavior on other major issues, such as the Middle East peace process and terrorism, as a recipe for paralysis.[/b]
In Takeyh's view, the first step toward a mature relationship with Iran would be "to commence direct negotiations" on issues of critical importance. (This view is now shared by a growing chorus of analysts.) The crucial issues of Iran's nuclear development, Iran's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Iraq should be handled separately, with progress on one not necessarily dependent on progress on the others.[/b] "It is neither inevitable nor absolute that Iran will become the next member of the nuclear club," Takeyh argues, but a more inventive U.S. diplomacy will be required to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. He continues: "The essence of this new approach is an appreciation that for the foreseeable future the Islamic Republic will remain a problem to be managed. This approach is neither one of containment nor an alliance but a policy of selective partnership on an evolving range of issues. By integrating Iran into the global economy and the regional security dialogue, the United States can foster links that allow cooperation on issues of common concern."[/b]
Hidden Iran is a skillful policy brief, written in a smooth, graceful style that is accessible to nonspecialists. Takeyh does not underestimate how difficult it is for the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America to find ways of dealing with each other, but he demonstrates persuasively that a policy of more of the same will only produce more of the same. Surely, the United States can do better than that.
true. but Islamism can also be seen as one successor to pan-Arabism, and as such is motivated by more over-arching goals also. while these groups have individual goals limited to the reform or overthrow of their home governments, surely you realize the common thread that runs between them. there is a global element that leads people to get on board these movements. and while these movements do seek to overthrow their allegedly corrupt national governments, many of them (certainly Hezbollah and the Islamic movement in Algeria) also seek to impose their own opressive regimes in place of the old ones.
Of course, if an Islamic group is fighting against their home government they want to replace it with a new one of their own. Many Islamic groups are revolutionary in character which is why I see them more akin to communists than the popular "Islamo-fascist" title being thrown around today. All of them have a vision of an ideal Islamic state, although they have completely differing versions of what and how it's going to work from group to group. Some of them want to expand this politically ideology throughout the Islamic world and re-create the Caliphate, but some are more local.
Iran for example, wanted to spread its revolution around the Arab world in the 1980s and 1990s and failed because they weren't Arabs and were Shiites. Hezbollah being thei one exception. Today, I don't really think they are talking about spreading their revolution, more like they're trying to become the dominant military and political power in the region through more traditional methods of other nation-states.
And while you bring up Hezbollah I think more and more that they are not a revolutionary group anymore as they were when they were formed. I talked about this before when we had all the threads about the Lebanon-Israel conflict, but Hezbollah is really becoming an establishment organization with a strong power base within Lebanon that it hopes to protect and expand. While you may not believe their rhetoric about not wanting to impose an Islamic state upon Lebanon anymore their actions seem to back it up. They've participated in Lebanese elections, and worked out political deals in parliament with the Christians which they use to see as their oppressors rather than strong arm them with their militia. During the conflict with Israel I also saw plenty of Shiite women interviewed on TV who were Hezbollah supporters wearing western clothes with no hijab - head/face scarves. I haven't really kept up with Hezbollah's development since the 1990s so I'm a little out of date on all of the details about them, but they have definitely made signs of change IMO.
Comments
I can understand how someone born and living in Gaza could brainwashed to think that way. It's horrible and wrong, yes, but (in addition to a multitude of reasons) at least partly the fault of Israeli oppression. The result for that is that education and employment are basically non-existent in Gaza, and the Palestinians living in those hellish conditions have absolutely no way out, except radicalism.
Now that Hamas have screwed things up for Palestinians, Israel's recent actions in Gaza should be condemned to the fullest.
Agreed, if you do a simple cost benefit analysis of what Iran has been doing they are winning on all fronts.
1) Building a nuclear bomb
A nuke would give Iran prestige, power, protection/security, and instill fear. Nothing the international community has offered can give them this. Actions against Iran's nuclear program also haven't had deep effects upon the country so picking between giving up the program and continuing with it seems a simple choice for the former. Success.
2) Selling oil
The reason Iran can stand up to the international community is because of their great oil wealth. There are plenty of buyers and the rise in oil prices was a boon for the country. Success.
3) Undermine the U.S. in Iraq while supporting its Iraqi Shiite allies
Iran has strong ties to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Dawa Party which are part of the ruling Shiite coalition that runs Iraq. They give weapons and money to them, and have sent plenty of agents into Iraq. Sadr and some smaller Shiite parties are opposed to the Iranians out of nationalist stances, but Iran still holds a lot of sway within the country. At the same time, they are undermining the U.S. in the country with little costs to themselves. Succes.
4) Supporting Hezbollah
One of the greatest defeats of the Iranian Revolution was its inability to export its revolution in the 1980s. They had 2 things going against them, they weren't Arabs and they were Shiites. The only success they had was in Lebanon with Hezbollah. Hezbollah's recent fight with Israel proved that Shiites could be leaders in the Arab struggle against Isarel and Iran was sitting in the background soaking up the prestige as well having armed and financed Hezbollah. Success.
5) Becoming a regional power
Iran has always wanted to be a regional power in the Middle East for centuries. The Shah wanted it and Khomeini as well. All of the above actions, along with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which destroyed their only real rival Saddam, has allowed them to achieve greater influence in the Persian Gulf. More than they've probably had in decades.
I don't see any real radicalism in any of these moves. The only signs of "radicalism" would be things like the Iranian president forging ties with Chavez in Venezuala and Castro in Cuba, and that's just image making/window dressing, while the above seem to be power moves in the region.
I'm sorry to say, but there are plenty of Islamists who have not go around with suicide vests ready to blow themselves up. That's obviously the public image that has been forged, but there are plenty of strains of Islamism out there that do not include suicide bombings and sacrificing themselves.
Why did you remove your post I was responding to?:
According to the CIA there are 1.6 billion muslims in the world. If what you believe is true there would be a lot more than 3 or 4 suicide attacks in the world a week.
The leaders who talk people into suicide bombings do not want to be destroyed any more than our leaders who send people to Iraq want to be destroyed. Their leaders want the same thing our leaders want, power.
Leaders in Iraq, Palestine, Iran just want power. To say that it is because they are Muslim is the same as saying our leaders want power because they are Christian. Apples and Apples.
It would appear your blind hatered of Muslims is keeping you from seeing the truth.
????? I didn't remove any posts????
Dolo, Al Queda is an organization comprised mainly of Sunnis. Iran is trying to spark a regional Shia revolution. To Conflate the two under the title "Islamist" is like conflating Saddam-a secular nationalist, with Al Queda. This concept of "Islamists" is ignoring important political, ideological, historical differences.
http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/koppel/koppel.html
air's this Sunday night at 9PM.
peace and love from your friendly evil dooer.
ps.
iranians got the braeks too. whatchou know about that?
Googoosh - 16 Dandylions
I agree with some of what you're saying here, Laser, but there are some fundamental differences in popular religious myth that make the pathologies of the average Christian soldier dying in war and a jihadist suicide bomber different. To be fair, I'd wager there are also Muslim suicide bombers who don't consider themselves part of what is labeled the jihadist movement. It should also be said that there are significant contextual differences between the average Christian soldier at war and a Muslim suicide bomber that make the comparison, as presented, Apples to Oranges. I don't think the characterization of radical Islam as a death cult necessarily = unfair anti-Muslim hostility. Although I will say that the apparent reluctance to contextualize suicide bombings is par for the course in some Strutters' defenses of Israel. (Because it's really ONLY about misguided crazies who want to strap bombs to themselves to get to paradise . . . The occupation is just a small subtext. And "I don't agree with that they're doing to the Palestinians, but they're there. Let 'em be." Come the fuck on-- "I don't agree with what the SS is doing, but they're there. Let 'em be.")
That said, Iran is definitely a religious totalitarian state, with Holocaust denying leaders who deploy homosexual-killing deathsquads . . .which is morally impermissable. (Had to add that lest I be painted as an apologist for Iran's leadership, anti-Semitism at large, and Islamofascism.)
Of course there are self interested individuals whom exploit islam for ends unrelated to the rhetoric they espouse. To say that the the mullahs are of this persuasion based upon their failure to do certain things up to this point isnt credible. This is why I brought up al-qaeda. Osama bin laden hasnt blown himself up but considering his circumstances prior to forming al-qaeda can you think of a plausible reason for forming it other than a sincere ideological commitment?
If the mullahs ambitions are really of the material world rather than the spiritual there are alot securer ways to pursue them than antagonising both the regional power in israel and the world power in the US.
To the contrary it seems your slavish devotion to the leftist orthodoxy is precluding you from the truth. Hence your condemning my supposed 'blind hatred of muslims' despite that ive cleary been refering to radicals throughout.
evidence lot #2 in the case of your unthinking devotion to leftist orthodoxy is your insistence that there is no essential difference between christianity and islam. Relativist nonsense of the highest order. If there were no essential difference between the two we would expect them to produce radicals in a similar number and of a similar belligerance. No doubt we see a healthy number of christian crackpots scattered about the place but do they really compare with the untold thousands possibly millions of jihadi's whom operate in just about every country on earth? I dont think so
Christians on the other hand largely live in democracies and are not subject to the daily abrogations of dignity common to the middle east. I think it is abundantly clear from the ultra violent behavior of pro-life activists as well as others that if pushed Orthodox Christians wouldn't hestitate to resort to violence to achieve their ends.
I do not like the fanatics any more than you do. I think we have to fight them differently. So that we actually will prevail.
Who, it seems, has only ever posted about politics.
yeah...but they don't ALL live under dictatorships. Intelligence estimates routinely place the number of jihadists residing in France and the UK (to name just two Western democracies) in the thousands. And you'll remember the thousands that have died in Spain, the US and the UK at the hands of jihadists. I got gripes about my country's foreign policy - you can believe that. But I don't go around killing people because I think I'm right. That's just arrogant.
You're conflating tactics with ideology. Just because some Islamist groups have used suicide bombings does not mean that they ALL are ready to sacrifice themselves and thousands of others for their cause. Nor does the fact that they have religious driven ideologies make that true.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is the granddady of all Islamist movements and is trying to participate in Egyptian politics despite being officially banned. They do not use suicide bombers.
The Madrid train bombers did not carry out suicide attacks. They were hoping that they could carry out several terrorist attacks after the Madris one.
The Taliban did not use suicide bombings until fighters from Iraq started going there around 2005.
And as I listed before, Iran has been very successful in carrying out their policies with no serious consequences. They are rolling in oil money, continue to work on their nuclear program, are supporting some of the Shiite militias in Iraq while undermining the U.S. effort there, and got some of the shine from Hezbollah's standoff with Israel. They did not have to have a religious ideology to do any of that did they? North Korea doesn't have a religious ideology and has carried out similar policies and worse.
This is pure nonsense. An islamic terrorist is by definition motivated by religious doctrine and any other consideration is a distant second. The idea that they are primarily engaged in overthrowing tyrannies is simply factually incorrect and when they are fighting opressive governments it is because they impose the wrong kind of opression, not because they desire freedom.
Youre contention that we dont see similar things in christians because of sociopolitical environment is again wrong on the facts(there are millions of christians whom face persecution around the world) and doesnt account for the huge islamic terrorist activity in western societies.
Actually, the majority of Islamist groups are based around overthrowing their home country's government. It's only been very recently with Al Qaeda and a few offshoots, who are still the minority in the Islamist movement, that attacking the U.S. has become a priority, but that's because they see the U.S. as the main supporter of the status quo and governments in the Muslim world they want to overthrow.
In Tunisia and Algeria the Islamist movements there were peaceful/non-violent organizations that wanted to participate in elections after years of authoritarian rule. When it appeared both would win, the militaries stepped in and stopped them and tried to destroy them leading to parts of the Islamic movement turning into an insurgency, especially a very bloody civil war in Algeria. These organizations were based upon first trying to transform their societies, and then overthrowing the government which they saw as illegitimate.
Hezbollah was formed to kick Israel out of Lebanon after it invaded. They also wanted to empower the Shiites who were the largest group within the country, but were always shit on by the Christians and Sunnis and were locked out of real political power by the arcane system created by the French colonists.
Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian revolution as well was based upon replacing the Shah of Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to replace the Egyptian government with an Islamic one, etc.
All of these groups whether they wanted to work within the political system or otherwise saw their governments as the main problems with their societies, and it wasn't just because they weren't Islamic. Arab nationalism and communism/socialism proved to be failures. More than 50% of the population was under 21 years old but had no futures finding jobs in often corrupt and command economies. Plus Arab governments had been consistently defeated by Israel which they saw as a "puppet" of U.S. interests in the Middle East. Together, these forces led to the major growth of Islamic movements in the 1980s and 1990s because Islam was felt as the way out of these problems. In Islamist literature this is called fighting against the "near enemy" - their own governments to be replaced with an Islamic won that is suppose to bring justice and empower Muslims.
What bin Laden did is totally change up the game by emphasizing attacking America instead of the home countries as the main priority. (Little side note, but bin Laden actually started off as an anti-communist and saw Russia as the main enemy to Islam because they had invaded Afghanistan. It was only later that he eventually changed his emphasis to the U.S.) That's the "far enemy." That's what led to the Cole bombing, U.S. embassy bombings and eventually 9/11. Zarqawi and Al Qaeda in Iraq took up this call as well as the bombers in Spain and England. Again, the idea is to attack the U.S. because they believe this will lead to the rallying of Muslims to their Islamist cause so they can eventually take over their home countries. (Remember, bin Laden talked a lot about wanting to overthrow the Saudi government and Zarwawi startd off fighting against his home government in Jordan).
So Islamist groups usually don't talk about fighting for freedom, but fighting against what they see as their oppressive home government is still a large part of their ideology for the majority of the Islamist movement.
true. but Islamism can also be seen as one successor to pan-Arabism, and as such is motivated by more over-arching goals also. while these groups have individual goals limited to the reform or overthrow of their home governments, surely you realize the common thread that runs between them. there is a global element that leads people to get on board these movements. and while these movements do seek to overthrow their allegedly corrupt national governments, many of them (certainly Hezbollah and the Islamic movement in Algeria) also seek to impose their own opressive regimes in place of the old ones.
A Selective Partnership: Getting U.S.-Iranian Relations Right
By Gary Sick
From Foreign Affairs, November/December 2006
Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. Ray Takeyh. : Times Books, 2006, 272 pp.$25.00
Despite the deep political chasm that separates Iran and the United States, they have repeatedly tried to communicate. These two wary powers have made significant overtures to each other at least nine times since the end of the hostage crisis in 1981. First was the U.S.-Israeli initiative in 1985 (better known as the Iran-contra affair); most recently, in May 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a conditional offer of direct talks. In between, there were official attempts at dialogue from the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, collaboration between Tehran and Washington following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and, more recently, three high-level Iranian communications on the nuclear issue. There has also been a steady stream of unofficial "Track II" meetings between former Iranian and U.S. officials, as well as persistent but unverified rumors of covert meetings.
Although all of these efforts have failed, the very fact that so many officials in both countries have persevered, risking their careers and reputations in the process, is a testament to the importance they attach to getting U.S.-Iranian relations right. [/b] Iran and the United States are the two most consequential powers in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. It does not take a Clausewitz to recognize that the region's fate may well be determined by these two antagonists.
In his new book, Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, tries to strip away some of the misconceptions about Iran that have bedeviled Western policymakers. Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic addresses the fundamental questions that plague policy officials (and ordinary citizens) in the West: Is Iran exploiting its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to covertly build a bomb? Does Iran control terrorist attacks against Israel via its surrogates in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories? Is Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with all his bluster and wild pronouncements, really in charge of his country? If not, who is? Just how do policies get made in the Islamic Republic? Takeyh wrote his book well before Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers and set off a major confrontation with Israel last summer, but these events have merely highlighted the need for the wider optic that Takeyh provides.
Iran is unique. A non-Arab (and non-Arabic-speaking) state in the Middle East with its own ancient history and culture and a distinctive political style, it is the only Shiite theocracy in the world. It has both a revolutionary regime and a deeply traditional and conservative society, and its decision-making system relies on shifting coalitions among competing power centers. Iran does not yield easily to the standard tools of Western political analysis.[/b] Takeyh, a regular in Washington policy circles and himself of Iranian ancestry, sets out to demystify this conundrum for a Western audience. His book's introduction is entitled "Getting Iran Wrong," and its conclusion, "Getting Iran Right." The chapters in between examine Iran's political history and changing role in the region since the Iranian Revolution, U.S.-Iranian relations, terrorism and the relevance of 9/11 for Iran, Iran's nuclear program, the implications for Iran of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and Iran's relationship with Israel.
Takeyh examines these subjects without any of the hysteria that characterizes so much of what passes for political debate about Iran (and without the jargon that often clutters the writing of Washington insiders). His tone is explanatory rather than censorious. If he has any agenda at all, it appears to be the promotion of rational pragmatism -- a stance unlikely to ingratiate him to ideologues on either the left or the right.
SEEING STRAIGHT
"From its inception," Takeyh argues, "the Islamic Republic was a state divided between competing centers of power and profoundly differing conceptions of political authority." Yet even if U.S. officials and pundits can agree that Iran today is not Saddam Hussein's Iraq or Kim Jong Il's North Korea, they seem incapable of resisting the temptation to treat Iran as a unitary, totalitarian, and implacably evil entity. Takeyh views this persistent misjudgment not as the failing of any particular administration but rather as a congenital condition that has plagued U.S. policymaking ever since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Still, even if demonizing one's adversary is a common tactic of international politics, such careless rhetoric can be costly when it produces policies that do not work.[/b]
For Takeyh, there is no question that change is coming to Iran. The country's "sophisticated and youthful populace can be neither appeased by cosmetic concessions nor silenced by threats of coercion," he writes. But he thinks change will come from Iran's internal dynamics and at its own pace. External powers eager to shape or accelerate reform must recognize, Takeyh cautions, that crude appeals for regime change undermine local proponents of transformation by making them look like imperialist lackeys; the forces of repression seize on such statements to stifle the opposition on grounds of national security.[/b]
Takeyh aptly shows how President George W. Bush's inclusion of Iran in the "axis of evil" (alongside Iraq and North Korea) and his calls for regime change in Tehran have produced precisely the opposite of what Bush hoped for. The label may have had a nice ring to American ears, particularly at a time when the United States was beginning to prepare its case against Saddam. But it dealt a severe blow to those in Iran who were fighting for political liberalization.[/b] Bush proclaimed the "axis of evil" in January 2002, soon after Tehran and Washington had cooperated in setting up the government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan -- their only successful joint venture since the Iranian Revolution. At the time, the reformist administration of Muhammad Khatami was struggling to sustain itself against its radical opponents. Although President Khatami's failure in Iran was due to many factors, not least his own timid leadership style, Washington's contemptuous dismissal of his democratization program appears to have been phenomenally self-defeating, especially considering the slash-and-burn rhetoric Ahmadinejad favors today.
The 14-month period between President Bush's "axis of evil" speech and his triumphal appearance on the deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, in May 2003, was a time of unparalleled hubris in U.S. foreign policy. Washington had eliminated tyrannical regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, briskly and with remarkably little loss of life. Proponents of the audacious use of U.S. power to reshape the Middle East were openly debating whether the next target should be Iran or Syria. In the midst of all the self-congratulation, few U.S. officials were interested in Tehran's offer to hold direct talks on all outstanding issues between Iran and the United States. According to former officials and even Secretary of State Rice, not only was the message studiously ignored, but the Swiss ambassador in Tehran, who represented U.S. diplomatic interests in Iran, was chastised for exceeding his authority simply by having delivered it.[/b]
Wherever one looks in the Middle East today, the specter of Iran hovers like Banquo's ghost at Macbeth's table. Quite inadvertently, the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq empowered Iran by eradicating its two most potent enemies, the Taliban and Saddam. And for the first time in history, Iraq's majority Shiite population, which is far more sympathetic to Iran than were the formerly dominant Sunnis, has taken the reins of power. At least partly as a consequence, Iran has become much bolder in challenging the West over its nuclear-enrichment program and in offering gratuitous advice on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[/b]
A NEW BALANCE
These events, together with the fact of Iran's long-standing alliance with the Alawite rulers of Syria, whom many regard as crypto-Shiites, have led some to suspect the United States of having hatched a secret plan to replace its old Sunni allies -- the rulers of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia -- with new Shiite partners. Such a view may seem outlandish to most Americans. But Sunni rulers are genuinely concerned about a possible Shiite renaissance, which, along with the Islamist political revival seemingly under way, could threaten their political and religious legitimacy. Such fears prompted Saudi Arabia and other Arab states initially to condemn Hezbollah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers last summer. Later, when popular outrage soared over the collateral damage inflicted by Israel on the civilian population of Lebanon, they had to backtrack. But even their momentary willingness to denounce an Arab-Shiite force opposing Israel was evidence that fears of Iran's rising power throughout the region are more than idle mutterings about a new "Shiite crescent."
The United States' Arab friends in the Middle East have vivid memories of Washington's alliance with the shah, and they recognize that, as Takeyh points out, U.S. and Iranian "strategic interests coincide in the region." As they watch the United States systematically eliminate Iran's worst enemies and install pro-Iranian governments in Kabul and Baghdad, they may understand these developments as inadvertent byproducts of the larger U.S. enterprise. But they know that such changes will necessarily strengthen Iran -- and that they will have to live with the consequences.
Iran has not been shy about exploiting the new opportunities. In only a year, President Ahmadinejad has placed Iran in the vanguard of a radical anti-American alliance that includes Venezuelan President Hugo Ch??vez, Cuban President Fidel Castro, and other populists around the globe. Ahmadinejad belongs to a generation of Iranian leaders who won their spurs in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, and his virulent anti-Americanism has embarrassed many of the aging Iranian clerics and revolutionaries who led the revolt against the shah and who regard the Islamic Republic as theirs to rule. But, as Takeyh observes, by quoting Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and continuing to parrot anti-Israel slogans that have become ritual since 1979, Ahmadinejad has made it difficult for the old guard to chastise him. And the popularity of his shenanigans has offset his lack of a viable economic strategy. These play well in Iran's provincial capitals and throughout the developing world; in some places, he has attained rock-star status.[/b]
Iran is emerging as Israel's main rival. As Takeyh notes, such a rivalry did not always exist. Under the monarchy, these two non-Arab states fashioned a close and productive relationship involving shipments of Iranian oil to Elat in exchange for covert collaboration on missile development, as well as joint agricultural and other projects. That relationship continued well into the 1980s. But the two states have become bitter enemies since. With its incendiary anti-Israel rhetoric, Iran now appeals directly to the Arab people, often over the heads of their more cautious governments. Israel, in turn, has come to see Iran as a threat to its existence on the grounds that Iran's nuclear program and missile development will, in Israel's eyes, inevitably result in a deliverable nuclear weapon unless something is done to stop it.[/b] Israel has long regarded Hezbollah as part of Iran's deterrence strategy -- a force that could be unleashed against Israel if it or the United States ever attacked Iran. That reasoning partly motivated Israel's massive retaliation after the Hezbollah kidnappings, and it seems to have played a role in Washington's initial decision to give Israel the leeway to destroy Hezbollah's military and command structures. Many in the region see the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict as a proxy war, the real war being between the United States and Iran. Although Iran's relationship with Hezbollah is no doubt more complicated than the bond between master and servant, there is no question that Iran is deriving both satisfaction and prestige from Hezbollah's reputation as the only Arab force capable of standing up to Israel's might.
Takeyh does not pretend to have a silver bullet for all the problems, but he does offer some sage advice based on his careful and sophisticated reading of the recent history. In his view, effective policy must begin with a willingness to see Iran as it is, on its own terms, rather than as a caricature or a clumsy model of a rogue state. He warns against facile claims that Iran is so fragile that it is about to collapse -- an assessment solemnly repeated for more than a quarter of a century. Takeyh sees Iran as a state in transition, with multiple centers of authority and constant power struggles. It has changed and will no doubt change much more, but, he argues, its basic system is remarkably resilient to wars, economic crises, and intense domestic rivalries.[/b]
The United States has relied heavily on sanctions as a way of containing and weakening Iran. But these have had a dismal record, and Takeyh advises U.S. policymakers to consider more effective alternatives. Similarly, he sees Washington's refusal to consider settling one problem, such as the nuclear question, without also addressing Iran's behavior on other major issues, such as the Middle East peace process and terrorism, as a recipe for paralysis.[/b]
In Takeyh's view, the first step toward a mature relationship with Iran would be "to commence direct negotiations" on issues of critical importance. (This view is now shared by a growing chorus of analysts.) The crucial issues of Iran's nuclear development, Iran's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Iraq should be handled separately, with progress on one not necessarily dependent on progress on the others.[/b] "It is neither inevitable nor absolute that Iran will become the next member of the nuclear club," Takeyh argues, but a more inventive U.S. diplomacy will be required to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. He continues: "The essence of this new approach is an appreciation that for the foreseeable future the Islamic Republic will remain a problem to be managed. This approach is neither one of containment nor an alliance but a policy of selective partnership on an evolving range of issues. By integrating Iran into the global economy and the regional security dialogue, the United States can foster links that allow cooperation on issues of common concern."[/b]
Hidden Iran is a skillful policy brief, written in a smooth, graceful style that is accessible to nonspecialists. Takeyh does not underestimate how difficult it is for the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America to find ways of dealing with each other, but he demonstrates persuasively that a policy of more of the same will only produce more of the same. Surely, the United States can do better than that.
Of course, if an Islamic group is fighting against their home government they want to replace it with a new one of their own. Many Islamic groups are revolutionary in character which is why I see them more akin to communists than the popular "Islamo-fascist" title being thrown around today. All of them have a vision of an ideal Islamic state, although they have completely differing versions of what and how it's going to work from group to group. Some of them want to expand this politically ideology throughout the Islamic world and re-create the Caliphate, but some are more local.
Iran for example, wanted to spread its revolution around the Arab world in the 1980s and 1990s and failed because they weren't Arabs and were Shiites. Hezbollah being thei one exception. Today, I don't really think they are talking about spreading their revolution, more like they're trying to become the dominant military and political power in the region through more traditional methods of other nation-states.
And while you bring up Hezbollah I think more and more that they are not a revolutionary group anymore as they were when they were formed. I talked about this before when we had all the threads about the Lebanon-Israel conflict, but Hezbollah is really becoming an establishment organization with a strong power base within Lebanon that it hopes to protect and expand. While you may not believe their rhetoric about not wanting to impose an Islamic state upon Lebanon anymore their actions seem to back it up. They've participated in Lebanese elections, and worked out political deals in parliament with the Christians which they use to see as their oppressors rather than strong arm them with their militia. During the conflict with Israel I also saw plenty of Shiite women interviewed on TV who were Hezbollah supporters wearing western clothes with no hijab - head/face scarves. I haven't really kept up with Hezbollah's development since the 1990s so I'm a little out of date on all of the details about them, but they have definitely made signs of change IMO.