What September 2001 event may have changed the balance of reasons for and against invading a country that was our sworn enemy, had flaunted UN sanctions to disarm, that were in-turn flaunted by just about every country who had agreed to enforce them, and was believed to be openly pursuing the acquisition of an atomic weapon by everyone in the world, except Joe WIlson?
What does that have to do with the war on terror however? The CIA, DIA, FBI continusously told the administration that Iraq did not have a working relationship with Al Qaeda. Iraq had not even attempted any anti-Western terrorism since 1993. While most of the world believed that Iraq had some left over WMD from the Iran-Iraq War/Gulf War, the majority felt that Iraq was contained and did not pose an immediate threat.
Here's some testimony by Carne Ross, who served on England's delegation to the U.N. and was in charge of Iraq weapons inspections and sanctions. He gave this to the Butler Committee that looked into Blair's use of pre-war intell leading to the Iraq war in 2006.
"I was First Secretary in the UK Mission to the United Nations in New York from December 1997 until June 2002. I was responsible for Iraq policy in the mission, including policy on sanctions, weapons inspections and liasison with UNSCOM and later UNMOVIC [those were the U.N. weapons inspections teams in Iraq].
During that time, I helped negotiate several UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq, including resolution 1284 which, inter alia, established UNMOVIC.
...
I read the available UK ande US intelligence on Iraq every working day for the four and half years of my posting. ... I also talked often and at length about Iraq's WMD to the international experts who comprised the inspectors of UNSCOM/UNMOVIC.
...
During my posting, at no time did HMG assess that Iraq's WMD (or any other capability) posed a threat to the UK or its interests. On the contrary, it was the commonly-held view among the officials dealing with Iraq that any threat had been effectively contained.[/b]
...
Iraq's capabilities in WMD were moot: many of the UN's weapons inspectors ... would tell me that they believed Iraq had no significant material. With the exception of some unaccounted-for Scud missiles, there was no intelligence evidence of significant holdings of CW, BW or nuclear material.
...
Iraq's ability to launch a WMD or any form of attack was very limitedl. There were approx 12 or so unaccounted-for Scud missiles; Iraq's airforce was depleted to the point of total ineffectiveness; its army was but a pale shadow of its earlier might; tehre was no evidence of any connection between Iraq and any terrorist organization that might have planned an attack using Iraqi WMD."
Iraq had not even attempted any anti-Western terrorism since 1993. While most of the world believed that Iraq had some left over WMD[/b] from the Iran-Iraq War/Gulf War, the majority felt that Iraq was contained and did not pose an immediate threat[/b].
I'm actually surprised you will make this admission. I've bolded what I think are the key points that you raise in support of my argument for interpreting Cheney's clip in a post 9/11 context.
and i bold immediate not because i miesread it to imply there WAS an immediate threat, but because after 9/11 the argument was not to let threats mature to the point where they were immediate.
And don't forget the secret Downing Street Memos which recorded a meeting of Blair and his top national security advisors after a trip by British officials to talk to the Bush admin. about Iraq.
"The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss [the timing of the war] with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.[/b]"
???U.S. scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al Aaida is so far frankly unconvincing. ... In addition, there has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL [bin Laden] and Al Qaida.[/b]???
Also, despite the Bush administration's false claim that Iraq was not cooperating, the new U.N. weapons inspectors that went into Iraq at the end of 2002 until right before the war in March 2003 found no evidence of a WMD or nuclear program. ALL of the major weapons facilities listed by the White House as WMD/Nuke related had been checked. No evidence of mobile labs had been found. The Niger documents were found to be fakes. The aluminum tubes that were suppose to be for centrifuges were found to be for rockets. The unmanned airplanes that the White House said were for spreading WMD were for reconnaisance. No evidence of mobile labs had been found. The U.N. was given overflight and interview rights with Iraqi officials. The only major remaining issue was providing proof that Iraq had destroyed all of its WMD stockpiles left over from the Iran-Iraq war, and even on that issue there was some progress.
So,
1) You don't have a connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda or 9/11
2) You don't have a connection between Iraq and anti-Western terrorism for over 10 years
3) You don't have an active WMD or nuclear program
All of this information was availble to the U.S. before the war started. The problem was Bush had decided to go to war in 2002 so it didn't matter what the evidence was or what intelligence said.
Comments
What does that have to do with the war on terror however? The CIA, DIA, FBI continusously told the administration that Iraq did not have a working relationship with Al Qaeda. Iraq had not even attempted any anti-Western terrorism since 1993. While most of the world believed that Iraq had some left over WMD from the Iran-Iraq War/Gulf War, the majority felt that Iraq was contained and did not pose an immediate threat.
Here's some testimony by Carne Ross, who served on England's delegation to the U.N. and was in charge of Iraq weapons inspections and sanctions. He gave this to the Butler Committee that looked into Blair's use of pre-war intell leading to the Iraq war in 2006.
"I was First Secretary in the UK Mission to the United Nations in New York from December 1997 until June 2002. I was responsible for Iraq policy in the mission, including policy on sanctions, weapons inspections and liasison with UNSCOM and later UNMOVIC [those were the U.N. weapons inspections teams in Iraq].
During that time, I helped negotiate several UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq, including resolution 1284 which, inter alia, established UNMOVIC.
...
I read the available UK ande US intelligence on Iraq every working day for the four and half years of my posting. ... I also talked often and at length about Iraq's WMD to the international experts who comprised the inspectors of UNSCOM/UNMOVIC.
...
During my posting, at no time did HMG assess that Iraq's WMD (or any other capability) posed a threat to the UK or its interests. On the contrary, it was the commonly-held view among the officials dealing with Iraq that any threat had been effectively contained.[/b]
...
Iraq's capabilities in WMD were moot: many of the UN's weapons inspectors ... would tell me that they believed Iraq had no significant material. With the exception of some unaccounted-for Scud missiles, there was no intelligence evidence of significant holdings of CW, BW or nuclear material.
...
Iraq's ability to launch a WMD or any form of attack was very limitedl. There were approx 12 or so unaccounted-for Scud missiles; Iraq's airforce was depleted to the point of total ineffectiveness; its army was but a pale shadow of its earlier might; tehre was no evidence of any connection between Iraq and any terrorist organization that might have planned an attack using Iraqi WMD."
I'm actually surprised you will make this admission. I've bolded what I think are the key points that you raise in support of my argument for interpreting Cheney's clip in a post 9/11 context.
and i bold immediate not because i miesread it to imply there WAS an immediate threat, but because after 9/11 the argument was not to let threats mature to the point where they were immediate.
"The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss [the timing of the war] with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.[/b]"
???U.S. scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al Aaida is so far frankly unconvincing. ... In addition, there has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL [bin Laden] and Al Qaida.[/b]???
So,
1) You don't have a connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda or 9/11
2) You don't have a connection between Iraq and anti-Western terrorism for over 10 years
3) You don't have an active WMD or nuclear program
All of this information was availble to the U.S. before the war started. The problem was Bush had decided to go to war in 2002 so it didn't matter what the evidence was or what intelligence said.